Reconstructing Exclusion: State-Humanitarian Crime and Practices of Land Resistance in Post-Disaster Haiti by Sherwood, Angela Christine
	 1 
Reconstructing Exclusion:  
State-Humanitarian Crime and Practices of Land Resistance  













Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  


































I, Angela Christine Sherwood, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my 
own work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported by 
others, that this is duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated. Previously 
published material is also acknowledged below. 
 
I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not 
to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s copyright or other 
Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. 
 
I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check the 
electronic version of the thesis. 
 
I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree by this 
or any other university. 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 




























This thesis would not have been possible without the support of countless friends, family 
members and colleagues along the way. I would firstly like to thank my supervisor, Professor 
Penny Green, for her patience, guidance, and engagement in this project, which pushed me to 
think of my topic in new and complex ways. This project benefitted immensely from Professor 
Green’s intellectual and emotional support. I would also like to thank Dr. Thomas MacManus, 
Dr. Kris Lasslett, and Dr. Megan Bradley for their helpful comments on different chapters of 
my thesis and related work. Thanks must also be given to Queen Mary School of Law and the 
International State Crime Initiative (ISCI), whose staff provided support to me during the 
completion of this thesis. 
 
 
There are a number of people in Haiti who also provided invaluable assistance to me during 
my fieldwork. Above all, I would like to express my gratitude Jimmy Kervens Jean Felix, my 
interpreter and research assistant, whose energy and phenomenal language skills (and motor 
bike!) made this project possible and enjoyable. Additionally, the expert legal advice and 
regular coffee breaks with Ronald Augustin were enormously helpful to this project. Many 
thanks to Ronald for helping me understand the complexities of Haiti’s legal system and the 
options available to squatter communities. Katlyn Leader, Laura Smits, Anna Konotchick, and 
Lorenza Rossi, deserve special mention as individuals who were vital to the logistical and 
substantive aspects of the research. I would also like to thank the informants of my fieldwork 
– especially those residing in Canaan – whose willingness to share their time, insights and 
stories greatly enhanced my understanding of Haitian land struggles. 
 
 
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to many friends and family members for their 
continual support. First and foremost, this includes my dad, mom and sisters Abby, Kristin 
and Katie. Kristin deserves special mention for her enthusiasm for this project, and for the 
countless hours she spent proofreading chapters and providing comments. I would also like 
to thank my family-in-law, John, Bela, Marianna and Harry. My gorgeous nieces – Isla, Emmy, 
Tess, and Ada – have also done wonders in terms of ensuring my escape from academic work 
when needed. Thanks is also due to several friends and colleagues who have helped me along 
the way, especially Valentina Bacchin, Alex Dalley, Christine Adam, Lauren van Staden, David 
Chaplin, Rachel Seoighe, Christy Burzio, Julia Levi, Sanjeeb Hossain, Karoline Popp, Patrice 
and Kathrin Quesada, May Romanos, Fabien Goa, James Lynch, and Pranika Koyu. 
 
Finally, for his endless patience, love, support, and belief in me and my work, I would like to 





































































































































This thesis examines the criminogenic political economy surrounding Haiti’s earthquake 
reconstruction process. It uses eleven months of qualitative fieldwork in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 
to analyse the actions and decision-making processes of the Haitian state and humanitarian 
organisations in the urban housing sector, and traces their effects on the everyday lives of 
earthquake-affected Haitians. Despite organisational claims of victory in ‘ending displacement’ 
in Haiti, my thesis reveals the collusion between states and humanitarian organisations in 
reproducing urban exclusion and violating human rights. As evidence, this thesis presents a 
continuum of harms committed by humanitarian organisations and their complicity in state 
organisational deviance. The thesis also examines the ways in which earthquake victims have 
applied sanctions to the illegitimate acts of states and humanitarian organisations. Engaging 
with state crime theory, this thesis considers the extent to which humanitarian acts and 
omissions in Haiti’s housing sector may be considered criminal. In doing so, it develops a 
concept of state-humanitarian crime that refocuses attention on humanitarian organisations as 
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On July 7, 2018, anti-government protests exploded throughout Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 
setting the city ablaze. In the course of the demonstrations, several luxury hotels, 
supermarkets, and other businesses owned by high-profile Haitian elites were attacked by 
protestors. Several civil society groups and academics interpreted the violence as a sign of 
growing frustration with elite corruption and inequality, given that protestors had deliberately 
attacked symbols of elite wealth in the city. Explaining the protests, Haiti Info Project, a group 
of investigative journalists, tweeted: ‘corruption, violence, hunger and misery are taking their 
toll.’1 Indeed, in today’s Haiti, 60% of Haitians live under the poverty line, and the average 
income of Haitians has fallen steadily since 2015.2 Haiti has reached yet another boiling point 
in its tumultuous history. 
Haiti’s recent political protests are part of a long history of struggle against elite 
privilege within a country ranked as one of the world’s most unequal.3 What is unique about 
the present situation, however, is how it specifically implicates a very recent period of 
international intervention in Haitian society and politics. From 2010 to 2015 – which I have 
bracketed in this thesis as the main period of international humanitarian response to the 
January 2010 earthquake – close to US$9.5 billion was disbursed in the name of Haitian 
disaster relief and reconstruction.4 This sum of money, mainly comprised of foreign 
government aid, is so large that it even surpasses the total cost of damage caused by the January 
2010 earthquake (total losses in physical infrastructure, houses, and economic activity were 
estimated to be US$7.8 billion) (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012). Such staggering amounts of 
aid reasonably imply that the small island nation should be in a much better position than is 
the case today. In fact, the very goal of the humanitarian intervention – as famously articulated 
by Bill Clinton – was to ‘build back better’ (Fan, 2013).  
                                                
1 Haiti Info Project (2018) 6 July. Available at 
https://twitter.com/haitiinfoproj/status/1015407067790626816?lang=en  
2 See The World Bank in Haiti at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview 
3 See The World Bank in Haiti at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview 
4 See Office of the Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Community-Based Medicine and Lessons from Haiti 
at https://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/lessons-from-haiti/key-statistics/ 
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The U.S.-led humanitarian intervention did little to improve post-earthquake 
conditions in Haiti. To the contrary, international involvement in earthquake reconstruction 
is frequently referred to as the ‘disaster after the disaster’ (see Katz, 2013; Schuller, 2010). 
There are different ways to explain this. On the one hand, post-disaster Haiti became a new 
marketplace for non-profit organisations, UN agencies, private companies, and several 
branches of the U.S government, who used donor funds to expand their own operations and 
test out new urban commodities and approaches. In the end, some 99% of aid funds for Haiti’s 
relief and recovery were channelled directly to foreign organisations (Ramachandran & Walz, 
2012). Furthermore, because much aid was absorbed by organisational operating costs, little 
aid landed directly in the hands of actual victims. This imbalance was replicated at the local 
level. Haiti’s largest companies received far more aid money than the grassroots NGOs and 
community groups providing frontline assistance to affected populations.5 In fact, Haitian first 
responders and advocates received twelve times less than the amount provided to Haitian 
businesses for their contracted relief services (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 11). These facts 
alone point to a dramatic story about the hidden motives and exploitative structures 
underpinning a foreign intervention that pledged to help Haiti and revitalize its urban centre. 
Haiti’s experience exposed the fundamental contradictions of aid and tested the moral 
legitimacy of the global humanitarian sector. The humanitarian intervention was rife with 
accusations of human rights abuse and criminality, perpetrated by the very institutions 
mandated to assist earthquake-affected Haitians. Some extreme examples of organisational 
crime included rape and sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers and international staff from non-
profit humanitarian organisations. Media revelations of sexual misconduct by Oxfam workers, 
for example, and Oxfam’s subsequent cover-up of these events, put the humanitarian sector 
at one of its highest levels of public scrutiny in recent history (Rawlinson, 2018). 
Notwithstanding their seriousness, these abuses pale in comparison to the UN’s role in 
contaminating Port-au-Prince’s main water sources with cholera during the disaster relief 
operation. Between October 2010 and July 2017, 9,693 Haitians died of cholera and there were 
814,551 cases of cholera-related illness (OCHA, 2017). Sparing and belated public apologies 
                                                
5 Almost 70% of the US$10 million in aid given to Haitian businesses went to its three largest companies, while 
NGOs and civil society groups received only US$800,000 to help their local communities (Walz & 
Ramachandran, 2013). 
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were made by the U.N. and Oxfam, but neither were held accountable for their actions nor 
was an adequate remedy provided to the victims (Pilkington & Quinn, 2016). The high degree 
of impunity exemplified by these cases raises speculation about the systematic occurrence and 
invisibility of humanitarian-related crime within the spaces of aid. 
 
I. Bringing International Humanitarianism into a Criminological Framework  
For reasons of their power and privilege, and their potential to harm the world’s most 
vulnerable people, this thesis advocates for deeper consideration of humanitarian institutions 
as subjects of criminological inquiry.6 By ‘humanitarian,’ I am referring to organisations 
involved in the ‘independent, neutral, and impartial provision of relief to victims of armed 
conflicts and natural disasters’ (Barnett & Weiss, 2011, p.9). For some time now, the saviour-
like representations of international humanitarianism have shaped how academics and the 
broader public perceive the work of humanitarian organisations as both benign and necessary. 
Humanitarian institutions have therefore received very little criminological attention, and 
when they have, their specific contributions to harm production are often vaguely defined or 
under-examined (Dandoy, 2013; Green & Ward, 2004, p. 54; Collinson, 2016). Some 
criminologists have engaged with the humanitarian field through their examination of state 
violations of international humanitarian law and the manipulation of humanitarian principles 
to justify state crimes. The U.S. invasion of Iraq is one of the most prominent examples in this 
respect (see Kramer & Michalowski, 2005; Whyte, 2007, 2010).  
However, criminological study in crisis zones has tended to position humanitarian 
organisations as separate or opposed to the criminal acts of others, such as states, in line with 
powerful international interpretations of humanitarian activity.7 International humanitarian 
                                                
6 In making this point, I acknowledge there are been recent efforts to develop a criminology of aid to better 
engage with the ways that international organizations exercise power and cause harm within global interventions 
(see Dandoy, 2013, pp. 2-6). A criminology of humanitarianism research network has been established to bring 
together criminologists interested in the discourses and actions of humanitarian organisations (see 
https://www.jus.uio.no/ikrs/english/research/projects/criminology-of-humanitarianism-/). Some 
‘crimmigration’ scholarship has also considered the relationship between humanitarianism and penal power (see 
Bosworth, 2017; Aas and Grundhus, 2015). See also the Border Criminology blog series on penal 
humanitarianism at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2019/03/introducing-new. Accessed: 4 March 2019. 
7 Humanitarian action is justified by international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is 
normatively constructed as benevolent, short-term charity necessary for responding to human need and 
alleviating human suffering (Lohne and Sandvik, 2017). There are widely held assumptions that humanitarian 
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organisations thus appear above the fray of wrongdoing, or conceivably, less capable of 
perpetrating significant harm relative to other powerful actors in the global political economy. 
An illustrative example is Collins’ (2014) reading of state crimes in Haiti. Collins carefully 
inventories the failings of the Haitian state in relation to its legal duties and responsibilities to 
displacement victims. While she rightly details the omissions of the Haitian state, her analysis 
fails to capture the dominant role of humanitarian organisations in the governance of displaced 
people, as well as the complex interactions between states and humanitarian organisations in 
violating displaced people’s human rights. Collins’s work suggests that despite critical 
criminology’s rising interest in the globalised aspects of crime and social control, the 
intersections between humanitarianism and state power, and the structural and operational 
harms caused by humanitarian practices, are still largely overlooked within the discipline.8  
This thesis aims to address this gap by assessing the criminological significance of 
humanitarian power relations and the systemic capacity of humanitarian organisations for 
harm production. Observers of the growing intensity of global production processes note that 
capitalist reproduction requires ‘a vast coming together of actors, resources and transactions, 
responsible for organising, at a molecular social-level, all the activities essential to its intensive 
and extensive drives’ (Lasslett, 2018, p. 13). With that in mind, critical criminologists are urged 
to identify and expose the different forces behind these “predatory assemblages” that sustain 
extreme forms of human suffering (Sassen, 2014, p. 13). International humanitarian 
organisations are relevant to criminological inquiry because of their structural relationships 
and dependency on states; their intrusive and often-disciplinary practices; and their routinized 
take-over of government functions when global south states fail in their responsibilities to 
citizens (Duffield, 2001; Donini, 2010). These organisations are increasingly known for 
deploying harmful capitalist ideologies, dominating powerless groups, and enforcing social and 
territorial hierarchies – all of which can augment already catastrophic levels of human poverty, 
social inequality, and corruption. Furthermore, the systematic involvement of humanitarian 
organisations in migration management and poverty governance has attracted particular 
                                                
activity generally follows rules, standards and norms outlined in international law and ethical practice (see Slim, 
2015).  
8 Some good examples include Barnett and Finnemore (1999). 
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criticism due to the way that humanitarian organisations are perceived to be fulfilling the 
material and political needs of state security (Duffield, 2001).  
Given this observation, we might want to think of humanitarianism as an integral 
component of the Third Sector, as Garland defines it, occupying ‘an intermediate, borderline 
position, poised between the state and civil society’ (2001, pp. 170–71). In other words, in 
everyday matters of state security and globalised population control, the deployment of 
humanitarian organisations to crisis zones allows imperial states to govern at a distance (2001, 
pp. 170–71, 173; Bosworth, 2017). Some argue that international humanitarianism not only 
restricts itself to the limits defined by the capitalist state, but fulfils the critical role of reacting 
to populations brutalised by the everyday operation of the capitalist system – which may 
become a threat to the capitalist order (Duffield, 2001). By relying on humanitarian 
organisations to deal with such population threats (Duffield, 2008), dominant states may 
remove themselves from ‘some of the messier aspects of enforcing order’ (Bosworth, 2017, 
p.3).   
Beyond these arguments, others have pointed out the sheer lack of accountability 
within the humanitarian sector (Ferstman, 2017). As part of this, very little has been written 
about the corporate side of humanitarian aid and how it shapes organisational conduct – a 
knowledge gap that some scholars are now attempting to address (Weiss, 2013). Like powerful 
corporations, humanitarian organisations clearly face market and performance pressures that 
arise specifically from the competitive business environment demanding their services. Pursuit 
of market dominance may create incentives for organisations to engage in unethical and illegal 
conduct that results in re-victimising aid recipients. In sum, various lines of inquiry are 
emerging about the authority, legitimacy and exercise of humanitarian power, as well as the 
opportunity structures that might be shaping criminal organisational conduct. 
In both subject matter and focus, an interrogation of humanitarian wrongdoing fits 
with the critical imperative to uncover crimes by actors in socially dominant positions, and to 
explain their criminal conduct according to the structure and logic of capitalism (Sutherland, 
1983; Chambliss, 1989; Chambliss et. al., 2010; Barak, 1991, 2015; Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 
2002; Kauzlarich et. al., 2003; Green and Ward, 2004; Michalowski and Kramer, 2006; Whyte, 
2009; Rothe, 2009; Rothe & Mullins, 2011; Tombs and Whyte, 2015; Lasslett, 2014, 2018). 
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Since the 1960s and 70s, the study of the crimes of the powerful has shifted the criminological 
gaze away from the deviancy of low-level offenders (i.e., the crimes of the powerless) to 
examine the illegal and illegitimate acts of private businesses, corporations, and states 
(Friedrichs, 2015). Powerful agents, argued by this thread of criminology, have long enjoyed 
the privileges of defining the boundaries of their own crime – even though their criminality 
has a proportionally greater impact on the lives of individuals and whole societies (Whyte, 
2009; Green & Ward, 2004; Rothe & Fredrichs, 2006). 
For empirical researchers, “the powerful” is defined as organisations whose exercise 
of power is hugely asymmetric with ‘at least some significant interlocks and interests…within 
the highest reaches of society’ (Friedrichs, 2015, p.43). This characterisation befits many 
humanitarian organisations with multimillion-dollar budgets who enjoy privileged access to 
states and corporations (Weiss, 2013), and whose authority to provide their own determined 
forms of aid is derived from states and the legal system, and not from democratic consensus. 
Criminologists concerned with examining the crimes of the powerful are interested in 
questions of power and crime (Whyte, 2009). Power, amongst many things, is the ‘ability to 
enforce one’s moral claims’ (Gouldner, 1971, p. 297). Calls for greater focus on the crimes of 
powerful entities have largely been concerned with the organisational behaviours of states, 
private businesses, and corporations as a distinguishable group of powerful actors (Sutherland, 
1983; Chambliss, 1989; Green and Ward, 2004; Michalowski & Kramer, 2006; Whyte, 2009; 
Tombs and Whyte, 2015; Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002). This academic endeavour has led to 
the formation of new and important categories for criminological research, including state 
crime, corporate crime, and state-corporate crime (Barak, 2015). Some critical criminologists 
have argued for an expanded categorisation of crimes of the powerful to keep pace with the 
changing logics and structure of power under processes of globalisation (Friedrichs & 
Friedrichs, 2002; Friedrichs & Rothe, 2014). This stems from the recognition that who has 
power, and how power is exercised, is part of an ever-shifting terrain that is responsive to 
overlapping logics of extraction and expulsion (Barak, 2015). In that regard, scholarship on 
the crimes of globalisation seeks to analyse the effects of the ‘demonstrably harmful policies 
and practices of institutions and entities that…by their nature occur within a global context’ 
(Rothe & Friedrichs, 2015, p. 26 in Barak, 2015, p. 8).  
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Moreover, a broader understanding of the crimes of the powerful addresses the 
concern that the failure to include, specify, and expose the crimes of powerful entities risks 
trivialising and ignoring the seriousness of the harms caused by such entities (Friedrichs & 
Friedrichs, 2002, p. 17). Accordingly, some critical criminologists have incorporated the study 
of international institutions in their conceptualisation of crime on the basis that such 
institutions play an intricate role in mediating predatory capitalist processes in collaboration 
with the state apparatus (Barak, 2015). One reason for including them relates to the growing 
dominance of international/multilateral organisations, whose rising power within the 
institutional landscape is attributed to the decline in power of state-based institutions under 
neoliberal9 transitions (Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002, p. 15). Previous criminological insights 
on international financial institutions (IFIs) provides grounds for examining the harms and 
injury caused by other institutions that operate internationally, such as humanitarian 
institutions, especially with the knowledge of the controversial roles these institutions often 
assume in the governance of human mobility (Duffield, 2001). 
Defining Critical Approaches to Harm, Violence, and Crime 
Advancing the study of the crimes of the powerful has provoked rigorous debate about 
what characteristics constitute crime and how criminologists can scientifically label 
organisational behaviour as deviant. Without recounting these debates in full, there are a few 
key aspects raised here that are relevant to my theoretical consideration of humanitarian actors 
and the substance of their actions. As a starting point, critical criminologists have often 
asserted that crime has no ontological reality (Hillyard & Tombs, 2004). One of the meanings 
deployed here is that offenses constructed as criminal are not the result of a higher objective 
truth about what events or experiences are most harmful in society. Instead, criminal 
definitions are the outcome of an ideological process that attaches a criminal quality to a 
particular act and actors (Pantzis, 2004; Lasslett, 2010). Criminologists have long pointed out 
the ways that white collar criminals leverage their class status and political influence to escape 
criminalisation (see Sutherland, 1983, pp. 227-239). Scholars highlighting the limitations of 
criminal law definitions have also underlined the problematic structure of law in relation to 
                                                
9 This thesis adopts Harvey’s (2005, p.2) understanding of neoliberalism as ‘political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can be best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.’ 
Chapter One discusses the role of the state to enable such practices.  
	 16 
holding the powerful to account. They point to narrow and individualistic constructions of 
criminal liability, which they argue masks the structural and collective nature of harms caused 
by the everyday operation of capitalist economies (Box, 1983; Hillyard & Tombs, 2004, p. 18; 
Pemberton, 2004). Specifically, criminal law’s requirement for ‘a criminal actor and criminal 
act’ has institutionalised a ‘moral hierarchy of intentional acts over acts of indifference’ 
(Pemberton, 2004, pp. 70–72). For these reasons, critical criminologists regularly dispute 
mainstream criminology’s reliance on law in theorising crime and its regulation (Hillyard & 
Tombs, 2004; Green & Ward, 2000, 2004; Whyte, 2009; Sutherland, 1983; Chambliss & 
Siedman, 1971).  
It is through these critiques that critical criminologists have sought to expand and/or 
replace the definition of crime in uncovering the crimes of the powerful. While some 
criminologists advocate for expanding notions of crime to capture the crimes of the powerful 
– such as incorporating human rights into criminal definitions – others support the 
abandonment of criminological categories (Michalowski, 2010; Hillyard & Tombs, 2004). At 
the radical end of the debate, criminologists advocate for applying broader concepts of social 
harm in their endeavour to expose the structural and social origins of human suffering (See 
Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1970; Hillyard et al., 2004; Pantazis, 2004; Pemberton, 2007; 
Friedrichs & Swartz, 2007). For clarity, social harm10 is defined as the extreme deprivation of 
human needs, or the restrictions placed on human beings that prevent them from functioning 
effectively as purposive agents. (Ward, 2004, p. 85; Pemberton, 2007). A main argument for 
criminologists to consider social harms pertains to the need to elevate understandings of non-
criminalised harms that are produced by the everyday processes, flows, and relations of 
capitalism and have significant, lasting effect on the entire life course of individuals (Hillyard 
& Tombs, 2004; Lasslett, 2010). The social-harm approach advocates for moving 
criminological analysis beyond the sensational and discrete acts of individuals toward the 
everyday suffering upon which the reproduction of the capitalist system rests (Hillyard et al., 
2004, p. 24). Applied to the humanitarian field, a social harm approach might therefore engage 
with responsibilities of humanitarian organisations and their indifference to harms linked to their 
                                                
10 Hillyard and Tombs (2004) have also defined concepts of harm through the following categorisation: physical, 
financial/economic, emotional/psychological, and cultural safety. Lasslett (2010, p. 12) further explains that 
‘social harms arise when socially generated processes undermine the organic reproduction of ‘man’, or the 
organic/inorganic reproduction of man’s environment.’ 
	 17 
actions, decisions-making, and relationships with other harmful actors and structures 
(Pemberton, 2007).  
Criminological understandings of social harm also connect with anthropological and 
sociological work11 on structural violence. As conceived by Johan Galtung (1969, p. 171), 
structural violence refers to violence that is ‘built into the structure and shows up as unequal 
power and consequently as unequal life chances.’ This notion of violence challenges 
epistemological perspectives that confine violence to physical, intentional, or interpersonal 
acts. Alternatively, structural violence seeks to identify violence in the way that structures 
operate. Social, political, and economic structures are seen to cause violence when they 
‘increase the distance between the potential [what could have been] and the actual [what is]’ 
or ‘impede the decrease of this distance’ (1969, p. 168). Applying this concept to the 
criminological field, Cooper and Whyte (2017) advocate for a more powerful derivative of this 
concept, one that recognises how material processes in fact shape structures and alter their 
likelihood to produce violence. They formulate the term “institutional violence” to describe 
power relationships between institutions and the subjects of their activity that increase the 
prospect of violent outcomes because of their linkages to political economy objectives. For 
example, they explain the Grenfell Tower disaster as an example of institutional violence by 
showing the series of mundane, every day, and collective decisions of British government 
institutions, connected to austerity politics, that produced the preventable fire and loss of life 
(Cooper and Whyte, 2017).  
Others seeking to expose the crimes of the powerful prefer to retain a commitment to 
the concept and labelling of crime in their theorisation of the serious offenses committed by 
powerful organisations. One approach,12 which is adopted by this thesis, uses Green and 
Ward’s (2004) explanation of state crime as: ‘state organizational deviance involving the 
violation of human rights.’ This conceptualisation of state crime is useful for transcending 
                                                
11 Paul Farmer (2004, p. 308) expands the concept of structural violence to include all political-economic 
structures that constrain human agency and underpin the ‘the social machinery of oppression’ – as well as those 
structures that simultaneously silence the historical memory of everyday suffering. Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes 
(2004, p. 318), agreeing with Farmer, add that structural violence is an anthropological concept showing ‘how 
political economy kills.’ 
12 For a summary of definitional debates on state crime, see Michalowski (2010, pp. 15-23). Other work to consult 
on this matter includes Chambliss (1989), Barak (1991), and Green & Ward (2004). 
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narrow legal definitions of crime by relying on three definitional elements: the state, 
organisational deviance, and human rights. This definition distinguishes itself by relying on the 
application of sociological concepts of deviance to identify organisational crimes that are 
commonly overlooked. Importantly, it is grounded in the understanding that rule-breaking is 
different from deviance. Deviance is conceptually distinct from rule-breaking because it implies 
a social process whereby subjective meaning is being attached to a particular act (Erikson, 
1962; Becker, 1963). As Becker (1963, p. 9) emphasises: ‘social groups create deviance by 
making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance.’ Extrapolated to the field of state 
crime, the general idea is that although the criminal justice system may fail to treat certain state 
behaviours as deviant, such behaviours may still attain the quality of being criminal via the 
labelling of that behaviour by a social audience (Green & Ward, 2004; Lasslett, 2010). Ward 
(2004, p. 87) clarifies the significance of a social audience to the identification of organisational 
crime as: 
An act is deviant where there is a social audience that (1) accepts 
a certain rule as a standard of behaviour, (2) interprets the act, or 
similar acts of which it is aware, as violating the rule, and (3) is 
disposed to apply significant sanctions – that is, significant from 
the point of view of the actor – to such violations. 
Green and Ward’s approach thus offers a way for counter-hegemonic social movements to 
contest the legitimacy of dominant ideas and to censure deviant state behaviour. I elaborate 
on this notion in Chapter Six. 
Green and Ward’s framework is not only relevant for the identification of crimes 
committed by states. It also applies to other kinds of organisational wrongdoing (see 
MacManus, 2018). This follows the argument that theoretical insights on how organisational 
crime takes places should be applied across the spectrum of formal organisations ignored by 
mainstream criminological research (Kramer et al., 2002; Vaughan, 1982, 1983). By applying 
Green and Ward’s (2004) and Ward’s (2004) formulation of deviance to the activity of 
humanitarian institutions, this thesis gives theoretical importance to social audiences in the 
labelling of humanitarian actions or omissions as deviant when these actions have violated 
socially accepted human rights norms. When this thesis discusses concepts of humanitarian 
crime, it will rely on Green and Ward’s definition. 
	 19 
Furthermore, an exploration of humanitarian wrongdoing benefits from previous 
criminological work attempting to explain the specific factors that give rise to organisational 
harm and crime. Some criminologists have highlighted the link between organisational 
deviance and performance pressure, while others have explained deviant organisational 
behaviours through the lens of the political economy and its criminogenic structure (see 
Kramer et al., 2002, p. 272). In the field of state crime, scholars have emphasised that the 
motivation of states to commit crime is ‘tacitly or explicitly related to large structural or cultural 
goals and objectives of government or its agencies’ (Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008, p. 86). How 
states pursue organisational goals of accumulation that are deeply injurious to populations is 
further discussed in Chapter One. 
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) suggest bringing together different levels of analyses 
– structure, institutional, and individual – within an integrated theoretical framework to 
capture the multi-layered motivations and opportunity structures for organisational crime. 
Taking this forward, Kramer and Michalowski have developed three catalysts for action which 
outline the specific variables either restraining or contributing to organisational deviancy 
(Kramer & Michalowski, 1990, 2006; Kramer et al., 2002, p. 273). The first catalyst for action 
identifies performance pressures or goal attainment as motivation for deviant behaviour. The 
second catalyst – opportunity structure – gives prominence to the means that organisations have 
at their disposal to achieve their goals. As Kramer et al. (2002, pp. 274–75) explain, the more 
that organisations perceive themselves as blocked from using legitimate means to achieve their 
goals, the more they are likely to pursue deviant alternative routes. The third catalyst 
underscores the presence of social control mechanisms as a predictor of organisational crime. 
If the operationality of control is weak, through for example the absence of legal regulations or 
their enforcement, then organisations have a higher likelihood of engaging in organisational 
deviance (Kramer et al., 2002). These three factors for analysing the factors behind 
humanitarian organisational deviance will be employed in the empirical discussion of 
humanitarian behaviours in Haiti. 
Finally, in exploring humanitarian criminality, this thesis proposes the concept “state-
humanitarian crime” to frame the manifold ways in which deviant state actions drive and 
interact with the illegitimate practices of humanitarian organisations. In thinking about this 
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interaction, there are obvious parallels and insights to consider from the extensive literature 
on state-corporate crime (see, for instance, Kramer, 1992; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990, 1993; 
Kramer et. al., 2002; Kauzlarich et. al., 2003; Green & Ward, 2004; Whyte, 2007, 2009, 2010; 
Tombs, 2012; Tombs and Whyte, 2015; Bernat and Whyte, 2017; Barak 1991, 2015). Kramer 
and Michalowski (1990, p.3) originally proposed an understanding of state-corporate crime as 
‘illegal and socially injurious actions that occur when one or more institutions of political 
governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic 
production and distribution.’ State-humanitarian crime, I suggest, encompasses a range of 
crimes that arise from the interactions of states and humanitarian actors in pursuit of deviant 
goals. These injurious collaborations may take the form of states initiating or facilitating 
significant forms of humanitarian deviance (Green & Ward, 2004, p. 28). States, for instance, 
may call upon humanitarian organisations to commit deviant acts. Or, similar to state 
relationships with corporations, state-humanitarian crime may entail states turning a blind eye 
to the illegitimate conduct of humanitarian organisations because it serves their own goals (see 
Kramer et al., 2002, p. 271). We may also find humanitarian organisations colluding with states 
to achieve mutually reinforcing goals that cannot otherwise be achieved through legitimate 
means (Kramer et al., 2002).  
In summary, the criminological concepts and frameworks discussed above provide 
useful starting points for identifying and analysing humanitarian wrongdoing in the context of 
their interactions and structural relationships with states and their agents. Over the course of 
this thesis, I expand on these concepts through empirical discussion of Haiti’s humanitarian 
intervention.  
 
II. Exploring State-Humanitarian Harm and Crime in Post-Disaster Haiti 
Applying the concepts of state crime and structural/institutional violence to Haiti, this 
thesis interrogates processes of harm production involving states and humanitarian actors 
during the reconstruction of earthquake-affected Port-au-Prince. To accomplish this, I focus 
explicitly on the actions and decision-making of states and humanitarian organisations in 
relation to (a) the delivery of housing aid and (b) the management of homeless people affected 
by the January 2010 earthquake. The research is led by two questions:  
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• What role have humanitarian organisations played in dispossessing disaster victims 
from urban land and violating their right to housing?  
• To what extent may humanitarian acts and omissions in Haiti’s housing sector be 
considered criminal?   
There are several reasons why I chose post-disaster housing as the lens for 
interrogating state-humanitarian deviance and harm production in the aftermath of Haiti’s 
earthquake. The first relates to critical debates about crime. Housing is a human right protected 
by international law,13 and is an internationally recognised norm.14 Access to adequate housing 
satisfies a number of human needs, including physical safety (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 
2002; Vasudevan, 2017). Housing also offers a material base for household and social 
reproduction (Katz, 2001). Research on urban housing, furthermore, illustrates a strong 
negative correlation between the lack of adequate and affordable housing and the poverty 
cycle, implying that lack of access to housing increases exposure to poverty and its associated 
harms and human rights violations (UN-Habitat, 2007). Housing also underpins the exercise 
of identity, social belonging, and citizenship (Hohmann, 2013). Denying the right to housing 
has grave consequences for people’s personal and social lives, including their physical and 
mental health, family life, economic security, and social-neighbourhood cohesion (Paton & 
Cooper, 2017; Cooper and Paton, 2013; Hohmann, 2013; UN-Habitat, 2007).  
Secondly, the right to housing is not only fundamental to human well-being, but it is 
also a human right that is constantly under violent attack in capitalist societies, especially in 
urban areas (Paton & Cooper, 2017; Cooper & Paton, 2013; Blomley, 2004; Otiso, 2002; Olds 
et. al., 2002). This is evidenced by skyrocketing rates of forced evictions, and widespread 
tenure insecurity and homelessness around the world, which are not limited to areas of the 
global south undergoing radical economic restructuring. Everyday millions of people are 
                                                
13 The right to housing is a recognised as a right that underpins the ability of humans to exist and is codified by 
several international treaties and human rights instruments (Hohmann, 2013). Article 25(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights outlines the right to adequate housing as a precondition for meeting basic material 
needs. Article 11(1) of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides the strongest 
international legal guarantee for the right to housing by placing obligations on state parties to ‘take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right.’ The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the 
ICESCR has further interpreted the right to housing as a ‘right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity’ 
and defines seven elements of this right: legal security of tenure; availability of services, materials, facilities, 
infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location; and cultural adequacy (CESCR, 1991). 
14 In other words, it fits the human rights criteria of Green and Ward (2000) about what behaviour can be labelled 
deviant.  
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expelled from their homes, or are affected by regressive state policies that prevent access to 
decent, adequate, and affordable housing. These dynamics are associated with global trends in 
the commodification of land and housing. Today, the market value of real estate has risen to 
more than twice the value of the world’s gross domestic product – evidencing the shift away 
from housing’s social value and the use of housing for investment (Farha, 2018).  
Criminological studies on evictions, gentrification, and homelessness link these 
devastating attacks on human need to deviant state behaviours and the criminogenic features 
of capitalist political economies (see Green et al., 2015; Lasslett, 2018; Cooper & Paton, 2017). 
Historically, political and legal forces have engineered the conditions enabling land theft, 
dispossession, and privatisation (discussed in Chapter One). State-led assaults on the human 
right to housing reveal the fundamental flaws in the legal protection of this right,15 which sheds 
light on the hegemonic status and protection of private property rights (Mattei & Nadar, 2008). 
Domestic and international law has generally failed to regulate or sanction harmful state 
behaviours that treat housing as a repository of capital rather than a social resource required 
for habitation and the fulfilment of human needs (Cooper & Paton, 2017).  
Modern struggles for housing thus illustrate the limitations of legal systems to 
sanction deviant state acts and decisions that erode the protection of the right to housing. 
Within international law, states are given significant scope to evade their obligations to respect, 
protection and fulfil the right to housing (Hohmann, 2013, p.19). While forced evictions 
remain one of the most clear-cut violation of the legal human right to housing, international 
law focuses mainly on procedural safeguards that states must undertake to prevent and protect 
people from forced evictions. Critical criminologists have often reached beyond legal human 
rights standards to determine state attacks on housing as crimes (Green et al., 2015). For 
example, Green and Smith (2016), using deviance-based definitions of state crime, document 
evictions of Palestinian populations as a result of Israeli state land control and housing policies.  
They classify these evictions as state crime because of their link to state goals of ethnic 
cleansing. Rhodes (2018), similarly, labels evictions in Burma as state crimes by illustrating 
                                                
15 This observation is also linked to the academic critique of hierarchies between first generation rights (political 
and civil rights, including the right to property) and second generation rights (economic, social, and cultural 
rights) within human rights discourse and practice (see Kennedy, 2001; Rajagopal, 2003). Hohmann (2013) points 
out that the right to housing has typically been treated with a high degree of skepticism by the international 
community, as a right that can be normatively justified, protected, and pragmatically achieved and enforced. 
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how state-facilitated evictions were designed to punish problematic populations and secure 
land control for future investment. In Britain, Paton and Cooper (2017), have formulated the 
term “domicide” – or murder of the home – to apprehend the mass destruction of homes and 
neighbourhoods as a result of state policies and acts supporting the financialisation16 of 
housing. These examples illustrate some ways that criminologists have called out wrongful 
state behaviour in the provision and protection of individuals’ access to housing. 
Another reason for focussing on Haiti’s housing sector pertains to growing 
humanitarian engagement in urban housing programmes and policy-making. Increased 
humanitarian involvement in urban housing corresponds to the trend of humanitarian 
organisations to continually “visibilize” different forms of human suffering and turn 
vulnerable people into objects of humanitarian governance and resource mobilisation (Kihato 
& Landau, 2016, p. 413). Describing this tendency in Haiti and its outcome for local power 
relations, the Center for Global Development claimed humanitarian organisations had created 
a ‘parallel state more powerful than the government itself’ in their delivery of housing aid and 
governance of displaced/homeless people (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 37). This 
statement, while not entirely correct in neatly separating the governing functions of 
humanitarian organisations and the Haitian government, does problematize an analytical 
framework that assigns responsibility for Haiti’s ongoing urban housing crisis solely to the 
Haitian state.  
The need to focus on the actions of humanitarian organisations in the housing sector 
is further validated by other empirical research that demonstrates the harmful outcomes of 
humanitarian housing and settlement-related decisions (see de Waal, 1997; Levine et al., 2012; 
Schuller, 2016, pp. 210–12; Ashutosh & Mountz, 2011; Crisp, 2018). The annual State of the 
Humanitarian System report in 2018 lists housing as one of the unmet needs most cited by 
populations receiving humanitarian assistance. As part of the rising concern about 
humanitarian action, inaction, and negligence, an Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
report on Haiti concluded that intense competition between humanitarian organisations for 
donor funding, as well as their struggles for territorial control over displacement camps and 
                                                
16 By financialisation, I mean the treatment of housing as a commodity rather than a place for habitation (Aalbers, 
2016). 
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neighbourhoods, made ‘any kind of coordination and coherence in the [Haiti’s housing] 
response almost impossible’ (Levine et al., 2012, p. 13). Schuller’s (2016, pp. 210–12) work on 
Haiti also stresses the material logic driving humanitarian action. He provides several examples 
where organisational devotion to their own “logic of production” rose above considerations 
of people’s actual housing needs.  
Humanitarian involvement in housing thus offers interesting terrain to probe the 
structure of international humanitarians, and in particular, the claim by humanitarian 
organisations that they rise above politics in the performance of their roles (Weiss, 2013). If, 
as explained above, housing is a politically contentious issue in capitalist societies, then 
organisational claims to be able to address housing issues, while maintaining a commitment to 
the principle of political neutrality, raises suspicion about organisational behaviours and the 
consequences of humanitarian actions. 
Haiti’s housing sector is therefore an appropriate field for analysing humanitarian 
deviancy and contribution to harm production given clear evidence of housing-related harm 
and human rights violations during earthquake reconstruction. The harms investigated in this 
thesis include widespread forced evictions and the failure to safely and sustainably provide 
housing to disaster victims. Although humanitarian organisations raised billions of dollars to 
build and provide housing for homeless Haitians, few homes were actually built with the funds 
allocated. In fact, hundreds of thousands of Haitians are now living in the same dangerous 
neighbourhoods they were prior to the January 2010 earthquake. As a consequence, many 
urban Haitians remain highly vulnerable to repeated cycles of displacement, household 
financial collapse, and death should another disaster strike Port-au-Prince.  
Finally, the emergence of new informal settlements is a sign of post-earthquake 
housing unaffordability and exclusion. The largest new informal settlement (Canaan), which 
is the main site of field research for this thesis, currently warehouses 200,000 people and is 
still growing (Kushner and Shelly, 2018). State neglect of new informal settlements puts the 
people living there at risk of harm and future victimisation of another disaster. Yet, against 
this dismal picture of housing, Port-au-Prince has successfully reconstructed government 
buildings, improved infrastructure in elite neighbourhoods, and gentrified its downtown area. 
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These disparities raise important questions about why so many disaster-affected Haitians have 
failed to benefit from the reconstruction process. 
 
III. Research Methodology 
 
My research is based on empirical data collected between October 2013 and August 
2014 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. While this constitutes the main period and location of the field 
work, some follow-up data collection (document retrieval and interviews) was conducted 
between August 2014 and April 2018. The aim of the research was to identify the structural 
and organisational conditions influencing the pursuit of access to urban land and housing for 
earthquake-affected people. 
 
The research followed an exploratory case study design. The rationale for selecting 
Haiti as a single case study to interrogate humanitarian harm and crime was detailed in the 
previous section. A case study design is intended to provide insight, advance current 
understanding, and establish a foundation for further comparison and research (Stake, 2005; 
Yin, 2003). This design enables the researcher to shed light on larger structural issues and 
social relationships by gathering multiple sources of evidence and producing a high level of 
detail on little known issues (King & Wincup, 2008, p. 28). The strength of the approach is to 
‘gain an understanding of what makes people tick, how an organisation works, and how one 
event may lead to another’ (King & Wincup, 2008, p. 28).  
 
To build a case study of Haiti, I relied on criminological theories of harm and 
organisational deviance to guide the formulation of research questions, the selection of 
methods, and the development of data collection techniques (e.g., creation of semi-structured 
questionnaires with selected informants). My case study approach was also informed by a 
literature review of humanitarian action for the purpose of making connections between Haiti 
and other case studies of humanitarian harm and wrongdoing. The fieldwork in Haiti drew 
together the following sources of evidence for case study analysis: prior studies of housing and 
humanitarian programmes; written humanitarian reports; various forms of humanitarian 
communication (e.g., emails, letters, meeting notes); administrative documents (e.g., project 
proposals); local and international media reports; land and property records; police and court 
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records; interviews with 200 individuals from different social positions; and direct observation 
of humanitarian, government, and community meetings. To organise the data and generate 
detail, the data was collected, organised, and analysed in a single qualitative database (NVIVO). 
 
Moving on to the empirical research itself, I relied on the following qualitative methods 
to elicit data for the fieldwork: semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and 
collection of public and organisational documents. I followed both purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques in the construction of my interview sample. At the beginning of my 
fieldwork, individuals from international and state institutions were purposefully selected 
based on their direct involvement and significant decision-making responsibilities in 
humanitarian camp governance, housing, urban planning, and the reconstruction of Port-au-
Prince. These individuals represented a wide spectrum of roles in Haiti’s humanitarian relief 
and reconstruction efforts. Interviews with them provided insight to official discourses as well 
as the sequence of housing decisions made by state and humanitarian actors. These interviews 
also exposed the power networks that had emerged around specific humanitarian projects and 
the position of humanitarian officials relative to foreign state actors, national and local Haitian 
authorities, and Haitian landowning elites (see also Lasslett, 2012, p. 128). 
 
My interactions with pre-identified humanitarian representatives (based on their 
involvement in housing issues) led to introductions to government officials. A referral from a 
humanitarian official, usually via email, significantly increased state authorities’ willingness to 
speak with me and share their views on land, housing, and reconstruction. In total, 73 
individuals directly involved in humanitarian projects and policy-making were interviewed 
(Annex 1). 
 
During the fieldwork, I was aware of my position as a researcher and moderated my 
approach to the fieldwork and interviewees to account for potential bias. When interviewing 
humanitarian actors, I occupied a semi- “insider” position based on my prior employment 
with international humanitarian organisations and my ability to speak the same bureaucratic 
“language” as my interviewees. My experience as a humanitarian field worker facilitated my 
access to humanitarian organisations and allowed me to achieve a level of trust with 
representatives. This, in turn, allowed me to reach a fuller understanding of the interpretative 
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frames that humanitarian actors constructed around disaster events and local struggles for 
housing. I was perceived by humanitarian interviewees as understanding their unique 
challenges as organisations operating in complex social environments. In some cases, 
humanitarian informants provided me with information that they believed should be made 
public, but that they had been prevented by their senior managers from doing so themselves. 
Usually, interviewees asked that their names and organisations be anonymised as a pre-
condition for the interview (a request that I have adhered to in this thesis).  
 
To gain social perspectives of state-humanitarian aid activity, I conducted eleven 
interviews with members of Haitian civil society organisations and 80 interviews with Haitians 
directly affected by the earthquake (Annex 2). The 80 interviews with Haitian disaster victims 
were drawn from purposefully selected locations (post-earthquake informal settlements). 
Twenty-five interviewees with disaster-affected Haitians were conducted in the following 
settlements located inside Port-au-Prince: Caradeux, Corail, Tabarre Issa, Chegar, and Acra. In 
addition to this, 55 interviews were conducted in the post-earthquake settlement of Canaan 
(located on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince). In Canaan, I specifically targeted the informal 
settlement’s neighbourhoods of Onaville, Canaan 3, Mozayik, and Village des Pêcheurs. Onaville is 
one of the first settlements that emerged after the earthquake, while Village des Pêcheurs is one 
of the last. Although I visited the Canaan informal settlement regularly throughout my eleven 
months of fieldwork, my main interactions with these land occupants were between May and 
August 2014. During this time, I made frequent visits to the informal settlement and spent 
significant time conducting interviews and observing/participating in community meetings 
and events within settlement neighbourhoods.  
 
In addition to Haitian earthquake victims, I also interviewed twenty-five individuals 
who were linked in some way to the Canaan settlement. These interviewees included: self-
appointed community leaders, land sellers, grassroots associations (e.g., women’s group 
representatives), local police, municipal government officials, and criminal groups extorting 
money from Canaan’s land occupants. In addition, I interviewed four international housing 
activists involved in advocacy and campaigns in Haiti and five researchers conducing academic 
or policy research on Haiti’s housing situation. 
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Most Haitians directly affected by the earthquake that I interviewed had at some point 
been labelled by humanitarian organisations as internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the 
disaster relief and reconstruction process. My interviews with these individuals each lasted 
from one to two hours and were conducted in Creole with the assistance of an interpreter, 
Jimmy Kervens Jean Felix.17 The interviews were subsequently transcribed in Creole then 
translated into English for coding and data analysis. Most interviewees in camps and informal 
settlements agreed to have their interviews voice recorded. Consent for all interviews 
(international and local) was obtained by reading a pre-developed description of the research 
purpose and objectives, and by soliciting either verbal or handwritten consent for the 
interview. 
 
I also conducted direct observations of events being studied. In Canaan, I spent several 
afternoons observing land mediation processes managed by community leaders in Onaville (see 
Chapter Eight). I was also permitted to attend three community meetings in Village des Pêcheurs 
and two community meetings in Mozayik. At these meetings, development issues facing new 
informal settlements, as well as eviction threats by private landowners and government 
officials were discussed. In Canaan, interviewed community leaders and land occupants led 
me around their neighbourhood to explain their living and housing conditions, and the urban 
planning measures they had undertaken in the absence of state and humanitarian support.  I 
was also invited to participate in several humanitarian meetings between October 2013 and 
August 2014. These meetings offered first-hand insight to the decision-making responsibilities 
of different humanitarian organisations and state officials; the processes and criteria 
influencing housing decisions; and how decisions or failures were justified by such actors. 
 
Data analysis for my study was based on the interrogation and categorization of data 
using qualitative software (see Maxwell and Miller, 2008). Prior to the field research, I had pre-
identified theoretical categories for sorting and synthesising collected data. After the fieldwork, 
I added or amended these categories during my line-by-line coding of data to reflect the themes 
                                                
17 Jimmy was referred to me by another researcher who had used his translation services. He speaks English, 
French, Spanish, and Creole fluently, and was previously a translator for the American Red Cross (ARC). He was 
also an instructor of English and Spanish for Haitian students at the Lycée National de Pétionville. Jimmy is a 
Haitian national and has a bachelor’s degree in languages from the State University of Haiti. 
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and topics that emerged from my experience on the ground. Analysing the data, I found 
significant cohering of views and perspectives amongst humanitarian actors, which I have 
highlighted in my empirical chapters. That said, there were sometimes dissenting views – often 
held by a handful of interviewees who also had experience working in international 
development organisations (and not only humanitarian organisations). I have tried to bring 
out these dissenting views on key issues throughout this thesis. 
 
IV. Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis probes questions of state-humanitarian harm and crime. To pursue this goal, it is 
divided into the following chapters: 
Chapter One introduces and explains the theoretical paradigm applied to the research. 
It outlines the criminogenic features of disasters and processes of urban reconstruction.  
Chapter Two dissects the structure and function of international humanitarian 
organisations. It draws together theoretical arguments of crime and a wide range of 
interdisciplinary literature on humanitarian-related harms and wrongdoing. The chapter 
establishes a basis for thinking about how humanitarian organisations may become involved 
in crimes of commission and omission, either through their collusive relationships with states 
or on their own initiative. 
Chapter Three provides a brief historical analysis of Haiti’s urban housing disaster 
after the January 2010 earthquake. It presents patterns of state organisational deviance and 
corporate criminality that led to interrelated forms of rural dispossession, over-urbanisation, 
and proletarianisation of the population. It emphasises the unnaturalness of Haiti’s post-
earthquake conditions and the preventable nature of earthquake harms, including 
unprecedented levels of death, destruction, and displacement. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of Port-au-Prince’s housing sector and land economy, foreshadowing the social 
conflicts that would emerge during reconstruction. 
Chapter Four is the first of five empirical chapters on Haiti’s reconstruction process. 
It details a continuum of state-humanitarian harm production in the management of displaced 
populations and provision of housing aid. It begins by explaining the predatory nature of 
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reconstruction aid and the intention of foreign governments and corporations to exploit 
Haiti’s disaster for their own benefit. It examines how these dynamics were overlaid by local 
reactions to the earthquake, which threatened to overturn gross inequalities in the distribution 
of urban land through land occupation. The chapter then describes the logic of humanitarian 
decisions around housing and classifies them as examples of structural and institutional 
violence. 
Chapter Five further problematizes the role of humanitarian organisations inside 
Haiti’s explosive reconstruction environment. It probes a range of quasi-legitimate to 
illegitimate organisational responses aimed at controlling “dangerous populations” and their 
“illegal” land occupations. Building on the theoretical arguments and historical evidence 
presented in previous chapters, this chapter frames forced evictions and involuntary settlement 
closures/returns of displaced people as key examples of state-humanitarian crime during 
Haiti’s reconstruction period. 
Chapter Six uses empirical data with land occupants to analyse organic practices of 
resistance within counter-hegemonic struggles for land and housing. It introduces Gramscian 
notions of civil society and resistance, and elaborates on them using scholarly work on 
everyday practices of resistance. By bringing the voices of earthquake victims to the fore, the 
chapter contests dominant assumptions that frame the establishment of Canaan – a post-
disaster settlement on the urban periphery – as an example of non-ideological, deprivation-
based squatting. It argues that this large group of land occupants have theoretical importance 
as a social audience censuring state-humanitarian policies and programmes that violated shared 
local norms pertaining to equitable land distribution, housing rights, and inclusive urban 
development. The chapter’s analysis of these processes draws on interviews with Canaan’s 
land occupants. 
Chapter Seven builds on the previous chapter by demonstrating the dialectical nature 
of post-disaster land struggles. The chapter explores the rare social power and counter-politics 
that arose from processes of illegal occupation in Canaan, which allowed land occupants to 
appropriate space according to their goals for reconstruction. It then details how processes of 
people-led reconstruction slowly unravelled in the face of extreme vulnerability to state-
sponsored fraud, exploitation, and evictions.  
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Chapter Eight returns to the analysis of humanitarian organisations and their 
techniques of neutralisation to deny their housing-related harms and crime. It examines 
humanitarian stratagems for obscuring, reinterpreting, and minimising their role in re-
victimising earthquake victims. The chapter ends by illustrating the instrumental function of 
humanitarian denial in undermining new land claims and locally led reconstruction processes 
in the Canaan settlement. It also demonstrates how strategies of denial allowed humanitarian 
actors to reproduce their power by asserting their superior, technocratic methods for 
addressing population problems.  
Chapter Nine outlines the contribution of this thesis in considering the criminality of 
a powerful strata of humanitarian institutions operating within the global political economy, 
whose role is to extend the logic of neoliberal governance to the periphery, and who are often 
motivated to breach international rules and norms of conduct in their management of 






















The Crime/Disaster Nexus: Theoretical Concepts for Research 
 This chapter lays out the theoretical paradigm informing my investigation of 
humanitarian criminality during Haiti’s post-earthquake reconstruction process. It begins with 
a discussion of some of the key elements of disasters that attract criminological interest. 
Disasters are often discursively constructed as natural events that have little relationship with 
human activity. This has obscured the political-economic structures driving the devastating 
effects of disasters on individual lives and whole societies. However, when disaster harms – 
such as housing losses and displacement –  are attributed to haphazard circumstances and not 
to historically contextualised and calculated human activity, public attention is drawn away 
from questions of state and business accountability, leaving the root causes of disaster harms 
unattended. Countering this trend, some critical criminologists have studied the cumulative, 
illegal, and illegitimate acts and omissions of states (and other powerful organisations) in their 
endeavour to conceptualise disaster harms as examples of state crime. Examples of illegitimate 
state practices that dramatically escalate social vulnerability to disasters include: political and 
industry corruption; state negligence and regulatory failures; state withdrawal of social welfare; 
land enclosures and mal-distribution; and state-sponsored housing deprivation (see Green & 
Ward, 2004; Green, 2005; Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008; Cooper & Whyte, 2017; Collins, 2014; 
de Waal, 1997).  
After briefly outlining criminological interest in disaster outcomes, this chapter builds 
a theoretical framework for analysing state-humanitarian deviance in post-disaster 
environments. By laying out a Marxist political economy approach, the social and material 
processes that drive change within post-disaster environments and motivate illegal and 
harmful organisational conduct are discussed. Similar to other studies of land dispossession 
and non-inclusive urbanisation, Marx’s theory of capital is used to explain the drivers of harm 
and state violence that are embedded in the global economy. These drivers relate to the innate 
tendencies of capital to perpetually seek out new areas for expansion and profitable 
investment, thus leading to the constant appropriation, re-organisation, and destruction of 
local environments (see Lasslett, 2018; Green et. al., 2015). These circumstances also 
continually shift the distribution of social and political power, allowing the powerful to use the 
criminal justice system to criminalise social behaviours that disrupt capital flows. Owing to the 
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complex relationship between capital, the state, and the law, communities often see their 
natural resources (“the commons”), as a source of their survival and protection, transformed 
by their exchange value on the market. As we shall see in Haiti, the tension between land as a 
social resource, and land as a commodity and private property, is commonly articulated in class 
struggles between landless populations and the state and propertied classes (see Chapters Four 
to Eight). Although land exclusion is commonly enacted through state and elite violence, and 
interlinked with several human rights violations (e.g. as the right to housing), it is not a pattern 
of harm typically recognised as crime in Haiti or elsewhere. This thesis will expound on these 
dynamics through empirical study of Haiti, while tracing the profound influence of 
humanitarian institutions on Haitian land struggles and their social interpretation. 
This chapter will also discuss how the state-capital relationship shapes patterns of 
organisational deviance. Marx’s discussion of the production and circulation of value in 
capitalist economies, processes of primitive accumulation, and the inherent instabilities of 
capital reveal the state’s strategic and often violent role in orchestrating the ‘terrain upon which 
capital can operate freely’ (Harvey, 2015, p. 235). The state is motivated to commit acts and 
omissions that violate social norms by nature of its stewardship of processes of capitalist 
expansion. Applying these ideas to disaster situations, these concepts take root in the various 
ways that states prioritise and advance accumulation strategies in their disaster responses. After 
disasters, states have been observed to commit illegitimate and violent acts in their attempts 
to force desired changes to the economy and to the built environment. Populations protesting 
state decisions that deviate from their expectations for protection are also routinely subject to 
state violence. Understanding these patterns of state deviance is relevant for analysing state-
humanitarian relationships in disaster responses and for scrutinising how humanitarian 
organisations exercise their power during their interactions with states and affected 
communities.  
 
I. Disasters and Their Criminological Significance 
Criminology has taken an interest (albeit limited) in natural disasters because they are 
among the world’s deadliest and most harmful events. Whether they occur suddenly (e.g., 
earthquakes) or have a slow-onset effect (e.g., famines), disasters claim the lives of thousands 
of people and generate unprecedented levels of population mobility, material damage, and 
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economic hardship. For the past twenty years, disasters have annually killed more than 75,000 
people and affected 100 million, in addition to causing over US$162 billion per year in damage 
(IFRC, 2015). Some studies speculate that disasters cause more unplanned human mobility 
and homelessness than conflict situations (IFRC, 2012).  
For some time, the scientific community has warned that human-initiated climate 
change will increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters and their impacts. This is 
already evident, especially in the global south, where people are disproportionately affected by 
changing weather patterns (Roy, 2018). Disasters are not only disruptive to people’s lives, but 
they often put in motion cycles of vulnerability and victimisation.   
Most global discussions still emphasise the “natural” elements of disasters, making 
them appear as unanticipated or inevitable geophysical events. These convenient political 
framings shift blame and responsibility for disaster-related harms to the forces of nature. As a 
result, the global framework of prescriptive solutions for disasters often excludes, or pushes 
to the background, consideration of political accountability and social justice (Green, 2005; 
Smith, 2006; see also Balint et. al., 2017). For example, the UN uses the term “natural disaster-
induced displacement” (applied in Haiti), which obscures an understanding of the human 
activity behind the destruction of homes and produced mass displacement. This agentless term 
suggests that mass human mobility in the context of disasters is the result of the geophysical 
event and the disruption it causes.  
Dominant interpretations of disaster events and their associated effects are distracting 
and politically beneficial. Recently, international attention has been devoted to the governance 
of disaster responses, focussing on their operational, institutional, legal, and resource 
dimensions (see Kalin, 2015). International law-making18 has attempted to define and protect 
the rights of disaster-affected people, but without broader consideration of the political-
economic environment through which these rights are to be realised. States and civil societies 
routinely convene in international forums to discuss and develop technocratic governing 
strategies around disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and disaster resilience (Kalin, 
                                                
18 See the International Federation of the Red Cross’s project on Disaster Law that lays out the relevant legal 
frameworks for disaster relief and prevention. Available at https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-
law/about-idrl/ 
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2015). Their efforts, however, have done little to combat forms of state and corporate 
criminality that have generated the worst effects of disasters. As illustrated by Hurricane 
Katrina, public discourses that eclipse broader discussions of political responsibility provide 
fertile ground for blaming and criminalising disaster victims for their own social conditions, 
while allowing new patterns of criminality to flourish (Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008; Tierney & 
Bevc, 2007; Squires & Hartman, 2013; Klein, 2007). 
Bearing these dynamics in mind, state-crime literature19 on disasters offers an 
important theoretical counterweight to liberal-institutional discussions that de-politicise 
disasters and their aftermath. That there is no such thing as a “natural” disaster is an important 
axiom for the criminological study of disasters (Green & Ward, 2004; Green, 2005; Smith, 
2006; Faust & Kauzlarich, 2008). An acceptable definition of disasters for criminologists is 
therefore one that recognises disasters as the interface between geophysical events and 
vulnerable human populations (Susman et al., 1983 in Green & Ward, 2004, p. 55; Hewitt, 
1983).  
In State Crime, Green and Ward (2004) apply their deviance-based definition of crime 
to locate state responsibility for natural disasters. They argue that the political and 
organisational conditions shaping harmful policies and practices, which in turn heightens 
vulnerability to human rights violations (e.g., the right to life or the right to housing), are highly 
relevant to understanding how states commit crimes of commission or omission. Their 
reasoning sketches out six areas of potential state organisational deviance linked to disasters, 
including systemic corruption, state-corporate crime, collusion with elites, war crimes, 
negligence, and post-disaster cover-ups (2004, p. 56). Applying state-crime insights into two 
major Turkish earthquakes in the late 1990s, Green (2005) interprets the mass loss of life and 
destruction caused by these events as the consequence of a chain of deviant decisions, actions, 
and inactions on the part of the Turkish state. Green locates a direct causal link between the 
state’s liberalisation and deregulation strategies and the rise of poor-quality housing stock. Her 
research shows how rampant, unpunished corruption intensified the construction of housing 
in violation of safety codes and standards.  
                                                
19 Scholars from other disciplines have also critically assessed state responsibility for natural disasters, but not 
from a criminological standpoint. 
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Using a similar line of analysis, Faust and Kauzlarich (2005) view the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina as a state crime of omission. Their empirical research found repeated 
failures and negligence by different U.S. government entities both before and after the 
hurricane. These included failures to fix the deteriorating levee system, issue timely storm 
warnings, and adequately respond to the widespread destruction predominantly affecting poor 
African American populations (2005, p. 89; see also Faust & Carlson, 2011). They determined 
that Katrina’s excess victimisation and preventable loss of life were forms of state criminality. 
Vulnerability is an important consideration when analysing the criminal behaviour of 
states. As a concept in social analysis, vulnerability illuminates the relationship between risk 
factors and exposure to hazards (Bankoff et. al., 2004). It is therefore useful for capturing 
‘changing social and economic conditions in relation to the nature of a hazard…[as] part of a 
dynamic, evolutionary and accretive process’ (Bankoff et. al., 2004, p. 2). The concept of 
vulnerability attends to the forces shaping social conditions. Its referent objects are the 
structures, organisations, policies, and practices that give rise to specific risks and their 
attendant distribution across gender, ethnicity, and social class lines (Kreps, 1984; Fothergill 
& Peek, 2004; Tierney, 2007; Tierney and Oliver-Smith, 2012; David & Enarson, 2012; Weber 
& Peek, 2012; Reid, 2013). Consequently, one way of attributing criminal responsibility to 
states for disaster harms is to follow changes in population vulnerability that result from  
Another aspect in the criminological literature related to natural disasters are the social 
conflicts catalysed by disasters and the nexus between crime and disaster reconstruction. 
Within the broader literature on disasters, there are some framings that emphasise their 
disruptive nature and their potential for animating social movements that call for state 
accountability and seek to address the root causes of disasters (Bankoff et. al., 2004). This 
framing implies that disasters retain a distinct temporal quality that is conducive to unmasking 
power relations and unsettling the hegemonic ideologies sustaining them (Bankoff et. al., 
2004). Indeed, there are a few historical examples where disasters have propelled new social 
movements leading to governmental reforms that address public safety concerns, such as 
Etienne (2012, p.13) points out in the case of the Mexico City earthquake of 1985. Yet, 
criminological study of reconstruction processes in post-conflict settings has noted a more 
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ominous trend that arguably should be extended to the consideration of post-disaster settings 
(see Whyte, 2007; Balint et al., 2017; Saeed & Parmentier, 2017).  
Disasters are manifestations of social conflicts that leave socially marginalised 
populations in the path of destruction. The criminological literature on reconstruction 
recognises this and the likelihood of oppositional forces and demands for structural change to 
arise in post-conflict settings. Recalling the prior discussion on the definition of state crime, 
civil-society responses during reconstruction are also important when defining organisational 
crime. However, some of this literature has problematized the tendency for civil society in 
times of reconstruction to be co-opted into broader governmental apparatuses focused on 
short-term relief and reconstruction objectives (Saeed & Parmentier, 2017; Balint et al., 2017). 
This literature also emphasises the conditions of anomie that mark reconstruction 
environments such as organisational fragility, lack of resources, and weakened state legitimacy, 
which in turn may enable new opportunity structures for crime (Balint et al., 2017). It stresses 
the importance of criminogenic legacies when prior crimes associated with conflicts (or 
disasters) are left unaddressed. Keeping these insights in mind, we will now unpack theoretical 
explanations for crime production that are relevant to understanding the criminogenic features 
and patterns associated with disasters and reconstruction processes.  
 
II. Understanding Crime in the Context of Disasters and Reconstruction 
II.I Crime and the political economy. 
Critical criminologists have long pointed out that criminal law categories capture only 
certain victimising behaviours due to the way they have been shaped by powerful interests. In 
doing so, they have interrogated the various ways that harm and crime emerge in relation to 
the everyday operation of the political economy. 
Thinking about disasters and their harmful outcomes as crime fits within this theoretical 
line of enquiry. Thus, in line with similar critical criminological studies, this thesis applies a 
critical Marxist framework to bring to light the material processes and political decisions that 
are behind avoidable disaster outcomes, and to explain how harmful social conditions (such 
as displacement, landlessness and homelessness) are reproduced during periods of disaster 
reconstruction. Marx’s theory of surplus value, his discussion of capital’s constant motion and 
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its destructive tendencies, and his account of social exploitation have proved useful tools for 
analysing the various ways that crime and harm are committed by powerful social institutions, 
either intentionally, or via their indifference, negligence, and subservience to market forces 
(Tombs & Whyte, 2015). Key to this discussion is the way that Marx conceptualises the laws 
and inner logic of capital, and the fundamental contradictions that arise between value 
extraction and social protection. The constant drive for accumulation and wealth by social 
institutions within the political economy, irrespective of the socially injurious effects generated 
from accumulation processes, is part of what allows us to reimagine the global political 
economy as a criminogenic force (Lasslett, 2018).  
A critical Marxist framework fosters an understanding of the state’s close relationship 
with capital and its essential function in capitalist societies to foster an enabling environment 
for value production. Criminologists argue that by taking on such functions, the state often 
becomes a “bystander, facilitator, and conspirator” in harm production (Tombs & Whyte, 
2015, p. 54). Clarifying this, they point to positive and negative forms of complicity of the 
state in harms committed by corporate actors in pursuit of their interests (Whyte, 2009, p. 32). 
States, for example, commonly craft policies reducing minimum standards of protection, as a 
way of enabling corporate activity and investment, or ignore corporate practices that violate 
human rights because these practices also achieve state interests. Such claims that states have 
played a role historically in creating the conditions for state and corporate criminality and 
impunity can be used to challenge hegemonic ideas about humanitarianism and its relationship 
and independence from states. These concepts serve as a basis for exploring how humanitarian 
institutions, in situations of disasters, project state power and legality, and collude with states 
in their deviant and violent strategies for accumulation. 
In the first volume of Capital, Marx explains criminogenic dynamics of the market by 
underlining the capitalist mode of production as an historically contingent system arising from 
the elimination of traditional forms of subsistence labour and the accumulation of the means 
of production in the hands of a dominant capitalist class (Marx, 1976, p. 1022; 1978a, pp. 22–
23). This shift in the character of production from a pre-capitalist to capitalist one changes the 
entire social structure, corresponding to the way that Marx envisaged social relations as the 
‘totality of production relations’ (Marx, 1978e, p. 207). Within the capitalist mode of 
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production, men and women ‘enter into definite relations that are indispensable and 
independent of their will…[corresponding] to a definite stage of development of their material 
powers of production’ (Pearce, 1976, p. 52). These material conditions organise the social 
relations that emerge between those owning the means of production (the capitalist) and those 
beholden to selling their labour power on the market (the wage labourer). Power is 
conceptualised as a struggle between class forces and their ideas – between the ruling capitalist 
class (exercising repression/control) and the labouring class (exercising resistance).  
Marx’s theory of capital also underlines the structural factors that create incentives for 
harm and crime in capitalist societies. He explains that since productive capital relies on the 
creation of surplus value – the value accrued by the capitalist over and above the cost of the 
labour power invested in the production of a commodity20 – it must always seek new ways for 
expansion. The incessant drive for surplus value – the logic of capital – motivates capital 
(through its owners) to pursue all means necessary to provide the fastest growth possible, 
irrespective of the social cost, including the negative impact on worker wages, labour and living 
standards, and environmental sustainability (see Marx, 1978e, pp. 210–11; Marx, 1978c, p. 
221). For this reason, Marx draws a causal connection between  the processes of accumulating 
and valorising capital by capitalist institutions and the accumulation of human misery. In doing 
so, Marx essentially describes a “criminogenic structure of capitalism” – a structure of social 
institutions inclined toward producing social harm and inequality through the ways that the 
means of production are relentlessly pursued and materially appropriated, often at the expense 
of human rights (Whyte, 2009, p.64; Hillyard & Tombs, 2004, pp. 31–54). 
 Crucially, Marx brings to light the violent practices by the state, corporations, and 
capitalist elites that are associated with capitalism’s practical realisation. These practices arise 
in the context of Marx’s discussion of primitive accumulation21 as the first stage of capitalist 
development, in which the capitalist aggressively targets the means of production (namely raw 
materials, land resources, and cheap labour power) and seeks to exploit them to supply the 
                                                
20 In other words, surplus value is value produced but not returned to the owner of the labour power. Instead, 
surplus value is claimed by the capitalist and is the source of all profit. See Marx (1976, p.725-761). 
21 Primitive accumulation defines the movement from pre-capitalist to capitalist society, whereby the economic 
system starts to become replicated within the system of social relations (Marx, 1976, pp. 873–904; Polyani, 2001, 
pp. 72–74). 
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needs of industrial capital (Marx, 1976, pp. 874–75, 1068–75). Historical research22 of these 
processes have evidenced a range of illegitimate and violent methods used by states and the 
capitalist class to achieve the goal of accumulation, including the separation of the masses 
from their means of their subsistence (the commons) and control of the capitalist class over 
the means of production (see Thompson, 2013a, pp. 207–53). Adding to this, state-corporate 
and corporate crime scholarship has empirically illustrated a number of serious offenses driven 
by capitalist forms of competition and production, ranging from cartels and price-fixing, to 
fraud, speculation, and corruption, to environmental harms and contrived wars for access to 
new markets (see Sutherland, 1983; Whyte, 2007, 2009, pp. 64–68; Michalowski and Kramer, 
2010; Lasslett, 2014; Tombs & Whyte, 2015; MacManus, 2018). It is often argued that many 
of these offences, which have serious human rights impacts, are products of ‘criminogenic 
relationships’ between states, corporations, and other powerful social groups (Pearce, 1976; 
Whyte, 2009). How the state and legal system are implicated in these patterns of criminality is 
the subject of the next section. 
 II.II The capitalist state and rule of law. 
Borrowing from the Marxist view, the state is an historically contingent abstraction of 
the economic mode of production; or in other words, the state apparatus  is appropriated to 
enforce class interests (Marx, 1978b, p. 187). Based on this configuration, Marx suggests that 
the state applies its coercive force against the labouring classes when their acts threaten to 
undermine the dominant social order, thus showing why certain acts are labelled as crime and 
other acts are rarely treated seriously (Pearce, 1976). This view has also been used to question 
the nature of law as an instrument of class domination and the protection of privilege interests. 
Critical scholarship has shown how the state apparatus uses law to authorise its naked force, 
and to legitimise the theft, exploitation, and violence of the capitalist class (see Thompson, 
2013a, 2013b; Mattei & Nadar, 2008). This is particularly evident in the relationship between 
law and absolute concepts of private property, whereby the law authorises the power to 
exclude others from something that is in the interests of everyone (Singer, 2000).  
                                                
22 In the Black Act, Marxist historian E.P. Thompson describes the seizure and legal enclosure of English pastures 
and woodlands by a newly emerging capitalist class during the 17th century that entailed the violent suppression 
by the state of those resisting these processes. Marxist analyses of peasant land dispossession point to an 
historically distinct pattern of criminality associated with the pursuit of non-capitalist spaces for capitalist 
accumulation and the production of surplus value (see, for example, Green et al., 2015; Wood, 2013). 
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Marx’s views, and refinements of his theoretical framework, have informed ways of 
understanding the criminogenic character of the state-capital relation, and the role that law 
plays in advancing processes of accumulation that produce harmful social consequences. 
Adding to an understanding of the state’s role, and the nexus between the state and violence, 
Tilly’s (1982) work on the “racketeer state” has been used to critique conventional 
understandings of state protection. Tilly’s exploration of processes of state formation leads 
him to conclude that states have historically organised a protection racket by offering 
protection to populations, at a price, from threats created by the state’s own extractive 
activities (see also Whyte, 2009, pp. 28–35; Green & Ward, 2004, pp. 2–4).  
Tilly touches on two important points for understanding the criminogenic qualities of 
the state. First, he shows that processes of state formation, which involved the state’s 
competition with other organised groups using violence (i.e., bandits, pirates, gangs), reveal 
similarities between the state’s legitimate means of violence and the illegitimate means used by 
its rivals. The state’s neutralisation of its rivals, he illustrates, often entailed bringing them 
inside the state apparatus and benefitting from their means of violence. Tilly therefore sheds 
light on the alliances and collusive relations that crystallise between states and organised 
criminal groups, which has been used in criminological analyses of state violence (Whyte, 2009, 
p. 28). Tilly further emphasises the interconnectedness between state-making and capitalist 
expansion. He argues that the state’s endeavour to monopolise the means of violence, through 
the activities outlined above, have forged an historical alliance with the capitalist class, who 
supply the means for war-making and later, state-making. In short, historically, through war-
making and extraction, the state has developed a ‘durable interest in promoting the 
accumulation of capital’ (1982, p. 4). It is to these synergies between the state and capital that 
we now turn to examine post-conflict/post-disaster environments.  
 II.III Disaster capitalism and the criminogenic features of reconstruction 
environments. 
Similar to Tilly’s observations, David Harvey (2003) offers valuable insights on the 
criminogenic structure of global capitalism within the context of north-south relations (i.e. 
Haiti and the U.S.). Harvey’s framework on capitalist imperialism scrutinises the forces at work 
when the ‘politics of the state and empire’ merge with the ‘molecular processes of capital 
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accumulation in space and time’ (2003, p. 26). Drawing on the work of Rosa Luxemburg 
(2003) and Hannah Arendt (1968), Harvey describes two separate, but closely interlinked, 
logics of power that influence state behaviour. He demonstrates that modern states are 
incentivised to follow a capitalist logic of power, meaning that their strategies are shaped by the 
needs of capital to acquire the means of production and create surplus value. Yet, states also 
operate according to a territorial logic of power. Processes of accumulation as they have unfolded 
over time have incentivised states23 to find new political and administrative arrangements that 
will best mediate capital flows and allow states to consolidate their power within a defined 
territory (2003, p. 105). In this way, Harvey reinforces Tilly’s observation that states are 
incentivised to use their monopoly of power to for political and material advantage. Harvey 
therefore urges us to think about the criminogenic tendencies of states in the following terms: 
It is the state that is the political entity, the body politic, that is best 
able to orchestrate institutional arrangements and manipulate the 
molecular forces of capitalist accumulation to preserve the pattern 
of asymmetries in exchange that are most advantageous to the 
dominant capital interests working within its frame. (2003, p. 132) 
An important corollary to Harvey’s thesis is that one particular direction of state power 
is shaped by capital’s cannibalistic tendencies. Explaining this, he revisits a cornerstone of 
Marx’s theory on the circulation of capital. Not only must capital circulate continuously or die, 
as Marx posits, but it must also accelerate the speed of its circulation to bring competitive 
advantages (Harvey, 2014, p. 73; Marx, 1976, pp. 711–12, 874–47, 881). Consequently, there 
are structural pressures exerted by the capitalist mode of production to break down barriers 
related to time and geography that prevent capital from flowing freely and pursuing its 
maximum surplus value (Harvey, 2003). Harvey therefore outlines the perennial problem of 
over-accumulation that arises when capital is confronted with a lack of opportunities for 
reinvestment (Harvey, 2003, p. 149). In doing so, he re-articulates the state’s position to break 
down barriers for capital flows. States become motivated to find a spatial fix to their home-
grown problems of over-accumulation, thus nurturing their tendency to use their coercive 
powers and definitions of legality to open up new territories for capital penetration (2003, p. 
145).24  
                                                
23 By states, I am referring to the dominant interests that have captured the state. 
24 What drives the predatory gaze toward the global south, Harvey (2003) maintains, is not only the expansionary 
logic of accumulation and the dynamics of capitalist competition. It is also the preservation of elite interests and 
conditions of wealth inequality. Harvey maintains that in the global north, particularly the U.S., the circulation of 
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Harvey’s term “accumulation by dispossession” captures a spectrum of state practices 
linked to the state’s role to expand opportunities for capitalist reproduction. His concept 
resembles Marx’s depiction of processes of primitive accumulation, whereby the state 
orchestrates the conditions necessary for the capitalist to enclose customary land, appropriate 
nature for production processes, and press subsistence farmers into dehumanising forms of 
wage labour (Harvey, 2003, p. 145). State practices include pushing for privatisation, 
deregulation, beneficial labour arrangements, and the release of assets at low costs. To achieve 
these desired outcomes, dominant states typically forge alliances with local governing elites 
who can supply repressive policing and paramilitary structures, as well as the structural, 
institutional, and legal changes conducive to incorporating non-capitalist spaces into processes 
of production. The state’s role in accumulation by dispossession may also entail the state 
turning a blind eye to the illegal and criminal practices of corporations (i.e., bribery, fraud, 
theft) to obtain the assets of nations in the capitalist periphery. At the most coercive end of 
the spectrum, states may also resort to war-making or humanitarian interventions to dismantle 
nations or communities resisting processes of accumulation by dispossession. These state 
practices result in significant social changes, including the aggressive liberalisation of local 
markets, the industrialisation and deregulation of agriculture, and the massively scaled down 
provision of social welfare (Sassen, 2014).  
Important for this thesis, and in line with Harvey’s analysis, is Naomi Klein’s (2007) 
identification of disasters as geographic spaces that provide unique temporal and spatial 
conditions for accelerated accumulation. In The Shock Doctrine, Klein argues that disasters are 
particularly enticing for capital because they usher forward new dynamics of confusion, state 
dependency, and creative destruction (Klein, 2007, p.16–19). Using the term “disaster 
capitalism,” Klein characterises the criminogenic opportunity structure provided by disasters 
in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, disasters are treated globally as exciting market 
opportunities by dominant states, their militaries, and corporate and local elites, who seek to 
profit from disaster conditions (see also Harvey, 2003, p. 136). Corporations, for example, 
take advantage of these opportunities is by offering for-profit reconstruction services to donor 
                                                
capital has been constrained by neoliberal politics – elites bend the rules of capitalist production for maximum 
advantage, while blocking efforts to absorb surplus capital locally (through, for example, public investment) 
(Harvey, 2003, pp. 208–9). 
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governments, allowing them to profit from taxpayer money allocated for disaster 
reconstruction. Corporate profiteering from disaster situations is often legitimised through 
claims of superiority over local, community-led methods of reconstruction. Similar to other 
critiques of government outsourcing to corporations, corporate-led disaster reconstruction is 
marked by high profit margins at the expense of social needs or quality services. Theoretically 
speaking, however, state practices of re-directing the flow of public money for disaster 
reconstruction to corporations with little accountability, evidence’s the state’s function to find 
new avenues for the circulation of capital (Harvey, 2003). 
Second, Klein also observes the way dominant states, especially the U.S. as the global 
hegemon, exploit the disorder created by disasters to enact socially injurious policies as part 
of a long-term economic strategy. Irrespective of the harms entailed for disaster victims, 
dominant states endeavour to exploit reconstruction conditions in capitalist peripheries, with 
a view to restructuring local economies and making them more amenable to endless 
accumulation. Disasters are therefore leveraged to coordinate raids on the public sphere and 
force neoliberal policies related to deregulation, privatisation, and reduction of social spending 
(Klein, 2007, pp. 6–9). Disaster-affected governments desperate for humanitarian and 
reconstruction aid, have little recourse but to accept these policies in exchange for 
humanitarian aid. Klein therefore argues that while populations are in “shock”, and slowly 
recovering from disasters, their governments are being persuaded to quietly pass new laws and 
accept arrangements that will inevitably force open their territories to capital and financial 
flows.25 Moreover, governing kleptocrats often willingly do so, as they find their own ways to 
consolidate their wealth and power from fresh incoming capital and new structural 
arrangements (see also Comaroff & Comaroff, 2008, pp. 1–15). Foreign aid packages and 
institutional arrangements may therefore mask state demands for structural economic changes, 
in which incredibly painful strings are attached to the gifts of temporary shelter and food to 
affected communities (Loewenstein, 2015). In short, global responses to disasters can bring 
                                                
25 Klein writes that capital penetration after the 2004 Asian tsunami displaced people and gentrified empty 
beaches in a matter of days or weeks (2007, p. 401). This was made possible by the conditions placed on 
reconstruction aid packages and large-scale loans offered to governments facing significant recovery needs. These 
conditions included changes in labour laws, land and property deals and rights for private companies, and other 
areas of economic restructuring and privatisation. 
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criminogenic circumstances of corporate profiteering and contingent aid at the expense of 
helping suffering communities and resolving their protection needs. 
Reconstruction capital can therefore have a corrosive influence on processes of 
disaster recovery by provoking new patterns of criminality in the spaces of disasters 
(Loewenstein, 2015; Klein, 2007; Whyte, 2010). Literature on disasters suggests that land 
dispossession is a key pattern of state criminality triggered by disasters because of the 
destruction caused to the built environment (the clean-slate thesis), and the fragility of post-
disaster governance (Loewenstein, 2015; Klein, 2007). Land dispossession, enclosure, and 
privatisation are so common in post-disaster contexts that Klein remarks that ‘rubble is the 
new terra nullius’ (Klein, 2007, p. 402). As explained by Klein and others, influxes of 
reconstruction capital provide perverse incentives to ruling elites to neglect their 
responsibilities to provide land for safer housing for disaster victims and to expel victims from 
land that now demonstrates higher market value (Klein, 2007, p. 399).  
II.IV Critical explanations of social vulnerability and violence. 
I will now discuss some of the social outcomes stemming from the harms and crime 
perpetuated by the geopolitical structure of global capitalism. Marx theorised population 
vulnerability according to social and material consequences of successive stages of capitalist 
development. Broadly speaking, production processes wreak havoc on populations by taking 
what is socially necessary for reproduction and placing it in the hands of the capitalist class 
(Katz, 2001). The way that capital reproduces itself is therefore predisposed to producing 
surplus populations – people who are superfluous to production processes (Sanyal, 2007). 
What characterised social vulnerability, in Marx’s view, was the working classes’ lack of access 
to land, labour disposability and exploitability, and diminished social power and cohesion 
(Marx, 1976, pp. 781–802).  
Scholars have since drawn on the notion that capitalism produces populations who 
have been made redundant to describe the scale of vulnerability created by the geographic 
expansion of capitalism. The modern interpretation of surplus populations differs slightly 
from Marx’s. Some argue that in the capitalist periphery, intensified accumulation is more 
likely to produce exiled nomads than Marx’s wage-slaves (Sanyal, 2007; Davis, 2006, p. 175). 
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In other words, there are populations made redundant by the circulation of capital, ‘for whom 
the doors of the world of capital remain forever closed’ (Sanyal, 2007, p. 55). Urban 
populations in the global south have particularly attracted this representation. Davis (2006, pp. 
172–75), for instance, characterises the forced incorporation of global south land and 
populations into the market as an example of semi-proletarianisation. He claims that state-
initiated semi-proletarianisation has rendered global south cities the new dumping ground for 
unprotected surplus populations.  
More recently, population terms such as “human waste” (Bauman, 2004), “vagabond” 
(Katz, 2001), “human superfluidity” (Marks, 2011), and “bare life” (Agamben, 1998) to depict 
the vulnerabilities and struggles of populations cast out of the spaces of production. Such 
terms imply a social condition of “placelessness” and “non-being” (Butler & Anathasiou, 
2013). They describe a social position where one ‘no longer fits or has a place in the overall 
scheme of things and is in the way’ (Marks, 2011, p. 3). To be made redundant from the 
capitalist system underscores a process of dehumanisation, defined by a state of rightlessness 
–the right to have rights (Arendt, 1968; Agier, 2011; Agamben, 1998). To be expendable also 
conveys a state of constant exposure to violence and exploitation as a result of being shunned 
from the economic system (Agier, 2013, p. 72; Agier, 2012; Agamben, 1998). Even within their 
territorial borders, populations struggle to achieve social and spatial belonging and are unable 
to exercise their citizenship (Agier, 2013). These are experiences to which I will return in 
Chapters Six and Seven.  
These population terms used to express the outcomes of material and political 
processes often denote a spatial dimension to the way that vulnerability is experienced, 
especially in urban areas like Port-au-Prince. Scholars such as Mike Davis (2006), Michel Agier 
(2011), and Loic Wacquant (2008) interpret capitalist exclusion in cities as a form of spatial 
distancing and segregation, whereby superfluous and undesirable populations are pushed into 
urban wastelands. Davis detects a particular spatial pattern of exclusion in the way that urban 
landless people are continually warehoused at the “pariah edge” of the city (2006, pp. 45–48). 
Agier (2013) similarly uses the term “borderlands of illegality” to describe the extra-legal spatial 
arrangements that have emerged to supply the means of existence for the perennially excluded. 
He touches on the role of law in demarcating capitalist zones of inclusion and exclusion. 
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Agier’s borderlands of illegality manifest themselves in the form of displacement camps, 
informal settlements, and dangerous border crossings. These spatial characterisations call 
attention to the transient and insecure existence of populations who have been condemned 
and forgotten through the expansion of production processes and its criminogenic dynamics. 
The academic discussion about these terms highlights the recurring forced movement of 
populations from spaces that eventually become attractive to capital, meaning that people are 
perpetually forced to seek out new spaces of exile and existence (see also Wacquant, 2008, p. 
11; Agamben, 1998). In Haiti, these spatial patterns become visible in state-humanitarian 
approaches to camps and the constant movement of landless people during urban 
reconstruction. 
III.V Disaster governmentality: state reactions to social threats and conflicts. 
Thus far, we have discussed capital accumulation as a state-driven and generally 
criminal process that progressively weakens populations and makes subordinate their needs in 
the face of the rising dominance of capital. Another way to think about state criminality and 
violence (and what role humanitarian institutions play) pertains to the reactions of the state to 
the population problems created by the circulation of capital. While we shall reserve a 
discussion of social resistance for Chapter Six, here we examine the oppressive character of 
state power that materialises in response to population challenges to accumulation by 
dispossession. The question is, how does the state respond to social threats and conflicts 
engendered by transnational capitalist relations? And what role do states play in enforcing 
boundaries between inclusion and exclusion to enable capitalist reproduction?  
In criminology, these questions have been considered from the standpoint of criminal 
labelling and crime control (Pearce, 1976; Taylor et al., 1973; Garland, 2001; Aas, 2007, 2013; 
Bowling, 2013; Aas and Bosworth, 2013; Bosworth and Aas, 2015). For both Marx and Engels, 
the state uses its definitions of legality to dole out harsh punishments to the working class 
when their acts confront the foundations of capitalist hegemony (Engels, 1845; Pearce, 1976). 
Marx noted that social conflicts generated by the gross inequalities of the capitalist system also 
developed the productive power of the state and industry. He wrote that ‘crime, through its 
constantly new methods of attack upon property, constantly calls into being new methods of 
defence’ (Marx, 1964, in Taylor et al., 1973, p. 224). In this line of theory, capitalist societies 
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are prone to constructing crime problems to deal with social conflicts and decline generated 
by capitalist processes of production. These crime constructions, in turn, justify a more 
sophisticated state architecture for surveillance and control of surplus populations, whose 
deviancy threatens capitalist reproduction, by revealing the material consequences of capitalist 
inequality (Pearce, 1976; Hillyard & Tombs, 2004; Taylor et al., 1973). 
Considering how states respond to population problems and threats benefits from 
bringing Marx’s critique of political economy into conversation with Foucauldian insights on 
population and bureaucratic modes of social control (see Bidet, 2016; Lasslett, 2018). Whereas 
Marx explains the human toll of market exploitation and the mechanics of this process, 
Foucault’s work focuses more broadly on how exploited populations living on the margins are 
dealt with at the government level. Foucault’s concepts are valued for producing an 
understanding of the rationales, strategies, and techniques involved in the governance of 
poverty and undesirable populations (Procacci, 1991). Populations may be violently oppressed 
by states, or they may suffer harm via the political strategies, discourses, and administrative 
logics of the state that uphold violent structures and conditions (Cooper & Whyte, 2017, p. 
3). The exercise of state power, in other words, may express itself in a variety of ways that are 
harmful and criminal.  
Foucault’s notion of governmentality is a conceptual device for understanding how 
surplus populations become dominated by organisational practice. Throughout his work, 
Foucault sustained interest in the capillary and productive nature of power, and in particular, 
the operation of power through accepted forms of knowledge and truth. Applying Foucault, 
we understand that ‘knowledge is linked to power, first because it assumes the authority of 
truth, and secondly, because it has the power to make itself true’ (Lilja, 2008, p. 25). 
Importantly, Foucault’s less centralised interpretation of power led him to consider relations 
of power arising from the historical governmentalization of the state (Foucault, 1991, p. 103). 
He reasoned that power was not located inside particular structures, per se, but could 
materialise through the discourse, practice, and techniques applied in governing subjects 
(Foucault, 2012a, 2012b). He described the character of modern governance as the ‘conduct 
of conduct’ because he perceived governmental practice as steering human subjects toward 
specific ends, or as Foucault put it, toward the ‘right manner of disposing of things’ (Foucault, 
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1991; see also Dean, 2010, p. 18). Building on Foucault’s insights, Walters (2012, p. 16) defines 
governmentality as the blending of practices around certain knowledge-power axes, which 
drive regimes of truth about the objects of governance. Since Foucault’s work emphasised that 
governance was the art of exercising power in the form of economy, we may also think of 
governmentality as the practices that coordinate the subordination of individuals to their 
specific class and geographical position (Foucault, 1991). 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality demystifies governmental practices that appear 
emancipatory and benign, but in reality, embed populations more firmly in relations of 
domination. It is relevant for explaining when and why certain populations become visible and 
targeted for outside intervention (Foucault, 1991, 2012a; Proccaci, 1991). Foucault’s work 
underscores that poor populations are not always discarded and repressed by states and 
dominant classes, as Marxist theory would suggest (Proccacci, 1991). Rather, the underclasses 
may also become political economy’s privileged subjects because they are sought out by 
regimes of governmental practice for social discipline and regulation. The state’s 
preoccupation with containing threatening sectors of the population becomes the impetus to 
know populations, correct their contaminating behaviours, and rule them in accordance with 
the rationalities of the market (Foucault, 1991, p. 100; Proccacci, 1991).  
Foucauldian theory has inspired empirical study of different bureaucratic apparatuses 
that arise explicitly to govern the “zone of unchecked social beings” and transform them into 
“economic men” and “social citizens” (Gordon, 1991). Foucault shows how the market exists 
not only as an abusive space, but also as a reference point for bureaucracies to interpret and 
resolve population problems (Foucault, 2004a). In transnational migration control and 
policing, Foucault’s work has been used to show the densification of forces in achieving state 
goals of population management (Georgi, 2010). It has usefully cast suspicion on the rising 
power of international organisations and bureaucracies, their oppressive practices, and their 
roles for narrowing people’s choices based on what the market determines can be known and 
possible (Foucault 1991, p. 92; Gordon, 1991; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2015; Geiger and 
Pecoud, 2010; Georgi, 2010). Thus, Foucault’s work also adds conceptual tools for 
investigating the discourses, actions, and behaviours of humanitarian organisations who are 




This chapter has set out the core theoretical concepts that inform the empirical 
investigation of harm and crime during Haiti’s reconstruction process. At the beginning of the 
chapter, the criminological significance of disasters and their misinterpretation in global 
discourses were reviewed. The current political framing of disasters treats them as natural and 
unpredictable events whose material and population effects can be managed through better 
forms of global governance. In contrast, critical criminology has traced the political-economic 
structures and human decision-making as a way of illustrating the patterns of organisational 
deviance behind preventable harms generated during disaster events and after.  
Though not explicitly focused on disasters, a growing body of criminological research 
has called attention to the social conflicts and patterns of crime that arise in reconstruction 
environments. This research emphasises that new crime patterns are especially influenced by 
political failures to hold powerful actors to account for crimes committed either before or 
during crisis periods.   
The chapter considered the basis of theoretical inquiry into patterns of crime in 
relation to the inter-workings of the global political economy, which are relevant to the study 
of disaster contexts. To that end, the chapter revisited Marx’s approach to political economy 
and his key proposition of capital as value in motion (Lasslett, 2018, p. 59). Marx’s overarching 
framework of processes of capitalist accumulation is useful for conceiving the embedded 
motivations and methods used by states and the capitalist class to achieve their goal of 
accumulation. This explanation also unpacks the role of the state and law in reproducing the 
conditions conducive to capital accumulation. Adding to this, Harvey’s framing of 
accumulation by dispossession exposes the logic of imperialist state practice shaped by 
capitalism’s processes of surplus-value extraction. Combined, both Harvey and Klein provide 
a rationale for why disasters and reconstruction environments are enticing opportunities for 
capital accumulation, in ways that incentivise harmful and criminal state-corporate practices. 
Understanding the state’s role and strategies of accumulation in relation to disasters also 
provides a way of scrutinising the state-humanitarian relationship during periods of disaster 
reconstruction. 
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Acknowledging the social vulnerability and conflict created by disasters, Foucault’s 
work offers another conceptual device for questioning how disaster victims are governed by 
states and humanitarian actors. Foucauldian ideas of governmentality highlight the diversity 
of state practices, techniques, and strategies that target populations deemed dangerous and out 
of place – showing how governance is another cartography of power (Walters, 2012, p. 140). 
He alludes to ways that disaster victims may experience less obvious forms of institutional 
domination in their struggle for social justice and for alternative ways of living. Foucault’s 
work reminds us that the struggles of disaster victims may in fact entail a struggle against the 
dominance of bureaucratic managerialism and its preferred styles of thinking, and its ways of 
achieving social conditions for the benefit of traditional agents of power. 
How then are humanitarian institutions entangled in the criminogenic structure of the 
political economy? Recalling Harvey, a core function of dominant states is to develop 
institutional arrangements that facilitate and preserve the asymmetrical social relations 
conducive to capital accumulation (Harvey, 2003, p. 132). His discussion of multilateral 
institutions (i.e. International Monetary Fund and World Bank) suggests that humanitarian 
institutions serve state interests in similar ways, such as engaging in practices or providing an 
institutional form that aids and deepens processes of “accumulation by dispossession.” 
Bearing this in mind, the repertoire of techniques and practices deployed by humanitarian 
organisations become important sites for interrogating their practices, their relationship with 
states, and their exercise of power over affected communities.  
In the next chapter, I pursue these lines of theoretical enquiry by examining the 
proximity of humanitarian organisations to the state, law, force, and violence, while subjecting 










Toward an Understanding of State-Humanitarian Harm and Crime 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the criminogenic characteristics of disasters, as 
well as post-disaster processes of reconstruction. Drawing on different theoretical approaches, 
I explored the ways in which disasters entice global capital and give life to new forms 
population control that are required to maximise opportunities for capital penetration. I also 
highlighted the essential role that the state plays in creating an enabling environment for 
“accumulation by dispossession.” Disasters thus provide opportunity structures for crime 
(especially housing/land-related crime as discussed in this thesis) as states, elites, and 
businesses seek to exploit moments of destruction to advance their goals for accumulation 
and production, despite the social needs of the affected population. Yet, as covered in the last 
chapter, state actors and their accomplices may not only resort to repressive means and 
conventional forms of violence to achieve their socially contentious goals. Disasters also 
produce strong incentives for the disciplinary control of disaster victims to organise 
populations according to the ‘right order of things’ as dictated by the laws of capital.  
Mindful of these theoretical assertions, this chapter probes the meaning, function, and 
outcomes of global humanitarian action in criminogenic reconstruction environments. It 
considers the substantial academic literature26 on global humanitarianism to provide an 
overview of the various ways that humanitarian organisations co-produce harm and crime, 
either through their interactions with states and other powerful actors, or via the way that 
humanitarian action is conducted. To accomplish this, the chapter begins by exploring the 
broader political-economic context that establishes and mediates the power of humanitarian 
organisations to intervene in the lives of crisis-affected people.  
Some of the literature in this regard suggests that humanitarian action is predicated on 
the interests of dominant states. The argument is that humanitarian organisations have 
historically served state goals in a variety of ways including temporarily alleviating the 
devastating effects of war or deepening the effects of neoliberal economic changes forced on 
                                                
26 The literature was drawn from political science, sociology, anthropology, law and forced migration studies. 
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peripheral states. In terms of its function and purpose, global humanitarianism in this view 
exists primarily to prop up an inherently exploitative capitalist system.  
Moving on from these perspectives, the chapter explores the routinized harms that are 
produced by an expanded and bureaucratic humanitarian system that has emerged with 
globalisation.27 I consider the implications of radical shifts in humanitarian practice that 
correspond to the way that humanitarian organisations have been co-opted into the peace, 
security, and development agendas of dominant states (i.e. the U.S.). One claim explored is 
that humanitarian organisations are increasingly under pressure to transcend traditional 
mandates that have previously limited their activities to emergency relief and the protection of 
civilians. Scholars argue that global humanitarianism is currently more politicised than ever 
before, with humanitarian organisations increasingly willing to undertake tasks that generate 
serious ethical challenges for them (Duffield, 2001; Weiss, 2013; Maren, 1997).  
The chapter concludes by considering the humanitarian marketplace and some of 
institutional drivers for unethical and criminal conduct. It discusses how the growing demand 
for humanitarian action by states has produced a highly competitive humanitarian industry 
with little state oversight or regulation. Some speculate that the more saturated the 
humanitarian marketplace has become, the more perverse incentives and harmful self-
interested conduct are seen (de Waal, 1997; Weiss, 2013). I look at the dynamics of supply and 
demand operating in the humanitarian industry that may motivate organisations to cross 
ethical lines, support questionable state policies, or prioritise organisational self-interest over 
the rights and safety of vulnerable populations.  
 Thus, to move toward a better understanding of humanitarian harm production and 
criminal activity, this chapter will consider different levels of analysis, and will evaluate the 
contribution of humanitarian organisation to harms that may be considered criminal (see 
Green & Ward, 2004, pp. 28–51; Kramer et al., 2002). In subsequent chapters, my empirical 
discussion of Haiti will draw from these different levels of analysis, and the empirical examples 
presented here that illuminate the criminogenic relationships between humanitarian 
organisations and states. As the reader engages with this chapter’s topic of humanitarian 
                                                
27 By globalisation, I mean the ‘growing interconnectedness of states and societies’ that affects the way that 
localities are shaped by global events and processes (and vice versa) (see Aas, 2013, p.4). 
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criminality, he or she may wish to consider two important questions: How do the criminal 
agendas of states define and interact with the goals of humanitarian organisations? What are 
some of the motivations and opportunity structures for humanitarian organisations to commit 
crimes that facilitate state interests? 
 
I. Problematizing Humanitarianism: An Overview 
The last four decades has seen a large amount of literature on the harmful social 
impacts of international humanitarian aid in situations of conflict and disasters (see, for 
example, Harrell-Bond, 1986; de Waal, 1997; Duffield, 2001, 2008; Branch, 2008; Agier, 2011; 
Barnett, 2011; Fassin, 2012; Donini, 2010; Kennedy, 2004; Foley, 2008; Boano, 2009; Feldman, 
2007; Schuller, 2012b, 2016; Collinson, 2016; Hyndman, 2009; Hilhorst, 2002; Hilhorst et al., 
2010; Walters, 2011; Rieff, 2003; Peake, 2013; Geiger and Pécoud, 2010). Humanitarian 
organisations have been accused of directly enabling and obscuring state crimes; entrenching 
elite power; dispossessing the most vulnerable; reproducing social inequalities; and advancing 
ideologies that underpin the global neoliberal project. There are numerous examples of 
humanitarian aid prolonging wars, destroying local economies, intensifying state violence, 
restricting population movements, and contributing to the creation of concentration camps 
(Slim, 2015, p. 184).  
Scholars have even claimed that entire populations in peripheral states are being 
systematically weakened as a result of their subordination to humanitarian care and relief (de 
Waal, 1997; Schuller, 2012b; Farmer et al., 2004). An example of this is given by Alex de Waal 
(1997), who traced the side-by-side effects of neoliberal economic policy and the expansion 
of humanitarian responsibility for famine relief and prevention. De Waal’s account shows how 
band-aid humanitarian relief played a crucial role in destroying the political contract between 
African governments and their citizens, which he argues was the underlying cause of 
preventable famines in countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia. Structural or institutional 
critiques of humanitarian work, such as de Waal’s, are supplemented with documented reports 
of individual-level crimes by humanitarian officials, involving fraud, corruption, and sexual 
abuse (Branch, 2008; Ewins et al., 2006). As well-demonstrated by the recent Oxfam sexual 
abuse case, senior staff of humanitarian organisations are commonly implicated in covering 
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up harms and crimes committed by staff members, in order to maintain their organisation’s 
favourable position in the humanitarian marketplace. 
 Despite the serious nature of these above-mentioned allegations, what makes 
humanitarianism instrumental to the exercise of state power, yet so elusive to criminological 
study, is its moral hegemony. Repeated concerns about the operation of the global 
humanitarian sector has done little to affect the number, size, power, or responsibilities of 
international humanitarian organisations. During the first decade of the post-Cold War period, 
humanitarian funding increased five-fold from US$800 million in 1989 to US$4.4 billion in 
1999 (Weiss, 2013, p. 72). In 2017, international humanitarian organisations received over 
US$25 billion in external funding from states and the private sector to provide their contracted 
services and products to people affected by crises (Collinson, 2016; ICVA, 2016). Weiss (2013, 
p. 73) estimates that from 2003 to 2013 donor governments spent over US$90 billion on 
humanitarian assistance. Not surprisingly, over one-third of this humanitarian aid was 
provided by the United States (2013, p. 73). The U.S. share of humanitarian funding is 
important because of its dominant role in facilitating the global flow of capital and reorganising 
state relations and local economies to its advantage (Harvey, 2003, Kiely, 2010). 
Corresponding to this financial trend, the United Nations has broadened the territorial 
access and legal mandates given to humanitarian organisations to respond to global patterns 
of poverty and violence (Duffield, 2001; Barnett, 2011). Until the 1990s, humanitarian 
organisations predominantly focused on alleviating human suffering in conflict-affected rural 
areas. Today, they respond to a whole range of global threats, including urban violence, 
climate-change migration, and unauthorised mixed movements of refugees, economic 
migrants, and asylum seekers (Kihato & Landeu, 2016; Andersson, 2014; Reid & Sending, 
2014; Duffield, 2001). The rapid growth in financial resources and expansion of humanitarian 
mandates evidences a clear demand by states for humanitarian action that can respond to 
global threats and work toward a unified economic space (Chimni, 2000). In parallel to this 
trend, each successive relief operation bolsters the authority, power, and resource base of 
humanitarian institutions (de Waal, 1997, p. 85). 
The international bodies, organisations, and professionals working in the humanitarian 
sector are aware of the criticism of their relationships with states and their asymmetrical power 
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relationships with local communities. Nevertheless, official reaction to academic or media 
criticism tends to emphasise the tenuous position of humanitarian organisations in crisis 
zones, as well as the repeated institutional efforts led by the United Nations to reform and 
professionalise the humanitarian sector (de Waal, 1997; see also Walker & Russ, 2011, p. 215). 
As many critics point out, humanitarian reform processes have generally failed to resolve 
serious gaps in organisational accountability and have not altered incentive structures 
promoting organisational complicity with state crimes (Collinson, 2016, p. 1; Duffield, 2001; 
de Waal, 1997; Weiss, 2013). Scholars frequently attribute the lack of regulatory or behaviour 
change in the humanitarian sector to the institutional and political conditions that benefit from 
the current structure of humanitarian action (see de Waal, 1997, pp. 79–82; Donini, 2010).  
The humanitarian sector is able to mask its systemic flaws by its close and complex 
links with states, academics, and human rights advocates and organisations. Regimes of 
knowledge created around humanitarian action have been complicit in silencing victims and 
whitewashing organisational failures (Chimni, 2000; Malkki, 1996; Polzer and Hammond, 
2008). No matter how often humanitarian organisations fail to deliver on their objectives, or 
participate in the commission and omission of acts that lead to the violation of human rights, 
they have largely managed to retain their privileged position as capable and expert international 
institutions guided by universal liberal values. Their privileged position is related to the liberal 
assumption that international institutions play an esteemed role in championing normative 
values, solving collective problems, and building the capacity of under-developed states and 
civil societies (see Chandler, 2001; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). The media also tends to 
represent humanitarian organisations as compassionate, impartial, and problem-solving 
institutions (de Waal, 1997).  
For these reasons, much academic literature on humanitarian action has identified and 
referred to humanitarian institutions as protection actors. That is, they protect people from harm 
and are not related to acts of harm (see Cohen & Deng, 1998; Mooney, 2002, 2005; Orchard, 
2010; Ferris, 2011). Global discussions of humanitarianism and protection make explicit 
reference to vulnerable groups whose governments cannot or will not protect them, making a 
case for humanitarian organisations to address unmet needs and protection concerns (Ferris, 
2011, p.4, 66). The positive connotation of the term “protection actors” bestows considerable 
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legitimacy on the actions and governing styles of humanitarian organisations (Ferris, 2011). It 
reinforces the view that humanitarian organisations are capable actors and operate separately 
from states. Humanitarian organisations are thus credited with creating a buffer zone between 
needy populations and a range of deviant local actors who may wish to harm them (Orchard, 
2010). The general impression is that humanitarian interests and the interests of crisis-affected 
populations are aligned.  
The saviour/protector characterisation of humanitarian organisations detracts from 
broader structural questions pertaining to the role of humanitarian organisations and impact 
of short-term, emergency relief. It also suppresses consideration of non-institutional forms of 
human welfare that may be better suited to alleviating human suffering (such as debt relief, 
reparation, land redistribution, etc.). Even vigorous critics of humanitarian conduct largely 
refrain from assessing the overall desirability of humanitarian institutions, choosing instead to 
promote regulation, transparency, and accountability as methods for stemming harmful 
humanitarian conduct and the development of collusive relations with states (see, for example, 
Slim, 2015). 
At both an organisational and UN-level, routine attempts are made to deflect blame 
and responsibility for the harmful outcomes of humanitarian activity, allowing organisations 
to evade punishment or even dissolution. Humanitarian narratives of denial usually plead 
ignorance or beg clemency from the global public for acts or events that may have gone wrong 
in the pursuit of noble humanitarian goals (de Waal, 1997, p. 65). Within academic and policy 
discourses on international humanitarianism, a common set of defences that justify the 
harmful consequences of humanitarian action include:28  
• Humanitarian organisations lacked knowledge of the context and 
therefore made bad decisions.  
• Humanitarian organisations lacked resources and authority to do their 
jobs properly.  
• Humanitarian organisations unintentionally engaged in poor 
coordination with other actors, such as local communities, states, and 
other aid providers.  
• Humanitarian organisations’ hands were tied by local state authorities. 
• Humanitarian organisations simply had difficulty navigating real-
world constraints in the delivery of aid or development of policies.  
                                                
28 The bulleted list is drawn from Bell (2007, p. 2), Collinson (2016), Ferris (2011), and Slim (2015). 
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As we might suspect from this list, the proponents of humanitarian action see examples 
of “bad humanitarianism” as one-off defects that can be corrected through standardisation, 
professionalisation, and reform (Duffield, 2001). Especially amongst humanitarians 
themselves, culpability for bad humanitarianism is absolved through what Edward Said raised 
about ‘orientalist’29 discourses about ‘the other’. As some have observed, humanitarian 
institutions often show passive acceptance for the harms and human rights violations caused 
by their conduct by protesting that such outcomes were unavoidable in the dark and dangerous 
working world of the global south (de Waal, 1997; Duffield, 2001).30  
 Denial plays an important role in obscuring humanitarian harm and crime, and 
humanitarian defence and denial strategies are discussed in Chapter Eight. However, it is 
worth noting here that there are documented cases of humanitarian organisations 
spearheading or participating in criminal cover-ups. For example, Alex de Waal (1997) 
describes how the UN Emergency Office for Ethiopia (UNEOE) coordinated a system-wide 
cover-up of the Ethiopian state’s diversion of food relief and its perpetration of serious human 
rights violations. De Waal suggests this was done to maintain public confidence in the UN-
led relief operation and to preserve the UN’s close working relationship with the Ethiopian 
state. According to de Waal, UNEOE refused to report the theft of its food relief by the 
Ethiopian military and actively prevented a meaningful evaluation of the famine relief and 
prevention activities. They also hid how international NGOs were complicit in executing the 
government’s forced resettlement of people from famine-affected areas (de Waal, 1997). 
 
II. Defining International Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Organisations 
To speak of humanitarian crime and state-humanitarian crime requires a brief 
explanation of the subject matter under scrutiny. It must be recognised that humanitarianism 
is a contested concept, characterised by different definitions and ontological perspectives 
                                                
29 Said’s (1978) concept of Orientalism showed the various ways that Western cultural representations 
misrepresent non-Western people, exaggerate the West’s superiority, and are used in practices of political 
domination.     
30 We are reminded of Frantz Fanon’s (2001) insights on the Western construction of ‘the native’ during 
colonisation and decolonisation. The detached complicity of humanitarian actors for harms they have caused 
thrives off victim-blaming and racialized portraits of global south incivility (Fanon, 2001; Smirl, 2015). 
Humanitarians may even justify the adverse outcomes of aid by claiming that aid beneficiaries were lucky to receive 
any help at all from their stronger, more civilised caregivers (Smirl, 2015).  
	 59 
(Walters, 2011). Scholars have described humanitarianism as an ideology (Chimni, 2000; 
Donini, 2010; Fassin, 2012); an organisational identity (Collinson, 2016; Manzo, 2008); a 
regulatory apparatus (Agier, 2011; Collinson, 2016); a field of governmental practices (Walters, 
2011; Duffield, 2001; Fassin, 2012); and an industry (Andersson, 2014; Krause, 2014; Weiss, 
2013). Entering the definitional debate, Weiss (2013, p. 10) states: ‘humanitarianism (noun) 
consists of actions to improve human well-being or welfare, a humanitarian (noun) is a person 
who actively promotes human welfare, and humanitarian (adj.) usually means philanthropic or 
charitable.’  
Substantive debate over what constitutes humanitarian action produces different 
perspectives of the nature and purpose of such action, as well as disagreement over what type 
of organisation can legitimately label themselves as humanitarian (Donini, 2010). For example, 
private companies may attach the term “humanitarian” to their for-profit activities in 
humanitarian supply chains (Barnett, 2011; Weiss, 2013, pp. 42–48). 
The composition of the international humanitarian system, and the range of practices 
that qualify as humanitarian, has shifted over time. Scholars recognise that different forms of 
humanitarian activity were dominant in different historical periods, as influenced by the 
political-economic interests of dominant states (Barnett, 2011; Chimni, 2010). Barnett (2011) 
marks out three distinct forms of humanitarian action: imperial humanitarianism (18th century 
to 1918); neo-humanitarianism (1949–1992); and liberal humanitarianism (1992– present). The 
present humanitarian system is frequently described as oligopolistic in composition (ALNAP, 
2018). Weiss (2013) clarifies that at present a handful of UN agencies (e.g., UNHCR) and 
fifteen to twenty major international NGOs headquartered in the U.S. and Europe (e.g., 
Oxfam, MSF, Save the Children) dominate the humanitarian field in terms of activities and 
resource mobilisation. In 2015, five international NGOs accounted for 31% of global 
humanitarian expenditures (ALNAP, 2018). 
The fluid conceptual boundaries around humanitarian action gives scholars pause 
about becoming overly deductive in their analyses of humanitarian power relations. In other 
words, not all humanitarian action can be considered intrinsically criminogenic, and some 
organisations may be more prone to criminality than others (Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002). 
Though dominant forms of humanitarianism have produced easily recognisable harmful 
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consequences, there is a rich history of alternative humanitarian practices that have resisted 
politicization by states and served to counter state power (Barnett, 2011, p. 55; Slim, 2015). A 
good example is the recent acts of private citizens in Europe who, in the name of humanitarian 
solidarity, have risked criminalisation by assisting vulnerable migrants and asylum seekers to 
safely cross borders and pursue asylum claims.31 David Kennedy reminds us that there are 
multiple forms of humanitarian practice, including ‘humanitarianisms of the left and the right, 
of the establishment and the margin, and everything in between. There are humanitarianisms 
of Europe, of Africa, of the global, and of the local’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. xv).  
The internal structure of humanitarian organisations differs in terms of their ethos and 
normative values, with different organisational models and forms of engagement (Donini, 
2010). Academic study of organisational practice has tended to distinguish between emergency 
humanitarianism and alchemical humanitarianism (Barnett, 2011). Emergency humanitarian 
organisations – such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – are strongly 
committed to their original mission of saving lives and limit their actions to this goal. They 
strictly interpret and adhere to the four core principles of humanitarian action: humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Ferris, 2011). In contrast, alchemical humanitarian 
organisations are willing to bend core humanitarian principles in order to address the root 
causes of human suffering (Barnett, 2011). Scholars have sometimes presented this latter 
category of humanitarianism as one that has “mandate issues” or “boundary problems” (Slim, 
2015). They are more likely to face ethical tensions in carrying out their work (Slim, 2015), 
largely because such organisations are more easily incorporated into state security agendas 
(Duffield, 2001). 
There are some common characteristics amongst the larger, Western-run humanitarian 
organisations. Many of them can trace their foundations to Christian beliefs and the civilising 
mission of the Enlightenment (Donini, 2010). With some exceptions, most humanitarian 
organisations receive the majority of their resources from dominant states, and increasingly 
seek private funding from corporate philanthropists (Slim, 2015). As alluded to above, some 
                                                
31 Examples are outlined in a report by the Institute of Race Relations, “Humanitarianism: The Unacceptable 




of these organisations have a hidden history of participation in colonial administrations (Slim, 
2015, p. 10). Especially in large humanitarian organisations, humanitarian personnel are often 
accused of living colonial lifestyles, and having voyeuristic and risk-taking behaviours (Slim, 
2015, p. 11; Roth, 2014). In her study of the behaviour of humanitarian personnel, Roth (2014, 
p. 7) writes that “Aidland” is filled with foreign staff drawn to ‘living and working…on the 
edge.’ Similarly, Smirl’s (2015, p. 40) research finds that aid workers tend to see everything 
around them as ‘dangerous and polluting.’ This perception, she contends, has fortified a 
number of physical enclosures around the aid worker experience that are meant to keep the 
aid worker safe from exaggerated security threats (see also Dandoy, 2013). Smirl (2015) details 
how the daily experience of aid workers entails constant movement from the car, to the 
compound, to the hotel, giving humanitarian workers minimal face-to-face contact with the 
people under their care. 
Analysing humanitarian and state-humanitarian crime requires coming to terms with 
the different elements and interrelationships that comprise the global humanitarian system. 
While a deep dive into the different components of the global humanitarian sector is beyond 
the scope of this thesis (see, for example, Collinson, 2016; Currion, 2018), there are a few 
points helpful for criminological analysis. The first is that the humanitarian sector is poorly 
regulated. There are no real barriers of entry into the humanitarian field, meaning that an 
organisation can designate itself as humanitarian and operate as such with minimal interference 
(Donini, 2010). Furthermore, there are serious gaps in international law to govern the conduct 
of international organisations and provide recourse to victims of abuse (Ferstman, 2017). Most 
humanitarian organisations are left to operate according to internal and international codes of 
humanitarian conduct, making their adherence to those rules largely a matter of self-
enforcement (Slim, 2015; Ferstman, 2017). Donor governments and the states in which 
humanitarian organisations work have little incentive to monitor humanitarian behaviour and 
enforce normative codes, especially since they often influence the direction or boundaries of 
humanitarian activity (Weiss, 2013). 
The second important point to note is that organisations that explicitly call themselves 
“humanitarian” during times of emergencies frequently identify themselves with other labels 
(such as a development or migration organisation) (Collinson, 2016, p. 1). Chimni (2000, p. 3) 
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claims that the multiple and vague identities of organisations contribute to their lack of scrutiny 
and manipulative use by states. Others see the fluid identities of organisations as a problematic 
by-product of aid industry competition, whereby organisations broaden their mandates to 
increase their share of the aid market regardless of their commitments, experience, or capacity 
(Currion, 2018). There are also clear hierarchies in the global humanitarian sector that can 
affect the diffusion of unethical and criminal conduct. As David Rieff (2003) illustrates in the 
Bosnian experience, UNHCR’s ability to command the lion’s share of donor resources bred 
conformity amongst other NGOs reliant on its funding and subcontracts. Rieff suggests that 
these dynamics kept humanitarian organisations from speaking out or resisting the population 
containment strategies designed by the UNHCR (and major donors) to keep Bosnians from 
leaving the country as refugees, leading to significant loss of life. 
The global humanitarian system can be viewed as a network of organisations or as a 
coordinated institutional structure.32 Specific networks and institutions of collaboration exist 
for the protection of refugees, migrants, and internally displaced people, who are often 
targeted for social control. The ensemble of international humanitarian organisations is 
referred to as a system to denote harmonised goals, normative values, streamlined practices, 
and mechanisms of interdependence amongst organisations carrying out humanitarian work 
(Collinson, 2016, p. 7). The “system” terminology also signifies that humanitarian 
organisations increasingly offer specialized and interrelated functions within the ecosystem of 
humanitarian aid (Collinson, 2016, p. 7). For example, some humanitarian organisations have 
technical expertise in food assistance, while others claim to specialize in the management of 
displacement camps.  
Recognising these nuances is valuable for understanding that organisations play 
different roles within system-wide humanitarian responses. As such, some organisations may 
be more or less prone to norm-breaking conduct than others, based on the specific 
motivations for illegitimate activity within their respective area of work. While criminologists 
may discover individual cases of organisational deviance, they may also find that the entire 
humanitarian sector has participated in defending or normalising that deviancy (Collinson, 
                                                
32 The United Nations Cluster System, which allocates responsibility to different UN agencies according to 
sectors of humanitarian relief (e.g., water and sanitation), is an example of a coordination structure (see Chapter 
4). 
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2016, p. 13). It should therefore be emphasised that different organisations may embody 
different degrees of complicity in state crime, depending on their activities and participation 
in public discourse. 
 
III. The Criminological Dimensions of Humanitarian Action 
The remainder of this chapter presents different conceptual perspectives on the power, 
politics, and propensity of humanitarian organisations for harmful behaviour. The following 
sections discuss both the form of humanitarian organisations as well as the political and market 
factors that shape organisational behaviours. 
 
 III.I Humanitarianism and the state: ideology and co-optation. 
One way to place humanitarian organisations on the criminological agenda is to 
scrutinise the humanitarian form and its structural/ideological relationship to the criminal 
activity of states (as discussed in Chapter One). As mentioned, major humanitarian 
organisations are usually dependent on dominant states (such as the U.S. and Britain) or blocs 
of states (i.e. the European Union) for funding, and on the states in which they are intervening 
for authorisation and access to local communities – with some noticeable exceptions.33 These 
conditions of dependency can lead to ethical dilemmas for humanitarian organisations.  
In the past, humanitarian organisations have been accused of maintaining silence about 
atrocities for fear of upsetting states and jeopardising their access and ability to perform their 
humanitarian activities (Weiss, 2013). Humanitarian organisations commit to principles of 
neutrality and impartiality, and are encouraged to avoid justice-related issues in the delivery of 
their services (Chimni, 2000; Harvey, 2014). Through their commitment to state sovereignty 
and their dependence on states, they are structurally designed to operate ‘without ever 
interfering in the further accumulation of the wealth from which they derive their sustenance’ 
(Harvey, 2014, p. 296). 
                                                
33 For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) claims that it rarely takes funds from governments or businesses 




Historically, humanitarian organisations have become the witting and unwitting agents 
in the implementation of interventionist state policies that help expand or restore the flow of 
transnational capital (Chimni, 2000). There is a long colonial history of collusive relationships 
between states and humanitarian organisations in perpetrating large-scale theft – to the extent 
that some historians have described humanitarian organisations as the unofficial arm of 
colonial policies (Lischer, 2007, p. 108; Davey et al, 2013; Skinner & Lester, 2012). For 
example, in the past, humanitarian organisations provided health services to exploited colonial 
labourers as a means of guaranteeing their physical fitness for hard labour (Davey et. al., 2013). 
Humanitarians were also primary agents for delivering “civilising education” to indigenous 
populations. In that role, humanitarians promoted colonial values, conducted surveillance on 
local communities, and diffused potential rebellions against the colonial order (Barnett, 2011, 
p. 55). During the Cold War, humanitarian organisations were often co-opted into anti-
communist state strategies. For example, the UN High Commission of Refugees was created 
and almost named the Democracies Emigration Organization because of the way Western 
states planned to use the multilateral agency (and refugees from communist countries) to win 
their territorial battle with the Soviet Union (Harrell-Bond, 1985).  
More recently, humanitarian agencies have been criticised for legitimising state 
counter-terrorism strategies in Afghanistan and crimes of aggression in Iraq (Foley, 2008). 
Foley describes the close links between the delivery of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and 
US-British military operations to the extent that humanitarian needs assessments were 
sometimes used for intelligence gathering purposes (2008, pp. 110–18). Humanitarian 
organisations also contravened their principles of neutrality and impartiality by allowing the 
occupying forces and foreign donors to dictate areas of humanitarian assistance (those with 
strategic value to counter-insurgency operations) and to threaten withdrawal of assistance to 
Afghan populations that refused to report insurgents (2008, p. 111). Humanitarian action 
therefore constituted an important element of the state’s counter-insurgency strategy.  
In transit centres and detention centres around the world, UN agencies and 
humanitarian NGOs lend their staff and services to states in the selection, processing, and 
management of refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers. In these instances, Agier (2011) argues 
that international humanitarian institutions are complicit in implementing the state’s 
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criminalisation and imprisonment of vulnerable populations. By accepting to work in these 
spaces of imprisonment, humanitarian organisations “humanise” the state’s control strategies 
(Agier, 2011, p. 49). The consequence of their actions is to reinforce a range of harms to 
detained people that arise from the hierarchical relations, violence, and abuse of power 
characteristic of spaces of imprisonment (Agier, 2011, p. 52). This clearly demonstrates the 
potential for humanitarian organisations to act as a force multiplier of imperial power (Lischer, 
2007). For those that see humanitarian organisations as a creation of the state (such as 
UNHCR), and a constituent element of imperial state power, the view is that humanitarian 
organisations directly benefit the state (Chomsky, 2012; Hardt & Negri, 2001; Walker & 
Maxwell, 2009).  
Adding to this, the expansion of humanitarian organisations has resulted in a large 
staffing and resource base that can be mobilised within days or even hours. These 
organisations are present around the globe and are equipped with knowledge, language, and 
access to local communities by nature of their ongoing or previous operations. They are 
primed for immediate deployment to crisis zones and can immediately assess and help stabilise 
the situation on the ground, helping states and corporations ‘prepare the terrain for the return 
of international industry and finance’ (Donini, 2010, p. 229). States benefit from humanitarian 
intelligence, logical and technical capacity, as well as its ability to win “hearts and minds” in 
the places of state intervention (Foley, 2008). Agier (2011, p. 200) captures the state-
humanitarian relationship when he writes: ‘There is a hand that strikes and a hand that heals.’ 
States can also leverage humanitarian action when they are unwilling to intervene and prevent 
mass atrocities. Rieff (2008) maintains that Bosnia’s international humanitarian response was 
a classic example of Western states substituting the delivery of humanitarian aid for political 
involvement to stop the war. Their manipulation of humanitarian action, he contends, severely 
restricted humanitarian activities and pushed organisations into supporting strategies for 
refugee containment. 
Critical scholars have placed significance on the ideological function of humanitarian 
organisations, especially in aiding dominant states to develop their right to breach international 
principles of state sovereignty (Chomsky, 2012). During the 1990s, several large humanitarian 
organisations headquartered in Britain and the U.S. advocated for international military 
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interventions to address serious humanitarian crises (Foley, 2008, p. 4). Together with states 
and human rights advocates, humanitarian organisations claimed that human rights principles 
justified the right of states to challenge the principle of state sovereignty when a particular 
state had failed to protect its people. These ideas have now been recognised as the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. Critics nevertheless point out that in the current 
political and military context, challenges to state sovereignty will only ever come from 
powerful states to weaker ones (Chomsky, 2012; Chandler, 2001; Bricmont, 2007). As Noam 
Chomsky notes: ‘Nobody expects Bangladesh to interfere in the internal affairs of the United 
States in order to force it to reduce its CO2 emissions, which threaten to drown large parts of 
that Asian country’ (2012, p. v). Examples of dominant states exerting their right to 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and Iraq show how such doctrines are easily manipulated 
to mask the harmful motivations of states (see Whyte, 2010).  
 These observations demonstrate the broader uses of humanitarian ideology by states 
to obscure and reframe their own criminality (Harvey, 2015; Chimni, 2000). As we shall see in 
Haiti, by funding humanitarian organisations to deliver relief, states can distract social 
audiences from their role in crimes, and as a result, claim moral superiority. States often employ 
humanitarian organisations to rescue the very people harmed by their (the state’s) criminal 
activities, rendering humanitarian organisations complicit in the legitimation of their violence. 
Currently, there is no better example of this than the British government’s largely illicit arms 
trade with Saudi Arabia, which has helped created a humanitarian crisis for 21 million 
Yemenis.34 Although the U.K. is complicit in Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign in Yemen, 
through its sale of more than US$6 billion in arms, the U.K.’s Department of International 
Development (DFID) routinely publishes self-congratulatory reports about its role as one of 
Yemen’s largest humanitarian donors.35 Meanwhile, humanitarian organisations have taken 
funding from Saudi Arabia for relief operations and have allegedly agreed to provide good 
                                                
34 Amnesty International investigations conclude that the British government has broken many of its own laws 
in its sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia. See, for example, Amnesty International, “Exposed: British Made Bombs 
Used on Civilian Targets in Yemen,” 8 October 2018. Accessed on 2 January 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/exposed-british-made-bombs-used-civilian-targets-yemen  




publicity for the Saudi government in exchange for financial support.36 Global south states 
responsible for human suffering have also learned to benefit and re-shape their public images 
through their adoption of humanitarian language and integration into humanitarian relief 
operations (de Waal, 1997).  
Finally, powerful states benefit from humanitarian ideology in other ways. Some 
critical scholars maintain global humanitarian ideology sustains the global capitalist order in 
two main ways (Harvey, 2014; Chimni, 2000). First, humanitarianism is manipulated to 
incorporate new territories and spaces into the capitalist system (Harvey, 2014). Second, global 
humanitarianism offers states a minimalist way of responding to the harms caused by 
predatory capitalism (Harvey, 2014). The claims is that aid provides extra-economic, life-
saving activity that can facilitate capitalist reproduction (Zizek, 2008). Harvey (2014) points 
out that the core contradiction in humanitarian ideology by showing that life-saving relief has 
little value when the intention is to re-subordinate people’s lives to the interests of states and 
capital. Often, as Harvey and others explain, capitalist solutions are mobilised as the solution 
to humanitarian crises (Chimni, 2000).  
  
III.II. Humanitarianism as Global Governmentality. 
 Unconvinced that modern forms of institutionalised humanitarianism can be simply 
reduced to the interests of economically dominant states, some scholars have probed global 
humanitarianism as a constituent aspect of global liberal governance (see Duffield, 2001, 2008; 
Chandler, 2001; Agier, 2011, 2013; Fassin, 2012). This view still sees a connection between 
humanitarianism and imperial state power, but draws on Foucauldian concepts to flesh out 
the institutionalised nature of humanitarian power and its disempowering effects. Sometimes, 
the term “humanitarian government” is invoked to articulate the toxic blend of dominant 
knowledge and techniques of control that humanitarianism brings to the field (Walters, 2011; 
Agier, 2011). The harm caused by humanitarian organisations is therefore understood as a 
                                                
36 Wintor, P. “Saudis demanded good publicity over Yemen aid, leaked UN document shows,” 30 October 2018. 




consequence of their bureaucratic and undemocratic modes of operation which diminish 
people’s freedom and autonomy (see Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002, p. 26). 
Critics thus claim that an increasingly bureaucratic form of humanitarianism is 
strategically leveraged by states – as a form of liberal power – to operationalize their securitisation 
agendas (Duffield, 2001). Moreover, they see humanitarian bureaucracies as integral to the 
operation of global governance, and therefore complicit in delivering states’ integrated goals 
of security, pro-capitalist development, and population containment. 
Central to this argument is the observation that a more intrusive humanitarian system 
has emerged over the last three decades in response to political and institutional trends 
associated with globalisation (Duffield, 2001; Chandler, 2001; Barnett, 2011; Chimni, 2001). 
This entails a basic understanding that predatory capitalist development, and its emphasis on 
neoliberal governance, has ignited state anxieties about deteriorating social conditions and the 
human toll of economic-political changes. Essentially, mass underdevelopment, reduced state 
capacity,37 and precarious patterns of migration in the global south have raised fears about the 
looming insecurity of the periphery and its threats to the metropole (Duffield, 2001; Agier, 2011). 
Instead of seeing these unpalatable outcomes as the result of state-capitalist forms of 
criminality, dominant states blame local criminality, inferiority, and disorder as they seek to 
correct it (Duffield, 2001, 2008). As Duffield puts it, the threat of the “uninsured life” has 
prompted demands from hegemonic liberal governments for deeper social forms of social 
regulation and control. This does not imply that globalised capital has abandoned its main aim 
to exclude. Rather, as Duffield interjects: ‘the idea of underdevelopment as dangerous and 
destabilising [also] provides a justification for continued surveillance and engagement [of the 
global south].’ Economically dominant states are therefore impelled to both repressively police 
“states of exception” as well as identify and treat capital’s destructive effects to ensure that 
risks to political-economic arrangements are minimised (Duffield, 2008, pp. 147–48; 
Agamben, 1998). 
The intensified need for state security has fostered an expanded global architecture 
built on the twin goals of security and development. They have brought together governments, 
                                                
37 By “reduced state capacity” I am referring to an outcome produced by retrenchment of the welfare state under 
neoliberal transition. See Comaroff and Comaroff (2009). 
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militaries, private companies, humanitarian and development organisations, and multilateral 
institutions to implement state agendas. As a consequence, humanitarian organisations are 
more likely today than ever before, to work side-by-side with militaries, private corporations, 
and neoliberal multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (Duffield, 2001). These 
emerging relationships demonstrate how state securitisation goals are realised not only through 
population containment policies, but also through disciplinary-aid approaches that seek to 
correct the behaviours of deviant states and populations, and promote the latter’s self-reliance 
on the market (Duffield, 2008). 
State demands for deepening institutional interventions are also connected to the 
creation of liberal peace. This is what Duffield describes as the function of international 
institutions to diffuse local discontent with globalisation by expressing solidarity with excluded 
populations and aiding them to ‘right their grievances in a peaceful way’ (Duffield, 2001, p. 
126). Bearing these dynamics in mind, humanitarian organisations have become more 
susceptible to unethical and criminal conduct because they have increasingly assumed state 
functions that ‘restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially 
threatening life’ (Duffield, 2008, p. 146).  
The restructuring of the global humanitarian sector has also made humanitarian 
organisations more open to criminal complicity, because they have been encouraged to go 
beyond their original mandates and principles (Chandler, 2001; Donini, 2010; Duffield, 2001). 
It is argued by critical humanitarian scholars that institutional changes after the Cold War have 
prompted humanitarian organisations to venture into “unconventional spaces of government” 
in the state-sponsored, security-development nexus (Ong, 2006, p. 75). Notably during the 
ethnic conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s, the humanitarian sector began to publically advertise 
its commitments to human rights and ethical practice, which had a transformative influence 
on the sector and how it was appreciated by states (Chandler, 2001).  
Several states, legal advocates, and humanitarian organisations have argued that 
humanitarian work should transcend principles of neutrality and adopt more politicized, 
rights-based agendas in crisis zones (Chandler, 2001). Humanitarian proponents of human 
rights claimed the sector had a higher moral purpose than saving lives and could also help 
protect and realise individual human rights (Chandler, 2001). More recently, humanitarianism’s 
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rights-based rhetoric coupled with visceral media images of human suffering, have stimulated 
humanitarian organisations to expand the range of their activities to take on more 
development-oriented functions, including those of local governments who are seen to be 
failing (Chandler, 2001; Duffield, 2001).  
Professionalisation38 of the entire humanitarian sector has created a new appreciation 
for technocratic solutions and capacity building. Increasingly, states perceive humanitarian 
organisations as experts capable of global problem-solving (Weiss, 2013). While many of these 
institutional changes have been undertaken in good faith, they may have reshaped 
humanitarianism as a tool of international regulation. States have pushed humanitarians farther 
into ‘the networks and strategic complexes that make up liberal peace’ (Duffield, 2001, p. 88).  
III.IIa. Bureaucratic humanitarianism and the potential for harm and crime 
The role of humanitarian organisations in state security and development agendas has 
precipitated noticeable shifts in their governing styles and practices. In this section, I will 
unpack the extreme power imbalances that have materialised with the growth of the 
humanitarian system and its closer relationships with states, corporations, and multilateral 
institutions, including some of the harmful organisational behaviours that these political 
changes have incentivised. On the one hand, the demand for a more rights-based, 
professionalised humanitarian sector that can operate on a grand scale has resulted in more 
standardisation in humanitarian projects and policies. At the same time, the growing 
expectations of humanitarian organisations has put a massive strain on their abilities to deliver, 
arguably weakening adherence to international standards and codes of conduct (Barnett, 
2001).  
One result of the transformation of the humanitarian sector is the deployment of 
highly unrepresentative decision-making structures that are prone to dismiss local knowledge, 
roles, and values, despite the fact that humanitarian codes of conduct emphasise local 
participation and empowerment in aid decision-making (Collinson, 2016, p. 11; Slim, 2015). 
Within the more standardised global humanitarian sector, populations in flood-affected 
                                                
38 See Ferris (2011) on the platforms, forums, and committees designed to improve humanitarian performance 
and ethical behavior. 
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Philippines, for example, may easily become subject to the same range of humanitarian 
interventions developed for earthquake-affected populations in Pakistan.  
That vulnerable populations have little power to reject or question humanitarian 
assistance or arrangements imposed on them – or even propose alternatives – becomes 
problematic when considering the hegemonic values and ideologies that shape humanitarian 
practices. Standardised humanitarian practices are clearly bound by capitalist ideologies and 
human rights norms and hierarchies, such as the protection of private property rights (Donini, 
2010; Chandler & Reid, 2016). The bureaucratised humanitarian sector can be viewed as a 
major global force contributing to the transmission of criminal value systems, especially in 
helping the capitalist state neutralise value systems that are antithetical to its interests (Rothe 
& Mullins, 2009, p. 12). Prescribed international solutions for humanitarian problems are 
regularly depicted as responsible for de-politicising class conflicts, quashing social movements, 
and reinforcing socio-economic patterns that cause conflict or disaster-related harms (Donini, 
2010). It has been argued that because the bureaucratised humanitarian system values 
expediency and efficiency, it is inclined to work through existing power dynamics and breach 
normative standards (Agier, 2011). 
Modern institutional humanitarianism has sometimes been characterised as the ‘hunt 
for the undesirables’ (Agier, 2011, p. 148). The global humanitarian sector is described as 
obsessed with monitoring human movements and “datafying” populations that appear out of 
place (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016). Over the last two decades, the U.S., Australia, and 
European states have provided significant funding to intergovernmental organisations and 
large NGOs to develop tools of population surveillance, including drone capabilities, 
biometrics, and networks of informants to provide regular information on the land and sea 
movements of vulnerable and unauthorised populations (Sandvik et. al., 2014). Agier (2011) 
contends that the newly created investigative powers of humanitarian organisations is part of 
what articulates humanitarianism as a function of state control. Little has stopped this 
information, which is ostensibly gathered to perfect the humanitarian delivery of protection 
and assistance, from reaching state systems of surveillance and border security (Duffield, 
2016). 
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As humanitarian organisations have become more bureaucratised, they have become 
implicated in implementing state juridical orders that are entwined with capitalist interests 
(Agier, 2011). Humanitarian organisations play a functional role in preserving the 
territorial/wealth divide between states and legitimising rights-based hierarchies by accepting 
state legal categories, identifying populations according to them, and promoting distinctions 
in entitlements according to the state’s construction and enforcement of its legal 
responsibilities (Chimni, 2000). In this manner, they have been accused of misusing their 
powers of categorisation to achieve organisational goals, such as reducing the number of 
populations that can claim humanitarian assistance (Zetter, 2007). This misuse of power 
pertains to the way that modern humanitarian relief involves their “adopting” of groups of 
beneficiaries and taking responsibility for them (Agier, 2011, p. 155).  
Sometimes, states directly outsource their function in screening the claims of people 
for whom they have responsibility (e.g., refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, 
etc.), which some have viewed as the state distancing itself from its illegal activities (Barnett, 
2001). Intergovernmental organisations, such as the UNHCR and IOM, are two 
intergovernmental institutions that regularly assume state functions in screening and rejecting 
population claims. As a result, they may be directly implicated in the withdrawal or denial of 
assistance and the violation of human rights of people whose claims for assistance and 
protection have been deemed unacceptable, unworthy, or illegitimate by the state (Agier, 
2011).  
Scholars asserting that humanitarian organisations are increasingly implicated in state 
containment strategies often base their analysis on the socio-spatial formation of the 
displacement camp. According to Agier (2011, p. 81), humanitarian-managed camps ‘bring 
together [state-humanitarian] mechanisms of power, categorisation, filing, control and 
imprisonment.’ While camps are spaces that have been created by humanitarian organisations 
to recognise victimhood and provide aid, they operate as spaces that sit outside normative 
arrangements. The claim is often that camp management roles have forced humanitarian 
organisations to simultaneously undertake functions of investigation, care, and policing of 
surplus populations. In that sense, camps embody Agamben’s (1998) “state of exception” as 
zones, where the rule of law is suspended according to the will of the sovereign. Camps are 
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therefore fertile ground for human rights abuse and dehumanisation of victims, not least 
because populations are regularly treated with suspicion by humanitarian camp managers.  
In Managing the Undesirables, Agier (2011) catalogues examples of harms observed in 
humanitarian-managed camps that fit definitions of humanitarian crime and state-
humanitarian crime. These include: the deliberate withdrawal or strategic distribution of aid 
based on state/organisational self-interest, physical violence or facilitation of violence against 
populations demanding alternative forms of aid; the criminalisation/withdrawal of aid to so-
called profiteers who in fact represent populations to whom the state has criminally denied 
assistance; enforcement of state policies that violate human rights (such as prohibiting 
neglected camp populations to build safer housing on occupied land in camp sites); and forced 
return, repatriation, and destruction of camps that provide important sources of protection 
for vulnerable people (2011, pp. 10–11). Of these, the forcible removal of displaced 
populations from camps is perhaps the most documented crimes of humanitarian 
organisations although it has not been treated as such.39  
There are a few final points to make about the emergence of a more bureaucratic 
humanitarian system. One relates to the powerful turn to law as the basis of humanitarian 
“truth.” A highly bureaucratic humanitarian system is also exceedingly legalistic, in ways that 
are neglectful of the relationship between law and violence.40 While humanitarian obsession 
with the law certainly reflects its cultural biases, it also reveals its strategic uses in achieving 
bureaucratic outcomes (Gupta, 2015). Law offers a technical and neutral basis for 
humanitarians to formulate quick solutions without challenging the status quo (Mattei & 
Nadar, 2008; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009). Consequently, the law may become a site of 
conflict between humanitarians and populations resisting the application of unjust laws.  
Lastly, some note that humanitarian organisations may expose populations to abuse 
because of the way that camps are become “laboratories of neoliberalism” (Agier, 2011; Smirl, 
                                                
39 Academic literature has documented UNHCR and the IOM as common perpetrators of forced or coerced 
return and repatriation (see for example, Barnett, 2001; Crisp, 2018; Brachet, 2015; Koch, 2014). 
40 On the relationship between law and violence, see Walter Benjamin’s (1978) concepts of “law-making” and 
“law-preserving” violence, as well as Nicholas Blomley’s (2003) discussion of violence and the making of liberal 
property. Mattei and Nadar (2008) provide a thorough exposition of the way the law has been used to legitimise 
state plunder and uphold wealth disparities. 
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2015). As today’s humanitarian sector seeks to assist populations, it may also expose them to 
harm because of the types of strategies, policies, or programmes it puts into motion. For 
example, the capacity building efforts of government officials to engage in camp management 
can be seen as an attempt to make local officials more responsive to population problems. 
Such attempts do not necessarily improve the relief or protection of victims, but rather expand 
the function of humanitarians to steer local states into correct behaviour and incorporate them 
into the global system (Duffield, 2001).  
 
 III.III. The creation of a humanitarian market. 
Thus far, we have explored the criminogenic characteristics of humanitarian 
organisations in the roles they commonly perform on behalf of states. In this final section, I 
consider the organisational-level factors incentivising deviant behaviour. This approach is 
based on criminological understandings of organisational deviancy discussed earlier where 
‘criminal or deviant behaviour at the organisational-level results from a coincidence of pressure 
for goal attainment, availability and perceived attractiveness of illegitimate means, and an 
absence of effective social control’ (Kramer et al. 2002, p. 273; see also Sutherland, 1983). 
How and why organisations, or clusters of organisations, abandon their mandated 
responsibilities, violate international norms and codes of conduct, and become complicit in 
state crimes may not always be driven by state interests. Deviant behaviours may reflect 
marketplace conditions in the humanitarian industry.41 But since states authorise, fund, and 
benefit from humanitarian activity, they play a large role in determining the rules of aid industry 
competition and their enforcement.42 States may therefore facilitate humanitarian crime by 
failing to regulate or punish deviant organisational behaviour (such as forced 
repatriations/returns) that they have colluded in or benefitted from (see Kramer et al., 2002, 
pp. 271–72).   
                                                
41 By marketplace, I am referring not only to the ‘dynamics of competition and exchange’ that characterise 
humanitarian interactions, but also to the organisational behaviours, discourses and practices that are shaped by 
market dynamics. 
42 This point speaks to the criminological distinction made between state-initiated crime and state-facilitated 
crime in the conceptualisation of state-corporate crime. According to Kramer et al. (2002, pp. 271–72), state-
initiated corporate crime refers to states directing or approving organizational deviance. State-facilitated crime 
occurs when states fail to regulate and punish deviant behaviour by corporations either because they have 
colluded in that behaviour or benefit from it. 
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Despite the presence of an ever-growing, multi-billion-dollar humanitarian industry, 
little attention has been paid to the influence of competitive market dynamics on 
organisational acts and decision-making in the humanitarian sector (Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999; Weiss, 2013). As a result, there is scant empirical data on supply-demand relationships, 
market distortions, monopolies, and the frequency of organisational misconduct that might 
shed light on the scale and motivations for humanitarian crime (Weiss, 2013).  
It is a well-established fact that aid agencies compete with each other to win contracts 
and expand their organisations (Collinson, 2016). The uniqueness of their market competition 
is partially determined by the limited and time-bound nature of donor resources. It is also 
defined by an ever-growing number of market participants, who either pitch themselves as 
generalists or try to capture niche market areas (such as “shelter provider”). The field of 
humanitarian actors has become so crowded that the term “NGO republic” is used to ridicule 
an overpopulated landscape of self-interested aid actors (Katz, 2013).  
A key consequence of the humanitarian market instability and intense competition is 
that the survival of aid agencies is always in question (Collinson, 2016, p. 21). This instability 
can promote pathological behaviours and interactions between organisations because of the 
way organisations must wrestle for limited funds (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Humanitarian 
organisations face significant pressure to demonstrate to donors that they have satisfied a 
number of key performance goals such as efficiency, effectiveness, and social transformation, 
all of which are difficult to achieve in crises contexts (Duffield, 2001; Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999). Even when humanitarian organisations have been tasked to deliver these goals by 
foreign governments, they lack local authority and therefore run into significant obstacles in 
delivering their projects (Duffield, 2001). As Donini (2010, p. 221) puts it, the humanitarian 
field is one with unrealistic expectations. 
Such insights hint at some of the motivations for engaging in unethical and criminal 
activity. Similar to corporations, humanitarian organisations may resort to illegitimate means 
when they perceive the absence of legitimate means to achieve their goals. They may, for 
example, take on morally questionable activities requested by donor states to obtain funding 
and sustain their operations. They may partner with problematic actors (i.e., states, gangs) who 
can guarantee access and allow them to conduct activities that are otherwise blocked – with 
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or without consideration of the long-term consequences (Collinson, 2016). Organisations may 
even be compelled to make decisions or provide goods and services that are far below 
international standards, but meet the market price set by their competitors or donors (Krause, 
2014). In that respect, the value-for-money benchmarks set by neoliberal donor governments 
are a catalyst for cutting corners or implementing programmes with known defects (Collinson, 
2016).  
Perverse market rivalries may also encourage organisations to seek deviant routes to 
edge out their competitors. Market rivals may restrict the flow of information to secure their 
advantage, or refuse to cooperate with other organisations on issues for which there is no 
material or reputational benefit (Easterly, 2002, 2009). On the flip side, market competition 
might also encourage organisations to model their services or practices after others who have 
successfully secured resources, regardless of their harmful consequences or the ethical lines 
that have been crossed (Collinson, 2016). However, competition can lead to the consolidation 
of resources into larger humanitarian organisations to commodify their expertise and build 
powerful funding machines (Collinson, 2016, p. 22). William Easterly (2002) describes the 
current state of aid as a bureaucratic cartel, in which organisations have mutual enmity but 
agree to cooperate. As a result, aid beneficiaries are stuck and unable to exercise democratic 
choice over what is on offer.  
Another aspect of aid dynamics is that large humanitarian organisations looking to 
grow, may offer services beyond their mandate, expertise, and capacity – which can put 
populations at further risk. Smirl (2015) notes that humanitarian experimentation has become 
a key aspect of the humanitarian encounter. In fact, experimentation without accountability is 
why people may end up in worse off after a humanitarian intervention. These factors, Barnett 
and Finnemore (1999) point out, destabilise the notion that humanitarian organisations make 
rational decisions that abide by international norms and goals. Instead, these decisions are part 
of a ‘competitive bargaining process over turf, budgets, and staff that may benefit parts of the 
organisation at the expense of overall goals’ (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 717). In summary, 
self-interested action and poor performance are standard outcomes of organisational 
competition that have a high likelihood of producing harm and human rights violations 
(Collinson, 2016, p. 21). 
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Krause (2015, p. 16) captures the nuances of humanitarian competition and potentials 
for abuse in her discussion of “the good project.” She argues that we should perceive 
humanitarian aid as part of global supply chains, in which donor governments act as clients 
seeking out good investments, and humanitarian organisations market products (or projects) 
to them (operating like a supplier).43 Similar to any supply chain, donor clients have the power 
to award contracts to their preferred suppliers and evaluate projects according to their own 
aims and evidence. In the buying and selling of humanitarian projects, crisis victims take the 
form of commodities and are expected to take on certain identities (e.g., refugee) and 
participate in aid in acceptable ways (Krause, 2015; Sigona, 2014). Indeed, one longstanding 
complaint of international organisations is their willingness to commodify victim experiences 
in order to expand their share of the market (Andersson, 2014). The emphasis on 
implementing a good project has produced a situation whereby material interests and risk 
calculations take precedence over actual needs, humanitarian values, or principles (Krause, 
2014). There is arguably also an incentive to suppress and omit information when a project 
demonstrates certain harm or defects (Krause, 2014). 
The incentive to suppress and omit information is linked to the low level of control 
on humanitarian deviancy. As powerful agents with significant resources, humanitarian 
organisations can obscure or mark out the boundaries of their norm-breaking conduct 
(Easterly, 2002). Humanitarian organisations are not held accountable under international law 
and, similar to the corporate sector, it is difficult (if not impossible) for victims to bring a suit 
in domestic courts or establish extraterritorial jurisdiction to pursue claims against 
international organisations that have wronged them (Ferstman, 2017). This is because 
humanitarian organisations benefit from immunity privileges that are either enshrined in the 
international treaty establishing the organisation (such as UN organisations) or in agreements 
signed between an organisation and the state in which it operates (Parish, 2010, p. 282).  
Regarding the lack of accountability, Collinson (2016, p. 17) suggests that the buyer-
seller relationships between donors and humanitarian organisations can trap populations in 
“bush governorates,” which she describes as local spaces territorialised by humanitarian 
                                                
43 Humanitarian supply chains may involve several actors as large humanitarian agencies (typically the UN) 
subcontract to other international and local NGOs, and even to private businesses. 
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organisations with low levels of social control. In these spaces, organisations can coerce 
victims to consent to their activities, or rebuff other aid organisations who might have better 
services (Collinson, 2016). The highly subordinated and voiceless position of victims thus 
creates situations in which humanitarian organisations have few checks on their power may 
also sustain their willingness to engage in acts of deviancy. 
 
IV. Conclusion: Alternative Ways of Thinking About Crime  
This chapter has provided a framework for thinking about humanitarian and state-
humanitarian crime. The criminal dimensions of global humanitarianism were considered and 
the ways that humanitarian organisations have been manipulated by states to achieve material 
and political interests, were described. The chapter has also mapped different aspects of 
humanitarian complicity in state crime, including helping states to legitimise their crimes 
through humanitarian discourses.  
Attention was drawn to the institutionalisation of humanitarian power within the 
broader mechanisms of global governance. I examined how the bureaucratic practices of 
humanitarian organisations may result in harm to local communities, especially when such 
practices are embedded in state agendas for security and pro-capitalist development. The 
eagerness of humanitarian organisations to expand into new fields of global governance has 
heightened their potential for harm and crime. As key participants in global governance, they 
wield significant decision-making power and face pressure to achieve the goals set out for 
them by economically dominant states. Lastly, the competitive nature of humanitarian 
industries as a motivational factor for crime was discussed. Based on local conditions, 
humanitarian organisations may resort to norm-breaking and illegitimate means to outperform 
their competitors, or mask the consequences of their activities and policies to maintain their 
share of the market.  
In researching state-humanitarian crimes, criminologists must exercise caution in 
oversimplifying the work of humanitarian organisations and their relationship to states. Some 
humanitarian action, as discussed, has resulted in life-saving outcomes and some organisations 
are more complicit with norms and principles than others. Yet, the growing body of literature 
on international humanitarianism signals that a more intrusive humanitarian system has indeed 
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emerged in the political-economic landscape. The evidence strongly suggests that it may be 
contributing to harm as a consequence of its undemocratic and state-driven mode of 
operation. These insights will be important to bear in mind when we consider state-





































The Political Economy of Haiti’s Housing Disaster 
 On January 12th, 2010, an earthquake registering 7.3 on the Richter scale hit Haiti’s 
capital city of Port-au-Prince. Between 200,000 and 300,000 people were killed and 300,000 
injured (Oliver-Smith, 2012 p. 20). Tragically, many of those who perished were buried alive 
under the rubble for days before they eventually died. Even today, the exact number of deaths 
is unknown because of poor government record-keeping and the politicization of the death 
toll44 (Wilentz, 2013, pp. 181–84). Disgracefully, many of the dead could not be identified 
because they lacked state-certified birth certificates or national ID cards (Schuller & Morales, 
2012, p. 96). After the earthquake, many nameless bodies were heaped one on top of another 
and dumped into mass graves at the edge of Port-au-Prince.  
In thirty-five seconds, the earthquake destroyed 105,000 homes, the city’s 
infrastructure, and entire neighbourhoods (Lundahl, 2011, p. xiii). In total, 208,000 homes 
were damaged (Lundahl, 2011, p. xiii). In addition, thirteen of fifteen federal ministry buildings 
collapsed, as did 80% of the schools in Port-au-Prince45 (Oliver-Smith, 2012, p. 21). This 
astounding level of destruction was attributed to widespread corruption in the construction 
sector, deficient government regulation, and the hazardous concentration of urban 
populations in densely packed slums (Oliver-Smith, 2012, pp.  20–21). In the wake of the 
disaster, unprecedented levels of population displacement occurred as Haitians left collapsed 
homes and neighbourhoods, and took refuge on open land or in buildings that were still 
habitable. Some 600,000 people left the city to live with family in the countryside, putting an 
enormous strain on rural households and exacerbating their already high levels of food 
insecurity (Lundahl, 2011, p. xiii). Official displacement data suggests that over 1.5 million 
people were dislocated by the earthquake’s destruction, prompting the emergence of 1,555 
spontaneous settlements across Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area (IOM, 2010). When 
the reconstruction process began, earthquake-affected Haitians were facing unimaginable 
                                                
44 See the Guardian article “Haiti earthquake: Conflicting death tolls lead to confusion.” Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/11/haiti-earthquake-conflicting-death-tolls 
45 See figures from the Disaster Emergency Committee. Retrieved from https://www.dec.org.uk/articles/haiti-
earthquake-facts-and-figures 
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conditions of economic hardship and political disarray, as well as suffering from the mental 
and physical trauma of surviving one of worst human catastrophes in modern history. 
This chapter paints a picture of state responsibility for the harms resulting from the 
January 2010 earthquake. Applying Green and Ward’s (2004) definition of state crime, I 
identify the patterns of state and corporate organisational deviance that are important for 
establishing culpability for preventable deaths and injuries, huge economic losses, and mass 
displacement after the 2010 earthquake. These patterns show the relationship between 
earthquake harms and the cumulative effects of state power, local corruption, and corporate 
malfeasance. By highlighting the criminogenic features of Haiti’s political-economic structure, 
as discussed in Chapter One, this chapter brings to the fore the human rights violations and 
vulnerabilities to natural hazards that are the direct and indirect product of deviant 
organisational behaviours of states and corporations.  
The chapter also looks at the externalities of deviant state acts and corporate crimes. 
It details the creation of urban surplus populations through direct, state-led assaults on the 
land, housing, and livelihoods of rural populations. I will describe the precarious and nomadic 
experiences of displaced rural populations left jobless, politically abandoned, and socially and 
spatially excluded in Haiti’s capital city. To explore the implications of these dynamics, and 
their meaning for reconstruction, the chapter ends by drawing attention to patterns of 
vulnerability, exclusion, and corruption in Port-au-Prince’s housing sector immediately prior 
to the 2010 earthquake. The evidence presented on the city’s pre-earthquake housing crisis 
constitutes an important reference point for assessing state-humanitarian organisational 
responsibilities and behaviours during the period of earthquake relief and reconstruction. 
Understanding how state-humanitarian actors knowingly act and make decisions to reproduce 
the factors of vulnerability that expose people to disaster harms is a way of re-interpreting 
their behaviours as deviant. 
 
I. International Capital and the Making of Haiti’s Housing Crisis  
Haiti’s international reputation is of a failed state. To outsiders, Haiti is mired in 
political instability, extreme poverty, organised crime (drug trafficking), and gang violence. 
This small country is a constant target of primitive and racialized media depictions (Dubois, 
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2012), and its capital city was once labelled the most dangerous place on earth by UN 
representatives (Schuller, 2016). Haitians are often viewed as responsible for their miserable 
conditions and are “othered” in international political discourse as backward, immoral, and 
corrupt – stereotypes that play off Haitian colonial history, their African ancestry, and the 
supernatural practices of voodoo (Wilentz, 1989). Some right-wing fanatics suggest that 
Haitian impoverishment constitutes a form of punishment for breaking with the white colonial 
order (Dubois, 2012). Few can forget the outrageous claim of U.S. evangelical Pat Robertson 
that the January 2010 earthquake was God’s punishment for the “pact with the devil” made 
when Haitian slaves violently overthrew their French colonial masters.46 Such comments, 
when considered alongside Haiti’s long history of foreign oppression, show how international 
constructs of Haitian deviancy are often operationalised to obscure harms generated by 
imperialist state behaviours (Dubois, 2012). 
Missing from these international narratives is a recognition of the cumulative and 
corrosive effects of foreign occupations and neoliberal policies on Haiti’s living standards and 
turbulent political life. The effects of European colonialism, U.S. occupation, and U.S.-
imposed neoliberalism are discussed below. Each of these periods is marked by criminal state 
policies and the consolidation of criminogenic relationships between dominant states and local 
business and government elites. The cumulative effect on the Haitian population is endemic 
poverty, starvation, landlessness, over-urbanisation, and constant exposure to paramilitary and 
authoritarian state violence.  
 
II. Colonial Accumulation and Crimes Against Humanity 
The roots of foreign state deviance stretches back to the brutal policies of extractive 
colonialism. Haiti was first invaded by the Spanish, leading to the enslavement and later 
genocide of the native Taíno population. This was what Wilentz (2013, p. 92) calls the ‘initial 
and signature act of globalization’ on Haitian soil (see also Girard, 2010). In addition to 
diseases carried by Spanish colonialists, forced colonial labour was one of the main causes of 
death for the 500,000 Taínos living on the island, who were worked to death in gold extraction 
(Katz, 2013). The Spanish government’s initial act of land grabbing eventually paved the way 
                                                
46 See National Public Radio report, Pat Robertson Blames Haitian Devil Pact For Earthquake. Retrieved from 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2010/01/pat_robertson_blames_haitian_d.html 
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for the French to overtake and rule Haiti, establishing the colony of Saint-Domingue (Wilentz, 
2013).  
Realising Haiti’s potential for growing lucrative crops, such as sugarcane and coffee, 
France solved the island’s labour shortage by paying European slave traders to import 
approximately 40,000 African slaves per year to the colony, eventually bringing 500,000 
trafficked Africans to the island (Dubois, 2012). Labour trafficking and forced labour in Haiti 
generated significant wealth for European states. The cheap commodities produced by Saint-
Domingue’s slaves fuelled consumer markets and provided European states with important 
streams of taxable customs revenue (Blackburn, 2006). By the late 1770s, Saint-Domingue was 
supplying the European continent with over 60% of its coffee and 40% of its sugar.47 For a 
considerable period of time in colonial history, Haiti was one of Europe’s most profitable 
colonies and earned the nickname “the pearl of the Antilles” (Girard, 2010).  
The wealth that Europeans accumulated from Haiti took an enormous toll on the slave 
population and the island’s environment. In collaboration with the French state, colonial 
plantation owners committed egregious crimes in Saint-Domingue through their systematic 
rape, torture, mutilation, and murder of slave labourers (James, 2001). Historical accounts of 
the slave trade and system on the island show that most slaves died before they reached the 
age of 21 (James, 2001). The documented atrocities suggest that the French colony in Haiti 
was one of the most brutal in the entire Caribbean (Du Bois, 2012). Meanwhile, very little of 
the wealth, profits, or raw materials extracted from the island stayed on the island (James, 
2001). Scholars trace the origins of Haiti’s lack of economic development to the devastating 
social impacts, resource extraction, and environmental damage arising from French 
colonialism (Nunn, 2008a, 2008b; Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002).  
Between 1791 and 1804, Haitian slaves rebelled against French soldiers and plantation 
owners, leading to the successful overthrow of colonial slavery (Sprague, 2012). The punitive 
international response that followed Haiti’s independence (1804) reshaped the criminogenic 
relationship between colonial states and Haitians. For decades, Haiti was politically ostracised 
by not only France, but also the U.S. and other colonial powers. Throughout the 19th century, 
                                                
47 See the Guardian article, Haiti: a long descent to hell. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/14/haiti-history-earthquake-disaster 
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colonial states pursued a range of policies, including economic sanctions and threats of force 
and occupation, to destabilise and weaken the autonomy of the rebellious colony (Sprague, 
2012; Abbott, 2011).  
Once Haiti emerged as independent in a world still dominated by slavery, it posed a 
significant existential threat to the maintenance of colonial power (Dubois, 2012, p. 5). 
Eventually, the painful economic measures and political isolation imposed on Haiti pressured 
Haiti’s new political leadership to accept serious concessions in order to retain their 
independence. The Haitian government agreed to pay France an indemnity of US$21 billion 
for lost property – including plantations, crops, and slaves – in exchange for peace and 
diplomatic recognition (Dubois, 2012). The irony of Haiti’s settlement with France, which was 
meant to preserve Haitian independence, was that it ‘turned the victor into the vanquished’ 
(Wilentz 2013, p. 131). From 1825 until 1947 – a span of 122 years – France forced the island 
nation into crippling debt by requiring the Haitian people to purchase their freedom. Today, 
Haiti remains a prime example of how state-defined notions of private property rights have 
been used to protect perpetrators of serious crimes and rob victims of justice.  
 Academics, activists, and politicians from Haiti and around the world have repeatedly 
called on France to provide reparation for its criminal extortion of the Haitian people, which 
has arguably contributed to endemic poverty and political instability.48 During the first century 
of Haitian independence, almost 80% of the Haitian government’s budget was diverted to the 
repayment of an illegitimate and unjust debt, backed up by the threat of military invasion 
(Wilentz, 2015; Dubois, 2012, p. 204). This figure does not include the public money allocated 
to the development of Haitian military capabilities in response to the very real threat of outside 
state harassment, extortion, and invasion (Dubois, 2012). Even after its independence was 
recognised, various colonial states raided Haitian territory demanding ransom in exchange for 
leaving the island in peace (Sprague, 2012). Only 1% of the Haitian government’s budget was 
annually allocated to public services for over a century, which has arguably contributed to the 
endemic poverty and political instability of the country (Dubois, 2012).  
 
                                                
48 See MacDonald, Isabel. France’s Debt of Dishonour to Haiti. 16 August 2010. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/aug/16/haiti-france   
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III. U.S. Invasion and Extraction 
From the 20th century onwards, U.S. governments have engaged in a continuum of 
criminal state practices to achieve its organisational goal of forcing Haiti into its territorial 
mode of production. Located just 700 miles from the Florida coast, Haiti was a target for 
growing U.S. capitalist imperialism in the Caribbean. Historians note that from the late 1800s 
to early 1990s American foreign policy toward Haiti was expressly designed to drive out 
European (especially French49) influence over Haitian politics. The U.S. government 
convinced several banks, most notably National City Bank (now Citibank), to obtain a stake 
in Haiti’s Banque Nationale and take control of its day-to-day operations (Trouillot, 1990). As 
the opportunities to accumulate surplus profits in Haiti became more apparent, National City 
Bank’s leadership lobbied the U.S. government to occupy Haiti. This would secure exclusive 
privileges to Haiti for National City Bank that would allow it (and U.S. investors) to reorganise 
Haiti’s finances, control valuable agricultural land, and exploit its cheap labour force (Wilentz, 
2015). In Bankers and Empire: How Wall Street Colonized the Caribbean, Hudson (2017) explains 
that U.S. financial institutions were keen to invest large amounts of unproductive capital that 
they had accumulated through industrialisation and corporate consolidation. 
The demands by U.S. banks precipitated a series of criminal acts perpetrated by the 
U.S. government as U.S. colonial expansion in the Caribbean worked to facilitate the 
internationalisation of U.S. capital. In one flagrant act of international bank robbery, U.S. 
marines were sent to Haiti’s Banque Nationale in 1914 to remove US$11 million in gold, on 
behalf of U.S. banks (Dubois, 2012). The U.S. attempted to neutralise its crime by claiming 
the action was required to repay Haitian loans owed to the banks (Dubois, 2012, p. 204). While 
this theft had an obvious impact on the struggling nation, it fell short of the bank’s broader 
goal to control Haitian territory and finances. Therefore in 1915, the U.S. invaded Haiti and 
occupied the island for 19 years. The complicity between the U.S. state and the banks in the 
invasion was stunning. The banks were even involved in the military strategy and planning of 
the invasion (Hudson, 2017). The National City Bank then withheld funds for the payment of 
Haitian civil servants and worked to bankrupt Haiti by cancelling its loans without warning 
(Dubois, 2012). Once the island descended into financial and political chaos, the U.S. military 
                                                
49 At the time, France’s Banque de l’Union Parisienne owned Haiti’s national bank and advised the Haitian 
government on its debt financing and fiscal policies (Hudson, 2017). 
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seized upon the turmoil orchestrated by the banks and staged its rescue of the Haitian people 
and political system (Dubois, 2012, pp. 205–7).  
As hoped, the U.S. intervention paid off handsomely (see Dubois, 2012, pp. 210–13). 
During the occupation, the Haitian government lost its decision-making power as the U.S. 
handed complete control over its financial system to U.S. banks (Hudson, 2017). This control 
was legally authorised by a convention signed by the Haitian government that declared the 
U.S. the defender of Haitian sovereignty (Dubois, 2012, p. 233). Once control was transferred 
to U.S. administrators and banks, U.S. corporations received exclusive contracts from the 
Haitian government to develop Haiti by enacting agricultural, railroad, and other infrastructure 
projects (Dubois, 2012). When the Haitian government could no longer afford to give large 
contracts to U.S. corporations, it began awarding them with extraordinary privileges and 
concessions, especially rights to agricultural land (Dubois, 2012). Some American investors, 
benefitting from a more accessible and stable business environment, restarted colonial sugar 
plantations after working with local authorities to displace Haitian peasants from their land 
plots.  
The dynamics of dispossession by accumulation had an unprecedented effect on the 
economic security and livelihood of Haitian peasants who, as descendants of slaves, had never 
been granted legal rights to their land (see Chapter Six). An estimated 40,000 peasants were 
forcibly expelled from fertile agricultural land to make way for new rubber and sugar 
plantations bankrolled by U.S. capital (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015, p. 185). During the 
occupation, U.S. companies were not only complicit in forced displacements, but were also 
culpable of environmental destruction that continues to have an effect on rural livelihoods. 
Corporate pillaging under the American occupation had a considerable impact on rural land 
quality, and to this day, is blamed for seriously disrupting the island’s ecosystem (Steckley & 
Shamsie, 2015, p. 185).  
Amongst the many social impacts of these state-corporate crimes is that rural Haitians 
lost access to land, housing, and water, and to their livelihoods as subsistence farmers (Dubois, 
2012, pp. 210, 269). Since most peasants had no choice but to sell their labour to American 
corporations, who now controlled their land, they were easily exploited. During the U.S. 
occupation, Haitian labour became the cheapest form of labour in the region (Dubois, 2012, 
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p. 268). The influx of predatory American capital also precipitated one of the first waves of 
forced economic migration from the countryside to Port-au-Prince. Thus, one of the 
significant outcomes of the U.S. occupation was the erosion of the major gains made by 
former slaves to obtain land in the post-independence period and establish a truly independent 
labour process (Trouillot, 1990, p. 39).  
It is unsurprising that studies comparing Haiti before and after the U.S. occupation 
show that U.S. rule worsened economic conditions, even though the key political justification 
for U.S. occupation of Haiti was to rescue Haitians from misrule, economic mismanagement, 
and unemployment (Trouillot, 1990). In other colonial contexts, critical criminologists have 
found that criminal state practices are often employed to disrupt national and cultural 
independence and facilitate ongoing dispossession (see Atiles-Osoria, 2016). A core reason for 
the economic decline in Haiti is related to the way U.S. extraction policies centralised 
investment in Port-au-Prince, which in turn crushed its regional economies. U.S. economic 
policy virtually ruined regional markets and created a pull factor for jobs and economic 
opportunities in the capital that persists today (Trouillot, 1990). The U.S. economic policies 
also deliberately increased Haiti’s trade deficit with other countries, and prioritised the 
repayment of Haiti’s external debts with little regard for the costs to social welfare (Lundahl, 
2011).   
When the U.S. finally left Haiti in 1934, it had cemented Haiti’s dependency on global 
markets by reducing its exports to one main commodity (coffee) (Trouillot, 1990). In addition, 
the U.S. had forced Haiti to import and pay tax on U.S. goods (Trouillot, 1990, p. 103). Still, 
the most egregious economic crime committed by U.S. administrators was kidnapping for 
forced labour. Thousands of Haitians were forced to perform unpaid work on military-run 
infrastructure projects, which Haitian viewed as one of the most profane violations of their 
hard-fought freedom and humanity (Dubois, 2012, pp. 239–41).  
Politically, the U.S. occupation had devastating effects on state-society relations and 
democratic governance. Prior to the invasion, U.S. officials declared it would bring good 
governance to Haiti and engage in state building and the transmission of democratic values 
(Dubois, 2012). To the contrary, invading U.S. marines immediately imposed martial law and 
silenced Haitian dissidents with threats of imprisonment and death (Trouillot, 1990, p. 101). 
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No crimes committed by the occupying force, including rape, murder, physical assault, and 
torture were ever punished, despite numerous media reports and U.S. senate inquiries on the 
subject (Dubois, 2012, pp. 234–36, 239–41). Similar to the U.S.-led manipulation of Haiti’s 
2010 elections (see Chapter Four), the U.S. occupying force in the 1920s held sham elections 
to put their chosen leaders into office, who in turn, passed laws guaranteeing U.S. authority 
and power to appropriate the island’s natural resources (Dubois, 2012). The occupation also 
stoked political tensions between Haiti’s noiriste (black) and mulâtre (mulatto) political elites, 
which were later manipulated by authoritarian black power regimes (Trouillot, 1990).  
More damaging, however, was the occupation’s militarisation of the Haitian state. 
During the U.S. occupation, Haitian towns and communities were subject to surveillance and 
policing through the creation of a new Haitian military wing (the Genarmerie), which was trained 
and logistically assisted by U.S. marines (Dubois, 2012). Whereas Haiti’s previous army had 
drawn soldiers from different class backgrounds and united them against foreign threats, the 
U.S. explicitly formed and trained the Genarmerie to fight against other Haitians (Trouillot, 
1990, p. 106). A key function of the Genarmerie was to rebalance power in communities by 
suppressing peasants and strengthening the power of rural police. With the Genarmerie’s 
presence, local administrators could exercise their powers in the absence of popular consent 
(Dubois, 2012, pp. 105, 237). The establishment of the Genarmerie and its presence in local 
communities is what finally enabled Haiti’s subsequent rulers to consolidate their power into 
a centralised state apparatus, without support from civil society. From that perspective, the 
U.S. is culpable for bequeathing the Haitian state with the means to oppress civil society and 
violently enforce undemocratic rule.  
When the U.S. withdrew from Haiti, it had reconfigured Haiti’s political system and 
built the structural conditions for ongoing accumulation and dispossession. On the legacy of 
U.S. occupation on Haiti’s economy and political environment, historian Laurent Dubois 
writes: 
Like the generation of 1804…the activists of the 1930s discovered 
that the legacy of foreign control was extremely difficult to escape. 
The U.S. occupation had profoundly changed the country, 
smashing the political and economic order that had emerged 
during the nineteenth century and deepening the poverty in the 
countryside. It had centralized and strengthened the government’s 
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authority, giving the country’s leaders more power than they had 
ever had to control the masses and suppress dissent. Many 
Haitians dreamed in 1934 that their country would finally be able 
to move forward toward a radically different future. Instead, they 
found that the years of subjugation were haunting them still. (2012, 
p. 267) 
 
Although the U.S. government and banks had conspired to ruthlessly exploit Haiti, and 
successfully re-organised its political institutions and power bases to facilitate their 
organisational goals of accumulation, international denial of the social impact and enduring 
legacy of state-corporate criminality in Haiti remains (Dubois, 2012, p. 296; Hudson, 2017). 
IV. Accelerated Dispossession and Neoliberal Transition  
After the occupation, the U.S. relied on various tools of economic dominance and political 
repression that, until the threat of populist President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, did not require 
U.S. military presence in Haiti. Above all, U.S. dominance relied on cultivating criminogenic 
relationships with Haitian political elites to foster a permissive environment for the ongoing 
penetration of predatory capital (Sprague, 2012). In many respects, the period after the 
occupation was a continuation of occupation policies. It created an opportunity structure for 
predatory capital by deepening conditions of political instability, trade dependence, financial 
reliance, and labour precarity that gave U.S. businesses access to Haitian resources and its 
labour force. The social impact and human rights violations accompanying U.S.-imposed 
policies have been widely contested by Haitian civil society, which has been one way of 
attesting to their criminogenic quality (Wilentz, 2013; Hallward, 2007).  
Understanding U.S. state behaviour during thirty years of Haitian dictatorship (post 
U.S. withdrawal) is an important element of this discussion. The U.S. colluded with the 
dictatorships of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier (1957-1971) and his son, Jean Claude “Baby 
Doc” Duvalier (1971-1986) to achieve its organisational goals, despite the brutal, corrupt, and 
tyrannical methods used by these regimes to maintain their political dominance. The U.S. not 
only maintained silence about known atrocities, but gave the Duvaliers weapons, military 
training, and monetary aid. Given that half the Haitian national budget came from U.S. aid 
during this time, the U.S. provided a lifeline to the Duvaliers to stay in power (Dubois, 2012, 
p. 335).  In exchange, both Duvaliers facilitated the political and economic conditions 
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necessary for capital flows. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Duvalier dictatorships 
reduced import tariffs, established free-trade zones, banned trade unions, and suppressed local 
wages (Lundahl, 2011, pp. 36–37, 93). This resulted in a significant rise in American corporate 
activity in Haiti. In less than a decade, the number of U.S. corporations operating in Haiti 
escalated from seven companies to three hundred (Hallward, 2010). By the end of Jean Claude 
Duvalier’s administration, Haiti had become the ninth largest assembler of U.S. goods for 
retail and consumption (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015, p. 186). The profits amassed by U.S. 
industries during this timeframe were counterpoised by reports of serious labour abuses by 
the low-skilled labourers working in U.S. supply chains (Truoillot, 1990, p. 209).  
The state-facilitated flow of U.S. capital generated a major commercial disaster for 
Haiti. U.S. companies required Haiti to import the materials used in factory assembly lines, 
inflaming its trade deficit with the U.S. Furthermore, since the Haitian state neglected to tax 
the profits of U.S. manufacturers and their Haitian subsidiaries, very little revenue created by 
the manufacturing industry stayed in Haiti (Truoillot, 1990, pp. 211–12). Truoillot points out 
that opportunities for corruption within the manufacturing industry were such that state 
authorities completely abandoned development strategies for rural areas. Even the World 
Bank would eventually concede that Haiti’s manufacturing industry failed to make any 
significant contribution to Haiti’s economy, although it has continued to push factories and 
foreign-led industrial production as the core solution to Haitian poverty (Truoillot, 1990, p. 
213).  
After the fall of the second Duvalier dictatorship (as a result of a popular uprising), 
the U.S. exploited much of the political instability and economic weakness that it had helped 
to create. U.S. foreign aid and debt refinancing were used to force Haiti to adopt a new raft of 
neoliberal economic policies that liberalised the economy and dismantled barriers to foreign 
investment (Wilentz, 1989). In her review of U.S. documents and development policy, 
journalist Amy Wilentz found that: ‘The U.S. goal was to reduce self-sufficient farming, 
thereby causing peasants to migrate to Port-au-Prince, where they would provide a useful and 
very cheap labour force to work in American assembly factories.’ Historical evidence suggests 
this strategy was already in motion during the second Duvalier dictatorship when the U.S. 
persuaded the Haitian state to slaughter one million native Creole pigs (Schuller, 2016, p. 30; 
Trouillot, 1990). The Creole pig incident, according to Schuller (2016), was a state-orchestrated 
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policy designed to inflict suffering, generate rural depopulation, and render Haiti dependent 
on the U.S. swine industry. The eradication of Creole pigs withdrew the financial resources 
that peasants relied upon for “October school fees, illnesses, weddings, baptisms, and deaths” 
(Abbott, 1988, p. 242). Peasant families lost over US$500 million from the state destruction 
of the Creole pig population (Baptiste, 2012, p. 98). 
The U.S. government’s slow war against rural livelihoods took other forms. When the 
Haitian government radically decreased tariffs on U.S. food exports, it paved the way for the 
U.S. to dump cheap and subsidised U.S. rice onto Haitian markets (Hallward, 2010). Poor 
farmers, already harmed by state neglect and the Creole pig incident, witnessed huge decreases 
in their rice production (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015). Although many subsistence farmers had 
managed to survive state corruption and neglect under the dictatorship, they were unable to 
withstand criminogenic tariff policies enforced by Haitian political elites (Trouillot, 1990). 
While former U.S. President Bill Clinton publically admitted to the disastrous impact of U.S. 
trade policies on Haitian rice production and food security, the U.S. continues to export its 
subsidised rice to Haiti (Schuller & Morales, 2012).  
Over the past three decades, Haiti has become increasingly dependent on foreign aid 
and debt, resulting in a complete loss of economic and political sovereignty. By 2005, Haiti 
had dangerously assumed US$1.3 billion in loans from foreign governments and multilateral 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (Buss & Gardner, 2007). Haiti’s external debt 
has kept it hooked in to the U.S. system of capital accumulation and vulnerable to foreign 
economic policy demands (see Harvey, 2003, pp. 118–19; Steckley & Shamsie, 2015, p. 187). 
Haiti has sold off most of its publically owned assets and industries, including transport, 
construction, education, energy, healthcare, agriculture, and banking sectors (Hallward, 2010). 
It has also adopted broad import-liberalisation policies that have minimised protections for 
small local businesses (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015). Such policies have shrunk critical revenue 
streams for the government, crippling its ability to respond to crises, provide employment, or 
improve social services (Hallward, 2010, p. 14).  
As previously discussed, the U.S. has achieved its goals through its collusive 
relationships with predatory state actors. However, there have been times in the recent past 
when the U.S. has intervened both politically and militarily to quash anti-establishment parties 
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and their agendas that threaten to disrupt capital flows. The U.S. response to the pro-
democracy movement led by Jean Betrand Aristide and his pro-poor party Lavalas (meaning 
“the flood”) is the best illustration of this (Dubois, 2012, p. 362). As a minister, Aristide 
antagonised the United States and Haiti’s political elites with his sermons condemning U.S. 
foreign policy and its relationship to local state corruption, often encouraging Haitians to grab 
back land that rightfully belonged to them (Wilentz, 1989, p. 122). Aristide’s social justice 
agenda made him immensely popular in the latter part of the 20th century, especially amongst 
uprooted peasants living in urban areas (Wilentz, 1989, p. 134). His revolutionary vision drew 
political confrontation (Fatton, 2002, p. 80; Sprague, 2012, p. 295). Although Aristide won 
elections by a landslide in 1990 and 2000, he was ousted from his presidency both times (the 
first time by a military coup d'état, and the second time by coup led by paramilitary groups 
backed by the Haitian elite). Leaked documents and investigative journalism have made clear 
that the U.S. government, through the provision of direct and indirect support to 
paramilitaries, share responsibility for the second coup d'état that overthrew Aristide in 2004, 
which resulted in handing the government back to political elites willing to implement U.S. 
economic policy (Sprague, 2012, pp. 230–32).  
 
V. The Weak and Violent Nature of the Haitian State   
Foreign interests in Haiti have both fostered and benefitted from a corrupt Haitian 
state. Political scientists have traditionally classified the Haitian state has a kleptocracy – a 
‘despotic structure of power that preys on its citizens without giving much in return’ (Fatton, 
2002, p. 27). Since achieving independence in 1804, the state apparatus has been dominated 
by small groups of robber-barons who have competed for the state’s exclusive privileges and 
opportunities for power and wealth. The Haitian state is also appropriately classified as a weak 
state, in accordance with Ward’s observation (2004, p. 92) as to why certain states are more 
prone to harming their populations. As we shall see, the profiteering motives of political elites 
has led to extreme political instability in Haiti, characterised by the overthrow of 45 leaders 
and the institution of 23 constitutions in its short history. The class alliance forged between 
tiny groups of political elites and merchant bourgeoisie is extremely unstable because the 
interests pursued through this alliance are disconnected from the needs and interests of the 
majority, made up of the peasant class and urban poor. As Ward notes, the state’s fragile power 
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and lack of popular legitimacy causes it to seek out short-term solutions by means of violence 
and patronage networks. In Haiti’s case, the state has sought backing from the U.S. 
government and foreign commercial interests to sustain its position. These conditions have 
allowed the state to withdraw from its responsibilities to protect its population and brutally 
oppress opposition to its power.    
 
VI. Regressive Independence and the Origins of State Predation  
The predatory features of the Haitian state apparatus can be traced back to the early 
post-independence period. After overthrowing the French, Haiti’s new class of political elites 
were expected to remedy the suffering of former slaves and build a more equitable social 
system. Instead, Haiti’s new rulers used the administrative apparatus left by the French to 
refuse land rights to former slaves and restart planation-style agriculture (Dubois, 2012). 
Historical records show that the early state policy of caporalisme agraire (militarised agriculture) 
was driven by outside threats to Haitian sovereignty. With most of the colonial powers refusing 
to recognise Haitian independence, these new state officials appealed to nationalist sentiments 
to justify extending plantation labour and land relations (Trouillot, 1990). The political 
argument was that Haiti required quick accumulation to defend itself against its foreign (white) 
enemies and achieve its state-building goals (Wilentz, 2013, p. 89).  
 
While foreign threats may have been used to justify the ongoing criminal exploitation 
of Haitian labourers, scholars reveal how Haiti’s new political elites were eager to reap the 
benefits of the economic system left by the French. Lundhal (2011, p. 6) explains that Haiti’s 
political elites were motivated to maintain a system of uneven class relations to (a) protect the 
status and property of the mulatto population still living on the island who shared many of the 
benefits and rights of French colonials and (b) augment the political power of a new group of 
military generals and soldiers who had successfully defeated the French. The plantation system 
offered a method for consolidating and organising political power around the control and 
distribution of land (Dubois, 2012). In essence, productive plantation land gave Haiti’s new 
ruling elites an opportunity to build networks of patronage and placate their political 
opponents (Etienne, 2012). These political and economic incentives persuaded the new 
Haitian rulers to withhold land from former slaves and re-victimise the same people who had 
	 94 
been liberated by the slave rebellion. These decisions prompt historians to conclude that ‘the 
Haitian state and the Haitian nation were launched in different directions’ after colonial slavery 
(Trouillot, 1990, p. 40).  
Since independence, Haiti’s elites have contributed to household poverty through 
taxation and extortion. Though the state has provided little in terms of social welfare, it has 
heavily taxed the agricultural surpluses of Haitian peasants. Corrupt state officials allowed 
unscrupulous merchants and middlemen to pass their share of taxes on agricultural exports 
back onto destitute farmers (Trouillot, 1990, pp. 62–64). Unjust taxation has played a 
significant role in deepening local poverty and stagnating agricultural production (Lundahl, 
2002). Trouillot (1990, p. 64) reasons that piecemeal attempts at land reform and distribution 
in the early 19th century was lucrative for state officials because it opened up opportunities to 
tax and obtain graft from peasants’ surplus commodities. He argues that illicit and unjust 
taxation of the peasantry is what enabled state kleptocrats to enjoy extravagant lifestyles, while 
meeting their obligations to repay foreign debts. 
Volatile political competition and local resistance to dominant land relations are two 
forces that have mediated the distribution and pattern of land control in Haiti’s rural and urban 
areas. For the most part, land remains untitled and its governance falls outside the formal 
private property regime. This means that there is little certainty and security to land ownership, 
and that due process rights are difficult to enforce when one’s landholdings are challenged 
(Kushner, 2015). On top of this, few land sales are officially recorded by the state. Because 
land control has been linked to political patronage, land has constantly shifted in ownership 
between different factions of elites at different times (Etienne, 2012). In some instances, the 
government has augmented land control through the passage of laws that allow the state to 
assert rights of eminent domain (Kushner, 2015). Haitian peasants have mainly acquired their 
land plots through precarious forms of land occupation and tenure (discussed in Chapter Six). 
However, the more that local elites were drawn into the global economy, the more rural 
peasants were dispossessed of their land through violent expulsions or legal expropriation by 
the state (Etienne, 2012, p. 16). In short, Haiti’s complicated land history has produced 
extreme confusion over who owns what – matters that have often been settled informally 
amongst elites or through violence (Kushner, 2015).  
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VII. Legacies of Dictatorship: Political Violence and Corruption 
 
Desperate conditions in Haiti worsened over thirty years of Duvalier dictatorship, 
which has been described as ‘the worst plunder in the history of Haiti’ (Lundahl, 2011, p. 1). 
Apart from their facilitation of predatory capital flows, both dictators engaged in hyper levels 
of corruption, even by Haitian standards. Under François Duvalier, ‘corruption became the 
very foundation of the administrative machine, its only raison d’être’ (Trouillot, 1990, p. 176). 
From the allocation of government posts to the distribution of state projects, corruption 
served the broader organisational goal of mobilising a reliable power base across the country 
(Abbott, 1988). State officials were implicitly encouraged to engage in corrupt practices as a 
reward for their loyalty to the dictatorships and whatever power and influence they had 
managed to bring to support it (Trouillot, 1990; see also Green & Ward, 2004, p. 21). 
Widespread rent-seeking, in turn, led to half-implemented development projects and poorly 
constructed infrastructure and services. Trouillot notes that the political clientelism that 
flourished under both dictatorships had the effect of undermining community structures, in 
addition to widening the gulf between the minority rich and majority poor.  
Both Duvaliers stole astonishing amounts of public money for their personal gain. 
Jean Claude Duvalier is believed to have embezzled US$504 million from the public treasury 
over the duration of his rule.50 This second Duvalier even stole millions of dollars from IMF 
loans being provided for the country’s development, directing this money into his personal 
bank accounts.51 These acts occurred while illicit sums of money were being extorted from the 
rural and urban masses. To give an example, the second Duvalier government charged fees to 
both the Dominican government and Haitian migrants for allowing economically deprived 
Haitians to work on Dominican plantations (Dubois, 2012). These fees were then diverted 
into the hidden accounts of the Duvaliers and their patrons (Dubois, 2012, p. 347). State 
corruption under both Duvalier regimes left Haiti poorer, more indebted, and more vulnerable 
to the interests of foreign capital. 
The hyper criminality of the Duvaliers has been replicated by successive Haitian 
                                                
50 See the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), Haiti the Long Road to Recovery. Retrieved from 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/05/haiti-the-long-road-to-recovery.html 
51 See the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), Haiti the Long Road to Recovery. Retrieved from 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/05/haiti-the-long-road-to-recovery.html 
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governments who, like their predecessors, have extracted their income from peasant 
exploitation and from illicit activities surrounding new capital flows (Fatton, 2002, p. 27). The 
state has also become more motivated to enforce the property rights of the political elite and 
bourgeoisie. Accompanying this is the tendency of elites or those with political connections 
to forge official documents to corroborate their claims of land ownership (Etienne, 2012). 
Successive government have also inherited the paramilitary structures created by the 
dictatorships with U.S. funding. Current Haitian governments are able to mobilise well-trained 
paramilitaries and police to suppress popular dissent that threatens to undermine state power 
or foreign capital interests (Lundahl, 2011, p. 163; Fatton, 2002, p. 32).  
VIII. Creating a Violent Urban Order 
There is little doubt that the criminal acts and decisions of the Haitian state and foreign 
state actors have taken a toll on Haitian human rights. The UN Human Development Index 
has repeatedly placed Haiti at the bottom of its ranking, and today it is rated 163 of 188 of the 
least developed countries.52 Global indices also mark Haiti as one of most corrupt and least 
equal countries in the world.53 An estimated 1% of Haiti’s population controls 50% of the 
nation’s wealth, while the bottom 20% share only 2% of Haiti’s national income (Bailey, 2014). 
As these figures suggest, the vast majority of the population live in poverty on two dollars a 
day, critically lacking access to housing, land, water, electricity, and jobs (Buss & Gardner, 
2007). Some estimate Haiti’s unemployment rate could be as high as 70% of the total 
population (Buss & Gardner, 2007). Meanwhile, huge numbers of Haitians have migrated 
from the country in response to attacks on their land and livelihoods. While some have 
managed to migrate abroad legally, and have improved their economic standing, others have 
fled the country under dangerous conditions and worked abroad as precarious migrant 
labourers (Abbott, 1988; Amnesty, 2016). There are thousands of undocumented Haitians 
labourers in the Dominican Republic’s sugar cane industry who have been denied Dominican 
citizenship and are routinely subjected to labour abuse, police brutality, criminalisation, and 
arbitrary deportation (Amnesty, 2016). 
 
                                                
52 See the United Nations Development Programme 2016 Human Development report. Retrieved from 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/HTI.pdf 
53 See Transparency International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/HTI 
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Since the introduction of neoliberal policies, Haiti has lost more than 800,000 jobs 
(Schuller, 2016, p. 29). Local wages have risen slightly over the past two decades, but they have 
been considerably outpaced by inflation (Schuller, 2016, p. 32). Haitians feel the daily effects 
of mass privatisation and reduced social spending. Basic goods and services are now barely 
affordable, including food, education, housing, and healthcare (Schuller, 2016, pp. 32–33). 
Although the majority of the rural inhabitants technically own their land, their land parcels 
have shrunk considerably over time, the result of elite land grabbing and population growth 
(Lundahl, 2011). Peasants have also witnessed the declining quality and productivity of their 
land in the absence of state intervention, especially in preventing land overuse, deforestation, 
and soil erosion. Today, foreign accumulation and climate change are pushing rural areas to 
the brink of an ecological disaster (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015).  
Historical processes of predatory accumulation, with their effects on uneven 
development54 and mass proletarianisation, have laid the groundwork for a housing crisis in 
Port-au-Prince. Whereas other countries have experienced more diverse, regional patterns of 
urbanisation, the mechanics of rural decline and dispossession in Haiti have pushed people to 
its only economic centre: Port-au-Prince (Tobin, 2013). Mike Davis reminds us that over-
urbanisation ‘is driven by the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of jobs’ (2006, p. 16). 
This is a fitting description of Port-au-Prince, where the population grew from 15,000 in 1950 
to 720,000 residents in 1980 in reaction to state policies designed to open Haiti to international 
investment (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015, p. 186). When the 2010 earthquake struck, Port-au-
Prince’s population had reached three million people, representing almost a third of Haiti’s 
total population (Gros, 2011). This is astounding, considering that only fifty years earlier the 
city had only 5% of Haiti’s total population (Vigdor, 2010).  
The 2010 earthquake barely slowed the over-urbanisation trend in Haiti. Even today, 
the city continues to receive between 12,000 to 15,000 farmers, students, and other internal 
migrants monthly (Schuller, 2016, p. 30). This means that Port-au-Prince grows by 180,000 
residents each year. Research, including my own, has thoroughly evidenced that over-
                                                
54 By uneven development, I refer to the concept elaborated by Neil Smith (1984, p. 6), in which he describes 
uneven development as ‘the geographical expression of the more fundamental contradiction between use-value 
and exchange value.’ The concept accounts for geographic differences according to the way that capital moves 
and transforms space and the built environment as it pursues the creation of surplus value.  
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urbanisation is synonymous with forced migration. Rural peasants do not want to live in the 
city but are compelled to migrate due to the lack of employment and food insecurity (Leader, 
2013).  
The sizeable growth of Port-au-Prince’s urban population has strained city resources 
and exacerbated the vulnerability of people forced to live in the city. Port-au-Prince was built 
to accommodate a maximum of 250,000 people (Katz, 2013). Bordered by mountains and 
coastline, most of the land surrounding the city is prone to natural hazards and unsuitable for 
expansion. Considering this and other risks associated with overpopulation, Port-au-Prince 
has long required state intervention to guarantee decent housing, jobs, infrastructure, and 
other basic services such as water, sanitation, schools, and healthcare. Yet, running parallel to 
urban growth was tremendous political instability, entrenched state corruption, foreign 
interventionism, and most importantly, foreign pressure to minimise spending on social 
welfare (Schuller, 2016). This has translated into widespread neglect of many of the issues 
arising from rapid urbanisation, especially housing.  
Despite clear warning signs of urban overpopulation and anarchic construction, the 
Haitian government did not create a housing department or urban housing policy prior to the 
earthquake (Katz, 2013). Since many families lacked the means to construct homes, many 
neighbourhoods were constructed haphazardly and were teetering on the edge of collapse 
before the earthquake (Wilentz, 2013, p. 70). The government did not regulate or inspect new 
houses erected in response to mass rural-urban migration. This meant that most new houses 
were not constructed to code and lacked the necessary seismic retrofitting to protect people 
in the event of an earthquake (UN-Habitat, 2009, p. 3; Wilentz, 2013). Corrupt and neglectful 
political administrations also paid little attention to urban planning, evidenced by the absence 
of coordination between government departments that shared responsibility for land 
administration and the delivery of social services (Katz, 2013). House construction, especially 
in the outskirts of the city, resembled the “wild west,” meaning houses were built on whatever 
land was available. The demand for housing coupled with the lack of government regulation 
provided fertile ground for rogues and speculators to get into the unregulated housing market 
and provide unsafe housing for precarious newcomers (Wilentz, 2013, p. 71). 
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The government’s lack of response to over-urbanisation and housing needs were the 
roots of a housing crisis that made the earthquake’s high levels of death, destruction, and 
displacement inevitable. Contextualising this statement requires picking apart different 
dimensions of the pre-earthquake housing crisis. Like any other city, population growth 
affected the value of land and housing affordability. Although there is no reliable historical 
data on the cost of land and housing, there are isolated research studies that suggest that mass 
forced migration had already quadrupled the price of rental homes in the late 1980s and 1990s 
(Trouillot, 1990, p. 214; Fass, 1987). One can only assume this trend kept pace with the 
accelerated rates of urban growth that occurred in the late twentieth century onwards. The 
challenge of urban residents to afford rental accommodation has always been influenced by 
their lack of employment and the rising costs of urban services, especially as many services 
(such as water) have been privatised (Schuller, 2016).  
Put simply, the housing crisis was due to the housing demand outstripping the supply, 
despite the mass construction taking place throughout the city. Discussed in the next chapter, 
Port-au-Prince’s housing shortage was believed to be 300,000 homes when the earthquake hit 
(Levine et. al., 2012). The housing crisis was exacerbated by the concentration and unfair 
distribution of urban land, especially habitable land. Since most urban land is either legally 
owned or controlled by the state and minority bourgeoisie, most of the city’s newcomers 
lacked adequate living space (Hallward, 2007). Before the earthquake, 80% of the urban 
population had been living on 20% of the city’s land (Steckley & Shamsie, 2015).  
This has turned Port-au-Prince into an apartheid city (Hallward, 2007). The ambivalent 
bourgeoisie have increasingly segregated themselves at the top of the crumbling city. Unlike 
the peri-urban areas attracting internal migrants, affluent neighbourhoods benefit from 
economic activities, lush vegetation and open parks, and the stable provision of electricity and 
other key services (Katz, 2013). The spatially divided city is also distinguished by different 
levels of population density and exposure to natural hazards. Whereas high income residential 
areas have a density of 25,000 people per square kilometre, low-income areas marked by slum 
residences are four times as dense (Joseph, 2012, p. 22). People living in high-density areas are 
arguably more prone to death and injury during disasters due to the pressure that population 
density places on the natural environment.  
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 The Port-au-Prince housing crisis was marked by the lack of affordable housing for 
people without access to reliable income. While some of the dispossessed poor managed to 
secure homes in established urban neighbourhoods, which is the goal of many families when 
they move to Port-au-Prince, most people were forced to rely on slums and informal 
settlements to meet their need for affordable housing. Prior to the earthquake, 64% of the 
urban population (approximately 471,000 people) lived in areas classified as slums (Joseph, 
2012, p. 71). Most of these slums (which still exist) are clustered on low-cost land with high 
environmental risk, such as steep hilltops, ravines, and floodplains (Joseph, 2012). Within 
them, the housing was poorly constructed, and there were problems with water pollution, gang 
crime, and other issues associated with social upheaval and the lack of law enforcement and 
social services (Wilentz, 2013). In summary, a long history of foreign and local state 
domination created a housing crisis prior to the earthquake. This housing crisis was 
characterised by large numbers of dispossessed peasants being pushed out of rural areas into 
the city, where they faced dangerous building conditions and human rights abuses within the 
housing market.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
Reflecting on the social toll of the 2010 earthquake, journalist Amy Wilentz attributes 
the high levels of death and destruction to Haiti’s history as ‘one of the most thoroughly 
globalised economies in the world…in the grossest way’ (2013, p. 131). As this chapter has 
shown, foreign states, primarily the U.S., have invoked a range of means to transform Haiti 
into a space for capital accumulation. This includes creating and exploiting political instability; 
bankrolling despotic leaders; and manipulating its debt to foster long-term dependency on 
foreign aid and capital flows (Hallward, 2007). Meanwhile, opening up Haiti to foreign 
penetration has all but destroyed the rural economy (Wilentz, 2013, p. 132). Today, Haiti is 
unable to meet its own food needs, which is a dramatic change from only thirty years ago 
when the countryside was populated by self-sufficient farmers. Meanwhile, Haiti’s corrupt 
leaders have managed to profit considerably and strengthen their control over the means of 
violence.  
In highlighting the criminal acts and omissions of states, this chapter has sought to 
historicise Haiti’s housing crisis. The patterns of displacement and destruction caused by the 
	 101 
2010 earthquake are not solely attributable to a natural phenomenon. Rather, Haiti’s urban 
population was vulnerable to the effects of the earthquake as a result of their prior 
victimisation, related to processes of proletarianisation and unplanned urbanisation. This 
chapter has made this point by discussing the mechanics of Haiti’s criminogenic political 
economy and the sequence of harms and human rights violations that arose from state policies 
and violence. 
It is evident that Haiti’s post-earthquake reconstruction process needed to address the 
harmful political-economic structures and policies in order to claim success, especially if the 
Haitian state and international community desired to ensure that such horrific levels of human 
suffering were never repeated. To accomplish this, the state and international community 
would need to grapple with previous patterns of foreign and local state criminality and its 
bearing on social power and well-being, especially in relation to access to land and housing. 
However, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, prior patterns of state criminality have been 












Restoring Haiti’s Violent Urban Order 
 
Even though there are now no pickings left, we continue to swim 
this strange sea of empathy with vultures flying right above the 
water. 
—Rose-May Guignard, Haitian Urban Planner, on the international 
humanitarian response to Haiti’s 2010 earthquake55 
The previous chapter described the political economy that allowed serious harms and 
acts of violence to be perpetrated by states and corporations against the majority of the Haitian 
population. The repeated cycles of criminal state policies made Port-au-Prince a repository for 
dispossessed rural populations whose livelihoods had been destroyed by transnational capital 
and the opportunity structures it created for political corruption and state violence. As Haiti’s 
small kleptocratic elite wilfully ignored patterns of social breakdown and mass rural-urban 
migration, the people transitioning to the capital city encountered dangerous living conditions 
and differential access to material resources. Urban newcomers struggled to secure jobs, 
physical security, and safe and affordable housing, the latter of which reflected extreme 
inequalities in the distribution of land between Haiti’s political-business elite and the spatially 
concentrated urban masses. This violent urban order of Port-au-Prince, built on class 
domination and state neglect, made the lower urban classes extremely vulnerable to hazardous 
natural events. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the role of humanitarian organisations in 
perpetuating an urban order that distributed power and resources unequally, thereby exposing 
the majority of Port-au-Prince’s poor to serious harms and human rights violations. To explain 
how this occurred, the chapter first outlines state goals for post-disaster accumulation and the 
strategies employed to achieve them during reconstruction, following Chapter One’s 
discussion of how states foster market conditions and develop legal rules and infrastructure to 
promote short- and long-term value extraction. The chapter illustrates how recycled neoliberal 
policies came into being under the backing of states and powerful institutions, and were 
                                                
55 Rose-May Guignard, Post-earthquake Haiti: A Pentagram, Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian 
Practice Network, 14 January 2015. Retrieved from https://odihpn.org/blog/post-earthquake-haiti-a-
pentagram/ 
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legitimised by an international discourse of Build Back Better. After reviewing state goals for 
accumulation, which did nothing to reduce population vulnerability to future hazards or 
address critical housing needs and rights violations, the chapter juxtaposes state goals with the 
social realities of disaster-affected Haitians. I will illustrate how pre-earthquake housing 
insecurities combined with post-earthquake population displacement to disrupt the urban land 
control of Haiti’s kleptocratic state, business classes, and landed elite. Ultimately, the 
population dynamics created by the earthquake posed a threat to the landed economy 
underpinning the urban order. While new claims-making processes on parcels of (primarily) 
unused land are explored in Chapter Six, this chapter sets up my analysis of humanitarian harm 
production with an overview of the social conflicts that emerged between disaster victims and 
dominant classes during the reconstruction period.  
Against this social background, the remainder of the chapter is devoted to 
problematizing the structures, actions, and policies that emerged under the umbrella of 
humanitarian disaster relief, which despite the label “humanitarian,” promised to go beyond 
traditional relief activities and produce specific social outcomes. After the earthquake and on 
behalf of donor states and the Haitian government, international humanitarian organisations 
assumed key tasks in aid delivery, housing decision-making, and managing the movements and 
settlement options of homeless urban populations (who they classified as “internally 
displaced”). This chapter emphasises that the dominance of some humanitarian organisations, 
who were entrusted to develop housing solutions, was not an inevitable consequence of the 
aid intervention. Rather, the chapter depicts a successful humanitarian sector able to sell their 
authoritative position and scientific methods to donors, who in turn focused aid resources on 
organisations who could provide rapid fixes to earthquake problems. This marketplace 
dynamic heightened donor and media pressure on organisations promising to bring a rapid 
end to intractable problems of homelessness and displacement.  
However, once humanitarian organisations secured their share of the marketplace, 
their normative and ethical positions were challenged by class struggles and violent encounters 
over land and housing. These realities shaped the adoption of ostensibly “neutral” legal and 
technocratic approaches to complex political-economic issues. Time and again, highly risk-
averse and reputation-focused organisations failed to deliver housing projects in line with 
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international standards and codes of conduct. In various ways, the organisational desire to 
efficiently administer and quickly resolve endemic housing problems reinforced the power of 
dominant social groups and differential access between different sectors of the population. In 
analysing these social impacts, I argue that humanitarians were not only complicit in delivering 
donor and local state pressures for quick, inexpensive solutions to housing problems and land 
disputes, but their actions reflected organisational demands to limit accountability and 
demonstrate market value to donors. In doing so, I also consider the influence of international 
discourses and logics of practice on organisational thinking and the legitimation of governing 
techniques that are inherently controlling and undemocratic.  
 
I suggest that humanitarian organisations in Haiti played a criminogenic role via their 
suppression and de-politicization of local land demands, and by developing methods of 
population control that, as the next chapter will show, took a sharp turn toward more coercive 
and violent approaches, leading to mass evictions of subversive populations reluctant or 
unwilling to leave land occupied after the earthquake. This chapter thus empirically describes 
the state-humanitarian relationship in situations of disaster reconstruction, illustrating the 
value of humanitarian bureaucratic power to states in administering specific outcomes that are 
necessary for advancing state strategies of accumulation. 
 
I. State Organisational Goals for Earthquake Reconstruction 
This section describes the political-economic context of the international humanitarian 
response in Haiti as a way of understanding the synthesis between state goals and humanitarian 
actions. It outlines some of the main ways that states sought to reap huge returns from Haiti’s 
reconstruction process, at the expense of remedying harms and addressing entrenched 
patterns of urban vulnerability. In detailing these processes, the section highlights the collusive 
relationships between the U.S., European governments, foreign corporations, and the Haitian 
state to enable rapid and long-term forms of accumulation. These motivations offer context 
to the various ways that humanitarian action indirectly contributed to state and corporate goals 
to engineer Haiti’s increased reliance on global markets.  
Shortly after the January 12 earthquake, the United States and other foreign 
governments barely contained their intention to exploit the reconstruction process to advance 
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their own state and corporate goals. Before all the bodies had been pulled from the rubble, 
Haiti’s U.S. Ambassador had already written to the U.S. State Department to broadcast the 
opportunities for U.S. capital. His leaked email titled “The Gold Rush is On!”56 depicts 
corporate competitive to take advantage of Haiti’s unprecedented human catastrophe – 
irrespective of community plans or desires:  
 
As Haiti digs out from the earthquake, different [U.S.] companies 
are moving in to sell their concepts, products and services. 
President Preval met with Gen Wesley Clark Saturday and received 
a sales presentation on a hurricane/earthquake resistant foam core 
house designed for low- income residents. AshBritt has been 
talking to various institutions about a national plan for rebuilding 
all government buildings. Other companies are proposing their 
housing solutions or their land use planning ideas, or other 
construction concepts. Each is vying for the ear of President in a 
veritable free-for-all.57 
 The U.S. became the main donor for Haiti’s reconstruction. Similar to other major 
disasters, large U.S. corporations successfully leveraged their political relationships to redirect 
enormous chunks of international aid promised for re-housing Haitians (Schuller & Morales, 
2012, pp. 75–76). Approximately 70% (US$500 million) of U.S. taxpayer money allocated for 
Haiti’s reconstruction was instead re-invested in corporate contracts.58 Foreshadowing how 
this money would be spent, several U.S. contractors receiving donor funds, such as AshBritt 
Environmental and CH2M Hill,59 had already been implicated in cases of political corruption 
                                                
56 See Wikileaks, The Gold Rush is On. 1 February 2010. Retrieved from  
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10PORTAUPRINCE110_a.html    
See also Herz and Ives, WikiLeaks, Haiti: The Post-Quake ‘Gold Rush’ for Reconstruction Contracts. The 
Nation, 15 June 2011. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/wikileaks-haiti-post-quake-gold-
rush-reconstruction-contracts/ 
57 See Wikileaks, The Gold Rush is On, 1 February 2010.  Retrieved from 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10PORTAUPRINCE110_a.html 
Herz and Ives, WikiLeaks Haiti: The Post-Quake ‘Gold Rush’ for Reconstruction Contracts. The Nation, 15 June 
2011. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/wikileaks-haiti-post-quake-gold-rush-reconstruction-
contracts/ 
58 The Economist, A Growing Share of Aid is Spent by Private Firms, Not Charities, 6 May 2017. Retrieved from 
https://www.economist.com/international/2017/05/06/a-growing-share-of-aid-is-spent-by-private-firms-not-
charities 




and wasteful public spending in other disasters. For some of these corporations, Haiti’s clean-
up would prove more lucrative than their business operations after Hurricane Katrina.60  
Acts of international profiteering in the post-earthquake reconstruction period 
intersected neatly with local configurations of elite criminality, as new capital influxes 
reinforced the power and profitability of large Haitian businesses accused of corruption and 
violence.61 Various U.S. administrative departments engaged in their own forms of disaster 
profiteering by raiding public funds earmarked for Haiti’s reconstruction.62 For example, at 
least one-third of the U.S.’s initial relief package went to the U.S. military to pay for the 20,000 
troops it sent to Haiti after U.S. officials pressured the Haitian government to declare a state 
of emergency and delegate its law enforcement powers to the U.S. The militarisation of 
humanitarian aid destabilised ideas of aid as a means for alleviating human suffering, not only 
because critically needed aid was diverted from core human needs, but also because the U.S. 
military was repeatedly blamed for obstructing the delivery of supplies to affected 
populations.63 64 Such evidence of state-corporate profiteering revealed foreign priorities to 
leverage aid to profit from the disaster rather than to meaningfully improve urban conditions 
after the devastating earthquake. 
Humanitarian and reconstruction aid became a strategic device for re-organising 
Haitian economic policy and political sovereignty. From the outset, Haitian reconstruction 
policy was controlled by foreign governments and multilateral institutions who developed an 
Action Plan for National Recovery and Development. The Action Plan ushered in neoliberal 
reconstruction policies in the name of the Haitian state, despite minimal participation of state 
authorities in their development. The Action Plan emerged from a post-disaster needs 
assessment (PDNA) imposed on Haitians while they were still recovering from the trauma of 
the earthquake (Belizare, 2012). This clearly illustrates the way that dominant states (and 
                                                
60 D. Sontag, Weary of Debris, Haiti Finally Sees Some Vanish, New York Times, 17 October 2010. Retrieved 
from https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/world/americas/18haiti.html 
61 Jordan Flahery, The Profits from Human Misery, Morning Star Online, 13 January 2011. 
62 B. Quigley and A. Ramanauskas, Haiti: Where is the Money? 26 February 2012. Retrieved from 
https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2012/02/26/haiti-where-is-the-money/ 
63 M. Sheridan and W. Branigin, Chaos at Port-au-Prince airport slows Haiti emergency aid efforts, 15 January 
2010. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011500362.html??noredirect=on 
64B. Quigley and A. Ramanauskas, Haiti: Where is the Money? 26 February 2012. Retrieved from 
https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2012/02/26/haiti-where-is-the-money/ 
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complicit multilateral institutions) ‘act swiftly to impose rapid and irreversible change’ on 
crisis-affected countries (Klein, 2009, p. 6). The PDNA was sanitised by World Bank experts 
as a technical needs assessment requiring nominal local input, 65 and indeed, the PDNA lacked 
local voice and participation (Belizaire, 2012). Haiti’s PDNA process speaks to specific 
techniques used by the World Bank, as an institution of supranational international 
governance, to recast political processes as arenas for technical intervention (Li, 2001; Harvey, 
2003; Kiely, 2010).  
The PDNA was subsequently used by international experts, including the World Bank, 
foreign governments, and UN agencies, to assemble a package of neoliberal economic reforms 
as the solution to earthquake poverty and destruction (Belizaire, 2012). First and foremost, the 
Action Plan committed Haiti to providing ‘the legal and regulatory framework that can meet 
the requirements of a modern country open to investments’ (Action Plan, 2010, p. 22). 
Authorised by a UN Session in New York – far from Haiti – the Action Plan endorsed regional 
industrial parks and free-trade zones as remedies for patterns of over-urbanisation underlying 
earthquake vulnerability and human suffering. These recommendations tied Haitian 
reconstruction targets to U.S national interests by putting Haiti back on the path to becoming 
an offshore assembly hub for the U.S. garment industry.66  
The foreign interests directing the Action Plan were so clear that Haitian audiences 
dismissed the plan as ‘a patching-together of IFI [international finance institution] remedies 
that represent only the continuation of policies from before January 12, remote-controlled 
from abroad’ (Belizare, 2012, p. 39). Grassroots organisations such as Haiti’s Papaye Peasant 
Movement (MPP)67 – one of the largest civil society groups in the country – dismissed the 
                                                
65 Interview with World Bank Representative, Port-au-Prince, 15 November 2013. 
66 The Plan states: ‘The construction and management of large facilities and infrastructure for production 
(industrial zones, business “free zones”, etc.) or as an aid to production (ports, airports, energy and telecom 
infrastructure, etc.) will necessitate huge investments and adequate management capacity…The success of 
regional centers will depend largely on incentives for industrial, commercial and tourist development. In this 
respect, the Hope II law provides an initial framework for using Haiti’s comparative advantages, to benefit from 
its workforce, the proximity of the North American market and the know-how of its private sector…In the short 
term, in addition to negotiations and legal and regulatory measures, the State of Haiti wants to encourage 
investments in this sector by supporting the development of industrial parks and free zones.’ See Haitian 
Government, Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. March 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/publication/Action_Plan_12April_haiti.pdf 
67 The Papaye Peasant Movement was formed in 1973 and has approximately 50,000 members, making it one of 
the largest and most vocal associations advocating for social justice in Haiti.  
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internationally backed reconstruction plan, claiming it to be ‘concocted in the name of the 
people without their participation.’68 MPP and other civil society organisations also disputed 
the idea that states should drive the reconstruction process. MPP leader Jean-Baptiste 
Chavannes implied that foreign states and multilateral institutions were responsible for 
reinforcing power imbalances between local people and their repressive government when he 
stated: ‘We [Haitian civil society] cannot allow the government—which does not have the 
confidence of the people—to make all the decisions on building the country.’ 69 These 
misgivings coupled with the imposition of neoliberal policies known for destroying local 
livelihoods demonstrated how both the PDNA and Action Plan constituted some of the first 
international acts ‘alienating Haitians from ownership over their own tragedy’ (Doucet & 
Macdonald, 2012, p. 79).  
The Haitian state, meanwhile, created a permissive environment for foreign extraction. 
Haitian officials ceded their decision-making sovereignty to foreign states in exchange for aid, 
and later, for opportunities to engage in new forms of corruption associated with the influx of 
foreign capital. Haitian state approval of the Action Plan led to the creation of an Interim Haiti 
Reconstruction Commission (IHRC), an entity that severely limited public participation in 
reconstruction decisions. The IHRC’s co-chair arrangement70 guaranteed U.S. oversight and 
approval over all aid projects, especially in relation to lucrative business activities such as 
rubble clearance and infrastructural construction. This reconstruction body’s membership 
followed a “pay-to-play” principle, allowing rich and powerful donors to buy their seats on 
the reconstruction commission and participate in the approval and strategic funding of 
reconstruction projects, which were commonly tied to the desire of states to have their goods 
and services procured for disaster relief.71 The IHRC’s performance of “inclusive 
reconstruction” brought together multinational institutions, international NGOs, and a 
handful of internationally-approved Haitian officials and business representatives into the 
                                                
68 AlertNet, Haitians want a bigger say in post-quake reconstruction, 30 March 2010. Retrieved from  
https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haitians-want-bigger-say-post-quake-reconstruction 
69 AlertNet, Haitians want a bigger say in post-quake reconstruction, 30 March 2010. Retrieved from  
 https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haitians-want-bigger-say-post-quake-reconstruction 
70 Co-chair positions were filled by then-U.S. President Bill Clinton and then-Haitian Prime Minister Jean Max 
Bellerive. 
71 D. Chery, Haiti’s Pay to Play. Haiti Liberte. 2016. Retrieved from http://www.haiti-
liberte.com/archives/volume10-11/Haiti%20s%20Pay-to-Play%20IHRC.asp 
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IHRC. This composition helped legitimise the body’s authority to direct funds to state-backed 
corporate projects. 
Though established to provide Haiti with a well-managed reconstruction process, the 
IHRC collapsed after 18 months with few real achievements. From the outset, the IHRC was 
dogged by allegations of corporate favouritism and corruption, as huge amounts of 
reconstruction money disappeared under its management.72 The IHRC’s failures were abetted 
by the unwillingness of foreign governments to channel aid through a coordinated 
reconstruction body, which intrinsically reduced Haitians’ power over aid decisions (Willems, 
2012). Despite the political rhetoric infantilising Haitians and the Haitian state, the IHRC 
turned out to be one of the most corrupt and dysfunctional mechanisms ever produced by 
foreign governments for Haiti – to the extent that even the Haitian government pushed back 
and refused to renew its mandate (Schuller & Morales, 2012, pp. 35–55). Even so, the demise 
of the IHRC was problematic. It freed foreign donors and humanitarian organisations to pick 
and choose different issues or areas for involvement, based on their own organisational goals 
and strategic interests. This would inevitably lead to the kind of piecemeal, “project-ized” aid 
that reinforces aid agencies’ technocratic engagement with local communities and is conducive 
to the strategic avoidance of structural problems. 
When the Haitian government was unable to deliver structural reforms or efficiently 
restore local conditions, foreign governments orchestrated the political conditions necessary 
for achieving key market goals for Haiti, such as privatisation and establishment of free trade 
zones. In November 2010, nine months after the earthquake, when millions of people were 
still living in tents, the U.S., France, and Canada pressed Haiti to hold presidential elections 
and spent over US$25 million to bring about their desired result (Blot, 2012, pp. 195–99). The 
rushed and flawed election process, decried as a silent coup d’état by a former OAS 
representative,73 resulted in the election of pro-business candidate Michel Martelly. 74  
                                                
72 D. Chery, Haiti’s Pay to Play. Haiti Liberte. 2016. Retrieved from http://www.haiti-
liberte.com/archives/volume10-11/Haiti%20s%20Pay-to-Play%20IHRC.asp  
73 D. Beeton and G. Nienaber, Haiti’s Doctored Elections, Seen from the Inside: An interview with Ricardo 
Seitenfus, 24 February 2014, Dissent Magazine. Retrieved from 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/haitis-doctored-elections-seen-from-the-inside-an-interview-
with-ricardo-seitenfus 
74 Evidence of U.S. meddling in Haiti’s 2010 election was reported by the Centre for Economic and Policy 
Research in Johnston, J., Clinton E-Mails Point to US Intervention in 2010 Haiti Elections, 7 September 2016. 
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President Martelly’s vision of reconstruction mirrored that of the foreign states who 
had helped him gain power. He committed to implementing the reconstruction objectives laid 
out by the Action Plan. After his inauguration, Martelly declared Haiti ‘open for business,’75 
making foreign investment his primary strategy for addressing the earthquake’s devastating 
effects,76 thereby providing local articulation of the neoliberal policies laid out in the Action 
Plan.77 Little attention was paid to basic public needs, as Haitian officials aggressively pursued 
overseas capital with promises of generous tax exemptions, deregulation of key economic 
sectors, and cheap sweatshop labour. This also included a fire sale of key public assets and 
services to foreign investors, including the telecommunications sector and control over its 
custom’s tariffs during the reconstruction.78 The government invited the World Bank to re-
write and weaken regulations in Haiti’s attractive mining sector – which some speculated was 
the hidden motive for large-scale foreign intervention after the earthquake.79  
Martelly’s economic policy boosted his administration’s standing with foreign 
governments despite its failure to address mass homelessness or prevent violence against 
people living in new settlements created by the earthquake (discussed in the next section). 
While half a million-people languished without adequate housing, the Martelly administration 
won praise80 for becoming Haiti’s ‘most pro-business government in fifty years.’81  
                                                
Retrieved from http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/clinton-e-mails-point-to-us-
intervention-in-2010-haiti-elections. See also Weisbrot & Johnston, 2012, pp. 199–204. 
75 The Economist, Rebuilding Haiti: Open for Business, 7 January 2012. Retrieved from 
https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2012/01/07/open-for-business 
76 S. Shafy, Haitian President Martelly: ‘I’m Trying to Re-establish Confidence’ Spiegel Online. 5 November 2015. 
Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-haitian-president-michel-martelly-a-
1000719.html 
77 M. Whitefield, Haitian Prime Minister Prospects for Business. 7 November 2014. Retrieved from 
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78 D. Chery, Outsourcing Customs Tax Collection in Haiti and Beyond. Counterpunch. 24 November 2014. 
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 In summary, Haiti’s reconstruction environment provides a contextual example of 
how states seek out opportunities for capital accumulation in the aftermath of natural disaster, 
and leverage foreign aid and global institutional arrangements (such as the World Bank) to 
restructure local economies for freer capital flows (Harvey, 2003). This section briefly alluded 
to civil society censure of these processes, while showing the necessary function of Haiti’s 
government, elected under dubious circumstances, to provide the institutional arrangements 
for both short and long-term goals of accumulation. The benefits of working within the 
disaster capitalism framework laid out by imperialist states will become clearer in the following 
sections, where foreign states displayed little concern with the state’s failure to develop a 
housing policy or stop the criminal violence directed at land occupants/disaster victims. With 
this in mind, we shall now turn to the dynamics of land contestation created by the earthquake.   
 
II. Local Reactions to the Earthquake: Mobility and Land Capture 
In this section, I will describe how the January 2010 earthquake produced new arenas 
of land contestation between Haiti’s state elite, on the one hand, and earthquake victims, on 
the other. This section outlines the differences between local demands for urban justice and 
state-humanitarian goals for restoration of the pre-existing urban order. These distinctions 
become important for exploring humanitarian complicity with the predatory goals of states 
described above as well as their own acts of harm and crime directed at land occupants (who 
I will also refer to as “squatter communities” in this thesis).    
The 2010 earthquake produced a scale of human mobility rarely seen in an urban 
environment. In the immediate aftermath, humanitarian agencies registered 1.5 million Port-
au-Prince residents as displaced, based on their construction of makeshift settlements across the 
city. This meant that over one-third of the urban population had been dislocated by the 
disaster event. Yet, it is important to understand the complex factors behind patterns of post-
disaster mobility and settlement, and how these factors mingled with and were produced by 
the violent urban order described in Chapter Three. Most people who ended up living in tented 
settlements from 2010 to 2015 experienced tenure insecurity prior to the earthquake. These 
included renters, squatters, homeless individuals, recent rural-urban migrants, and tenant 
farmers (see Levine et al., 2012). People’s displacement and lack of housing after the 
earthquake were caused by the primary effects of the disaster, such as the physical destruction 
	 112 
of rental homes or squatter sites, as well as the secondary effects of the earthquake situation, 
in which they lost jobs/income and suffered the increased cost of rent and other living 
expenses.  
One notable factor for people displaced after the earthquake was the inability to find 
new affordable accommodation, as rents skyrocketed in the post-disaster economy. Rents in 
post-earthquake Port-au-Prince immediately tripled in response to diminished housing stock.82 
Another reason for post-earthquake homelessness was that vulnerable families who had paid 
a full year’s rent upfront on January 1st, had no savings to pay rent elsewhere after their rental 
unit was destroyed on January 12th.83 Furthermore, property owners without the financial 
means to reconstruct destroyed homes also comprised a segment of the displaced population. 
What must be emphasised is the ruinous state of urban housing in Port-au-Prince prior 
to the earthquake. Poor housing conditions guaranteed that large numbers of homes were 
vulnerable to damage and destruction. And as a result, large numbers of people would be 
without adequate housing for a long period of time. To grasp the enormity of the issue, 
consider the following figures. Although the earthquake destroyed 105,000 homes (and 
damaged 208,000 others), this level of destruction hardly eclipsed the housing deficit that had 
been created by decades of state neglect of rural-urban migration and population growth 
(Lundahl, 2011, p. xiii). The housing deficit prior to the earthquake was believed to be up to 
300,000 homes, or three times the number of homes destroyed by the earthquake (Levine et al., 
2012). This comparative data raises suspicions about the underlying goals of Haiti’s 
humanitarian intervention, given that states and international organisations paid little attention 
to the appalling state of urban housing in Haiti until the earthquake disrupted the urban 
environment and became the tipping point for mass population dislocation. In summary, when 
combining the pre-earthquake housing deficit with earthquake-related housing damage and 
urban growth rates, Port-au-Prince’s reconstruction effort would have needed to build 
approximately 400,000 homes to adequately accommodate the urban population, in addition 
to repairing damaged homes.84  
                                                
82 Interview with humanitarian official 35/housing expert, London, 10 June 2014.  
83 Interview with humanitarian official 35/housing expert, London, 10 June 2014. 
84 Interview with humanitarian official 35/housing expert, London, 10 June 2014. 
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Such a dire picture of housing explains why informal settlements exploded across the 
city as the main social response to a lack of housing during the reconstruction period. In the 
first six months after the earthquake, humanitarian agencies registered 1,555 post-earthquake 
settlements across the urban landscape (IOM, 2010). While some people sought shelter in 
parks, schools, churches, and the airport, many of these newly recorded settlements 
materialised on empty and unused plots of urban land.  
Post-earthquake settlements varied widely in terms of the conditions they offered. In 
2010, approximately 33% of the entire displaced population were living in settlements that 
provided shelter to over 1,000 households (IOM, 2010). Depending on the space available, 
this could mean that families were crammed together with less than one square meter of living 
space (Collins, 2014). In the most extreme cases, settlements like that in the Champs des Mars 
Plaza sheltered over 4,600 households.85 In informal settlements, especially the crowded ones, 
people suffered from a range of harms, including lack of adequate shelter and public services 
(e.g., water and sanitation), risks of injury and disease, exposure to rain, landslides, and other 
natural hazards, and incidents of crime and sexual violence (Collins, 2014). In terms of sexual 
violence alone, Amnesty International reported 250 rapes in precarious settlements from 
January to May 2010 (Collins, 2014, p. 139). Studies from 2010 also showed minimal access of 
new settlements to functioning toilets (30%) and tented shelter (10%) (Schuller, 2010). This 
meant that considerable segments of the urban poor were subject to appalling living 
conditions, insecurity, and human rights abuses whilst awaiting house reconstruction (Collins, 
2014). 
The picture of lawlessness, mayhem, and violence does not fully capture the urban 
dynamic created by the earthquake, where mass mobility catalysed the extra-legal capture of 
urban land. The literature on Haiti’s earthquake tends to focus on post-earthquake settlements 
as “states of exception,” highlighting their characteristics of marginalisation and rightlessness. 
While this perspective certainly applies when analysing state-humanitarian governance of these 
spaces, a more nuanced understanding of state-humanitarian crime requires us to 
                                                
85 International Organization for Migration. First Wave of Families Leaves Haiti's Champ de Mars with IOM 
Help. Retrieved from http://haiti.iom.int/fr/node/132 
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simultaneously grasp the ways in which these new settlements had nurtured opportunities for 
people to reclaim urban land and redraw the spatial boundaries of the city.  
It must be recognised that not all settlements were tainted by inhospitable conditions. 
Many of these spaces offered living arrangements that were better than the slum 
neighbourhoods where people lived prior to the earthquake (Schuller, 2012a). There was the 
potential for spontaneous settlements to become new urban communities with permanent 
housing. More than half of the 1,555 settlements housed fewer than 100 families (IOM, 2010). 
Size, of course, is only one pre-condition of habitability. More telling, perhaps, are unpublished 
humanitarian assessments suggesting that up to 256 settlements provided favourable living 
conditions that would allow them to be turned into permanent housing.86 Even when informal 
settlements did not provide habitable living conditions, people still valued them for providing 
a backstop to their worsened economic situation after the earthquake – a theme to which I 
will return in Chapter Six. 
Data gathered from humanitarian institutions on land occupation is supplemented by 
my fieldwork (October 2013 to August 2014) and interviews with the people living in post-
earthquake settlements. Information gathered during my fieldwork counters the dominant 
depiction of new settlements as inhospitable and lawless spaces, and shows them as the central 
battleground for post-earthquake land struggles between precarious urban populations and 
the state elite. I discerned three ways that people engaged with new informal settlements in 
their quest for better access to land and housing. First, for multiple reasons pertaining to the 
cost and inaccessibility of urban housing, earthquake victims began relying on that settlements 
as an informal extension of the urban housing market.87 There was a great deal of fluidity 
within and between settlements, which was evidenced by the “for rent” and “for sale” signs 
on internationally provided tents, temporary shelters, and plots inside these informal spaces.88 
post-earthquake settlements also offered families a buffer zone for economic recovery. As 
some interviewees explained, lower-income families with some financial assets were able to 
leverage their designated plots or tents in informal settlements as stepping-stones to better 
                                                
86 IOM Draft Paper ‘Longer-Term Solutions to Displacement in Haiti: Exploring Community Integration as a 
Viable Approach’ obtained in person in July 2014. 
87 Interview with humanitarian official/housing expert 35, London, 10 June 2014. 
88 Interview with humanitarian official/housing expert 35, London, 10 June 2014. 
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housing options. During the course of my fieldwork, I was told by one family that they lived 
in a settlement for free for two years (from 2010 to 2012), allowing them to save money and 
find jobs. When they felt more financially stable, they left the settlement and obtained better 
housing in a more established neighbourhood. Part of what allowed them to make this move 
was the sale of their allotted space and tented home to a poorer family suffering from insecure 
tenure.89 This second family had not lost their home during the earthquake, but was unable to 
afford their rent one year after the earthquake struck. The narratives of both families are 
instructive, not only for showing important reasons for land occupation. They highlight social 
behaviours that humanitarian organisations would fail to appreciate and would often classify 
as deviant, according to the ways humanitarian actors configured space and interpreted 
property rights. 
A second trend my research identified was the deliberate attempt to leverage the 
chaotic urban environment to claim land for long-term housing. These acts of land occupation 
exemplify a “people-led reconstruction process” that I will explain in more detail in Chapter 
Six. Interviews with people living in post-earthquake settlements inside Port-au-Prince 
underscored the extent to which people distrusted the Haitian state and internationally led 
reconstruction process.90 Interviewees in Tabarre commune – a less dense and under-
developed area of the city – explained that only days after the earthquake some people gathered 
friends and family to look for empty land to restart their lives. Their intention was to capture 
and control unused land as a means to protect themselves from further victimisation. 
Essentially, the days after the earthquake were the perfect moment to fly under the radar and 
clandestinely occupy land. Because this group of earthquake victims saw little aid money and 
believed most of it was flowing directly to international humanitarian organisations, they 
framed their occupation as an act of self-protection. They perceived internationals as 
commodifying their victimisation, which one interviewee described as internationals putting 
‘our human rights for sale.’91  
Thirdly, mass displacement and the creation of informal settlements opened up new 
ways of bargaining with the criminal state. Even if captured land did not provide a hospitable 
                                                
89 Interviews, Caradeux settlement, Port-au-Prince, 19 July 2014. 
90 Interviews, Caradeux settlement, Port-au-Prince, 19 July 2014. 
91 Interviews, Caradeux settlement, Port-au-Prince, 19 July 2014. 
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environment for permanent housing, people perceived land control as a means for negotiating 
for alternative housing, especially if the land had high commercial value in the reconstruction 
environment.92 People understood that settlements had uniquely visualised the plight of the 
urban poor and had given them the right to be heard.93 However unintended, these local tactics 
initially benefitted from humanitarian discourses implying that people living in displacement 
sites (i.e., new informal settlements) were entitled to a solution to their displacement. That 
said, land occupations would eventually be subjected to restrictive humanitarian discourses 
that would undermine and frame local demands and methods of land control as deviant. 
 To summarise, earthquake population movements and land occupations severely 
disrupted the urban order and reconstruction economy. Many settlements were on urban land 
coveted in the reconstruction period, including for infrastructure or commercial 
reconstruction. The Haitian state, which had failed to address social housing needs prior to 
the earthquake, stood to lose control of valuable parcels of urban land. Private landowners, 
who often did not have legal or legitimate title to their property, also risked losing access to 
land as a result of the earthquake’s land occupation phenomenon. These dynamics presaged 
the inevitable social clashes and violent encounters over land in the reconstruction period. 
 
III. Humanitarian Containment and De-Politicisation of Post-Earthquake Land 
Occupations 
I will now examine humanitarian actions and the position of humanitarian practices in 
relation to the institutional framework of state predation described in Section I. This section 
emphasises many of the contradictions that are intrinsic to international humanitarian action, 
including the highly-politicised nature of “apolitical” organisations. It shows how 
humanitarian organisations applying conventional norms and narratives on disaster 
displacement implicitly support state organisational goals by restructuring debates over 
reconstruction needs and solutions. Humanitarian discourses, in other words, distract from 
the harms and criminality underpinning earthquake homelessness and reproduce the authority 
of institutional power to determine the trajectory of foreign aid. This study demonstrates that 
once humanitarian organisations assumed power over disaster victims in informal settlements, 
                                                
92 Interview with community leader in Acra settlement, Port-au-Prince, 15 April 2014. 
93 Interviews with local housing activists 2, 3, & 4, Port-au-Prince, 24 April 2014. 
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their approach to housing was shaped by dehumanised, managerialist thinking about victims 
and a desire to capitalise on Haiti’s aid resources. Such practices serve capital by re-
appropriating land conflicts, undermining victims’ land claims, and restoring capital flows and 
power relationships.   
  
III.I The institutional and discursive framework of Haiti’s humanitarian action. 
 Humanitarian organisations first engaged in the institutional framework of disaster 
predation by adopting state discourses of ‘Build Back Better.’94 This discourse was arguably a 
neo-colonial because of the way it positioned the superiority of international expertise to fix 
Haiti’s housing crisis and broken urban system. On the one hand, this discourse legitimised 
international control over nearly all aid resources dedicated for reconstruction under the 
assumption that international organisations had the knowledge and capabilities to transform 
Port-au-Prince into a well-ordered, thriving metropolis. On the other hand, it became a rallying 
cry for aid organisations to go beyond life-saving relief and drive structural changes in the 
urban environment.  
The UN affixed itself to the goal of nation-building when then-Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon vowed UN support to broker a new social contract between the Haitian government 
and its people.95 The IMF also claimed that huge amounts of international aid would constitute 
Haiti’s Marshall Plan and bring an end to Haitian poverty and deprivation.96 Though 
humanitarian organisations re-articulated the ‘Build Back Better’ phrase in their statements 
and reports, my interviews suggest that many humanitarian staff eventually lost faith in the 
commitment to this goal. As one humanitarian interviewee confessed: ‘After one year into the 
reconstruction, organisations were admitting and whispering to each other, this is impossible, 
building back better is nothing but a dream.’97 This interviewee contextualised his statement 
                                                
94 The “Build Back Better” mantra first emerged after the 2004 Asian Tsunami. There, it was synonymous with 
a number of state-building goals. It has since been used in other international disasters, including the Kashmir 
earthquake in Pakistan (2005), Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. (2005), Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008) (see Fan, 
2013, p. 1).  
95 United Nationals, Haiti Earthquake: Situation Updates, Ahead of donor conference in New York, Ban talks 
of building back better. 31 March 2010. Retrieved from  
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/haiti_quake_update.shtml 
96 D. Strauss-Kahn, ‘Why We Need a “Marshall Plan” for Haiti’, Huffington Post, 22 January 2010. Retrieved 
from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-we-need-a-marshall-pl_b_432919 
97 Interview with humanitarian official 35/housing expert, London, 10 June 2014.  
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by pointing out that the ‘Build Back Better’ discourse had placed enormous, unachievable 
expectations on humanitarian organisations to transform urban relations without the necessary 
resource commitments. Even so, most organisations remained publicly silent about the 
emptiness of state rhetoric, the lack of donor funding, and their demanding, frontline position 
to deliver ‘Build Back Better’ objectives.98 
Part of this may have been that such discourses sanctioned the legitimacy and authority 
of the UN-led humanitarian response, which adopted the goals laid out by the Action Plan 
and the ‘Build Back Better’ mantra. As with other disaster responses, the UN rolled out the 
UN Cluster System,99 an institutional mechanism which compartmentalised urban issues into 
sector responsibilities (i.e., food, shelter) and assigned different organisations to coordinate 
and oversee these responsibilities. The UN Cluster System is designed to bolster national 
structures by bringing together humanitarian actors and national authorities to support 
humanitarian programmes, with the view of eventually transferring all humanitarian 
responsibilities to national authorities (Ferris, 2011, p.71). 
From the beginning, this institutional mechanism side-lined civil society participation 
in sector-related decision-making. Because most coordination meetings were held in the UN 
compound (Log Base), local Haitian NGOs and grassroots activists were routinely excluded 
and intentionally (or unintentionally) barred from entry (Miles, 2012). When Haitians did 
manage to attend, international organisations dominated meetings with their expert language 
and knowledge, and silenced local voices by conducting meetings in the colonial languages of 
English or French. Adding to this, Miles highlights the spatial distance between Haiti’s 
international aid community and disaster victims in the following observation: 
UN coordination staff effectively insulated themselves from their 
Haitian counterparts and the affected population behind the walls 
of the Log Base. They travelled the city in SUVs, afraid of the 
people around them in the streets that led to their organisations’ 
camps…. Most had short-term assignments in Haiti, and because 
                                                
98 Interview with humanitarian official 35/housing expert, London, 10 June 2014. 
99 The UN Cluster System is the institutional architecture guiding global humanitarian responses led by the 
U.N. It is the outcome of humanitarian reform processes and aimed at enhancing the coordination of 
humanitarian agencies and ensure that humanitarian needs are met in different sectors. See 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach. 
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of the misperception concerning security and Haitians, they were 
unaware of urgent problems all around them (Miles 2012, p. 49). 
Humanitarian decision-making, in other words, replicated the power asymmetries 
between dominant states and the Haitian government. Many Haitian NGOs would need to 
drop their social priorities and adopt the normative language and priorities set by international 
organisations in order to participate in the international relief effort as service providers. As 
observed by Mark Schuller (2012b, 2016), aid dynamics reinforced the social distance and 
tension between Haiti’s professional “Klas ONG” (NGO class) and poorer Haitians 
benefitting from humanitarian relief. The dominance of the UN cluster system and the more 
than 10,000 international NGOs and UN agencies100 that flocked to Haiti had other 
repercussions for state accountability and governance. Throughout the humanitarian relief 
period (2010 to 2015), Haitian activists and scholars criticised humanitarian service providers 
for replacing state functions and reducing local expectations of the Haitian state, raising 
concerns about what would happen when international organisations left Haiti (Haiti 
Grassroots Watch, 2012). The institutional form of humanitarianism in Haiti therefore 
appeared to fit comfortably within broader neoliberal strategies to decrease state 
responsibilities and funds for social welfare.  
As alluded to above, international humanitarian organisations allowed foreign states 
to channel funds for relief and reconstruction, while minimising their actual contributions and 
thus reducing the risk of public censure. Despite pledges to improve urban conditions, foreign 
governments would only disburse 60% of their pledged humanitarian recovery funds, which 
was originally US$9.28 billion (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 7). Most of this funding would 
be provided in the first two years of the humanitarian response, meaning that huge gaps in 
financing for humanitarian programmes and housing would emerge after 2012, an important 
factor when looking at the forces behind humanitarian organisational deviance.  
As previously discussed, most foreign aid declared for rebuilding Haiti and providing 
housing would never reach the people affected by the earthquake. This was due to weak 
foreign oversight and restrictions on how aid organisations used their funds, and the tendency 
                                                
100 Baptiste, N., Are Foreign NGOs Rebuilding Haiti or Just Cashing In?, 10 July 2015, Foreign Policy in Focus. 
Retrieved from https://fpif.org/are-foreign-ngos-rebuilding-haiti-or-just-cashing-in/. 
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to provide the bulk of funds to an established aid oligopoly (see Weiss, 2013, p. 32). Large UN 
agencies and international NGOs often subcontracted donor funds to smaller organisations, 
leading to significant waste in organisational overheads and operational costs. In foreign 
government funding alone, one-quarter was distributed to large UN agencies and international 
NGOs with high costs of operation (Ramachandran & Waltz, 2012, pp. 8–9). In terms of U.S. 
funding, some of the largest non-profit humanitarian providers included CARE USA (US $115 
million), the International Organization for Migration (US $94 million), Catholic Relief 
Services (US $74 million), and World Vision ($US $8 million). Studies interrogating why so 
few houses were built for Haitians would later show disturbing trends in humanitarian 
profiteering (Johnston, 2018). In total, Haiti’s humanitarian sector appeared to absorb, for 
their own operational costs, approximately 43 cents of every aid dollar claimed to be spent on 
Haitians (Edmonds, 2012, p. 63). The lack of transparency by aid organisations, however, 
makes it difficult to determine the exact nature of organisational spending and how much 
money that could have been spent on housing was redirected to organisational overheads, 
vehicles, professional salaries, and organisational growth objectives (Disaster Accountability 
Project, 2012). Failures to provide adequate housing were clearly linked to donor indifference 
to organisational spending and hidden patterns of aid profiteering and waste. 
 
III.II Restructuring debates on housing, land, and reconstruction. 
I will now consider the processes by which Haiti’s humanitarian agencies consolidated 
their power and authority over disaster victims living in informal settlements. How these 
processes unfolded reveals how debates about housing shifted from a structural approach to 
a fragmented, individualised approach to resolving disaster-induced displacement (not 
homelessness). Although international organisations with either humanitarian and 
development identities were both subsumed under the UN Cluster Approach, their 
institutional mandates often overlapped. “Emergency” issues (i.e. those dealt with by 
humanitarian actors) were clearly rooted in longer-term “development” problems (i.e. those 
responded to by development actors). This led to heightened competitiveness between two 
distinct groups of organisations with different terminologies, objectives and approaches to 
their institutional work. In this competitive aid landscape, foreign donors’ power to fund 
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specific organisations also implied the power to select the aid approaches and activities most 
desirable to them.   
Literature on Haiti which has overlooked the finer distinctions between humanitarian 
and development organisations has often failed to grasp the origins of humanitarian 
dominance. Retold by organisations on both sides, the decision to approach urban housing as 
a short-term, humanitarian issue was not an inevitable consequence of international 
intervention. Rather, it stemmed from humanitarian successes in the aid marketplace. As 
debates were waged about how international organisations should address Haiti’s housing 
deficit and displacement issues, UN agencies and international NGOs with humanitarian 
mandates began to sell to donors their prior experience in dealing with crisis conditions and 
carrying out large logistical operations in crisis zones.101 Humanitarian actors were also well-
organised under the UN cluster system. They presented an orderly humanitarian approach to 
population problems, especially as different camps and aid relief responsibilities were assigned 
to different agencies, and regular forums were established for coordinating activities and 
decision-making. The humanitarian sector (unlike the development sector) benefitted from an 
expansive population surveillance system created by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), which had assumed lead responsibility102 for camp management (the 
governance of informal settlements). IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix, which routinely 
gathered data on population movements and conditions, provided a technical tool to frame 
population issues in statistical terms (i.e., number of displaced people; number and size of 
camps; land characteristics of camps; number of people/camps threatened with evictions; 
number of people provided housing solutions). Invoking Foucault’s (1991) insights on 
governmentality, this surveillance system backed the claims of Haiti’s humanitarian sector to 
know displaced populations. The DTM not only legitimised humanitarian authority to treat 
displacement problems, but it also promised a scientific method for restoring the pre-
earthquake urban order.  
Humanitarian agencies further rationalised their superiority over development 
organisations by invoking their responsibilities under the international legal framework on 
                                                
101 Interviews with humanitarian officials 32 (9 August 2014) and 37 (16 July 2014), Port-au-Prince. 
102 According to its institutional mandate under the UN Cluster System. 
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internal displacement (discussed shortly). This framework provided a persuasive narrative 
about the earthquake and urban restoration. With it, humanitarians offered a logic of practice 
and institutional prescriptions that fit comfortably with state goals that centred around the 
return home of Haiti’s displaced populations. However, the internal displacement narrative 
and approach clashed with domestic civil society (which wanted to tell a story about predatory 
capitalism) and development organisations, such as UN-Habitat, who problematized 
approaches to housing based on individualised concepts of displacement.103 In UN-Habitat’s 
view, international aid was more likely to help people if it focused on addressing the structural 
barriers that prevent house reconstruction (i.e., land allocation) rather than treating individual 
circumstances, according to the highly-controlled tradition of humanitarian approaches (see 
Chapter Two).  
The position of development organisations was best articulated by then-Special 
Rapporteur on Housing, Raquel Rolnik:  
 
In Haiti, reconstruction and recovery has less to do with the 
construction of new houses for individuals directly affected by the 
earthquake than with the improvement of the overall living and 
housing conditions in unplanned and under-serviced settlements 
affected by the disaster. The approach should thus focus on 
settlements and communities, not individual constructions, and 
the aim to create places where people can have an adequate 
standard of living.104  
Regardless of the concerns and counterarguments of development organisations, the 
humanitarian approach was more appealing to donors. Interviewees from humanitarian and 
development organisations suggested that donor governments favoured the quick and limited 
displacement-ending approaches advertised by the humanitarian sector, and therefore directed 
their funds toward humanitarian strategies for re-housing displaced Haitians.105 
 
                                                
103 Interviews with Haitian government advisor, Port-au-Prince, 14 March 2014 and local housing activist 10, 
Port-au-Prince, 24 April 2014. 
104 UN Human Rights Council. Note by the Secretary-General on the Right to Adequate Housing: Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living. 5 
August 2011. UN doc. A/66/270, paragraph 54. 
105 Interviews with humanitarian officials 32 (9 August 2014) and 37 (16 July 2014), Port-au-Prince. 
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III.III Return, property protection, and ending displacement as organisational goals. 
 This section will consider the consequences of humanitarian action as a form of 
population governance in Haiti’s post-earthquake settlements. In Chapter Two, I looked at 
how humanitarian agencies are implicated in a network of institutional relationships that serve 
states by maintaining the geopolitical order. A range of governing techniques are deployed by 
humanitarian organisations to administer populations in ways that eliminate threats to the 
capitalist system and seek to create more responsible, less dependent subjects, accepting of 
state-society relations under neoliberalism. The art of crisis population management, in 
Foucauldian terms, becomes a matter of incentivising population movements to operate 
within the parameters and frameworks set by capital and states, and deterring or suppressing 
population movements that appear dangerous and out of place (Choudry & Kapoor, 2013, p. 
13; Lasslett, 2018). Humanitarian government relies on established, sanitised forms of 
knowledge and tools of science to predict and achieve population outcomes.   
Following this theory, one technique of humanitarian governance relates to the 
construction of social identities that are compatible with processes of capitalist accumulation. 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, UN political leaders and their affiliates 
(UNHCR and IOM) swiftly declared Haiti as an “internal displacement” crisis and invoked 
the social designation of internally displaced person (or IDP). This was based on preliminary 
judgements by the international community that the earthquake had triggered population 
displacement by forcing flight from homes to informal settlements (designated as camps).  
Before analysing the implications of the UN’s act of institutional labelling, I will reflect 
on the ways that international concepts of internal displacement reproduce dominant 
ideologies and unequal power relations. One enduring critique of the IDP identity is that 
international definitions of displacement are highly subjective, giving power to humanitarian 
practitioners to make some populations visible while rendering others invisible to systems of 
aid (Polzer & Hammond, 2008; Hathaway, 2007). These concerns are validated by the fixation 
on crisis-related forms of internal displacement in international legal frameworks and 
discourses designed to protect displaced people.106 There is a lack of clarity on how other 
                                                
106 The definition provided in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement makes this clear: ‘Internally 
displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
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forms of internal displacement, such as those associated with state-corporates crimes and 
violence, should be treated by normative frameworks focussing on crisis-related movements 
(Robinson, 2003).  
Of significance is that this exclusion of certain types of displacement speaks to the 
criminological debates about harm and crime (see Hillyard et. al., 2004). Current normative 
frameworks have conceived the most harmful forms of internal displacement as those which 
are exceptional and abnormal (i.e., prompted by crisis conditions). The effect is an international 
system that overlooks displacement that occurs as part of an everyday capitalist existence, and 
is as damaging and arguably more pervasive (see Cooper & Paton, 2017). We may also say that 
the international legal framework on internal displacement has driven a politics of difference 
between categories of displaced people, showing how liberal discourses on rights protection 
often bring forth state policies of exclusion and discrimination (Kapur, 2007, p. 542). As we 
shall see in practice, normative constructs of internal displacement have also underpinned the 
assumption that states and humanitarian agencies should only work toward remedying the 
needs and harms created by single events (i.e., an earthquake). This assumption, in turn, has 
justified short-lived, humanitarian responses that focus on symptoms rather than root causes 
of forced movement and homelessness.  
A host of liberal states, legal scholars, and humanitarian actors have championed 
normative developments on the protection of IDPs as a sign of progress in the international 
human rights regime.107 Opposing this view are critical scholars who question the institutional 
power derived from the categorisation and recognition of IDPs, especially the institutional 
roles that have been carved out for international humanitarian organisations. 108 From the latter 
                                                
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, 
situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized State border.’ See also B. Petterson (2002), Development-induced 
displacement: internal affair or international human rights issue? Forced Migration Review (12). Retrieved from 
https://www.fmreview.org/development-induced-displacement/pettersson 
107 See Roberta Cohen and Francis Mading Deng (1998), Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement. 
Washington: Brookings Institution Press; Susan Martin and Andrew Schoenholtz and Patricia Weiss Fagen 
(2005), The Uprooted: Challenges in Managing Forced Migration. New York: Lexington Books; E. Mooney (2005. The 
concept of internal displacement and the case for internally displaced persons as a category of concern. Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 24:3, 9-26.; Elizabeth Ferris. 2011. The Politics of Protection: The Limits of Humanitarian Action. 
Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
108 See Polzer, T. and Hammond, L. 2008. Invisible displacement. Journal of Refugee Studies, 21:4, pp. 421 on 
common international practices of labelling and pathologizing beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. See also 
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perspective, an international IDP regime has developed norms, logics, practices, and 
knowledge that justify a more disciplinary and repressive framework of humanitarian 
engagement, which in turn is co-opted and used by states (Polzer & Hammond, 2008). 
Arguments against an emerging global regime for governing IDPs – consolidated over the last 
twenty years – maintain that normative development on internal displacement constitutes an 
important tool for population containment (Duffield, 2001). They point to the provisions laid 
out in normative frameworks, such as the authority given to state and humanitarian institutions 
to determine the status of IDPs, identify solutions for displacement and decide when 
displacement has ended. 109 Although contextually specific, states and humanitarian 
organisations are often motivated to declare an end to displacement to demonstrate problems 
have been solved, and that their legal and moral duties have been fulfilled (Ferris, 2007). 
 How institutional regimes on internal displacement operate as a governing strategy in 
service of state interests is best exemplified by the discursive and legal restrictions placed on 
the settlement of displaced people. The normative framework offers prescriptive methods for 
dealing with displacement issues that are conceived at the individual level, thus negating 
collective rights and actions (Polzer & Hammond, 2008). Similar to refugees, individuals with 
an IDP status are entitled to a “durable solution”, which is defined by the following conditions:  
• voluntary settlement to one of three options (known as 
“return,” “local integration,” or “resettlement”)  
• elimination of vulnerabilities associated with the experience of 
displacement (emphasis added)  
• attaining the same human rights protection as the rest of 
society  
(Mooney, 2005) 
 These international standards are seldom followed in practice. States and humanitarian 
institutions involved in population governance have repeatedly constructed “return” as the 
preferred solution to displacement and the end of the displacement process (Hammond, 1999; 
Black & Gent, 2006). While it is widely recognised that return home may be contested or 
                                                
Duffield, M., 2001. Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security, on the specific effects of 
the IDP regime. 
109 As evidence, Principle 28.1 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement states: ‘competent 
authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which 
allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, to their homes or places of habitual 
residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country.’  
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expose people to harm and violence, international institutions have played a critical role in 
constructing positive narratives about return of IDPs (or refugees) to assuage public doubts 
about the acceptability and voluntariness of return processes (Barnett, 2001; Malkki, 2006, 
p.395; Ashutosh & Mountz, 2011). The UNHCR and the IOM are two global institutions 
most associated with disseminating these narratives and carrying out “voluntary” returns on 
behalf of states (see Chimni, 2000; Grieger & Pecoud, 2010; Koch, 2014). Such discourses 
frequently frame return home as a desirable, win-win outcome for vulnerable populations and 
states (Koch, 2014). In that sense, re-positioning people to the places where they belong 
emerges as a means of achieving order, stability, reconstructed state-society relations (Black & 
Gent, 2006).  
The deployment of positive narratives about return may do more harm than just 
obscuring the non-voluntariness of state-humanitarian return programmes. They may also 
negate a more radical politics of place by naturalising pre-displacement conditions and 
emphasising the moral value of re-rooting people in their places of origin (Malkki, 1995). 
Furthermore, contemporary narratives of return operate within the confines of capitalism by 
framing property rights as the linchpin of successful return processes. The dominance of 
return has given rise to legal instruments110 to protect the property rights of displaced people 
(see Smit, 2012; Calhan, 2014). Concepts of return and property rights are often the basis of 
humanitarian technocratic engagement with victimised populations.  
I will now consider the specific effects of population governance aligned with 
organisational goals of return, private property rights, and rapidly ending displacement. 
Amongst the first acts of humanitarian organisations responsible for finding housing solutions 
for earthquake victims was to construct an IDP population. This was accomplished by 
investigating, surveying, and mapping new informal settlements in the city, then defining the 
populations living in these settlements as the primary object of humanitarian intervention and 
analysis. Informal settlements were thus subsumed under humanitarian management and 
control. As described in the literature on camps, these spaces assumed characteristics of “states 
                                                
110 See the Pinheiro Principles: United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and 




of exception,” where normative rhetoric on IDP rights quickly disappeared (see Turner, 2016; 
Zetter, 2007). Humanitarian organisations asserted their ways of seeing land occupations (as 
temporary camps) over the land claims of victims and assumed power to continually reframe 
victims’ claims to meet state-elite interests.  
An immediate effect of humanitarian classification was that post-earthquake 
settlements were reconstructed as distinct and separate territorial spaces in relation to the rest 
of the city. The people living in settlements were marked as vulnerable populations of concern, 
while the people outside them – who may not have left their homes but were equally in need 
of housing – were excluded from humanitarian assistance. The spatial formation brought by 
humanitarian actors thus fabricated a politics of difference between the people living inside 
and outside of these spaces demarcated for humanitarian intervention. Making these artificial 
distinctions more concrete, organisations distributed IDP identity cards to people in camps. 
Such acts were the grounds for denying assistance to vulnerable persons (without such identity 
cards) seeking to enter camps to receive assistance. Despite the fluid way people were 
occupying unused land parcels for informal housing, humanitarians made every effort to 
“border” informal settlements and police movements into settlements. Their actions had no 
connection to the needs for land and housing, but were instead shaped by managerial demands 
to define and manage a reasonable caseload of earthquake victims/claimants. 
 Populations living in post-earthquake settlements were subordinated to managerial 
systems that reduced their needs, demands, and experiences to statistical data. Through the 
Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), humanitarians incessantly mapped and collected data 
on the displacement situation, in ways that highlighted successes in reducing population 
numbers. In this way, humanitarian organisations gave both foreign states and the Haitian 
government a tool to monitor their performance, as defined by the numbers of IDPs and post-
earthquake settlements still remaining after the earthquake. Outside of state pressure, there 
were other incentives to remove informal settlements from the post-earthquake landscape. 
International framing of camps as spaces of last resort informed organisational perceptions 
that settlements should only offer temporary refuge. Some organisations stressed that informal 
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settlements needed to be removed in order to restore the integrity of the urban environment 
and catalyse new economic opportunities.111  
My research shows that humanitarian sentiments toward land occupants shifted in 
relation to the amount of donor funding available to organisations.112 As donor funding 
declined over time, so too did humanitarian sympathies toward populations in new 
settlements. This is because humanitarians were subject to reputational attacks when they 
could not provide adequate services and living conditions to people of whom they had 
formally assumed responsibility.113 Organisational fatigue based on the gap between 
expectations and actual capacity is reflected in the statement of one aid worker:  
Taking on this [camp management] responsibility in a place like 
Haiti was absurd. It put us in the position where we were supposed 
to find a solution for every single person in every single camp, and 
not only that, we had to ensure that every camp had basic services 
until this solution was found. Half my job was trying to maintain 
a decent level of services in the camp and the second half was 
trying to think – what the hell are we going to do with all of these 
people?114 
 Beyond these frustrations, organisations appeared aware of their acts of mislabelling. 
Many humanitarian reports cast post-earthquake settlements as dangerous and disease-ridden 
spaces, both as a fundraising tool and a way to legitimise humanitarian activities.115 However, 
interview data suggests that several organisations privately acknowledged their discourses were 
obscuring local realities and desires for land control. Even when the relationship between 
informal settlements and people’s land goals were recognised, they were dismissed as 
problematic by the international community due to occupants’ lack of legal standing. This is 
                                                
111 See Turner, S. 2016. What Is a Refugee Camp? Explorations of the Limits and Effects of the Camp. 
112 Interviews with humanitarian officials 3 (London, 9 June 2014), 6 (Port-au-Prince, 21 April 2014), and 37 
(Port-au-Prince, 16 July 2014). 
113 This is seen in humanitarian service delivery to “camps” (i.e. informal settlements). Whereas 211 “camps” had 
their needs adequately covered by international humanitarian organisations in March 2011, decreased donor 
funding had caused this number to drop by only 25 “camps” by October 2012.  These figures were matched by 
the gradual decline in the provision of essential services to “camps”. In 2014, only 67% of people living in post-
earthquake settlements had access to latrines (IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix reports March 2011 and 
October 2012; Amnesty International, 2015a). 
114 Interview with humanitarian official 3, London, 9 June 2014. 
115 See, for example, the 2013 Humanitarian Action Plan at 
https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/2013_Haiti_HAP.pdf. 
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evident in a 2011 report from the Human Rights Commission that raised alarm about new 
shantytowns: 
 
The inhabitants of official camps…appear determined to stay 
there for the long-term, judging by the tents and shelters 
surrounded by gardens, bushes or trees. Almost everyone asked 
expressed the desire to remain in the camps rather than return to 
where they had lived before…. The Independent Expert was 
struck by the progressive transformation of the official camps into 
informal settlements and shanty towns…. Although the camps 
were an appropriate response to an emergency situation, one can 
only wonder whether they have now contributed to the emergence 
of a new kind of social organization that might create more 
problems than it solves.116 
To conclude, organisational acts of mislabelling were not necessarily unintentional. 
Rather, they reflected discomfort with social identities and land behaviours that challenged 
traditional ways of thinking about and treating displacement situations. This is a point to which 
we shall return in Chapter Eight in relation to humanitarian forms of denial. 
III.IV Property-based housing solutions and restoring the urban order. 
Recalling Chapter One, Foucault’s (1991) work shows that what is distinctive of 
governmentality is the need to govern populations according to regimes of truth, based on 
science, that allow government to administer populations according to natural laws. Bearing 
this in mind, I will look at the ways that humanitarian agencies used Haiti’s unjust property 
laws to administer housing solutions and then condone the removal of land occupants from 
post-earthquake settlements. These processes began with the implementation of a massive 
IDP registration process during the first year after the earthquake. Led by the IOM, this 
registration process conducted in 1,555 settlements aimed to gather information about the 
targeted population that could be used to develop housing solutions. Understood as a specific 
technique of humanitarian power, the IDP registration process originated a new universe of 
truth about IDPs, stated in terms that resonated with the normative framework on IDPs 
described above. Similar to the DTM, IDP registration provided, as expressed by Didier Fassin 
                                                
116 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/42, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights 
in Haiti, Michel Forst, 4 April 2011, paragraph 17. Retrieved from https://canada-
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(2012, 29), ‘the possibility of observing the phenomenon, making it visible and measureable; 
[and] finally, the opportunity to resolve a social problem that finds no other solution.’ 
The IDP registration process ascribed new propertied identities to land occupants. 
This identity was based on data gathered about people’s (a) neighbourhoods of origin (i.e. 
where they would return to in Port-au-Prince) and (b) pre-earthquake land tenure status (to 
identify housing entitlements). This classification system, based on one’s previous spatial and 
property status in the urban order, gave rise to a housing approach that disregarded how one’s 
former position constituted a threat to his or her physical safety and economic well-being. 
Although the IDP registration was conducted by the IOM with donor support, the property-
based approach it constructed was adopted widely by other humanitarian organisations.  
From this point on, humanitarian policy-making departed from statistical knowledge 
gathered to correct and eliminate the abnormalities of land occupation. From a managerial 
perspective, singling out former property owners as housing beneficiaries proved the quickest 
method for reducing the number of housing claimants, which was a step toward emptying 
post-earthquake settlements. In 2010, however, property owners comprised less than 50% of 
the population in settlements (IOM, 2010).  
It is important to emphasise that this decision did not result from an assessment of 
social needs or the input of settlement-based populations, both of which are required by 
humanitarian codes of conduct. Instead, this decision reflected the interaction between 
managerial requirements, state-humanitarian goals, and normative prescriptions. In terms of 
the latter, the prioritisation of housing aid to former property owners was justified because it 
spoke to the normative framing of IDP populations as people forced to flee from their homes – 
they had a place to call home in the first place. Accordingly, people with formerly registered 
property rights (or clear possession rights) became easily distinguishable rights-holders in 
relation to the legal framework guiding humanitarian action. Property owners displaced by the 
earthquake were, as some humanitarian staff phrased it, the ‘low-hanging fruit’.117 Moreover, 
humanitarian organisations could make a logical connection between stereotypical ideas of 
property owners and their preferred method of intervention – to return people to their original 
                                                
117 Interviews with humanitarian officials 31 (Port-au-Prince, 4 November 2013) and 32 (Port-au-Prince, 9 August 
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homes and neighbourhoods of belonging. Since they were operating in a disaster context, and 
not a conflict one, organisations appreciated return as the least politically contentious solution 
for displacement victims under their care and management.118 Return home/property rights-
based solutions allowed humanitarian organisations to comfortably practice aid without 
confronting hard questions of social-spatial justice and resource allocation. 
The property-focused approach applied to post-earthquake settlements yielded 
broadly harmful effects. It fractured new communities of land occupants into the propertied 
and non-propertied, and shaped a discriminatory system of housing aid that favoured the 
former group. Translating these consequences into monetary figures, the 114,124 property 
owners helped under this approach received housing assistance in the form of transitional 
shelters (T-shelters),119 which cost approximately US$4,226 per family.120 Meanwhile, families 
with less secure forms of tenure received as little as US$500 in the form of rental assistance. 
Although both propertied and property-less individuals suffered from the lack of a safe and 
decent home, property owners jumped ahead by receiving the means to rebuild homes.  
The UN Special Rapporteur on Housing criticised aid disparities as a violation of 
international principles of non-discrimination and equality, and labelled hierarchies in aid 
assistance as incompatible with the progressive realisation of the right to housing for all.121 
Moreover, this individualised approach to aid failed to address the wider disparities in land 
access underpinning critical housing shortages. The humanitarian approach, dismissed by the 
Special Rapporteur on Housing, ‘divert(ed) resources from the reconstruction of permanent 
housing and neighbourhoods.’122 Furthermore, human rights reports frequently called 
attention to the poor quality of housing being provided to homeowners. These homes only 
had a three- to five-year lifespan, meaning the temporary homes provided were detached from 
                                                
118 Interviews with humanitarian officials 26 (Port-au-Prince, 27 March 2014) and 7 (Port-au-Prince, 21 April 
2014). 
119 Transitional shelters (T-shelters) were usually made of timber frames with corrugated metal roofs. 
120 The figures of transitional shelters provided by the international community are found in Amnesty 
International’s report ‘15 Minutes to Leave’ (p.17). The costs of different housing interventions were provided 
during interviews with humanitarian agencies. 
121 UN Human Rights Council. Note by the Secretary-General on the Right to Adequate Housing: Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living (5 
August 2011) UN doc. A/66/270, paragraph 54. 
122 UN Human Rights Council. Note by the Secretary-General on the Right to Adequate Housing: Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living (5 
August 2011) UN doc. A/66/270, paragraph 54. 
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long-range housing needs and strategies (Amnesty, 2015a). Essentially, humanitarian 
organisations operated to take the pressure off the Haitian government to come up with a 
long-term plan to address acute urban housing problems. 
To make matters worse, property owners faced strict organisational requirements to 
qualify for housing assistance. To meet selection criteria, property owners needed to show a 
high degree of legal proof of ownership that was inconsistent with the informal nature of 
Haiti’s property system. Some homeowners were barred from receiving housing assistance if 
their former homes were located in areas unauthorised for construction. My research identified 
three cases in which former property owners were excluded from housing programmes 
because their homes had received a red tag123 during the government’s structural building 
assessment. This meant their home required significant structural repair. Additionally, the 
homes of these families, through no fault of their own, were located in areas deemed too 
dangerous for house construction. They were disqualified from housing packages for former 
property owners based on the fact that no organisation wanted to rebuild a home with a high 
level of expense and risk. The property status of these families was subsequently downgraded 
from propertied to non-propertied, which meant they faced losing their home and ownership 
status. Noting this trend, the International Democracy and Justice Institute for Haiti (IDJH) 
raised concerns that 64% of homes marked with a red tag were being re-occupied by 
earthquake victims without the requisite assistance to rebuild them.124 This finding implied 
significant numbers of former property owners had returned to shelter that was potentially 
life-threatening due to a lack of alternatives that met their housing needs. 
III.V Urban experimentation and technical strategies for improving land access  
In the previous section, I mentioned that closing settlements was the primary goal of 
humanitarian organisations and that more than half of the population living in these 
settlements lacked land and housing to return to. Inevitably, humanitarian agencies were 
                                                
123 In 2010 the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications conducted a structural assessment 
of every home and building in the area affected by the earthquake. This led to the following colour coding: red 
(unsafe/serious structural damage), yellow (limited occupation/some structural damage), and green (safe/no 
structural damage).  
124 Center for Constitutional Rights, Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, Bureau des Avocats 
Internationaux, International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University’s Washington College of Law, 




forced to consider other housing strategies to achieve their goals once it became clear that 
assistance to property owners alone would not achieve the desired reductions in the size of 
camp populations. This prompted another humanitarian policy for Haitians without property 
rights, called “formalisation” (sometimes referred to as “camp regularisation” and 
“community integration” by different humanitarian organisations). This section considers the 
“formalisation” policy as another example of the depoliticised housing strategies aligned to 
state-humanitarian interests. 
The general idea of the formalisation strategy was for humanitarian organisations to 
identify unused parcels of urban land that could be used to locate permanent housing, through 
‘interventions that ensure land tenure security, basic services, social protection mechanisms 
and housing.’125 Despite this definition, formalisation was an elastic concept interpreted and 
practiced differently by different organisations between 2010 and 2015. Formalisation could 
entail an organisation deciding to upgrade an existing settlement through the interventions 
listed above, or less commonly, could involve the identification of new land parcels for the 
construction of housing. Regardless of how it was implemented, interviewees generally agreed 
that formalisation was only an acceptable strategy when an existing settlement met the 
following criteria:126  
 
(1) No land conflicts with the state or private claimants 
(2) Showed a viable route to securing legal land tenure 
(3) Government approval of organisational upgrades/permanent housing 
(4) Low density and land viability (i.e., no environmental risks) 
(5) Presence of a cohesive and peaceful community 
These selection criteria made little sense given the historical context of state predation and 
elite land grabbing, coupled with the post-earthquake influx of capital that only escalated the 
material advantages of urban land control. The formalisation strategy therefore constituted 
another example of what Li (2011, 293) calls ‘rendering technical.’ This is to say, rather than 
confront political realities and injustices, humanitarian organisations charted a legal and 
technical method for making more housing available for some of the city’s poorest residents. 
                                                
125 IOM Draft Paper ‘Longer-Term Solutions to Displacement in Haiti: Exploring Community Integration as a 
Viable Approach’ obtained in July 2014.  
126 Interview with humanitarian official 4, Port-au-Prince, 26 June 2014. 
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Symbolically the formalisation strategy signified humanitarian attempts to undertake 
essential responsibilities abdicated by the Haitian state. Housing was an indispensable 
requirement for mitigating mass post-earthquake homelessness, and Haitian authorities 
refused to take any substantial measures corresponding to their legal and constitutional 
obligations to protect the right to housing.127 Humanitarian attempts to clarify the state’s vision 
for housing led to the conclusion that ‘there was no clear roadmap on what to do for 
permanent housing in the urban setting, no model or process had been outlined, no vision or 
guidance was in view’ (Amnesty, 2015a, p. 20). This is not entirely correct, as the Martelly 
government had unequivocally stated that Haitians were responsible for their own housing. The state’s 
hands-off housing policy, released four years after the earthquake, championed self-recovery 
as the primary method for addressing the city’s broken housing system.128 These omissions 
were exacerbated by the common disappearances of state officials when their presence was 
required to authorise humanitarian housing projects. In many ways, the collapse of the IHRC, 
the reconstruction coordination body, made it easier for state officials to evade their 
responsibilities. While foreign donors lobbied for the creation of a state housing authority 
(UCLBP) to establish a focal point for humanitarian housing interventions, the limited 
mandate given to the UCLBP did not resolve the problems of state apathy and the institutional 
barriers obstructing better access to housing.129 Humanitarian organisations provided an 
institutional arrangement whereby outside actors, with no concrete responsibilities to Haitians, 
could treat land access as a series of pet projects (or charity). In this way, the state could avoid 
engaging with access to land as a constituent element of realising rights to housing. 
Against this political backdrop, it is not surprising that several international 
organisations seeking access to land for new homes and neighbourhoods, failed to deliver on 
their promised objectives. There are a number of reasons for this. First, while the idea to 
formally upgrade informal settlements as new housing sites might appear an appropriate 
strategy, the overarching motivation for pursuing it was innately connected to organisational 
                                                
127 According to Article 22 of the Haitian Constitution, Haitian citizens have the right to housing, although the 
scope and content of this right is vague and not in line with international standards (Amnesty 2013). Article 36-
3 also provides for some limits on property rights by stating that: ‘Ownership also entails obligations. Uses of 
Property cannot be contrary to the general interest.’ 
128 Haiti’s housing policy, the Politique nationale du logement et de l’habitat (PNLH), can be retrieved from:  
 https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/politique-nationale-du-logement-et-de-l%E2%80%99habitat-pnlh-octobre-
2013 
129 Interview with humanitarian official 7, Port-au-Prince, 21 April 2014. 
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self-interests. For example, one paper outlining an organisation’s strategy made it clear that 
humanitarian organisations were engaging with this approach precisely because it promised a 
new way to lower the number of claimants to humanitarian assistance. The paper read: 
 
Despite recent progress made with returns programs as of late, the 
population decrease is now occurring at a slower pace compared 
to the decline witnessed last year and the first quarter of 2011. In 
fact, even with the most optimistic projection that camp 
populations decrease at the current rate of about 7% per two 
months, there would still be a caseload of about 313,921 [displaced 
people] by the end of 2012.130 
This affirms the detached and dehumanising ways that organisations were engaging with 
Haiti’s homeless populations. It shows how organisations, supposedly acting in the name of 
displaced victims, based policy decisions on their own self-interests. The same document 
reinforces this point through another statement that makes humanitarian goals clear: 
 
It is important to underline that the sum of our actions as the 
international community continue to be judged against the 
presence of camp resident IDPs. 
These statements signalled the real possibility that organisations would abandon land-access 
problems if they could not demonstrate progress against the overriding goal of reducing 
population numbers in post-earthquake settlements.  
Most organisations were unable to make their formalisation strategies work. The 
weakness in organisational strategies was in the legal and technical criteria for land-access 
projects. For a start, humanitarian organisations assumed that Haitian officials would 
cooperate with their innovative methods for providing housing and tenure security to 
extremely poor and insecure populations. This was far from the reality of the situation. Neither 
Haiti’s political decision-makers nor its private landowning and business class wanted to cede 
land control to the urban masses. Class animosities and divisions are such that Haiti’s small 
political-economic elite live in perpetual fear of the lower classes rising up and usurping their 
power and material advantages (see Hallward, 2007, pp. 3–4). This fear was heightened in the 
post-earthquake period, and was expressed by one government interviewee who stated that 
                                                
130 IOM Draft Paper, Providing Durable Solutions to IDP Camp Populations Through Camp Regularization and 
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the humanitarian-controlled camp system and formalisation strategy had provoked anxiety 
amongst the members of Haiti’s ruling class. According to this official, state authorities were 
intent on limiting the success of land-access projects, because they had ‘dangerously 
communicated to Haitian landowners that valuable urban land was at risk of being privatised 
by humanitarian agencies.’131 Essentially, humanitarian discourses and modes of assistance had 
incited a deep-seated fear that precarious populations might be empowered to consolidate 
control over urban land, and with it, political power.132 This fear underscored one reason why 
Haitian authorities were often inaccessible to humanitarian organisations or outright unwilling 
to approve their “formalisation” projects.  
Humanitarian pursuit of a ‘technical and legal fix’ (Li, 2011) to land-access problems 
was incompatible with the rigidity of Haitian law and the complexities fostered by a weak and 
unclear system of land administration. Chapter Three showed how decades of political conflict 
and clientelistic land gifting had translated into a situation in which the Haitian state had little 
record of what land it or private individuals owned. Ultimately, the state’s strategic avoidance 
of land conflicts was a way to maintain political stability amongst competing factions of elites 
(Etienne, 2012). For formalisation projects, this meant that humanitarian organisations and 
the Haitian lawyers they employed struggled to identify unused land parcels with registered 
title.  
On top of this, Haiti’s legal system severely challenged humanitarian requirements for 
legal tenure on land because of its rights hierarchies and exclusionary principles. Haitian law 
impedes the achievement of formal tenure security for land occupants (i.e., squatters). For 
land occupants to assert possession, they must demonstrate uninterrupted occupation for ten 
and twenty years based on the status of land occupied. After this, the claimant must go through 
a lengthy and expensive legal process to have their possession legally recognised.133 Haitian 
                                                
131 Interview with humanitarian official 6, Port-au-Prince, 21 April 2014. 
132 Interview with humanitarian official 27, Port-au-Prince, 30 July 2014. 
133 The Haitian Civil Code defines possession as ‘a relation between something and an individual by which this 
person has the possibility to accomplish personally or through a third party, actions which correspond to the 
exercise of a right whether this person is or is not entitled to this right.’ Under Article 1997 of the Civil Code, a 
land occupant may assert possession when the following two elements are demonstrated: a) seizure and 
occupation of a property and b) the action of, and the quiet, continuous, public and unequivocal enjoyment of 
the property by the possessor. Possessors acting in good faith may have their possession considered after 10 
years if the real owner lives in Haiti, and 20 years if the owner does not. See the Property Law Working Group. 
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property law also bars land occupants from accessing ownership or possession rights on 
certain categories of state-owned land (again showing how some land occupants could be 
immediately excluded from humanitarian housing projects).134  
Furthermore, Haitian law also makes the expropriation of urban land for social 
housing extremely difficult and expensive. The law requires a high degree of state involvement 
in the process of expropriation. To expropriate land, the state must demonstrate it has 
established a formal housing project on expropriated land, and if it cannot show this, it must 
return the land to its original owner.135 Additionally, the state can only expropriate land and 
compensate owners if the landowner in question can produce legal title. Again, the country’s 
lax system of land administration and titling means that much land is held informally without 
the requisite legal documentation, making it difficult for the state to identify owners and legally 
expropriate. Due to these legal complexities, many settlement occupants were automatically 
disqualified as potential candidates from humanitarian land-access projects. 
Formalisation projects were ultimately linked to the reputational needs of 
organisations to showcase their organisational expertise – their material motivations for 
engaging in crisis contexts. As a rule, humanitarian organisations shied away from any project, 
including housing, that posed a risk to organisational reputations (see Levine et al., 2012). 
Organisational aims, explained by one humanitarian interviewee, were centred around the 
desire to produce ‘comprehensive, gold-plated housing solutions that would never be criticised 
by the New York Times.’136 Again, this pressure to build high-quality housing that met 
international standards for safe, legal, and adequate housing did not square with the messy 
realities on the ground, marked by widespread land informality, land fraud and corruption, and 
                                                
2016. Securing Land Rights in Haiti: A Practical Guide. Habitat for Humanity. Retrieved from 
http://box5436.temp.domains/~landlaws/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Haiti-Land-Manual-2-English.pdf. 
134 According to Articles 444 and 576 of the Haitian Civil Code and Article 3 of the Decree of September 22, 
1964. 
135 The Loi du 5 septembre 1979 sur l'expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique (September 5 1979 Law for the 
Expropriation for Public Utility) authorizes the Prime Minister to expropriate private property by order or decree 
in cases of ‘extreme urgency,’ including the need for public housing (IFRC, 2014). The law, which is still in place, 
establishes legal precedent for certain criteria that state expropriations must fulfill. Most important is that state 
expropriations can only occur ‘for the purpose of carrying out works of general interest’ (Article 1: September 5 
1979 Law for the Expropriation for Public Utility). 
136 Interview with humanitarian official/housing expert 40, Port-au-Prince, 1 August 2014. 
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the scarcity of financial resources vis-à-vis actual housing needs. How these risk factors shaped 
organisational anxieties is apparent in an aid worker’s self-critique: 
Our problem was, if we were going to build a housing, then it 
needed to be on land that was legally titled so we wouldn’t be 
accused of putting people at risk. Then, the house should be given 
for free, which was costly, because it needed to have running water 
and sanitation. Only if you satisfy all of these criteria are you [an 
organisation] blameless. But realistically, we didn’t have what it 
took to provide housing to half a million people.137 
 The sensitivity to reputational concerns turned housing and land-access projects into 
a series of risk calculations, often leading to inaction. Although organisations had claimed their 
superiority over Haitians to provide housing and raised funding on this promise, their risk-
averse behaviours systematically steered them away from helping the people most in need of 
housing. Put differently, organisational risk calculations incentivised disengagement from the 
quasi-state responsibilities that humanitarian organisations had enthusiastically assumed at the 
beginning of the disaster response. Perverse incentives arose for avoiding complex situations 
and engaging in projects that promised a high likelihood for success, as highlighted by one aid 
worker:   
If I look at how we are behaving, we [humanitarian organisations] 
are all cowboys just running into the wild west, just grabbing our 
stake, grabbing our set of beneficiaries. This is because an 
organisation can only be held responsible for whatever it puts its 
fence around at the very beginning. That way, you are not 
responsible for anything that happens outside of your beneficiaries. 
If you're smart, what you do is you go in and you pick the smallest 
group in the world. You create a blameless, fabulous housing 
intervention where everybody says it’s wonderful. This works 
because there is no discussion how we as a humanitarian collective 
are failing. Every time we intervene in someone’s life, we are 
excluding more and more people who are going to get absolutely 
nothing because their situation is too difficult.138 
To understand how these processes operated consider the following case, identified 
during fieldwork, of a large international NGO attempting to build formal housing by relying 
on the legalistic, state-centric, and risk-averse approaches to housing discussed above. In this 
                                                
137 Interview with humanitarian official 3, London, 9 June 2014. 
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case, the humanitarian organisation had first engaged with the eighty families living in a small 
settlement. After determining this group to be a “nice and cohesive” group of IDPs, the 
organisation secured donor funding to build them permanent housing. The organisation’s first 
act was to hire a Haitian lawyer to conduct legal research into the status of the occupied land. 
Simultaneously, the organisation consulted the municipal authorities in their area to receive 
authorisation for a new housing project. Although the lawyer’s research showed the lack of 
registered title for the land in question, his research and the organisation’s engagement with 
local authorities had tipped off powerful landowners to the organisation’s intentions. 
Consequently, one well-known Haitian landowner invoked his rights to the land and produced 
title documents that the organisation’s staff presumed to be forged because of the 
overwhelming lack of evidence to validate the claim. Yet, despite the obvious falsity of the 
claim, the organisation dropped the housing project rather than assist the land occupants to 
fight the claim. The organisation rationalised their reasons for doing so, based on their 
perceptions of reputational risk and their unwillingness to engage in local land politics. This is 
made clear by the narration of events by the organisation’s representative:  
The key reason that building permanent homes was so difficult was 
that Haitian landowners always showed up with vague legal 
documents every time they smelled an international housing 
project. Self-proclaimed landowners were always from one of the 
seven most powerful families in Haiti, who would go straight to 
the mayor’s office and state their claim. In our case, the mayor, 
who had authorized our housing project, was facing elections and 
did not want to solve the problem. The Prime Minister’s office also 
refused to help, saying it was our project and telling us to take the 
issue to court. But going to court wasn’t an option for us as an 
international organisation. It would be time-consuming and 
outside our timeframe and mandate. It was a risk we were not 
willing to take. We also did not want to be seen to be getting 
involved in political issues, so we told the people we could no 
longer deliver housing for them. We later had heard that the 
population had been evicted.139 
This case is similar to other failed land-access projects identified during my fieldwork. 
In all of the cases recorded, organisational actions and inactions revealed the strong tendency 
to abandon land claimants in the face of alternative claims of the Haitian state and landed elite 
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to occupied land. When this happened, land occupants who had been made visible by systems 
of aid were usually rendered more vulnerable to violent outcomes, particularly in the form of 
evictions. It is important to reiterate that humanitarian harm production in these cases related 
to two distinct outcomes. The first is that organisations failed to meet their normative 
responsibilities and the expectations placed on them despite their claims of expertise and 
control of aid resources. In the end, donors such as USAID, working through humanitarian 
organisations and private contracts, would fund only 2,649 of the 15,000 houses it promised, 
which is approximately 0.007% of the total number of houses needed.140 The second is that 
the organisational behaviours in land-access projects often increased the likelihood of re-
victimisation. Essentially, humanitarian practices related to land access and new house 
construction were responsible for intensifying the forces of violence against the vulnerable 
landless.  
IV. Conclusion: Linking Disaster Capitalism and Humanitarian Institutional 
Violence 
This chapter presented my findings on the practices, processes, and logics of 
humanitarian aid during Haitian reconstruction. I began by exposing state goals for disaster 
accumulation, relying on Klein’s (2009) insights of disaster capitalism. I outlined the 
institutional arrangements imposed on Haiti after the earthquake to achieve both short-term 
goals – state-corporate profiteering – and longer-term objectives of restructuring the Haitian 
economy to achieve optimal conditions for appropriation of Haiti’s land and labour. I also 
considered the World Bank’s role in implementing a post-disaster needs assessment without 
local participation, and later reframing neoliberal economic policies as the solution to disaster 
reconstruction.  
The key argument made in this chapter is that humanitarian organisations supplied an 
institutional framework for working within the limits of disaster capitalism. Foreign donors 
and the Haitian state were able to rely on humanitarian organisations to treat population 
problems created by the earthquake in ways that enforced limitations to humanitarian 
assistance and obscured local demands for more equitable allocation of Port-au-Prince’s land 
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resources. From the beginning, humanitarian organisations functioned to legitimise the 
reproduction of harmful state policies in post-earthquake Haiti by disseminating state-led 
discourses suggesting harmonised goals between Haitians, states, and international institutions 
to Build Back Better. Yet, underneath international pledges to transform the urban space into 
something better operated the more injurious moves of states and corporations to redirect 
reconstruction funds toward profitmaking institutions and enact legal and political changes 
necessary for Haiti’s incorporation into global markets – despite historical evidence showing 
social harms caused by such policies. 
The chapter also interrogated the normative and state-centric logics guiding 
humanitarian practices, and also the competing logics of humanitarian and development 
ideologies. Humanitarians demonstrated a clear preference to assist populations who had the 
least complex housing situation, and drew from their prescribed methods and toolbox of 
solutions to address displacement problems. Their labelling, surveillance, and data collection 
methods reworked the understanding of conditions on the ground and justified expert-led 
approaches to the problems of populations targeted and determined worthy of humanitarian 
interventions. Meanwhile, Haitians with different ideas and priorities for reconstruction were 
marginalised from decision-making processes led by humanitarian organisations. These power 
relations, brought to the field of post-earthquake land conflicts, worked against the interests 
of landless urban residents.  
The chapter emphasised several harmful outcomes of state-humanitarian power 
relations. First and foremost, the chapter revealed patterns of aid discrimination resulting from 
the interpretation of IDP norms in ways that fit managerial interests. The chapter 
problematized technical and legalistic aid approaches centring on the return or “rooting” of 
individuals or groups of individuals. These approaches invariably negated broader public 
conversations about state responsibilities and the distributive inequalities underpinning 
harmful living conditions. Consequently, the Haitian state benefitted enormously from a 
humanitarian aid sector’s disinterest in questions of urban justice and their tendency to 
administer populations in ways that restored the pre-existing urban order. The disengagement 
of risk-averse organisations from land-access projects that confronted state-elite interests 
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constitutes an important example of humanitarian complicity in state omissions to designate 
land and coordinate a plan for social housing in post-earthquake environments. 
This chapter concludes that the harms of land dispossession produced by 
humanitarian organisations outlined above, should be characterised as institutional violence. 
One of the purposes of this chapter was to identify different claims-making processes on 
unused parcels of urban land after the earthquake. The data presented in this section revealed 
that patterns of earthquake displacement also represented patterns of land occupation. This 
understanding is important for grasping the impact of humanitarian decisions. Institutional 
violence, we are reminded by Cooper and Whyte (2017, 2), ‘involves the targeting of subject 
groups and populations in ways that reproduce and increase the likelihood of other, ongoing, 
violent circumstances occurring.’ Applying this definition, I argue in the previous section on 
formalisation, that humanitarian projects built on securing legal access to land and building 
formal tenure for land occupants often had the effect of making clandestine squatters visible to 
harmful power structures, thereby exposing them to threats of eviction. Another way of 
grasping the implications of these decisions is that they disrupted people’s occupation 
strategies. In other words, people may have extended their tenure security through quieter and 
clandestine forms of building (see also Levine et al., 2012). Had land occupants been left alone 
and not been the target of humanitarian programmes and legalistic methods, they may have 
increased their chances for tenure security over the long run, according to the ways that Port-
au-Prince residents have traditionally built up their tenure security in Haiti. We recall how 
earthquake displacement brought together large groups of people who were somewhat better 
placed to defend the land they had occupied. Speaking to this potential outcome, and the 
dispossessing elements of humanitarian practices, one urban planner commented:  
Humanitarian organisations were completely preoccupied with 
legality and risk. But their behaviour doesn’t make sense because if 
you look around many Haitian communities are informal and build 
their tenure status over decades of incremental building. International 
organisations were too concerned with respecting regulations and 
standards rather than seeing how they could help squatters use the 
situation to their advantage. I believe this was related to organisational 
politics of neutrality and aid competition more than anything else.141  
                                                
141 Interview with humanitarian official/housing expert, 35, London, 10 June 2014. 
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In the following chapter, we move ahead in our analysis of humanitarian behaviour to explore 






Forced Evictions and Involuntary “Returns” as State-Humanitarian 
Crime 
In Chapter Four, I demonstrated that land was bound to emerge as an issue of social 
conflict between Haiti’s excluded majority and the political-business elite. Displaced disaster 
victims housed in informal settlements used various tactics to demand that their land and 
housing needs be considered during the reconstruction process. The Haitian state, however, 
had no intention of designating land for new urban housing or recognising the claims of 
disaster victims. 
This chapter elaborates on these social conflicts by taking a closer look at the role of 
humanitarian organisations in enforcing exclusive property rights. I do this by going beyond 
the unintended consequences of humanitarian decision-making and acts that facilitated the 
dispossession of land claimants. In the previous chapter, we saw that even though certain 
humanitarian practices increased the vulnerability of earthquake victims to harm and re-
victimisation, these practices did not fit descriptions of deviant behaviour according to the 
criminological definitions offered at the beginning of this thesis. 
This chapter, however, delves deeper into questions of organisational deviance. It 
identifies specific humanitarian practices that clearly fall within the state-crime framework. 
The practices identified relate to two key decisions taken by humanitarian organisations, which 
I argue were designed to expel the poor and landless from post-earthquake settlements without 
the provision of viable alternative housing. I show how these policy decisions were made in 
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the name of “protecting” illegal land occupants from inevitable violence against them, and 
restoring Port-au-Prince to its “natural” order. The human rights violations that result from 
humanitarian-led population expulsions, which I argue are intentional and linked to deviant 
organisational goals, is key to categorising these practices as state-humanitarian crime. Chapter 
Six extends this picture of state-humanitarian crime by exploring the social reactions of 
earthquake victims to state and humanitarian actors who carried out land expulsions and 
suppressed alternative land claims.  
 
I. Organisational Pressures for Goal Attainment 
When humanitarian organisations re-categorised Haiti’s post-earthquake settlements 
as IDP camps and brought them under their architecture of camp management, they assumed 
state responsibilities for providing settlement and housing solutions to nearly a million disaster 
victims. These responsibilities, however, were at odds with the resources provided by foreign 
donors primarily interested in exploiting Haiti’s reconstruction process for their own ends. 
Aid organisations were further hampered in their ability to achieve their objectives because of 
their strict adherence to so-called apolitical action, their deference to state authority, and their 
predisposition to risk-free land access and housing projects. Meanwhile, donor governments 
and the media exerted significant pressure on organisations to solve the problem of mass 
displacement. IOM, the lead agency for coordinating Haiti’s camps, and its partner 
organisations comprising the UN camp management and coordination cluster, received sharp 
criticism from the media and watchdog groups for the poor and unsanitary living conditions 
in IDP camps and for failing to quickly move people from camps into permanent homes.142 
Organisations that had assumed camp management responsibilities as well as the responsibility 
to find housing and settlement options for earthquake victims, were the most susceptible to 
media criticism and reputational damage, which they saw as jeopardising future donor 
funding.143  
                                                
142 See BBC, UN condemned over appalling Haiti earthquake camps, 7 October 2010. Accessed on 10 December 
2018. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11491537  
143 Participant observation of humanitarian coordination meeting involving representatives of 10 humanitarian 
organisations, Port-au-Prince, 14 May 2014. 
	 145 
Disturbing numbers of forced evictions carried out by state officials and private 
individuals in 2010 and 2011 increased the pressure on humanitarian organisations to address 
physical violence directed at land occupants. Mass forced evictions heightened media scrutiny 
of humanitarian organisations who were responsible for the protection of camp occupants 
and the resolution of their vulnerable displacement situation. When the Martelly government 
assumed power in 2011, it made clear its desire to close tented settlements as quickly as 
possible and restore the urban environment. Port-au-Prince could not claim to be open for 
business while tented informal settlements remained in the city. In addition, informal 
settlements were a powerful reminder of state negligence and omission to provide housing for 
its people. As a Haitian academic stressed: ‘the continued existence of these places provided a 
daily reminder to the state of the nation’s social cleavages and its failure to tackle rampant 
homelessness.’144  
International donors also expected humanitarian organisations to meet their 
‘deliverables’ in terms of housing/shelter provision and reduce officially recorded numbers of 
people entitled to humanitarian assistance. Donors relayed their fears that humanitarian aid 
was creating dependency, signalling an expiration date for humanitarian funding. However, 
for reasons mentioned in the previous chapter, few humanitarian organisations actually 
succeeded in achieving their deliverables – creating land access for new housing to end the 
camp-based internal displacement situation. Despite international claims to have built 
hundreds of thousands of homes for Haitians, only 37,000 were actually built,145 a tiny fraction 
of the half million required. Without improved housing or economic conditions, land 
occupants were reluctant to leave informal settlements, and as mentioned, some wanted to 
turn their land control into permanent housing.  
Data from July 2011 highlights the population problems faced by humanitarian 
organisations desiring to show success by reducing IDP numbers and closing settlements. 
Eighteen months after the earthquake, 594,811 people still lived in 894 informal settlements 
(IOM, 2011a). As described in Chapter Four, humanitarian policies first focused on providing 
housing support to former property owners. By 2011, this focus had led to a drastic reduction 
                                                
144 Interview with Haitian academic, Port-au-Prince, 10 July 2014. 
145 See Amnesty International. 2015. Ten Facts about Haiti’s Housing Crisis. Available at  
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/01/ten-facts-about-haiti-s-housing-crisis/ 
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in the number of former property owners requiring housing assistance. But at the same time, 
it signalled the end of a clear-cut solution to a segment of the population (property owners) 
with less complex housing needs in comparison with the population comprised of former 
renters and squatters. In July 2011, for example, the number of former property owners 
residing in post-earthquake settlements had decreased to only 10% of the total settlement 
population. Correspondingly, the number of former tenants, squatters, and other categories 
of placeless people jumped at this time from 60% to 78% of the total population living in 
post-earthquake settlements (IOM, 2011a). The state’s unwillingness to specify a plan for re-
housing this population or designate land for this task further impeded the fulfilment of 
humanitarian responsibilities. I will now discuss how these factors combined and shaped 
organisational behaviours toward earthquake victims. 
 
II. Humanitarian Complicity in Forced Evictions 
This section explores the complicity of humanitarian organisations in forced evictions 
carried out by state authorities and private individuals of Haiti’s elite class. Recalling the 
introductory chapter of this thesis, forced evictions constitute state crime according to both 
legalistic and deviance-based definitions due to their violations of human rights and their 
frequent labelling as crime by civil society. During reconstruction, forced evictions from post-
earthquake settlements was the most common method used by the state elite to retake land 
control. Humanitarian data suggests that at least 60,570 people living in 176 post-earthquake 
settlements were victims of mass forced evictions from 2010 to 2015 (IOM, 2015). These 
evictions obliterated informal settlements and left the former occupants homelessness.  
The number of forced evictions in this time frame is likely higher than what was 
reported by official data. My interviews with local and international civil society raised 
credibility issues with humanitarian population tracking systems (the DTM – or Displacement 
Tracking Matrix). For example, there was a tendency to exclude evictions where only part of 
the population was evicted from the post-earthquake settlement.146 Interviewees suggested 
that humanitarian agencies had a vested interest in keeping eviction numbers low to deflect 
international criticism about their failure to protect vulnerable people. Some research suggests 
                                                
146 Interviews with housing activists 1,2, 3, Port-au-Prince, 24 April 2014 and international human rights activists 
2 and 4 London, 28 October 2014. 
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nearly one-third of the total population living in post-earthquake settlements (labelled as IDPs) 
were forcibly evicted between 2010 and 2011 (Ferris & Ribeiro, 2012). 
Of particular concern, the official record of evictions excluded instances in which 
entire populations or settlements simply disappeared without explanation. In official reports, 
these were ambiguously classified as spontaneous returns. Local and international housing 
activists protested that many people in the “spontaneous-return” category were in fact victims 
of forced evictions.147 The misreporting of the true nature of the circumstances could be 
attributed to the displaced camp occupant’s lack of visibility and the absence of any 
investigation into their disappearances. This perfectly illustrates the plight of Haiti’s invisible 
and disposable surplus populations.   
Most illegal evictions were initiated by private citizens and facilitated by state inaction 
and indifference (Amnesty, 2013; Calhan, 2014). Usually, they were carried out by hired 
criminal gangs and paramilitary groups trained by previous authoritarian regimes. Elite 
landowners with state ties frequently engaged state institutions, including the police and 
members of the judiciary, in their campaigns to terrorise, intimidate and violently expel land 
occupants without warning (Amnesty, 2013, 2015). When a mass of occupants resisted 
eviction, private landowners resorted to a range of coercive and violent tactics, such as starting 
night-time fires at the edge of settlements or blocking land occupants’ access to water and 
other basic services.148 The methods used to effect forced evictions ranged from violations of 
due process, to rape, murder, physical assault, and destruction of homes and property, as more 
serious crimes committed during evictions processes (Amnesty, 2013). Very few forced 
evictions were mediated through the legal process – private landowners did not bother to 
obtain eviction orders required under Haitian law. 
Earthquake victims occupying state-owned or state-controlled land were vulnerable to 
evictions carried out by state police trained in repressive tactics. The evictions executed by 
                                                
147 Interviews with housing activists 1,2, 3, Port-au-Prince, 24 April 2014 and international human rights activists 
2 and 4 London, 28 October 2014. Interviewees identified one particular case where illegally evicted people had 
been alternatively classified as a “spontaneous return” by IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix because this 
group had received some financial assistance from an NGO after their eviction. 
148 T. Padgett and J. Desvarieux, Evicting Haiti's Homeless: How Land Tenure Hampers Recovery. Time 
Magazine, 23 September 2010. Retrieved from 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2021206,00.html 
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Mayor Wilson Jeudy, in the established neighbourhood of Delmas Commune, are examples 
of this type of state criminality. In May 2011, Mayor Jeudy’s street brigade (a 75-member team 
called BRICOR) attacked informal settlements with machetes, batons, and guns, resulting in 
the expulsion of 1,000 people in two days.149 Shots fired at the tented community seriously 
wounded at least one person.150 The national government did not condemn Jeudy’s known 
acts of violence directed at earthquake victims. The mayor was motivated by the goals of both 
accumulation and the desire to punish unauthorised squatting. Land occupants stated that he 
told them they were being punished for failing to pay rent to the municipality for their 
residency on state land.151 There is little question that Mayor Jeudy’s eviction of thousands of 
people in a span of days was facilitated by long-term U.S. financial support and training of 
Haiti’s police. Video evidence and statements from a private U.S. security firm, Risks 
Incorporated, strongly implicate the U.S. government in paying for the training of BRICOR 
in abusive population control tactics just months before the earthquake.152 
Both private and state-led evictions were widely condemned by foreign governments, 
the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, and international institutions and housing activists. The 
strongest response came from a group of domestic and international housing activists,153 who 
collectively filed a petition against the Haitian government at the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. The Commission’s ruling provided binding instructions to the Haitian 
                                                
149 Center for Constitutional Rights, Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, Bureau des Avocats 
Internationaux, International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University’s Washington College of Law, 
and You.Me.We.. Letter to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 15 June 2011. Retrieved from 
http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Haiti-Precautionary-Measures-Update-to-IACHR-15-
June-2011REDACTED.pdf  
See also Herz, A. Torture Firm Risks Incorporated Tied To Destructive Evictions in Haiti. Narco News Bulletin, 
29 May 2011. Retrieved from https://www.narconews.com/Issue67/article4435.html  
150 M. Miles, Violent Forced Evictions in Delmas: Is this the Change President Martelly Promised? Haiti 
Liberte, 25 May 2011. Retrieved from http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-
45/Is%20This%20the%20Change%20President.asp 
151 Center for Constitutional Rights, Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, Bureau des Avocats 
Internationaux, International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University’s Washington College of Law, 




152 A. Herz, Torture Firm Risks Incorporated Tied To Destructive Evictions in Haiti. Narco News Bulletin, 29 
May 201. Retrieved from https://www.narconews.com/Issue67/article4435.html  
153 The team consisted of the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), Institute for Justice & Democracy in 
Haiti (IJDH), You. Me. We., the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), and the International Human Rights 
Law Clinic at American University’s Washington College of Law. 
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government to prevent and remedy unlawful evictions and report on its progress. In response 
to international shaming, state officials up to the level of the prime minister voiced concern 
over illegal evictions.154 The government nevertheless continued to shirk its obligations to 
protect citizens from violent and extrajudicial evictions, thus creating a permissive 
environment for local authorities and private landowners to continue.155 State authorities 
instructed the courts to stay eviction orders with full knowledge that most evictions were 
implemented without judicial authorisation. State authorities also failed to investigate or 
sanction a single forced eviction during reconstruction (Amnesty, 2015a, pp. 27–28).  
The UN-led humanitarian architecture in Haiti did not participate in the transitional 
civil society response mentioned above. Their approach relied on expressing public concern 
about violence directed at IDPs and the human rights implications of forced evictions. Their 
rhetoric focused on individual cases of violence and not system-wide barriers to the provision 
of adequate and affordable housing. Top UN officials urged the Haitian state to respect IDP 
norms, which required state officials to prevent forced evictions from post-earthquake 
settlements until conditions for safe and dignified conditions for return could be met.156 The 
humanitarian messaging on forced evictions was important, because it effectively called for 
the state to exercise compassion for the special circumstances of displacement and land 
occupation of people on other people’s property. Speaking on behalf of the entire 
humanitarian community, the UN did not mention land injustices and unsustainable patterns 
of land control that prevented the construction of adequate housing for displaced people.157 
158 This played a role in legitimising elite land claims.159  
                                                
154 Interview with humanitarian official 7, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 21 April 2014. 
155 Nicole Phillips, Kathleen Bergin, Jennifer Goldsmith, Laura Carr. “Enforcing Remedies from the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights: Forced Evictions and Post-Earthquake Haiti.” Human Rights Brief 
19, no. 1 (2011): 13–18. Retrieved from  
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.uk/&httpsredi
r=1&article=1781&context=hrbrief 
156 Jamaica Observer. UN concerned about forcible eviction of quake survivors. 13 September 2011. Retrieved 
from  
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/UN-concerned-at-forcible-evictions-of-quake-survivors- 
157 D. Sontag, In Haiti, Rising Call for the Displaced to Go Away. New York Times, 4 October 2010. Retrieved 
from  https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/world/americas/05haiti.html 
158 D. Sontag, In Haiti, Rising Call for the Displaced to Go Away. New York Times, 4 October 2010. Retrieved 
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159 Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti. The humanitarian community concerned about 




The criminal conduct of state authorities had little to no effect on humanitarian 
partnerships with the state in the management of disaster victims and delivery of services. The 
humanitarian organisations’ indifference to forced evictions was evident in their limited 
censure of state authorities and continued day-to-day engagement with them. Against the 
backdrop of state-sponsored evictions, humanitarian organisations continued to train Haiti’s 
Civil Protection Agency (DPC). These trainings constituted an exit strategy for humanitarian 
organisations who hoped to eventually hand over camp governance to Haitian authorities.160 
When evictions appeared imminent in post-earthquake camps/settlements, humanitarian 
organisations were accused of deliberately avoiding and abdicating their protection 
responsibilities. A housing rights advocacy group, called Under Tents Haiti, strongly criticised 
humanitarian organisations for their unwillingness to censure state authorities or show 
solidarity with residents when they were about to be evicted. In one particular eviction, 
international housing activists called the IOM, the humanitarian organisation responsible for 
camp management of a particular settlement, to warn them of an impending eviction and 
requested their support to protect the population. According to this representative, the IOM 
stated they could not intervene due to the risk to their operations if their actions aggravated 
state authorities.161  
Beyond their inaction and silence as forms of complicity with state-initiated and state-
facilitated evictions, humanitarian operations were seen by some as benefitting from evictions. 
Forced evictions indirectly contributed to humanitarian goals to close all informal settlements 
and reduce IDP population numbers. Although some might read this as a cynical view of 
humanitarianism that ignores the good deeds done for populations, there is evidence to 
support this claim. Regularly issued Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reports tended to 
report evictions in the highlights section of reports with graphs showing the successful, 
downward trend in the total number of displaced people.162 The reports did little to distinguish 
                                                
See also UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti 
"gravely concerned" at continuing forced evictions of IDPs. Press Release, 10 January 2013. Retrieved from  
 https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/humanitarian-coordinator-haiti-gravely-concerned-continuing-forced-
evictions-idps 
160 Interviews with humanitarian officials 25 and 55, Port-au-Prince, 10 April 2014. 
161 Interview with international housing activist, Port-au-Prince, 6 April 2014. 
162 See IOM’s DTM reports from Haiti. Retrieved from https://www.globaldtm.info/haiti/ 
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the harms caused by evictions; rather they discussed evictions in terms of how many camps 
(informal settlements) “remained open.”163   
Further evidence of the humanitarian organisations’ indifference to evictions is the 
limited attempt to identify evicted populations and put them back on official beneficiary lists. 
When asked if this identification process was possible or desirable to prevent the exclusion of 
evicted populations from future housing programmes, organisations responded that such 
measures would be a logistical nightmare.164 As one interviewee put it, the humanitarian system 
was already overloaded and chasing the housing needs and entitlements of evicted people was 
opening Pandora’s box.165 The desire to perpetuate the invisibility of evicted populations, in 
pursuit of managerial goals and against normative standards on displacement, is a deliberate 
form of humanitarian complicity in vanishing victims (see Polzer & Hammond, 2008, p. 425). 
My fieldwork also revealed hidden biases against the poor that played a role in 
humanitarian silence on forced evictions as state crimes. Critics have commented on the close 
ties and common perspectives that developed between a professional class of humanitarian 
personnel, foreign diplomats, and Haiti’s political and business elite due to their frequent 
interactions in Port-au-Prince’s exclusive restaurants, clubs, and international conferences (see 
Hallward, 2010; Schuller, 2009). In some instances, humanitarian staff laid bare their class 
position and power by positively evaluating the land control outcomes desired by Haiti’s 
political elite and by airing their political judgements against “IDP squatters.” We find different 
degrees of bias against the poor amongst interviewees and the impact of these biases on 
humanitarian actions. For example, the following excerpt from an Oxfam report shows 
rationalisation of the violent acts of private landowners:  
…property owners are concerned about losing their land. These law-
abiding landowners do not want to start legal proceedings against the 
occupants, since these would be both lengthy and expensive, but the 
government has not given them any guarantees as to how long the 
IDPs will remain, let alone any compensation for their generosity 
                                                
163 To give an example, the DTM report from July 2011 reads: “107 sites that have closed since the last assessment 
period, 27 reported being closed as a result of evictions.” Retrieved from https://www.globaldtm.info/haiti/ 
164 This view was expressed by representatives of the eight largest NGOs and intergovernmental organisations 
directly involved in camp management at a humanitarian coordination meeting in Port-au-Prince on 14 May 
2014.  
165 Interviews with humanitarian officials 20 (29 July 2014), 21 (22 October 2013), 32 (9 August 2014), Port-au-
Prince.  
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(emphasis added). Unfortunately, some landowners have started 
taking matters into their own hands and are responsible for illegal 
evictions using violence, intimidation and other means to make IDPs 
leave.166   
This statement seems to excuse eviction violence by conveying a “natural state” of Haiti’s pre-
earthquake property relations. It negates the context of structural violence and state criminality 
that produced mass displacement and land occupations as outcomes of the earthquake, while 
obscuring the acts of fraud, theft, violence, and corruption behind patterns of land ownership 
(see Hallward, 2007).  
These biases were also evident in interviews with some humanitarian personnel in 
charge of day-to-day operations and decision-making. Frequently, humanitarians stigmatised 
land occupants (people without alternative housing) as people responsible for harming Haiti’s 
urban development and the economic activities of productive social groups.167 Lower-class 
Haitians were sometimes even blamed for poorly constructed buildings and for building 
wherever they wanted, as if their land occupying behaviours reflected a combination of 
stupidity and disregard for law and order.168 One instructive example of the inherent bias of 
aid workers against the landless poor came from an individual whose job it was to develop 
strategies to protect displaced people. Although the aid worker was responsible for developing 
policies to protect camp-based populations from evictions, she openly aired her belief that 
Haitian landowners were being ‘unfairly constructed as the devil for wanting to get rid of 
squatters in order to make money with their land.’169 Her sentiments were not unique and were 
shared by other organisations. Another aid worker claimed that people who were squatting on 
private land ‘just wanted to be bought out and make money from the chaotic disaster 
situation.’170 
                                                
166 Oxfam. Salt in the Wound: The Urgent Need to Prevent Forced Evictions from Camps in Haiti. Oxfam 
Briefing Note, 10 December 2012, p. 7. Available at 
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169 Interview with humanitarian official 55, Port-au-Prince, 10 April 2014. 
170 Interview with humanitarian official 5, Port-au-Prince, 10 April 2014. 
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Routine personal contact between humanitarians and affluent landowners was a key 
element in cohering opinions between the two groups – and the same can be said between 
humanitarians and state officials. To illustrate, one aid worker felt strongly that his role was to 
help broker a situation to allow the purported landowner to reclaim his land from IDP 
squatters.171 He empathised with the landed elite’s goal for accumulation during the capital-
intense reconstruction period. Instead of being able to use his land productively, it was being 
occupied by people whose homes and livelihoods had been completely destroyed by the 
earthquake. This aid worker sought to justify the landowner’s position of loss by grouping the 
earthquake victims/land occupants on the land with other groups of property bandits in Haiti:  
 
When I was visiting the camp, the landowner showed me a map of 
the city. He pointed to all the land that his family had owned until 
people invaded it. He told me Haiti is like the wild west. A person like 
him can easily lose his land and never get it back from squatters. He 
showed me how, if this keeps happening, people will just develop 
slums around here for years. I could see his point. We [humanitarian 
organisations] were at risk of legitimising all of these people’s land 
grabs after the earthquake.172 
This quote, which demonstrates a willingness to accept the landowners’ versions of history, 
materialised from fears of being seen to intervene in ways that supported lower-class illegality. 
We also see here how humanitarian organisations played a role in rewriting history. The above 
quote portrays the land-vulnerable as land grabbers and the landed elites as victims of property crime. 
This inversion of historical truth, and its meaning for de-legitimising squatters’ land claims, 
emerges in the context of humanitarian ideology about private property rights and the 
institutional role of humanitarian organisations to uphold these sacred rights (see also Calhan, 
2014; Smit, 2012). The struggles of the marginalised landless as acceptable or worthy of their 
support are not viewed as legitimate. As illustrated here, the world view of humanitarians on 
property rights seamlessly merged with the interests of Haiti’s state elite to wrest land control 
from post-earthquake squatters.  
There are two ways that an ostensibly neutral humanitarian sector assumed an 
inherently political role by expelling unwanted populations on behalf of the Haitian state. The 
                                                
171 Interview with humanitarian official 5, Port-au-Prince 10 April 2014. 
172 Interview with humanitarian official 5, Port-au-Prince 10 April 2014. 
	 154 
first is related to humanitarians’ reliance on Haitian law to guide approaches to land conflicts 
and to legitimise acts that supported dominant interests, including their own. Law therefore 
became a reference point for humanitarians to ‘contain anarchic violence’ in order to ‘regulate 
violence in a civilised and humane way’ (Blomley, 2003, p. 121). This involved developing a 
Property Law Working Group (PLWG) to clarify legal rules for a wider group of international 
stakeholders (including humanitarian organisations), so that all actors could coordinate their 
interventions in relation to land sale, promote legal evictions, and safeguarding private 
property rights. Much of the PLWG’s work involved creating manuals that humanitarian 
practitioners, states, investors, and landowners could use to craft legal and effective responses 
to land-related problems (such as dealing with unauthorised land occupations).173 These 
manuals provided easy instructions and legal justification for the implementation of orderly 
and well-managed evictions, which had no bearing on the wider obstacles to housing rooted 
in land inequality and class domination. They also served to naturalise exclusionary legal 
principles and hierarchies between private property protections and the right to housing.  The 
PLWG functioned to de-politicise land conflicts by suppressing the need for public debate 
about land and law reform, and empowering a repressive state and legal system to resolve land 
conflicts. 174 
The PWLG’s role in dispossessing squatters was accompanied by more insidious and 
conscious organisational involvement in forced evictions. My research shows how violent 
state-sponsored evictions challenged the organisational reputations of humanitarian 
organisations. Organisations received pressure from international donors and the UN 
architecture to reduce the threat of violence being directed at squatters living on state and 
private land.  This resulted in the creation of a “triage approach,” formulated by humanitarian 
actors, to deal with eviction threats. Its purpose was to protect the physical security of people 
from violent evictions (while ignoring the structural causes of this violence). Although this 
was the original intention, the triage approach became a way to remove key procedural 
                                                
173 See Haiti Land Transaction Manual. Retrieved from: 
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protections from land claimants and allow for the state’s or landowners’ speedy recovery of 
occupied land.  
This distortion of original intentions arose from the idea that humanitarian 
organisations could protect squatters by asserting their voice and methods over those of 
squatter communities. Humanitarian organisations with camp management responsibilities 
began to regularly report on eviction threats to the IOM-led camp management cluster – a 
forum where squatters were excluded. Once an eviction threat was detected, the IOM and 
other humanitarian actors proceeded to hold negotiations with purported landowners or state 
officials making these threats, thus acting “on behalf of displaced people.” The negotiations 
usually resulted into an agreement between humanitarian actors and the individuals making 
eviction threats on a timetable for evictions. This timetable then enabled the registration of 
squatters and the provision of small amounts to compensation in exchange for their departure. 
Their removal from the settlement was also overseen by humanitarian organisations.175  
This approach circumvented some of the more protective, yet cumbersome, legal 
procedures on evictions in Haitian law. This included the obligation for private landowners or 
state officials to seek court authorisation to implement evictions. Similar to Koch’s (2014) 
observation on the role of international institutions in curtailing the claims of asylum seekers, 
this humanitarian approach was framed as a “protection” activity for land occupants targeted 
by elite violence. In the humanitarian framing, land occupants simply had no legal right to land 
they occupied. This justified humanitarian intervention to remove land occupants from a 
potentially harmful situation (no matter their willingness to struggle and fight for their right to 
occupy certain land plots). The approach was highly successful in turning potential incidents 
of physical violence into orderly and legal evictions, thereby lowering the number of forced 
evictions on record. 
Essentially, humanitarian organisations created a mechanism for state authorities and 
landowners to evict post-earthquake squatters without substantial social or financial cost, in a 
way that allowed humanitarians to meet their institutional mandates and progress toward goals 
without actively challenging systems of power. This approach, however, was strongly 
                                                
175 Interview with humanitarian officials 7 (21 April 2014) and 9 (21 January 2014), Port-au-Prince. See also 
Joseph & Shah, 2012. 
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condemned by local civil society groups on both procedural and social justice grounds (see 
Joseph & Shah, 2012). In civil society’s view, humanitarian actors were directly aiding and 
abetting criminality by negotiating with private citizens and state actors who were threatening 
to carry out criminal acts. Their triage approach not only allowed individuals threatening to 
commit crimes to side-step legal processes that afforded protection to vulnerable land 
occupants, but also gave these individuals decision-making power over the lives of the people 
who they were prepared to harm. It also legitimised landowners’ claims over the claims of 
squatters. A lack of transparency in these negotiations between humanitarians and perpetrators 
of forced evictions also raised serious concerns. Humanitarian actors were seen to be 
validating the land claims of landowners even when they could not produce legal proof of 
ownership (Calhan, 2014). For these reasons, local groups questioned the perverse relationship 
between these approaches and humanitarian goals to empty camps. 
Certain civil society groups also contested the very idea that international institutions 
could supplant important legal protections with their own forms of protection. This was 
because humanitarian organisations had already demonstrated their deference to state 
interests, and therefore could not be trusted to impartially represent vulnerable land claimants 
in negotiations over the future of their occupation. Without impartial legal representation and 
due process, some civil society groups believed land occupants were being sold out by the 
triage approach to land conflicts that essentially replaced unlawful evictions with legally 
sanctioned expulsions. This is summarised by a local housing advocate:  
These negotiations around evictions are tainted. No one is 
recognising housing rights in this process. The humanitarians think 
that squatters, the poor, are simply lucky to get what they can.176 
 
To conclude, this section has demonstrated different forms of humanitarian 
complicity in state-led and facilitated forced evictions. It has shown instances where 
humanitarian organisations have either violated their institutional mandates and codes of 
conduct to enable state criminality, or have directed state criminality by establishing 
mechanisms for rapid evictions that violated procedural protections fir land occupants. These 
                                                
176 Interview with local housing activist 1, Port-au-Prince, 25 October 2013. 
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themes continue in the next section as I describe policies designed by humanitarian 
organisations to empty the remaining post-earthquake settlements. 
 
 III. Involuntary Returns and Humanitarian-Led Expulsions  
Previously in this chapter, I looked at the perverse incentives for humanitarian 
organisations to collaborate with the criminogenic goals of the state. I will now consider the 
key developments in humanitarian policy-making that responded to tension between state-
humanitarian interests and those of earthquake victims. This tension comes to light in the 
implementation of the Rental Subsidy Cash Grant Programme (RSCG). This programme, I 
argue, illustrates the coercive and norm-breaking behaviour of humanitarian organisations in 
pursuit of deviant goals that entail the violation of human rights – especially the right to 
housing. The range of measures undertaken by humanitarian actors under this programme 
stands in radical contrast to international norms177 designed to protect the rights of earthquake 
victims.  
The basic principle of the RSCG programme was that every family still living in post-
earthquake settlements would be entitled to a one-year US$ 500 rental grant on the condition 
that they “returned” to the formal rental market. Investigation into the roots of this policy 
revealed that it borrowed from methods of expulsion already in place in Port-au-Prince. Prior 
to the wholesale adoption of the RSCG programme, Port-au-Prince mayors were already 
coercing people to leave post-earthquake settlements by giving them the option to leave either 
with monetary compensation or by force.178 Indisputably, the RSCG programme embodied 
the same logic of coercing vulnerable people to leave post-earthquake settlements without full 
recognition or progressive realisation of their housing rights. Settlement closures enabled 
through the RSCG programme had the effect of disappearing visible homeless populations 
into the ranks of the invisible poor. 
                                                
177 The rights of disaster victims in relation to housing and settlement are laid out in various international legal 
instruments, including the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee Framework on Durable Solutions, and General Comment 7 (The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced 
Evictions) on article 11(1) on the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See also Slim 
(2015, p.40) on the 33 conduct norms humanitarian organisations are expected to follow in their operations 
(including transparency, accountability, respect, and do no harm). 
178 Interview with humanitarian official 10, Port-au-Prince, 26 January 2014. 
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The origins of the RSCG programme are traced to the Returns Working Group 
established in 2011 by humanitarian organisations performing camp management 
responsibilities. A core purpose of this group was to find acceptable, scalable housing solutions 
to enable camp closures.179 Participants of this working group recalled a willingness of group 
members to develop housing interventions more acceptable to the Haitian state, given past 
failures and minimal progress. Recalling Chapter Four, many humanitarian housing 
interventions had stalled due to state indifference or direct obstruction.  
This shift in humanitarian thinking around 2011 is significant for several reasons. It 
revealed momentum to prioritise state interests over victims’ interests to achieve 
organisational goals. And, this desire to collaborate with the state came at a time when the 
state was actively engaged in carrying out violent, illegal evictions. The state’s criminality, 
however, was expressly overlooked in favour of a partnership that promised results through 
the development of state-backed policy. The rationale for colluding with a criminal state is 
evident in the words of a senior aid worker:  
We [humanitarian organisations] didn’t want to become a voice in the 
wilderness screaming for years about housing. We needed political 
will to deal with the situation. We knew we had to recommend 
something strategic to the government, something they would be 
willing to discuss. Otherwise we would be living in a vacuum forever, 
getting nothing done, without the government on board.180  
This desire for more state engagement in the housing sector overlapped with a 
readiness to abandon or manipulate international norms to meet expected goals. Organisations 
indicated that international norms were not necessary or realistic for Haiti.181 Norms, they 
argued, could serve as reference points for their actions but needed to reflect the context of 
their operation.182 Many saw that their limited resources and the extreme land complexity 
justified authoritarian, non-participatory decision-making, as well as limited compliance with 
normative standards and codes of conduct. The effect was to further marginalise land 
occupants from decision-making processes in ways that dehumanised their situation and 
                                                
179 Interview with humanitarian official 3, London, 9 June 2014. 
180 Interview with humanitarian official 12, Port-au-Prince, 17 July 2014. 
181 Interview with humanitarian official 21, Port-au-Prince, 22 October 2013. 
182 Interview with humanitarian official 12, Port-au-Prince, 17 July 2014. 
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positioned them as obstacles to humanitarian goals. An aid worker’s sentiments on the ethical 
and normative restrictions on humanitarian practice, is seen in their statement:  
 
The financial reality is that we [humanitarian organisations] didn’t 
have the money to provide a housing solution in line with human 
rights criteria. Sure, if we really had the nine billion dollars promised 
we would be able to do what internationally is talked about. But we 
had less than half a billion. There was no point sitting around the table 
and discussing housing solutions in terms of what is right or wrong 
and the moral implications. We [the humanitarian sector] had to deal 
with reality. We generally agreed it was better to just provide minimal 
aid to 100,000 than to meet standards for 10,000.183 
 
Perspectives like these grounded new policy-making that would actively undercut housing 
rights. In 2012, the state and humanitarian actors adopted the Rental Subsidy Cash Grant 
Programme (RSCG) as their primary method for ending displacement. The programme, which 
I shall describe below, operated much like a settlement clearance policy. Testament to the 
authoritarian nature of humanitarian policy-making, and the collusive relations between the 
state and humanitarian actors, one state official bragged that the RSCG programme was 
created by ‘six men who got along and knew how to get things done.’184  
Significant efforts were made by humanitarian actors to frame the RSCG programme 
as legitimate state policy. Humanitarian creators of this programme attempted to harmonise 
the RSCG programme with normative principles and procedures on internal displacement, 
while reinforcing the view that the programme fulfilled both state and humanitarian 
obligations to displaced victims. The policy thus conveyed that it was aiding displaced people’s 
“right to return” to their previous position as renters in Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods. This 
framing relied on the construct that post-earthquake settlements were dangerous places, and 
implied that all land occupants wanted to return home. Explored in Chapter Eight, such discourses 
misrepresented the view or interests of land occupants toward post-earthquake settlement 
land. They also played a key role in legitimising the RSCG’s one-year rental grant as the best 
and only solution for landless people. This was regardless of the harm landless people would 
face once they had left settlements providing free or minimal cost housing. The RSCG policy 
                                                
183 Interview with humanitarian official 3, London, 9 June 2014. 
184 Interview with government official 7, Port-au-Prince, 13 October 2013. 
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manual itself clarifies how limited rental grants for perpetually homeless and landless 
populations were rationalised: 
Providing a rental property for one year to a family who were renting 
before their displacement can in some circumstances legitimately be 
considered a housing solution which has closed the cycle of 
displacement and therefore fulfilled the duty of care of responsible 
authorities with specific regard to the emergency event which 
precipitated displacement.185 
Here, we see the institutional role of humanitarian actors in correcting the settlement 
behaviours of land occupants and in defining their limited entitlements to state/international 
assistance, irrespective of their broader vulnerability to harm and human rights violations. 
Notwithstanding how the programme was socialised, state discourses were more 
straightforward and revealing of the illegitimate aims of the RSCG programme. During a UN 
Human Rights Committee reporting session, a Haitian official from a housing authority stated: 
Like it or not, the rental subsidy programme is a success for lowering 
the number of camps. Rental subsidies are the only option.186 
In interviews, the RSCG programme was depicted as a win-win approach for the state, 
humanitarian actors, and land occupants.187  
The excessive bureaucratic force required to implement the RSCG programme is 
telling of its function as a coercive, corrective measure designed to satisfy political goals and 
demands for urban land. In the RSCG manual, the humanitarian architects of the programme 
smoothed out its legal, technical, and operational aspects to bring it in line with rights-based 
standards.188 In practice, as revealed by my fieldwork, the targeted subjects of the programme 
faced harassment, exploitation, violence, and curtailment of their rights. These outcomes were 
                                                
185 p. 25 of the Rental Subsidy Cash Grant Operational manual. Retrieved from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/273871467991006017/pdf/102641-WP-Box394839B-PUBLIC-
final-operational-manual-rental-support-cash-grants.pdf 
186 Quotation from notes provided by human rights observers of the UN Human Rights Commission on 8 
October 2014. 
187 Interview with humanitarian official 21, Port-au-Prince, 22 October 2013. 




related to the RSCG’s inherently punitive approach to land occupants who were socially 
constructed as underserving, socially deviant, and potentially dangerous.  
How people were targeted to be RSCG programme beneficiaries illustrates this. 
Settlement occupants did not sign up to become part of the RSCG programme. The state and 
private landowners has significant leverage over when and where settlement closures would 
take place. Landowners could speed up humanitarian-implemented settlement closures by 
simply indicating their intention to evict land occupants. Once humanitarian organisations had 
developed the logistical machinery of the RSCG programme, they could intervene in eviction 
threats by providing rental grants and overseeing population expulsions in a matter of weeks.189 
In the case of Caradeux, a post-earthquake settlement resisting closure, the IOM acquiesced to 
a direct order from the prime minister’s office to implement the RSCG programme against 
the community’s will.190 The Caradeux settlement was located on a parcel of state-expropriated 
land claimed by a private landowner locally known for engaging in land criminality, including 
document fraud and forced evictions. State officials, who allegedly received campaign 
contributions from this landowner, also had material interests in wresting control of this land 
from Caradeux’s occupants, in order to construct a new road through the settlement for 
commercial purposes.191 Siding with the state and landowners to close the Caradeux 
settlement, against the community’s will and without due process, was an obvious violation of 
humanitarian principles of voluntariness and community participation, as well as international 
standards on forced evictions.192 
Populations targeted by the RSCG programme were often subjected to repressive and 
dehumanising processes involving a wide range of rights violations. Land occupants were 
enrolled in the RSCG programme not through informed consent, but through militarised 
invasions of their settlements. In stark contrast to international guidance on forced evictions, 
the consultation process for settlement closures entailed aid workers, Haitian police, and UN 
police encircling a targeted settlement in the middle of the night and restricting all movements 
                                                
189 The main international organisations implementing the RSCG programme were: CARE; Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS); Concern Worldwide; Goal; Help Age; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P 
HRO); and World Vision. 
190 Interview with humanitarian official 32, Port-au-Prince Haiti on 9 August 2014. 
191 Interview with humanitarian official 5, Port-au-Prince, 10 April 2014. 
192 See footnote 169. 
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to or from the settlement while the RSCG registration took place.193 Once surrounded, families 
were forced to admit people they did not know to their tents and complete RSCG beneficiary 
registration paperwork under duress. Some international observers of the process witnessed 
people slow or reluctant to engage with the process have their tents ripped open.194 In one 
example, the dehumanising methods used to register people led to the careless exposure of a 
naked women, who had not been given time to dress herself in the midst of her settlement’s 
invasion.195  
Land occupants said that the entire process made them feel like animals.196 Some 
mothers protested that their children were traumatised for months following the force 
displayed during these registrations.197 Organisations implementing the RSCG programme 
paid no attention to the trauma that night-time visits of armed police might have on people 
who had lived under brutal dictatorships for decades. In the case of Caradeux, the land 
occupants’ attempt to resist RSCG registration resulted in the Haitian police tear gassing the 
population and beating some of the residents (the IOM alleged the violence occurred after its 
staff had left the settlement).198 The violence left several people with serious injuries, and the 
settlement population reported that at least one baby had died after inhaling tear gas.199 Still, 
humanitarian organisations escaped international judgement for their involvement coercive 
settlement closures and violence against some of the world’s most vulnerable people.200 Donor 
governments and UN bodies normalised these violent encounters as necessary forms of 
                                                
193 The stated intention for restricted movement was that people might otherwise try to enter from the outside 
to claim entitlements to rental assistance. Amongst the many ways this punitive approach violated international 
norms related to human dignity, free movement and meaningful participation in aid processes, it also failed to 
account for the very reason that someone might enter an informal settlement to receive housing aid – which was 
that no housing assistance was being provided anywhere else. Such approaches highlight the harmful implications 
of arbitrary distinctions and categorisations of disaster affected populations and their entitlements, as well as the 
tendency of aid organisations to criminalise the behaviour of local populations. 
194 Interview with researcher/migration expert in London, United Kingdom on 26 April 2018. 
195  Interview with researcher/migration expert in London, United Kingdom on 26 April 2018. 
196 Interviews with land occupants, Caradeux settlement, Port-au-Prince, 19 July 2014. 
197 Interviews with land occupants, Caradeux settlement, Port-au-Prince, 19 July 2014. 
198 Interview with humanitarian official 49, Port-au-Prince, 7 August 2014. 
199 Interview with land occupants, Caradeux settlement, Port-au-Prince, 19 July 2014. See also media report, 
Haïti-Logement : Violences policières contre des personnes déplacées au Camp Caradeux. Retrieved from: 
http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article16344#.XKoFnRNKh-V 
200 The Caradeux settlement was still resisting closure when I left Haiti in August 2014. Discussions were ongoing 
amongst state authorities and humanitarian organisations about how to close Caradeux without significant 
public/media backlash. 
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policing and enforcement of property rights, especially in light of the deviant behaviours 
demonstrated by landless people. 
The coercive tactics by which land occupants were brought into the RSCG programme 
was portrayed as a voluntary return to the rental market – although it had the hallmarks of 
involuntary movement. Families were told they had the option to receive rental grants or leave 
settlements with nothing.201 Humanitarian language around choice gave the impression that 
precarious populations had the option to freely select where they wanted to live in the city after 
leaving extra-legal settlements. This, of course, was pure fiction based on the limited means of 
earthquake victims.  Families were given only a few weeks to consider their options and find 
rental accommodation before the scheduled date of settlement closures – in a housing 
economy marked by mass destruction and limited rental stock.  
Although procedurally a grievance process did exist, it did not meet expected 
standards.202 It focused solely on complaints about eligibility for rental grants and refused to 
entertain complaints about organisational behaviours or closure of the settlement. For these 
reasons, both land occupants and Haitian civil society labelled the process a form economic 
coercion that put landless people at extreme risk of being homeless after their one-year grant 
expired. 203  I will return to discuss this form of social censure. During interviews, humanitarian 
organisations defended the RSCG programme by invoking its contribution to peaceful 
resolution of land conflict and urban stability. Some rationalised that the RSCG programme 
was the first step in a linear process from humanitarian relief to development. Rental subsidies, 
they claimed, had provided displaced families with the means to leave illegal settlements and 
re-join their fellow non-displaced citizens in the formal housing sector.204  
Deeper interrogation of the RSCG programme reveals its disciplinary elements, 
especially in seeking desired effects on the urban population. Destitute families were only 
                                                
201 Interviews with land occupants, Caradeux settlement, Port-au-Prince, 19 July 2014. 
202 Paragraph 13 of General Comment 7 of article 11(1) of the ICESCR states: ‘States parties shall ensure, prior 
to carrying out any evictions, and particularly those involving large groups, that all feasible alternatives are 
explored in consultation with the affected persons, with a view to avoiding, or at least minimizing, the need to 
use force. Legal remedies or procedures should be provided to those who are affected by eviction orders.’ 
However, land occupants in humanitarian camps in Haiti were denied access to legal procedures to contest their 
removal from settlements. 
203 Interview with housing activist 1, Port-au-Prince, 25 October 2013. 
204 Interview with humanitarian official 31, Port-au-Prince, 15 March 2014. 
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allowed to use rental grants for housing, even if they had other priority needs (i.e., food). 
Likewise, they were forced to select housing that met international criteria. While this may 
have implied access to safer housing for the duration of the one-year grant, it also increased 
the risk that people would not be able to afford more expensive housing once their rental 
grants expired.205 Sometimes, families were restricted from renting homes from family 
members, who may have lowered the price for them, because of views that people were 
somehow scamming the system if at least one of their extended family members had access to 
housing.206  
The RSCG programme also compelled beneficiaries and landlords to sign one-year 
contracts for the one-year period of rent. Though rental contracts are not standard features of 
Haitian landlord-tenant relationships, their main function was to demonstrate the legality of the 
RSCG programme. In reality, rental contracts were meaningless because they were not 
embedded in institutional systems of monitoring and enforcement of tenants’ rights. Once 
again, this practice worked against the vulnerable subjects of the RSCG programme, who 
found themselves locked in potentially exploitative relationships with landlords from a 
different social class.  
Once in their rental housing, the people expelled from post-earthquake settlements 
were subjected to surprise monitoring visits by humanitarian agencies. These visits were telling 
of the priorities and control practices embedded in the RSCG programme, because 
implementing agencies were solely interested in monitoring the rootedness of former land 
occupants. RSCG beneficiaries could not receive the final instalment of the rental grant 
(US$125) unless they were found to be living in the same rental homes approved by 
humanitarian agencies. Some aid workers indicated that this criterion was ‘linked to the kind 
of housing behaviour we were are trying to encourage.’207 Testament to the true nature of the 
RSCG programme, these monitoring visits did not inquire of the housing or living conditions 
of people thrown out of settlements. They paid no attention to how people may have struggled 
to find employment to pay for their second year of rental housing, or who may have become 
poorer as a result of their loss of access to cheap (or free) land. 
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206 Interview with Haitian housing activist 1, Port-au-Prince, 25 October 2013. 
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IV. Organisational Omissions and Negligence 
One way of showing the deviant behaviour of organisations is to expose their 
knowledge of the harms created by their decisions and policies as well as their unwillingness 
to address them. There is an important aspect to understanding why humanitarian design and 
implementation of the RSCG programme should be considered as an example of state-
humanitarian crime. Humanitarian agencies should have anticipated the harms of forcing 
precarious families back into a post-earthquake housing economy. They should have halted 
the implementation of settlement closures after multiple studies demonstrated the harmful 
effects of these acts (discussed below).  
Strong support for the assertion that the RSCG programme was an example of state-
humanitarian crime can be found in the humanitarian assessments conducted from 2010 to 
2011. These assessments show that people in informal settlement were living hand-to-mouth 
and unable to afford their basic needs, including housing (Ferris & Ribeiro, 2012).  A key 
finding from a 2011 report from the IOM, one of the implementing agencies of the RSCG 
programme, was that people living in informal settlements had legitimate financial reasons for 
living in settlements rather than renting homes. Housing debates with development 
organisations had also raised concerns about the risks of humanitarian labelling and the 
individualised approaches to housing. In 2013, for example, UN-Habitat issued statements 
warning that informal settlements had become a critical part of the housing market for people 
without jobs and housing.208 Due to their provision of relief services, humanitarian agencies 
were also aware of the buying and selling of tents and land plots. Drawing on these different 
sources of data, it is safe to assume that humanitarian organisations implementing the RSCG 
programme where aware of the risks of further impoverishment and long-term homelessness 
associated with mass settlement closures.  
 Recalling Chapter Two, much academic research on humanitarian institutions excuses 
their harmful behaviours by blaming their actions on normative blind spots and cultures of 
practice. While this is a factor in how harmful decisions are made and carried out, humanitarian 
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organisations in Haiti articulated a clear understanding of their potentially harmful acts. In 
other words, they understood that rental grant recipients could easily end up in precarious 
housing situations after their one-year housing grant expired. One admission of guilt came 
from an aid worker heavily involved in the implementation of the RSCG programme, who 
admitted it was ‘kicking the can down the road, making it appear that the housing problem 
had been solved when it was still a major problem.’209 Such views highlight the awareness of 
organisations that they had directly affected a process of non-recognition of people’s actual 
housing needs. 
Staff with RSCG implementing organisations also displayed anxiety about the lack of 
sufficient rental housing for the number of people being forced back into the formal rental 
market. 210 They knew that several families were purportedly moving to the same rental 
accommodation – empirical evidence of the imbalance between housing demand and 
supply.211 Unpublished reports from organisations clearly stated that there was not enough 
housing stock to meet the needs of everyone forced to leave settlements.212 Privately, 
humanitarian staff expressed their fears that the RSCG programme was driving up the cost of 
rent, or causing city landlords to evict existing tenants (i.e., people not coming from informal 
settlements) in favour of RSCG beneficiaries with access to upfront cash.213 In other words, 
paying people to leave informal settlements could victimise other precarious households by 
overheating the rental market and pushing them out.214 Despite these concerns, no attempts 
were made to confirm or deny this potentially harmful trend. 
 Furthermore, humanitarian organisations had access to multiple evaluations and 
reports demonstrating the harmful effects of the RSCG programme. The first evaluation (in 
2013) should have halted its implementation after finding that only 25% of rental grant 
recipients remained in their rental accommodation after their one-year grant had expired. Of 
                                                
209 Interview with humanitarian official 25, Port-au-Prince, 10 April 2014. 
210 Interviews with humanitarian officials 25 and 55, Port-au-Prince, 10 April 2014. 
211 In a scenario where people were being told they must leave their camp and find an alternative home in a two-
week timeframe, there is little reason to believe they would admit their failure to find housing and risk missing 
out on their only option for housing assistance, however insufficient. This problem was only amplified by the 
sheer absence of humanitarian staff to assist families or field questions about the programme.  
212 An example is the IOM Draft Paper ‘Longer-Term Solutions to Displacement in Haiti: Exploring Community 
Integration as a Viable Approach’ obtained in July 2014. 
213 Interview with humanitarian official 3, London, 9 June 2014. 
214 Interview with humanitarian official 25, Port-au-Prince, Haiti on 10 April 2014. 
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the 75% of people who left their rental accommodation after the expiration of their rental 
grant, three-quarters said they did so because they could no longer pay rent.215 Another quarter 
said they left because of problems with their landlord, also implying flaws with the RSCG 
programme.216  
Humanitarian agencies should have seized on this study as evidence of significant 
harms being perpetrated by the programme, including making people worse off than they were 
in informal settlements. Instead, the programme continued through to a second evaluation (in 
2014) where similar results were found. This time, professional evaluators struggled to even 
find RSCG recipients for their housing survey, forcing them to reduce the sample size of their 
study by almost half.217 While the second evaluation found that half of the RSCG beneficiaries 
remained in their rental homes after the grant ended, it still reported a high percentage (20%) 
of people unable to afford rent in their second year, or had left their rental housing because 
of problems with landlords (15%).218 Again, these findings had no effect on the programme’s 
implementation. In fact, the study was disregarded, and the organisations which commissioned 
it sought an additional US$20 million from donors to close all remaining informal settlements 
in the city.219  
 
V. Conclusion 
In the end, the RSCG programme achieved deviant state-humanitarian goals for rapid 
closure of informal settlements without the provision of adequate housing for evicted land 
occupants. Humanitarian data shows that 273,049 land occupants were expelled from informal 
settlements under the RSCG programme (IOM, 2015). RSCG programme evaluations suggest 
                                                
215 The Wolf Group Performance Consultants, External evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied 
to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti, September 2012 – January 2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Haiti-Rental-Grant-Evaluation-the- WolfGroup.pdf  
216  The Wolf Group Performance Consultants, External evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied 
to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti, September 2012 – January 2013. Available at http://www.ijdh.org/wp-
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217 M. Trevino, R. Stewart, M. Daku, and A. Lawlor (2014). Second External Evaluation of the Rental Support 
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218 M. Trevino, R. Stewart, M. Daku, and A. Lawlor (2014). Second External Evaluation of the Rental Support 
Cash Grant Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti. Final Report. International Organization for 
Migration. 
p. 28. 
219 Interview with humanitarian official 20, Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014. 
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that significant numbers of people have been put at risk of future human rights violations 
associated with the lack of housing through their inclusion in this programme. Over the course 
of the humanitarian response, state and humanitarian actors enacted the permanent closure of 
541 post-earthquake settlements, at least some of which could have satisfied the long-term 
housing needs of people with insecure forms of tenure.220 This number, coupled with at least 
60,000 recorded forced evictions, and an unknown number of “spontaneous returns”, suggests 
that hundreds of thousands of earthquake victims have been re-victimised during the 
reconstruction process. By 2015, only 37 settlements were remaining from the original 1,555 
settlements created after the earthquake. While such figures have been heralded as progress in 
ending displacement, the reality is that mass settlement closures occurred without 
simultaneous efforts to construct new homes or bring down the exorbitant cost of rent.  
This chapter demonstrates that forced evictions and coerced/involuntary returns 
under the RSCG programme are two examples of state-humanitarian organisational deviance 
during urban reconstruction. The pressures on humanitarian organisations to end 
displacement incentivised a range of practices aimed at expelling unwanted populations from 
post-earthquake settlements. In the context of post-disaster land struggles, humanitarian 
organisations supplied the logistical machinery, resources, and discursive legitimation 
necessary to end disruptive extra-legal occupations without the state needing to cede valuable 
urban land for housing or fulfil its obligations to protect the right to housing. Direct 
humanitarian involvement in unlawful evictions and coercive expulsions from post-earthquake 
settlements illustrate the ways that humanitarian organisations leverage their institutional 
mandates and access to communities, to serve state interests, which were often responsive to 
the flow of reconstruction capital. The RSCG programme stands out as an embodiment of 
the exercise of humanitarian governmental power to correct social behaviours that disrupt the 





                                                





Resistance to Land Exclusion in Post-Earthquake Haiti 
 
Central to this thesis is how Haiti’s urban poor responded and challenged the 
continuum of state-humanitarian crime and institutional violence. I have described the 
assemblage of state-elite-humanitarian power after the earthquake and followed its various 
modes of harm, exclusion and violence against landless people lacking access to affordable 
housing. An outcome of the deviant acts of these actors, working in concert to reclaim urban 
land from landless people, was that it led to a large floating population of homeless people in 
Port-au-Prince. Indeed, the coercive and violent measures undertaken by the state and 
humanitarian organisations to remove people from post-earthquake settlements accomplished 
the primary goal of restoring state-elite land control; but these measures did not succeed in re-
rooting landless people in the formal rental market. This was because people had limited 
economic means to rent homes after their one-year rental grant expired, and because there 
was limited rental stock in the post-earthquake city.  
I will now explain how the urban dynamics shaped by patterns of state-humanitarian 
criminality constituted the social ingredients for mass resistance to land dispossession and 
inequality. My discussion of these dynamics will primarily centre on the mass land invasion of 
Port-au-Prince’s northern periphery, and the subsequent creation of Canaan, a new informal 
settlement. The Canaan settlement is located approximately 40 kilometres from downtown 
Port-au-Prince and sits adjacent to a major highway connecting Port-au-Prince to a string of 
elite-owned tourist resorts. This large, previously empty swath of land was originally intended 
to be the site of a new integrated economic zone (IEZ) accommodating two industrial parks 
for foreign manufacturers seeking cheap Haitian labour (see Chapter Seven). However, 
between 2010 and 2015, more than 200,000 Haitians migrated to the northern periphery and 
occupied the entire area allotted for the IEZ. Canaan’s emergence is therefore symbolic of the 
power of earthquake victims to disrupt reconstruction capital and initiate their own form of 
people-led reconstruction. 
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This chapter argues that Canaan must be viewed as a form of land resistance shaped 
by people’s violent encounters with the state elite and humanitarian actors who denied them 
of their post-earthquake access to adequate housing. Local struggles for land continually 
unfolded throughout the reconstruction period in response to state-humanitarian attacks on 
the land gains made by landless populations. To tease out this argument, this chapter provides 
unique insights into the micro processes of resistance driven by individual agents and forms 
of community mobilisation. These insights contribute to the theoretical understanding of the 
dialectic between state repression and resistance, and the tension between legality and illegality, 
as populations confront their exclusion through the means of the law. Recognising how Haiti’s 
land struggles evolved over time is central to labelling state-humanitarian criminality and 
coming to terms with how local forces may condemn and counter harmful state-humanitarian 
behaviour.  
Insights on local resistance to state-humanitarian harms and crime are based on 
fieldwork in the Canaan settlement, specifically the four neighbourhoods221 of 
Village des Pêcheurs, Mozayik, Canaan 3, and Onaville. Using interviews with fifty-five squatter 
households and multiple observations of community-related interactions, I explore how 
people interpreted their post-disaster circumstances and their struggles for land, home, and 
social belonging. Through their discourses and reflections about the state, class relations, and 
their individual rights, this chapter underscores some of the transformative aspects of people’s 
experiences in migrating from inner Port-au-Prince to the urban periphery, and in occupying 
and having an opportunity to change the broader urban environment. Chapter Seven expands 
on these understandings by taking a more detailed look at land occupation and self-
construction as a form of social empowerment for marginalised landless people. There, I also 
examine the capital-driven forces perpetuating widespread abuse, discrimination and violence 
against urban people living in informal settlements (Holston, 2008). 
This chapter also elaborates on the theoretical concepts guiding my inquiry into post-
disaster mobility and extra-legal land capture as forms of resistance against predatory power 
structures. By combining the state-crime framework with the work of scholars theorising class 
                                                
221 Canaan contains many distinct neighborhoods, called zones by the people living there. Depending on their 
level of development and construction, neighborhoods or zones may have their own governing committees, 
water points, markets, cemeteries, and other infrastructure built by the residents. 
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struggle and rebellions, this chapter outlines key concepts to guide an empirical discussion of 
Haiti. In particular, it draws upon scholarship identifying and analysing clandestine forms of 
agency that are available to subordinated populations who lack access to more visible and 
organised modes of resistance. This chapter therefore examines both acts of open defiance as 
well as the subtler forms of resistance that have sprung up in the face of severe state repression 
and violence. In doing so, it identifies similarities between post-disaster resistance strategies 
and other historical instances when Haitians “voted with their feet” to object to state predation 
and decision-making that facilitates the dominant mode of production (Sheller, 2012; Green 
& Ward, 2004, p. 9). It shows how local resistance strategies are rooted in alternative value 
systems about land and its fair distribution, thus challenging the hegemonic portrayal of Haiti’s 
post-disaster land occupations as non-ideological and deprivation-based.222 The purpose is to 
demonstrate the significance of Canaan’s land occupations as a critique of the illegitimate acts 
and policies of state and humanitarian actors. 
 
I. Everyday Resistance and Challenging State Crime 
Communities of resistance are important to state crime scholars for their role in 
censuring state behaviour and defining state actions as violations of shared norms and beliefs 
(Green & Ward, 2004, p. 4; Green & Ward, 2014; Lasslett et al., 2015). As mentioned, state-
crime theorists give legitimacy to actors from below to label state deviancy, allowing them to 
go beyond the traditional reliance on international law and legal human rights norms when 
defining state crimes. Examining how local discourses and practices have significance as a 
form of censure requires attending to the nature of the political forces operating within a 
particular social context (Green & Ward, 2004; Gramsci, 1971, pp. 210; Scott, 1990, pp. 136–
37).223 Resistance practices not only have criminological significance in the ways that 
communities expose and apply sanctions to the crimes of the powerful, but they also have 
value for apprehending the shifting terrain of power relations (Green & Ward, 2004, 2014).  
These ideas rely on a Gramscian understanding of the composition of state-society 
relations and the preconditions for class consciousness and political revolution. Gramsci 
                                                
222 See Pruijt (2013) on different categories of urban squatting. 
223 An example is Lasslett et al.’s (2015) consideration of sabotage as a deliberate method used to expose and 
censure state-corporate crime. 
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depicted the state as two distinct superstructural levels existing in dialectical unity – political 
society and civil society (Gramsci, 1971, p.12). Whereas political society entails the 
organisational and coercive features of the state, civil society stands apart as a field where 
power can be both exercised and generated (Filippini 2017, p. 46). Civil society organises social 
hegemony to the ideas of the dominant group, thus playing an important role in securing social 
consent to state power. For Gramsci, social groups competing with the dominant group for 
the state apparatus must be able to exert their hegemonic influence on civil society before 
assuming governmental power (Gramsci, 1971, p. 207). Civil society may represent a serious 
challenge to the power of the dominant group when it no longer reinforces its hegemonic 
position (1971, p. 239). When conflicting positions emerge in the realm of civil society, it 
invites instability between political society and civil society, and opens up possibilities for the 
rebalancing of social forces. Gramsci writes: 
 
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” but 
only “dominant,” exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely 
that the great masses have become detached from their traditional 
ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, 
etc. 
This makes counter-hegemonic ideas an important strategy of class struggle and political 
transformation. 
Often, critical criminologists seeking to identify the sanctioning power of civil society 
have turned to organised civil society groups, such as local NGOs, and their defence of people 
against state criminality (see MacManus, 2018). However, applying Gramsci’s insights, there is 
also space for recognising that local NGOs may not always constitute an “organic expression” 
of the masses (Gramsci: 1971: 97). Their interests and aspirations, for instance, may align more 
with the ruling classes, and they may have little connection with the masses. Furthermore, 
scholars may struggle to find examples of open defiance of civil society to state crimes because 
of the level of brutality exercised by the state against opposition forces. As scholars of 
resistance have often pointed out, headline-grabbing protests and visible forms of organised 
political resistance are a luxury rarely afforded to powerless groups (Gramsci, 1971, p. 101; 
Hobswam, 1959, pp. 1-16; Scott 1990, pp. 136–37, 183). 
Acknowledging this, scholarly observations of the history of subordinate groups, and 
	 173 
their everyday acts of resistance, amplify our understanding of how people may censure and 
challenge powerholders. Subordinate groups, for reasons of their safety and security, may 
therefore ‘pursue precisely those forms of resistance that avoid any open confrontation with 
the structures being resisted’ (Scott 1990, p. 87). Prior studies of slaves, peasants, tenants, 
workers, lower castes suggest that acts of dissent and resistance against power holders are 
clandestine by design and therefore challenging to detect (Thompson 2013a, 2013b; Scott, 
1990, pp. 138, 191). Social resistance has often played out historically through out-of-sight 
speech and practices such as performing careless labour, stealing from employers, squatting 
on public land, evading rents and taxes, and committing acts of sabotage (Thompson 2013a, 
2013b; Hobsbawm, 1971). Subordinate groups often maintain loose organisational structures 
and even ‘reinforce hegemonic appearances’ in their need to defend themselves (Scott, 1990). 
Because these acts are not openly practiced or visible, the resistance of the oppressed tends to 
stretch the cultural imagination of outsiders (like the international humanitarian community), 
and is questioned as political or even theoretically relevant (Rude, 2005; Hobsbawm, 1971; 
Smith, 2001, pp. 2–3, 40–41). When powerless groups do rise up and rebel, history has often 
treated their short-lived agitations as ‘fickle, irrational, and destructive’ (Rude, 2005, p.10). 
Gains made by subordinate groups, likewise, are constantly interrupted by ruling class forces, 
which has significant resources at its disposal to absorb or quell dissent (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 
55, 210-11). 
While this may be the case, the resistance strategies of subordinate groups, scholars 
insist, are no less meaningful or ideological than other forms of resistance that articulate class 
struggle. Scholars appreciating everyday acts of resistance have stressed the theoretical 
importance of micro-practices of resistance and the infrapolitics of subordinate groups (see, for 
example, Thompson 2013a, 2013b; Hobsbawm, 1971; Rude, 2005; Scott, 1990). These micro 
practices, they maintain, are invaluable sites of social commentary on hegemonic power 
relations and may even disrupt class domination through legal and illegal means. For example, 
referring to the social power of squatters in relation to their challenge to dominant property 
relations, James Scott comments that ‘the accumulation of petty acts can, rather like 
snowflakes on a steep mountain, set off an avalanche’ in terms of tipping the balance of 
property relations (1990, p. 192). 
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Bringing these insights back to state-crime theory, and its interest in seeking acts of 
moral censure from below, scholarly work on everyday practices of resistance advocates for a 
careful reading of the behaviours of subordinate groups during open interactions with 
powerful actors and behind closed doors. This approach also entails paying close attention to 
how social reactions expressed in public may contradict those expressed in private. James 
Scott, for example, decodes resistance by considering two dimensions of political life that are 
in constant interplay. These two dimensions are the public transcript, comprised of the social 
discourses and performances that happen out in the open, and the hidden transcript, that which 
happens offstage amongst subordinates and away from the surveillance of power holders. Scott 
derives his insights about everyday practices of resistance from the discrepancies between 
these two transcripts, and from the rare moments in power relations when these two worlds 
collide and culminate in overt rebellion (1990, p. 6).  
The overarching theme is that, although subordinate groups may perform compliance 
with hegemonic norms and rules, there is an offstage world of subversive acts and speech that 
must be interrogated and considered as resistance to the very rules enforced by power holders 
(Scott, 1990, p. 136). Following subordinates back and forth between the public and hidden 
transcript illuminates the capacity of subordinates to challenge their oppression and exclusion 
from the formal economy and political life (Scott 1990, pp. xiii, 138, 191, 193; see also 
Thompson, 2013a). It is therefore not necessarily ideological domination that prevents 
populations from openly censuring dominant power, but the ruling class forces of 
‘surveillance, reward, and punishment’ that keep populations silent and in check (see Scott, 
1990, p. 193; Foucault, 2012a; Cohen, 1985; Cohen and Scull, 1983, Rose, 2000; Garland 1990, 
2001; Wacquant, 2000).  
Resistance is therefore defined by subordinates constantly testing the limits of ruling 
class power (Lasslett, 2018).  Once lines are crossed without incurring punishment, dissident 
acts may push the boundaries of what is possible, setting new limits and revealing weaknesses 
that can be exploited. Elaborating on the social balance of forces between dominant groups 
and the oppressed, Scott explains:  
 
A dominant elite under such conditions is ceaselessly working to 
maintain and extend its material control and symbolic reach. A 
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subordinate group is correspondingly devising strategies to thwart and 
reverse that appropriation and to take more symbolic liberties as well. 
(Scott, 1990, p. 197) 
 In this chapter, I will use these characterisations of everyday resistance to explore the 
political force of resistance strategies around land that are not instantly recognisable but pose 
significant challenge to state-humanitarian structures of power. I will then link the mobility 
and occupation strategies of Haitians with previous forms of resistance to land issues. 
 
II. Contextualising Haitian Resistance to State Crimes Around Land   
From the Haitian revolution to agricultural development, there are many examples of 
marginalised communities working together to resist oppression and cope with social and 
political crises (see, for example, Smith, 2001; Wilentz, 1989; Bell, 2001). As Smith notes, 
Haitian resistance strategies have largely been ignored because their challenges against 
dispossession and injustice reflect the difficulties of openly defying the power of the Haitian 
state, landholding elites, and foreign governments. Given the invisibility of these actions, 
repeated claims are made that Haiti ‘has no real civil society’ (Smith 2001, p. 3). 
The focus of my thesis is urban housing and its intimate relationship with land 
struggles. Therefore, my concern is with the everyday strategies used by Haitians to demand 
their share of the benefits that accompany access and rights to land. Land is a vital means for 
guaranteeing subsistence needs are met (such as housing). Property rights, within capitalist 
societies, are also demonstrated to influence social practices of citizenship and belonging, 
affecting discrimination and exclusion for those denied such rights (see Radin, 1992; Holston, 
2008; Vergara-Camus, 2014). Property theorists have also underscored how the lack of access 
to land in propertied societies inhibits the individual realisation of personhood, and erodes 
experiences of freedom and dignity (Radin, 1982). Similar to other contexts, the prominence 
given to land ownership by Haiti’s marginalised classes throughout history is entwined with a 
deep-seated desire for the type of freedom that comes with land possession, including the 
freedom from material and social oppression and the opportunity for ex-slaves to overcome 
intergenerational poverty (Sheller, 2012; see also Vergara-Camus, 2014). 
In thinking through the relationship between land, mobility and resistance, I will use 
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the historical concept of marronage, a form of slave resistance formerly practiced in Haiti, as a 
framing device. Marronage is an historic strategy of mobility and land occupation that bears a 
structural resemblance to the motivations and methods of post-earthquake land occupations. 
Of significance is that both the end of slavery and the development of customary land rights 
in rural Haiti are the direct product of marronage and marronage-like practices. 
During time of French colonial slavery, marronage was a term used to define the deviant 
acts of slaves who ran away from plantations (Manigat, 1977). Though historical 
interpretations of marronage vary, scholars and historians maintain that it symbolised the 
rejection of the colonial order, with some asserting that it represented the most obvious 
‘expression of class struggle in a slave-master society’ (Manigat, 1977, p. 424). Marronage existed 
in two distinct forms in colonial Haiti:  petite marronage – slaves absconding for short periods 
of relief from their brutalisation and forced labour; and grand marranoge – slaves successfully 
escaping the plantation system (Lundhal, 1992, p. 15). Most often, marronage involved slaves 
taking refuge on the hilltops directly above Haiti’s sugar plantations to places that offered ‘the 
ability to survive tant bien que mal [as best they could], with a modicum of independence’ 
(Bellegarde-Smith, 2004, p. 223). Acts of marronage constituted high-risk, mobility strategies 
that provided an escape from systemic colonial violence, and often entailed stealing basic 
provisions from plantations to escape to the Haitian frontier (2004).  
Not unlike the present, slaves’ everyday acts of resistance, embodied in marronage, were 
downplayed by colonial authorities as basic survival tactics with no significant bearing on 
colonial power dynamics or appraisal of their rule (Maginat, 1977). As such, absconding slaves 
(maroons) were classically described in colonial documents as lazy, savage, and delinquent 
fugitives, suggesting there was no higher purpose to their methods of short-lived escapism 
(1977). This view has since been disputed by scholars and historians with a more critical read 
of historical documents. They point out that absconding slaves inherently challenged the 
colonial order by refusing to avail themselves as property of a particular master (1977). Maginat 
argues that individual acts of marronage were highly significant to the development of a 
collective revolutionary consciousness, which in turn, nurtured the Haitian revolution. The 
congregation of absconding slaves, through different variations of marronage, hastened the slave 
revolt by bringing together small bands of insurgents who were motivated to destroy the 
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colonial system and appropriate land as their own. C.L.R. James’ carefully detailed account of 
the late-eighteenth century slave revolt in St. Domingue-Haiti emphasises this point: 
Those whose boldness of spirit found slavery intolerable refused to 
evade it by committing suicide, would fly into the woods and 
mountains and form bands of free men – maroons. They fortified 
their fastnesses with palisades and ditches. Women followed them. 
They reproduced themselves. And for a hundred years before 1789 
the maroons were a source of danger to the colony. In 1720, 1,000 
slaves fled to the mountains. In 1751 there were at least 3,000 of them. 
Usually they formed separate bands, but periodically they found a 
chief who was strong enough to unite the different sections. Many of 
these rebels struck terror into the hearts of the colonists by raids on 
the plantations and the strength and determination of the resistance 
they organised….(2001, p. 20) 
 Historical accounts of marronage imply that such practices constituted the limited power 
of slaves to challenge colonial structures and behaviour deemed intolerable. Manigat (1977) 
stresses that slaves’ mobility decisions often took place when ‘the threshold of acceptability 
has been crossed,’ such as starvation, inhumane standards of living, or generalized violence on 
the planation. As Manigat writes: ‘The maroon has taken it upon himself to run away from the 
“order” of the civilised world which for him is “disorder,” contrary to nature’ (1977, p. 422). 
The maroon was subsequently labelled a rule breaker in colonial society for daring to assert 
freedom and autonomy (1977).  
In relation to practices of marronage, scholars have since use the phrase “voting with 
their feet” to characterise Haitian resistance practices that embody similar patterns and 
objectives. Haiti’s post-independence period is illustrative of this. When the newly formed 
Haitian state decided to reinstate a share-cropping model of production that closely resembled 
the planation system (see Chapter Three), marronage was again practiced as a method of protest 
and rejection of the forced appropriation of ex-slaves’ labour power (Hedlund et. al., 1990, p. 
52). The post-colonial plantation system was in fact toppled by exploited workers fleeing the 
plantations and squatting on the rural frontier (Sheller, 2012). Unlike the colonial 
administration, the new Haitian state did not have the same coercive means to conduct 
surveillance and control the movements of plantation workers (Lundahl, 2002, p. 332). 
Absconding plantation workers thus took advantage of the opportunity to occupy land and 
meet their own needs as subsistence farmers, just as their ancestors did though their acts of 
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marronage.  
 These recurring examples have suggested something historically and culturally distinct 
about the logic of Haitian resistance, and the use of mobility and land occupation strategies to 
escape excessively oppressive circumstances (Lundahl, 2002, p. 335). Lundahl writes that 
Haitians demonstrate a kind of cultural readiness to apply the ‘squatter alternative’ as a way of 
facilitating their exit from repressive situations. Sheller (2012) also suggests mobility strategies 
operate as Haiti’s “hidden transcript.” In her perspective, Haitian mobility patterns are 
revealing of the subordinated class’s desire for autonomy, the exercise and limits to their class 
power, and their thresholds of acceptance of dominant class relations underpinned by land 
inequality. She concludes that while mobility strategies have provided means of escape, it is 
access to land that has truly offered the Haitian peasantry ‘a key terrain for wresting power’ 
(Sheller, 2012, p. 173). These are all important insights for assessing the political significance 
of squatter movements in Haiti. 
 
III. Resistance to Post-Earthquake Land Violence and Exclusion  
 
III.I Camp-based rebellions to humanitarian governance 
Taking land from needy landless residents and putting it back into circulation for 
accumulation and productive use, was arguably the most egregious outcome of state-
humanitarian settlement closures. Given the fate that awaited them outside the camps, landless 
Haitians inside camps began to subvert and thwart the camp-by-camp implementation of the 
Rental Subsidy Cash Grant (RSCG) programme. During a March 2014 interview with one the 
coordinating staff for the RSCG programme, he admitted that at least seven settlements had 
openly rebelled against state-humanitarian plans for them.224 Settlement leaders had vocalized 
their intention to stay, and in some instances, barricaded the entrance of the settlement to 
prevent the entry of humanitarian staff or state authorities.  
Sometimes, blockades at settlement entrances were measures of protest against the 
limited housing package on offer and not the intention to permanently live in the camp (as 
discussed in Chapter Four). For example, Acra was an overcrowded settlement of 32,000 
                                                
224 Interview, humanitarian official 50, Port-au-Prince, 20 March 2014. 
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people whose leadership refused to accept the short-term rental grants offered by the 
humanitarian rental grant programme. According to Elie, settlement leader and housing 
advocate, Acra’s population had no intention of staying and building homes within the 
densely-crowded settlement; however, they did intend to use their occupation to leverage 
access to land. The settlement sat on a plot of land claimed by the powerful Acra family and 
Raynold Georges, the former lawyer for President Jean Claude Duvalier (DOP, 2013). The 
settlement leadership, who had formed an inter-settlement network of activists called Changem 
Leson, explained that they refused to leave their tented city until their demands for land and 
housing were met by the state. The leadership also contested the legitimacy of the claim of the 
private owners and maintained that the land was in fact state owned (DOP, 2013). When I 
brought this particular case back to the international humanitarian organisations, those I spoke 
with dismissed Elie’s social justice campaign as an unachievable dream given the land claims 
by the Acra family and the Haitian state’s indifference to their plight.225 According to 
humanitarian actors, Acra’s land occupants would have no option but to return to their former 
position as renters. 
Elie, his wife, and the Changem Leson network in Acra camp formed a housing 
cooperative called CHAL (Coalition for Housing Action and Savings) and deployed group 
members to identify potential land plots, with a view to negotiating their movement to another 
location. This act linked with their ultimate goal, which was to ‘build a new Haiti that is self-
sufficient and one where the popular masses can flourish instead of being terrorised by Haitian 
and foreign governments.’226  
The Acra settlement’s acts of resistance drew a hugely repressive response from local 
authorities and powerful land claimants. In February 2013, heavily armed men, presumed to 
be linked to the government, stormed the settlement and set parts of it ablaze, leading to the 
death of a five-year-old child, and the destruction of the tents and possessions of 4,000 families 
(CEPR, 2013). Two months later, the camp faced another round of attacks and intimidation. 
This time, Jean Claude Duvalier’s former lawyer showed up at the settlement, with the Haitian 
police and magistrate judge from the Delmas Commune, to threaten the settlement’s residents 
                                                
225 Interview, humanitarian officials 40 (1 August 2014) and 7 (21 April 2014), Port-au-Prince. 
226 See the Changem leson. Accessed on 4 October 2017. Retrieved from 
https://chanjemleson.wordpress.com/about/  
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(DOP, 2013). The Defenders of the Oppressed (DOP), a Haitian NGO, gathered witness 
statements after the event and concluded that the lawyer had ‘…told the camp residents that 
he would kick them out with fire or would bulldoze the camp’ (DOP, 2013, p. 2). The next 
day, settlement residents thwarted another attempted arson, which was reported to the 
authorities but ignored by the police. When residents closed off the road adjacent to the 
settlement for a protest march, police responded with brutality. Two male protestors were 
picked out of the crowd and taken away – one of whom was allegedly beaten to death while 
in police custody. State prosecutors, at the request of Duvalier’s former lawyer, filed criminal 
charges of arson and conspiracy against DOP lawyer, Patrick Florvilus, who was advocating 
for an investigation of the police murder of the settlement protestor (Bell & Synder, 2013). 
Repeated death threats against Advocate Florvilus eventually forced him to flee to Canada. 
This loss, combined with the untimely death of Elie in 2015, weakened the settlement’s 
resistance to closure. By 2016, four years after the earthquake, the settlement could no longer 
hold out against the state, private land claimants, and humanitarian bureaucracy. The 
settlement was closed that year, illustrating the extreme challenges of land occupants to 
maintain their land control in the post-earthquake period.  
Chegar was another settlement that resisted eviction by the humanitarian-state rental 
grant programme. The Chegar population rejected the RSCG rental grants and asserted their 
desire to stay on the land they had occupied. This tented community of three hundred people 
particularly took issue with humanitarian terminology. During interviews, Chegar’s leadership 
and some families insisted they were living on the land as a community with occupation rights. 
They rejected humanitarian labels portraying them as a group of internally displaced people 
(IDPs) seeking temporary refuge and awaiting humanitarian support to “return” to exploitative 
rental conditions.227 Over time, communication between humanitarians and Chegar residents 
broke down. Calling themselves the ‘place of the homeless’ (Chegar des gens sans abri), Chegar’s 
residents tried to secure their tenure by covertly building concrete foundations underneath 
their white, tents – intending to unveil their new houses when they had constructed just 
enough to make it more difficult to evict them.  
As with the Acra camp, the humanitarian sector refused to acknowledge Chegar’s 
                                                
227 Interviews, Chegar residents, Port-au-Prince, 2 April 2014 
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tactics as legitimate resistance against humanitarian-led evictions and legal enclosure of the 
city. Instead, the humanitarian officials I spoke with, who were struggling to register the 
settlement for the RSCG programme, denounced the settlement leadership as ‘a bunch of 
gang leaders’ whose criminal motivations drove their occupation behaviours. Their discourse 
about Chegar echoed public statements made by local authorities implicated in violent 
evictions around the city. For example, the mayor of Delmas Commune Wilson Jeudy 
frequently claimed that humanitarian-provided tents provided to displaced people had been 
appropriated by gangs for their criminal activities.228 Humanitarian discourses about Chegar 
included a disparaging narrative about the ‘poor and helpless women who were being trapped 
by their gangster husbands and relatives.’229 During interviews, however, it came to light that 
the humanitarian officials touting this narrative about vulnerable Haitian women held captive 
by violent Haitian men had never personally interviewed or interacted with any of the women 
living inside the settlement.230 While this settlement still existed at the end of my fieldwork, 
follow-up on this case indicated that state threats of violence against the community continue 
to persist and destabilise the settlement. 
Both Acra’s and Chegar’s experiences demonstrate two important points about 
resistance against humanitarian-led settlement closures. They show the difficulties of rejecting 
the rental subsidy programme, and the ways in which state-humanitarian actors worked to de-
legitimise land claims and resistance tactics. We see from these examples that the Chegar 
community was labelled a band of criminals, and that the people from the Acra camp were 
framed as a group of social justice dreamers, ostensibly too naïve to understand that their right 
to housing was an impossible reality in the face of poverty and earthquake destruction. In both 
cases, the communities encountered strong state and humanitarian push back, sometimes with 
violence, revealing the restricted space for opposition to state-humanitarian plans.  
 
                                                
228 See Haiti Libre, Strong Operation of Destruction of an IDP camps in Delmas, 25 May 2011. Available at 
http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-3026-haiti-social-strong-operation-of-destruction-of-an-idp-camps-in-
delmas.html 
229 Interview, humanitarian official 50, Port-au-Prince, 20 March 2014. 
230 Interview, humanitarian official 50, Port-au-Prince, 20 March 2014. 
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III.II Insubordinate renters and mass exit to the urban frontier. 
 Unlike the residents of Chegar and Acra, most people living in camps did not benefit 
from powerful challenges to the camp closure process. Even if people strongly disagreed with 
leaving their free accommodation in a post-earthquake settlement in exchange for short-term, 
humanitarian rental grants, they struggled to mobilise and resist their expulsion. Some Haitian 
civil society members blamed this on the individualised RSCG approach. Families were 
manipulated by aid strategies that made them think they could lose both their access to land 
and their entitlement to any form of housing aid if they rejected the RSCG programme.231 Yet, 
instead of actually returning to the rental market, many of these families took their cash grants 
and purchased land illegally in the rapidly emerging informal settlement of Canaan.  
In Canaan, most of my interviewees had previously lived in post-earthquake 
settlements and suffered expulsions by state-humanitarian officials before making their way to 
the informal settlement. While people held mixed views about living in post-earthquake 
settlements inside Port-au-Prince, they were united in their perception that they had been 
forced to leave the settlements. Some confirmed that the informal settlements were indeed 
miserable places to live given poor conditions and high levels of insecurity. Casseus, a 47-year-
old father of three, described his anxieties associated with living in an overcrowded settlement 
inside Port-au-Prince:  
 
The problem was that it was no place to raise my children for the two 
years that we lived there. I don’t think that the camps were necessarily 
bad places full of bad people – but we just didn’t know who they 
[others in the camp] were.232  
Nevertheless, not everyone raised issues about their time in post-earthquake settlements. 
Those who lived in smaller settlements had more favourable views of their living situation 
than those who lived in settlements with large populations. One family in Canaan described 
their expulsion: 
 
We would have preferred to stay in the camp – things were much 
easier when we lived in the city. But we were not given the option to 
stay in the camp, and we could not stay in the city because of the cost 
                                                
231 Interview with Haitian housing activist 1, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 25 October 2013. 
232 Interview 15, Village des Pêcheurs, 20 June 2014. 
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of rent. What could we do? Outside the camp, Port-au-Prince is too 
expensive for us.233 
This family, like several others interviewed, felt they had no choice but to register under the 
humanitarian-led RSCG programme. They explained, that they had to register and receive the 
grant, or receive nothing at all. Interviewees vividly recounted how they feared the Haitian 
police during these settlement closure processes, describing how the police made final visits 
to their settlements to ensure all tents and people had been removed.234  
Some families receiving rental grants connected with informal brokers selling land. 
Half of my interviewees in Canaan had purchased their land by using the humanitarian rental 
grants, strictly intended for renting houses inside Port-au-Prince, to purchase land in the 
burgeoning illegal land market. All were fully aware they were meant to rent houses under the 
RSCG programme, but outright rejected the humanitarian goal for them to ‘throw the money 
away on rent.’235 From the perspective of an insubordinate rental grant recipient, there was no 
reason why the upward trend in city rents would suddenly reverse itself. They reported that 
rents had increased by 25–35% since the earthquake. One man explained why he resisted using 
his rental grant to return to the rental market in accordance with the programme’s 
requirements:  
 
The money [cash grant] has been critical for us to buy land here, even 
if they [humanitarian organisations] told us we must rent houses. But 
the rental houses are too expensive. A 3,000 Haitian dollar236 rental 
property (per six months) became 4,000 rental property within a year 
after the earthquake. This is too expensive. First the house is 
expensive, and second, we must spend money on school for our 
children, for food, for everything else that we need. And this is on top 
of the fact that all prices, including houses, have all increased.237  
As earlier mentioned, to qualify for the humanitarian-issued rental grant, families were 
required to identify a safe (earthquake-proof) home, sign an agreement with the landlord that 
they would rent the house for a full year, and de-register from their settlement (i.e., promise 
                                                
233 Interview 3, Village des Pêcheurs, 17 May 2014  
234 Interview 3, Village des Pêcheurs, 17 May 2014 
235 Interview 20, Village des Pêcheurs, 24 June 2014. 
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not to return). Once these conditions were met, the cash grant was either dispersed into the 
bank accounts of the family or of their new landlord, depending on the model of the rental 
subsidy program implemented by the participating humanitarian organisation. It was in this 
context that rental subsidy recipients proceeded to negotiate deals and sign fake rental agreements 
with Port-au-Prince landlords who were offering housing that met the criteria of the rental 
subsidy programme. Such deals allowed them to ‘sign their name’ but ‘not their feet’ – to 
reference a familiar Haitian proverb that implicates mobility as a familiar tactic of resistance 
(vous signé nom moi, mais vous pas signé pieds moi) (Sheller, 2012, p. 166). The grant money was then 
taken to the new informal land market emerging on the northern periphery of Port-au-Prince. 
A UN-Habitat staff member, highly dismissive of the restrictive and disciplinary nature of the 
humanitarian rental programme, said that at one point her staff had stated that more than ten 
families had used the same home to claim the rental subsidy grant, as evidence of the frequency 
of this type of subversion.238 She alleged that both landlords and the local staff of humanitarian 
organisations, who were implementing and overseeing settlement closure processes, had 
received a cut from the grant-recipient families to allow them to use their grants for illegal land 
purchases.  
My fieldwork found various tactics by which populations expelled by the RSCG 
programme used their humanitarian grants to fund their resistance to the programme’s 
overriding aim to transform them from squatters back into precarious renters. Family splitting 
is another example. In a handful of instances, families explained that they had split up before 
or during the distribution of humanitarian rental grants in order to claim more than one rental 
subsidy grant. The purchase of subsistence items (food, water, clothes, etc.) and the desire to 
buy more than one parcel of land were the two most commonly given reasons for trying to 
obtain more than one rental grant.  
 Giving further context to how this played out, my fieldwork encountered another 
example. Jean was a 22-year-old man, who in the four years he had lived in a post-earthquake 
settlement inside Port-au-Prince, had met and married Annie, another settlement resident.239 
Despite this change in their family status, Jean and Annie could not register as a separate 
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household, suffering the consequence of how humanitarians promoted nuclear family units 
without accounting for how family structures change over time (see Schuller, 2012b). Like any 
newlywed couple, Jean and Annie were eager to set up their own household. They viewed 
humanitarian restrictions that disqualified them from receiving aid packages as unacceptable 
and an assault on their freedom, dignity, and personhood. The couple decided to challenge 
the system by moving to another settlement where they purchased a tent and identity card 
from another family who wanted to leave the settlement to live in Port-au-Prince. In this way, 
Jean and Annie were eventually able to qualify for a separate rental grant, which they used to 
illegally purchase land in Canaan near their parents – who had done the same with their grants. 
In summary, my fieldwork documented countless examples of landless populations finding 
ways to subvert the RSCG’s aims without engaging in direct confrontation with the 
programme’s administrators. 
 
IV. Discourses of Resistance to State-Humanitarian Crime 
Recalling Chapter Four, humanitarian-constructed categories of city residents – 
displaced, non-displaced, renter, owner, returnee, and squatter – reinforced constructs about victims, 
their experiences, and their entitlements that are key to the functioning of disaster capitalism. 
This labelling was not only rejected by Haitians, but as earlier mentioned, had little connection 
with how Haitians framed their own experiences. Taking a closer look at the hidden transcript 
in Canaan – the alternative ideas, values, and goals expressed by post-earthquake squatters – 
we find emerging discourses that apply sanctions to state-humanitarian housing initiatives 
because of the ways these institutional actions reproduce injustices and increase exposure to 
harm. The counter-hegemonic discourses articulated by Canaan’s land occupants reveal an 
alternative vision of who should have rights to unused urban land and how such rights are 
innately connected to the fulfilment of human need, as well as necessary for remedying 
historical injustices. They are furthermore revealing of the practices of resistance used by 
RSCG recipients to exit repressive circumstances and negotiate new terms of urban 
citizenship, freedom, and belonging.  
 
IV.I Defining harm and victimisation 
In this thesis, I have identified the failure of humanitarian characterisations of Haiti 
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and the importance of labelling to the construction of humanitarian power over displaced 
people. Taking these claims to the informal settlement of Canaan, my fieldwork failed to find 
a single interviewee who self-identified as an IDP (déplacés), despite having lived in a 
humanitarian-labelled camp at one point. Despite probing for individual use of humanitarian 
labels to make claims to land and housing, I found minimal understanding or perceived 
advantages of humanitarian labels. At the home of one land occupant, the family produced 
their camp-based identity card during our discussion about humanitarian identities and 
management systems. Without much enthusiasm, the head of the family explained: ‘A blan 
[foreigner] gave me this card, but I don’t know what it means.’ This lack of knowledge, which 
evidenced the bureaucratic function of humanitarian identity constructions, and not the 
protection function of such identities, was supplemented by frustration about international 
identity constructions. ‘We are not déplacés,’ emphasised one Canaan land occupant, ‘we are a 
community of people struggling for land.’240  
Amongst Canaan’s land occupants, distributive inequalities were central to the 
interpretation of the January 2010 earthquake and its disproportionate effects for landless 
urban residents. In stark contrast with humanitarian discourses that centred on disaster-specific 
displacement, land occupants’ descriptions of suffering went far beyond the earthquake’s 
events and spatial geography. Conversely, Canaan’s land occupants characterised the 
earthquake as a pivotal moment in their lifetime of repeated exposure to harm. Not just an 
isolated event, the earthquake brought to the fore their marginalised and precarious social 
position, while reproducing an age-old struggle for land between the Haitian elite and 
dispossessed underclass. The earthquake brought class differences into stark relief and 
mobilised landless people to 
take new bolder risks in a 
period of uncertainty and 
chaos, to remedy their multi-
layered conditions of 
precariousness. This 
alternative narrative voiced by 
Canaan’s residents is 
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significant for exposing the motivations, justifications, and social justice goals behind extra-
legal land occupations. What becomes apparent in the people’s narratives of their experiences 
is their complete rejection of state-humanitarian return initiatives as a legitimate policy for 
earthquake victims. People’s ‘active taking of space,’ as Dean Mitchell (2013, 10) phrases it, 
was a valid social response to state-humanitarian harm and violence.  
Personal accounts of tactics employed to avoid renting in the city were amplified by 
harrowing stories of endemic poverty and vulnerability to violence as a result of perpetual 
mobility and lack of place and belonging. When I asked a middle-aged couple living in the 
informal neighbourhood of Canaan 3 about the 2010 earthquake, they summarised their life as 
one of endless forced migrations. What emerged from their narrative was an intense dislike 
for Port-au-Prince. The couple saw Port-au-Prince as an overcrowded, dirty city that 
harboured only slightly better economic opportunities for neglected rural people. The couple 
felt stateless in their own country given the way they had wandered from place to place without 
political recognition or attention to their suffering. Though the couple had stronger 
community ties to their birthplace in Gonaïves (northern Haiti), they were compelled to leave 
it several years prior to the earthquake, after Hurricane Jeanne ripped through Gonaïves and 
destroyed their homes and livelihoods.241 Without state support, the couple struggled for three 
years to rebuild their home before finally giving up and migrating to Port-au-Prince to find 
work. After ten difficult years of dealing with informal work, dangerous neighbourhoods, and 
exorbitant rents, the couple faced new tragedy when their rental home and belongings were 
destroyed in the January 2010 earthquake. They then purchased land illegally in Canaan 3, 
hoping to put an end their constant mobility and re-victimisation. Even so, their hope for 
establishing a home was tempered with scepticism about whether or not finding a secure place 
to live was really achievable for Haiti’s urban precariat. As Jesula, the wife of the couple, put 
it:  
 
After everything that has happened to us, I have no attachment to any 
place. It is only my husband who still has the dream that one day we 
will find a place to stay.242 
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 Stories of constant vulnerability to harm were echoed by many of Canaan’s residents 
interviewed during the fieldwork. A few neighbourhoods away, in Village des Pêcheurs, 47-year-
old Samuel recounted a story similar to Jesula’s. For Samuel, it was the decline in agricultural 
production in the 1980s that compelled him to migrate to Port-au-Prince as a young man. 
Samuel anchored his narrative around the various factors of exploitation he had encountered 
since coming to Port-au-Prince. These experiences underpinned his transitory experience in 
the city and justified his illegal purchase of land. After arriving in Port-au-Prince, Samuel was 
never able to afford university or fulfil his desire for educational improvement and a better 
job – 90% of universities in Port-au-Prince are privatised and economically out of reach 
(INURED, 2010). Jobs were difficult to find, and at the time of the earthquake, the menial 
jobs that Samuel had performed had all disappeared. In the face of limited work opportunities 
and stagnant incomes, the cost of rent, food, schooling, and other basics were always 
increasing in the city. As Samuel saw it, without access to land, which he saw as the basis for 
establishing a home, he had no way to protect his family from rising costs or improve their 
economic well-being. He spent twenty-five years – more than half his life – moving from one 
overcrowded and poorly serviced slum neighbourhood to the next. ‘Before the earthquake, I 
never spent more than one or two years in one house,’ Samuel explained. ‘What happens is 
that you live in a house, and then it becomes expensive. You are forced to leave and find a 
cheaper one.’243  
These journeys from peasant villages to the urban underworld were marked by strong 
contempt amongst Canaan’s occupants for the unjust and exploitative rental market that they 
had been forced into as a result of state neglect to ensure sufficient housing supply and 
affordability. Once in the city, people’s stories laid bare the intersecting vulnerabilities derived 
from the lack of access to urban land and affordable housing. Canaan’s occupants reflected 
on the daily anxiety they experienced when renting homes in Port-au-Prince as rents ruthlessly 
outpaced their actual earnings in the informal economy. One land occupant described renting 
as an inescapable, traumatic experience prior to the earthquake: 
 
What is not good about having to rent a house is that you never have 
the money. You are always waiting for the six-month deadline when 
your landlord will demand payment [for rent]. Your heart is always 
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beating.244  
Living on the streets or moving down the economic ladder to a cheaper neighbourhood or 
rental home always implied greater exposure to physical violence and health-related risks. In 
one instance, an unexpected illness put the head of the family out of a job. Within a few 
months, the family could not pay their rent and found themselves squatting in an alleyway that 
also functioned as a public toilet. The smell, flies, and lack of privacy were unbearable, but this 
was their only choice given their intersecting problems of unemployment and lack of decent, 
affordable housing in the city.  
Sometimes, the contempt for the unjust rental market and their spatial segregation in 
dense, overcrowded slums was demonstrated by their references to cultural myths and 
symbols. Illustrating this, one occupant named Marie protested her insufferable housing 
circumstances prior to the earthquake by discussing them using voodoo references that imply 
the risk of harm:   
 
When you can’t pay, you must find the least expensive house. So, you 
keep moving to a cheaper and cheaper house. You are trying to raise 
your children – but each neighbourhood you move to is worse than 
the previous one. You encounter loups-garous [evil spirits] in the bad 
neighbourhoods you have moved to.245 
 In voodoo culture and religion, loups-garous are humans who have turned themselves 
into werewolves in order to commit various types of evil acts, especially attacking one’s 
neighbours (Simpson, 1942; Wilentz, 2013, p. 169). Loups-garous are known for threatening and 
killing children at night while their parents are sleeping. By making reference to loups-garous 
during discussions about renting, occupants like Marie expressed their fears about the risks to 
their children when families had little stability or control over their housing choices. Their 
insecure tenure, characterised by frequent, downward mobility to dangerous neighbourhoods, 
was a hugely objectionable aspect of renting that people sought to overcome through their 
subversive acts of mobility and land occupation.  
By protesting their former status as renters, Canaan’s occupants clearly outlined a 
                                                
244 Interview 23, Village des Pêcheurs, 26 June 2014. 
245 Interview 15, Village des Pêcheurs, 20 June 2014.  
	 190 
relationship between the rental market and class domination. People contested relations of 
dependency and dominance between renters living on the margins and the propertied elite, 
which underpinned their feelings of inferiority, enslavement, and lack of self-worth. Land 
occupants often vilified former landlords for their abusive treatment of powerless renters. One 
father impugned his former landlord for repeatedly harassing him in front of his four children:  
 
My landlord was always putting me down because, without a steady 
job, I struggled to pay rent. He always let us know that he could 
dispose of us anytime he felt like it.  
Others similarly disparaged greedy and unsympathetic landlords who extracted 
maximum amounts for rent but refused to “wait a single day” before evicting households for 
overdue rents. People’s lower-class position and housing precarity made them vulnerable to 
consistent exploitation by unscrupulous landlords in the form of inflated rents or 
instantaneous eviction. Verbal exchanges between landlords and households in arrears were 
filled with dehumanising insults that put the moral character of the tenant into question. 
Encounters with landlords were forceful moments in dominant power relations that were 
hated by the demoralized renters. For this reason, land occupants explained that realising 
freedom depended on their exit from the urban housing market and the unequal class relations 
sustaining it. Such feelings were articulated by one squatter in the following manner:  
 
In Haiti, when you can’t pay for your home, the landlord will evict 
you within a day. When he throws you out, he will also let you know 
that he is evicting you because his home is the result of his hard work 
and you are not worthy of it. Only when you finally have your own 
home can you feel free because you no longer have to suffer from 
these harsh words.246 
Another former renter who now occupied land in Canaan voiced similar objections to class 
domination facilitated by the rental market: 
 
You aren’t treated like a human if you rent houses. Landlords can do 
anything to you – even switch off your electricity if they are bothered 
or want to intimidate you.247 
 Both observations unmask deep motivations for land that go far beyond fulfilling 
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subsistence needs. Post-earthquake, extra-legal land occupation constituted an important form 
of protest against class-based land control and property relations. This protest is grounded in 
how lack of land access perpetuates conditions of exploitation, and is related to how lack of 
land undermines personal dignity and the feeling that one can make a personal or social 
contribution. Access to land thus operates both as a remedy to past conditions and as an 
opportunity to achieve the same freedom and respect afforded to Haiti’s landed class. 
 
IV.II Defining Perpetrators of Land Violence and Exclusion 
Land occupants’ narratives did not simply identify the aspects of urban renting that 
they deemed harmful and illegitimate, which was the basis for contesting the RSCG 
programme and state-humanitarian treatment of housing issues. When airing their grievances 
about precarious urban living, squatters directly attributed their experiences of land exclusion 
and violence to the actions of the landowning elite and Haitian state, and the international 
actors upholding their social dominance. Humanitarian agencies were also named as 
perpetrators of harms against landless people, especially in relation to their administration of 
housing aid. Sanctioning the practices of the powerful, land occupants asserted their vision for 
land redistribution and the realisation of their rights to land and housing. 
According to Canaan’s land occupants, Haiti’s landowning elite (the grandon) had 
violated social norms by voraciously accumulating land using whatever means available to 
them, including violence, intimidation, and fraud. Regardless of the grandon’s criminal practices, 
occupants criticised elite accumulation of land because it infringed on the ability of the urban 
masses to equally enjoy the benefits of land access. Occupants believed that all Haitians should 
have basic entitlements to land, and that enforceable limits should be placed on how much 
land single households can possess. They pointed to a series of small-scale evictions248 on the 
periphery of Canaan as evidence that landowning elites were preparing to lay siege to the 
booming informal settlement and re-appropriate the settlement land for their own purposes. 
As one man living on the edge of Canan said worryingly: 
 
Before the earthquake no one was looking at this unused land. 
Now the grandon want part of this land because we have made it 
                                                
248 The Mozayik eviction, discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight, has been documented. Available at 
http://www.snagfilms.com/films/title/mozayik 
	 192 
profitable and a better place to live. 
 Canaan’s residents reproached elites for leaving their land plots empty and not putting 
them into productive use. This was particularly offensive given the chronic lack of land access 
for the urban poor. A group of students in the settlement berated Haiti’s elites for their use of 
land that defied common sense by elevating the social use of land over its commodification 
and use in production processes. This was illegitimate and a problem that needed to be 
addressed by the Haitian state. In the words of a twenty-two-year-old university student:  
 
There is a difference between rich and poor [in their land 
behaviours]. The rich people are using their land for investment 
and profit. Those people have no intention to live on the land. But 
there are people like us in poverty [who need it]…and the state 
isn’t saying anything about it.249 
 There were some Canaan occupants who entirely rejected possessive individualism 
and the notion of private property rights, seeing that enclosure processes had produced a 
system of unequal access amongst Haitians. This was unacceptable to occupants who argued 
that land should be treated as a natural resource rather than a legally protected possession. In 
this alterative framing, the only way that communities could thrive and deal with the 
repercussions of urban life was if land was readily accessible and shared amongst the people 
living in Port-au-Prince.250 Some occupants explicitly stated that they preferred living in 
Canaan as opposed to other neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince because, at the moment, it 
offered equal access and equal rights to the land. This dynamic would change as the settlement 
developed. However, these debates illustrate the strong desire for equality as a key principle 
for guiding post-earthquake decisions about land use, housing, and the distribution of property 
rights.  
Apparent from the student’s statement above, identifying elites as perpetrators of 
urban landlessness veered into discussions about the state’s role in protecting elites and 
preventing land access. In social struggles over land, land occupants complained they were at 
a disadvantage. The Haitian state had been filled by the grandon. People perceived an 
undemocratic state imposing the will of wealthy Haitians during political and social conflicts 
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over land. This contravened their normative vision of the state, which was to protect and 
promote the well-being of its citizens. Such notions were relayed by one land occupant living 
in the Village des Pêcheurs neighbourhood of Canaan:  
 
A state exists to take care of the people. It should be like the 
relationship between a father and his sons. The father provides for 
his sons. He does that so his sons can go ahead and do good things 
in their lives.251 
Occupants held the view that the state’s key function was to enforce limits on the 
predatory accumulation of land by the elite, which was directly related to their (the occupants’) 
lack of housing and miserable urban conditions. Haitians commonly referred to their state as 
sleeping – a metaphor used to describe their sense of abandonment, especially during the 
exercise of class power and violence. Such feelings led one resident of the Mozayik 
neighbourhood of Canaan to vent his frustration in the following terms:  
 
It is the role of the state to bring support to us here and to help us 
face the great obstacle that the grandon [the landowning elite] is to 
our lives.252  
Another Mozayik resident agreed: 
 
The government must give the grandon a limit so they will no longer 
destroy the houses of the people.253 
These perspectives are enlightening as they show which state and private actions were 
considered harmful and morally reprehensible.  
Land occupants’ representations of harm are strikingly incongruous with state-
humanitarian descriptions of Haiti’s victims in the post-earthquake period. The state and 
humanitarian organisations explained disaster-related harms without naming perpetrators, 
pointing to natural causes and Haiti’s ‘lack of development’ (see Chapter Four). Their 
explanations shied away from confronting the criminality of the state in advancing 
accumulation practices that directly produced disaster-related harm and violence. In contrast, 
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by painting struggles for land and housing as the consequence of unequal class relations, and 
the uneven distribution of land underpinning them, land occupants articulated their strong 
desire for greater state regulation of land use and distribution. By doing so, they demanded 
protection from predatory accumulation.  
The collusion between humanitarian actors and landowning elites was identified as 
problematic by some squatters. They contested the lack of transparency around the use of 
humanitarian funding and the huge discrepancies in housing packages between former home 
owners and former tenants. There was also a strong impression that the international 
humanitarian community had exploited earthquake victims as commodities to obtain funding 
for themselves and the state. One squatter observed the following of state-humanitarian 
dynamics: 
 
All of the NGOs that came from abroad wanted to help with 
human rights, but they got blocked by the government who did 
not want us to have the land. And they [humanitarians] are now 
more likely to work with the State. And this makes the State even 
more powerful against us. The state is pocketing their money – and 
they [humanitarians] are not defending or being responsible to the 
people.254 
 
IV.III Justifying Extra-Legal Occupations as Legitimate Housing Strategy 
Canaan’s land occupants were fully aware that they had illegally purchased land, that 
they lacked legal status on the land, and that they could be evicted at any moment. At the same 
time, they firmly believed they had a right to occupy state land. Unlike narrowly constructed 
humanitarian categories, anyone who was part of the landless urban poor was included in their 
categorisation of an earthquake victim and had a right to occupy Canaan. By asserting that 
Canaan was public land, interviewees vehemently denied the competing claims to Canaan by 
private individuals or companies (land claims to Canaan are discussed in Chapter 7). 
Notwithstanding their obvious interest in insisting that Canaan was publically not privately 
owned land, interviewees raised Haiti’s complicated land history as justification for rejecting 
any alternative claim to the land as legitimate. They recounted both pre- and post-earthquake 
examples of wealthy landowners using violent or coercive methods to evict squatters from city 
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land plots (presumed public), and then turn to the judicial system to achieve legally recognised 
property rights.  
In essence, land occupants constructed the legitimacy of their occupation on the 
grounds that all social classes were treating the earthquake as another race for rights255 in Haiti’s 
ambiguous property system (see Chapter Four). Occupants wondered why their appropriation 
of land was stigmatised and considered unlawful when landed elites committed similar illegal 
acts on more valuable pieces of land, which unlike landless people, they did not need to survive? 
Drawing out these comparisons between the social classes, and calling out the selective 
criminalisation of the poor, were ways that people justified their land claims in Canaan. 
Land occupants further vindicated their acts of resistance and occupation by referring 
to their marginalised status in Haitian society and the repeated failure of the state to fulfil the 
occupants’ rights as citizens, and as human beings. The state’s criminal actions and failure to 
protect people from harms triggered by the earthquake meant that it now owed the people – 
a popular belief percolating in discussions about land claims. In accordance with what was 
moral and just, the state was now required to recognise their land claims. It did not matter 
how land was obtained, the state must now work toward establishing equal treatment amongst 
citizens of different social backgrounds and fulfil its obligations to them. This reasoning is 
evident in the statement of Jean Louis, an occupant in Village des Pêcheurs neighbourhood: 
 
Everyone knows that the state owes the people. Our state has 
responsibility for its people – after all, I am a Haitian citizen. So 
far state has never recognized us. But now, the government must 
recognize us on this land because not everyone has the possibility 
to rent houses in Port-au-Prince. We should have an opportunity 
for a better life.256 
In Jean Louis’s view, state authorisation of land occupants’ rights in Canaan ought to include 
state recognition of the social and economic importance of land for everyday life.  
Canaan’s land occupants justified their resistance to state-humanitarian programmes 
and their illegal occupation of Canaan by pointing to the generational harms behind their 
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suffering. They referred to their ancestors’ experiences of French colonialism, and slavery in 
particular, when discussing the chain of actors responsible for their ongoing suffering and 
their land-related response to mitigate it. As part of the explanation for their land behaviours 
and housing strategies, land occupants would mention Jean Jacques Dessaline, a venerated 
leader of the Haitian slave revolt.257 On several occasions, impassioned discussions about 
occupation processes and the legitimacy of land claims were linked to General Dessaline’s 
radical overthrow of colonial plantation owners, who were responsible for unfathomable 
violence and misery. They invoked Dessaline’s story to show that popular revolt was 
sometimes justifiable and necessary to address grievances. One land occupant justified his land 
claim in Canaan in the following way:  
 
[On housing] we cannot start with today. We must go back and ask 
what Dessalines died for: it is our land issue. In Haiti, we have 
millions of hectares of land that are empty -- really empty. So, our 
problem is not that we do not have land. We have it. But it has 
never been given to the people. To get it we must act like 
Dessalines. A warrior never knows when he will die, he only needs 
to know that he is working for the people. 
Other exchanges with squatters in Canaan echoed these comments. Interviews held in the 
Mozayik neighbourhood, similarly justified land occupations using Dessaline’s revolution as a 
key element of their argument:  
 
We have the right to this land because Dessaline died for us 
[emphasised by the interviewee pointing at the group]. He died to 
give us land. But you see, we haven’t received it yet.258 
 This consistent reference to General Dessaline, and the unfulfilled dreams for land for 
ex-slaves, is underscored by how the informal settlement received its name in the first place. 
Interviewees explained that the name Canaan symbolises a journey to the promised land. Their 
struggle mirrored the biblical narrative of Abraham and his descendants, who suffered from 
slavery and a long and hard journey to achieve a place of belonging. Canaan was therefore 
open for occupation to any victim of Haiti’s long history of suffering. Occupying state-owned 
land in Canaan distributed land to the landless and was reparation for past harms. 
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While it was a rare for squatters to make reference only to the earthquake when 
justifying their land claims, it did not mean they excluded the earthquake as a factor in their 
land behaviours. Families formerly confined to overcrowded slums talked about the trauma 
of having a ‘city fall on top of them’ during the earthquake. This experience had a serious 
psychological effect on families who went on to occupy land in Canaan as a matter of personal 
safety and disaster prevention. A former basketball coach at a Haitian secondary school 
recounted that his wife was trapped under the rubble of their home for three days after the 
earthquake. Severely traumatised, she refused to live in Port-au-Prince. In this instance, it was 
earthquake-related trauma and fear or re-victimisation that compelled their resistance to 
returning to densely constructed neighbourhoods. The function of land as a remedy and 
method of protection from future victimisation is illustrated in the following statement: 
 
Many of my family members died during the earthquake, and I 
suffered from them dying. But now I have land and the state must 
recognize what I have lost, and that this is my opportunity to be 
safe and live a better life.259 
While earthquake-related experiences of death, destruction, and violence were not the primary 
reasons given for land occupation, they were a factor.  
 
IV.IV Defending Land Banditry and Brokerage  
 Similar to Eric Hobsbawm (2001) account of social banditry, people selling land 
illegally often received support from people in Canaan, illuminating yet another way that 
communities expressed their resistance to the dominant system of land control and property 
rights. Land occupants’ appreciation and support for land sellers making a profit off the illegal 
sale of land contrasted with state-humanitarian portrayals of them as property bandits. To the 
state-humanitarian actors, Canaan’s land sellers were a detestable group of Port-au-Prince 
gangsters, opportunists, and fraudulent brokers enticing people to purchase land they would 
never be able to legally own. This is not to say that unscrupulous land sellers did not exist in 
Canaan. Haitian police and community leaders in the area both reported incidents of land 
sellers selling a single plot to multiple families. But within my sample of interviewees, most of 
                                                
259 Interview 15, Village des Pêcheurs, 20 June 2014.  
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whom had paid for their land, I failed to find anyone who spoke negatively of land sellers 
(which as I will discuss below was not because of fear of reprisal). Whereas state-humanitarian 
actors condemned Haiti’s property bandits for challenging private property rights and spoiling 
urban development plans (see Chapter Eight), land occupants privately heralded land sellers 
for advancing their social justice agenda and demands for people-led reconstruction. Such 
reactions suggest, mirroring Hobsbawm’s insights, that social banditry often becomes a 
precursor or companion to major social movements, particularly in times of social breakdown 
(Hobsbawm, 2001, p. 27). 
For people who found it impossible to exercise citizenship in their own city, land 
sellers were heroes. This was because they facilitated access to a desperately coveted resource 
that was always out of reach. The irony was that whilst humanitarians lauded themselves as 
Haiti’s saviours, my research found that any hero label given by landless people was reserved 
for people actually engaged in land struggles and pushing ahead redistribution (see also Scott, 
1990, p. 191). Madame R.,* the chief land broker in Village des Pêcheurs, exemplifies this reality. 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, land occupiers were hesitant to identify Madame R. when 
asked who had sold them their land. They were obviously protecting her identity from 
someone that they did not know. However, after confirming that Madame R. was the exclusive 
broker for Village des Pêcheurs, I asked questions about her role in selling land more confidently, 
which in turn elicited more open responses once people recognised my level of understanding. 
At no point did interviewees complain about Madame R’s land practices, prices, or plot sizes. 
Instead, she was portrayed as an avenger of land inequalities. A young woman from the 
settlement described Madame R. by saying:   
 
I heard Canaan was once a grandon [elite landowner] piece of land. 
But then, there was a lady, Madame R., and she fought for the 
people. She fought to take this land, and then she gave it to us.260 
Other supporting evidence of the squatters’ positive view of land sellers is seen in the 
way squatters avoided describing their interactions with land sellers as monetary transactions. 
Rather than say that land brokers sold land plots, they might say ‘Madame R [or other sellers] 
passed me the land.’ These word choices, arguably, reflect a mind-set about the constructive 
                                                
260 Interview 20, Village des Pêcheurs, 24 June 2014. 
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role that land sellers played in facilitating access to land.  
In other examples of the hero-like status attributed to land sellers, some occupiers 
commended Madame R.’s organisational abilities for rescuing them from settlements on the 
verge of humanitarian closures. It appears that from 2013–2015 (or perhaps earlier), Madame 
R. was moving in and out of post-earthquake settlements in Port-au-Prince, using the 
intelligence she obtained about humanitarian settlement closure schedules to provide rental 
subsidy evictees with options to purchase land in Canaan. While this was certainly a successful 
business model for Madame R., it was a great relief to families being victimised by the closure 
of their settlements, and who were painfully aware that the meagre rental subsidies would 
barely cover their housing and subsistence needs for a year.  
Djerry and Mona are two land sellers from the Mozayik neighbourhood. Prior to the 
earthquake, Djerry worked illegally in the U.S. before being deported back to Haiti. He and 
Mona had grown up together in the Delmas neighbourhood of Port-au-Price, making a living 
playing and writing Haitian folk songs that provided social and political commentary on the 
Haiti’s predatory state.261 Their political history is interesting because it foreshadowed their 
willingness to challenge Haitian power structures. Djery explained that after he and Mona 
identified the boundaries of the new village of Mozayik, they arranged for the families evicted 
from post-earthquake settlements in Port-au-Prince to move into their new village. The 
Mozayik story is unique because most of the evicted families banded together to find another 
place to live after their eviction. The villagers all paid US$300 each for a land parcel – slightly 
less than the amount they were given under the RSCG programme. Djerry called this a 
community tax which paid for the administrative services he rendered to the community.  
How land sellers such as Madame R., Djerry, and Mona continued to work on the 
behalf of land occupants is discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the deliberate forms of post-earthquake 
resistance around urban land that exposed, defined, and challenged state crime. Relying on 
                                                
261 See Largey (2000) on Haitian folk music and its role in resistance to the state. 
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theoretical and empirical examples of resistance, Haitian strategies of mobility and occupation 
have been framed as common ways that Haitians vote with their feet to critique power 
relations. These strategies repudiated the unjust and harmful behaviours of powerful groups, 
enhanced individual freedoms, and created opportunities to overcome entrenched patterns of 
structural violence.  
 From 2010 to 2015, landless Haitians in displacement camps were targets of violent 
evictions and unjust managerial approaches that aimed to re-house landless people in the very 
neighbourhoods that were the site of unspeakable destruction. Inside camps, Haitians were 
subject to scrutiny and surveillance with limited opportunity to stay on public land plots that 
offered better housing conditions, or use their occupation to bargain for a better housing 
package than return to slum neighbourhoods. Many who did not succeed in resisting camp 
closure enacted small-scale forms of resistance to the rental subsidy programme and its 
implications for long-term housing insecurity. It is through resistance to the rental subsidy 
programme that Haitians exited the city and occupied the urban periphery. Shown from the 
discourses of the people living in Canaan, their actions and motivations for moving to Canaan 
are intertwined with the desire for a more sustainable and just way of living in the city. This 
wayward settlement of people expelled from the city as a result of legal enclosures should not 
be underestimated. It tipped the balance in land relations and made the rejection and distaste 


















State Criminality and Counter-attacks on Canaan’s Informal Settlements 
This chapter explores the dialectical nature of Haiti’s post-earthquake land struggles 
by taking an intricate look at the Canaan settlement. Here, I will engage with two broad themes 
and their interrelationship. First, I will analyse Canaan’s development from a tiny squatter site 
to a lively hub on the urban periphery, characterising people’s assertion of their “right to the 
city.”262 Through processes of self-construction263  and property-making,264  I show how 
Canaan’s land occupants turned land that they had grabbed back from the state and Haitian 
elite into their own homes and neighbourhoods. This alternative reconstruction process 
fulfilled the desire of land occupants to secure adequate housing and create a much safer space 
for living. The settlement’s progress, however, challenged the superiority claimed by 
humanitarian actors to “Build Back Better.” Humanitarian achievements in terms of house 
construction alone was dwarfed by the hundreds of thousands of self-constructed homes built 
in Canaan, in addition to new markets, schools, churches, and other key infrastructure. 
This positive outlook on Canaan as an illustration of people-led reconstruction is 
countered by the toxic politics and criminogenic political economy surrounding Canaan’s 
establishment. The social power displayed in Canaan posed an obvious threat to established 
power relations and prompted new patterns of criminality and violence targeting thriving 
squatter communities. Canaan’s land occupants and their successes faced attack by state 
officials, large landowners, and criminal gangs with state ties, who seek to profit from the land 
insecurity and vulnerability of new squatter communities. We find Haiti’s dominant classes 
                                                
262 The right to the city traces its roots to Marxist geographer Henri Lefebvre’s works Le Droit à la ville (1968) and 
The Production of Space (1991). Lefebvre theorised the hegemonic production of space and its reversal, arguing that 
spatial inequalities was a key driver of the social reproduction of capitalist exclusion within the city. Building on 
this, David Harvey (2008, 2012) similarly argues for the ‘right to the production of space’ and the ‘right to the 
city.’ For Harvey, the ‘right to the city’ calls for individuals to have the right to organize their own spaces of living 
according to their own needs and realities in the city. This right manifests a broad mandate for social groups to 
reclaim the city for anti-capitalist struggle. 
263 By self-construction or ‘autoconstruction,’ I refer to efforts undertaken by excluded communities to construct 
their own houses and build habitable neighbourhoods (see Holston, 2009, pp. 8-9). 
264 Legal geographers – such as Nicholas Blomley (2004) and Sarah Keenan (2014) – have paid close attention to 
non-legal ways that excluded communities construct property rights. Keenan (2014) argues that property is 
spatially contingent and not simply a “subject-object” formation. In adopting this view, she discusses property-
making as the social networks, norms, and understandings that operate through space and disrupt dominant 
systems of meaning about who belongs where. Keenan’s work counters that of liberal property theorists who 
view property rights as historically determined and legally fixed.  
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constantly reacting to the subversive tactics of land occupants, and always seeking to rebalance 
modifications made to power relations. 
This backlash from Haiti’s elite foreshadows a second theme characterising Haiti’s 
post-earthquake land struggles: re-victimisation. In Canaan, we find that social aspirations to 
create a land of opportunity, which is described as a buffer zone between land occupants and 
the oppressive city, are continually challenged by forces of violence. This chapter documents 
multiple instances of abuse as squatters attempt to transform the built environment and secure 
rights to land and housing in the settlement. State-initiated and state-facilitated violence makes 
Canaan another zone of exclusion and exception (see Agamben, 1998). It starts to unravel the 
image land occupants have for alternative living and protection from everyday urban violence. 
As these dynamics unfold in the settlement, they also evidence how state-humanitarian rental 
subsidy programmes increased the vulnerability of populations expelled from camps to other 
criminal practices of the state and its accomplices. Little by little – as illustrated here and 
further in the next chapter – Canaan’s settlements become re-entangled with the same 
predatory forces of urban reconstruction that drove people out of the city in the first place. 
 
I. A Brief History of Pre-Earthquake Canaan 
Canaan’s land history brings Haiti’s dynamics of political contestation, state power, 
and legal repression into sharp relief. Before the 1940s, this land plot was used for agricultural 
production (URD, 2012). During Haiti’s dictatorship, parts of Canaan were expropriated by 
President François “Papa Doc” Duvalier for public use. It appears that Duvalier intended to 
use the land to develop a luxury tourist area to be controlled by Haitian elites.265 Yet, for 
unknown reasons, it was never built. It was suggested during the fieldwork that offshore gas 
and oil reserves discovered in the area may have halted Duvalier’s tourism development 
plans.266  
When development plans stalled, Canaan’s empty fields were co-opted for the 
campaign of terror launched by the Duvalier dictatorships. In the 1970s and 1980s, state 
paramilitaries, infamously known as the Tonton Macoute, used Canaan as killing fields for 
                                                
265 Interview with Haitian Lawyer 2, Port-au-Prince, 3 April 2014. 
266 Interview with Haitian Lawyer 2, Port-au-Prince, 3 April 2014. 
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executing and burying members of the political opposition and others opposing the regime. 
At the time of writing, mass graves were still being discovered in different parts of Canaan.267 
In 2010, Canaan was still being used as a graveyard for people victimised by the state. The 
2010 earthquake dead were piled onto trucks and driven to the area to be disposed of in mass 
graves next to the victims of the Tonton Macoute.268 Described shortly, this prior land use 
becomes important in relation to the ways that Canaan’s land occupants constructed their role 
in transforming the area. 
Today, Canaan is the subject of a land conflict between three parties: the Haitian state, 
private landowners/companies, and land occupants. In the absence of a functioning land 
registry, it is unclear how or when parts of Canaan shifted back to private ownership after 
Duvalier’s expropriation of the land in 1971. However, after the 2010 earthquake, 300 
individuals claimed property rights to different land parcels in the sweeping area of the Canaan 
settlement (Katz, 2013). These claims were presumably linked to the opportunity structure 
provided by the earthquake to grab land while the state remained weak and land value soared 
(Katz, 2013). Of these property claims, the most legitimate came from a Haitian property 
development firm called Nabatec S.A., which has been able to produce a land title, historical 
documents, and witnesses verifying its ownership (Nabatec, 2010). Nabatec’s claim constitutes 
13.3% of the 18,500 acres of land that comprise the Canaan area (URD, 2012). More than half 
the current Canaan population lives on land claimed by Nabatec. 269 East of the Nabatec-
owned land is a smaller parcel believed to be owned by the state. On the west side of the 
settlement, near the Port-au-Prince commune of Caberet, the delineation of property rights is 
unclear and more contested. Eviction risks within Canaan have been affected by where 
residents live and the different land claims to different parts of the settlement. 
 
Nabatec’s conflict with squatter communities is important because of the company’s 
prior intention to turn parts of Canaan into a free trade zone. Between 1998 and 2003, the 
property development firm approached the Haitian government with an urban development 
                                                
267 Ghosh, B. 2010. Haiti's Mass Graveyard of Old and New Nightmares. Time. Accessible at 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1953379_1953494_1957248,00.html 
268 Ghosh, B. 2010. Haiti's Mass Graveyard of Old and New Nightmares. Time. Accessible at 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1953379_1953494_1957248,00.html 
269 Interview with humanitarian official 3, London, 10 June 2014. 
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plan for the northern extension of Port-au-Prince. Documents sourced from Nabatec show 
that the firm not only pursued its development plan for Pole Nord with central government 
officials, but also sought support from three mayors from the Port-au-Prince communes 
surrounding all sides of Canaan. The Haitian firm was well-positioned to lobby state and local 
authorities, having undertaken several expensive development projects in Haiti, including 
shopping centres and elite neighbourhoods (Katz, 2013). Nabatec’s investors also comprised 
a consortium of some of Haiti’s most powerful families; the company had generated high 
revenues prior to the earthquake (Katz, 2013, pp. 178–79). As further evidence of the 
company’s close and privileged relationship with the state, Nabatec’s CEO and President, Aby 
Brun, represented the government on several reconstruction committees after the earthquake 
(Katz, 2013).  
In 2009, Nabatec put forth a vision for private sector-led urbanisation for Canaan that 
was accepted by the Haitian government.270 Nabatec’s 56-page plan (Habitat Haiti 2004), also 
sourced during the fieldwork, maps out the following four sectors in which Nabatec would 
lease its land to the Haitian government and carry out the following activities on it: (a) the 
establishment of an IEZ with two industrial parks and (b) house construction (presumably for 
factory workers) (c) construction of government and corporate offices and (d) the 
development of a luxury tourist resort. With the aid of the U.S. government (particularly then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton), Nabatec and the Haitian government identified Korean 
garment companies to invest in the free-trade zone (Washington Post, 2016). 271  
In essence, the Nabetec development project promised to transform the northern area 
of Port-au-Prince into an “organised” and “efficient” model of market-led urbanisation. Yet, 
the stated objectives of the plan arguably showed its intention to expand the vulnerability of 
the lower social classes by co-opting Haitians into factory jobs and mortgaged housing. The 
World Bank and the U.S. government have long claimed that IEZ’s can offer Haiti job creation 
and foreign investment opportunities (IFC, 2011). However, not only do IEZ’s give foreign 
corporations the benefit of untaxed investments of capital and the profits generated in Haiti, 
                                                
270 The close relationship between the Haitian firm and then-President René Preval, as well as the firm’s vision 
for private sector-led urbanisation, is partially explained in a letter dated October 29, 2009, obtained during the 
fieldwork. 
271 Stated in government letters (dated in 2009) obtained during the fieldwork. 
	 205 
labour exploitation is rife within the factories established within these zones. All twenty-four 
garment factories in Haiti, usually established in its free-trade zones, have been accused by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) of wage exploitation and failing to enforce minimum 
wages (Fatton, 2014). Proving this analysis correct, SAE-A, a South Korean company facing 
allegations of labour exploitation, had been selected to open the first garment factories in the 
free-trade zone to be established in Canaan (Sontag, 2012). SAE-A had been the subject of 
controversy for its poor treatment and exploitation of cheap labour in other countries, such 
as Guatemala, in making clothes for well-known American clothing suppliers, including Wal-
Mart and the Gap (Sontag, 2012). Nevertheless, SAE emerged as a preferred investor for 
Haiti’s new IEZ via lobbying by the U.S. government (Sontag, 2012). 
 
In addition to the IEZ, Nabatec also proposed to construct a housing development 
(Village Lathan II) that hardly satisfied the housing needs of the most marginalised. Village 
Lathan II was only pitched for low-middle income households. Furthermore, Nabatec’s 
Habitat Haiti 2004 plan specifically states that “ideal candidates” for its housing development 
were people with ‘a decent level of revenues…a certain level of education and skills, a stable 
family structure, an aspiration for a clean environment and good living conditions, good 
education for their children’ (Nabatec, 2010, pp. 8–9). To access Nabatec-constructed homes, 
Families (likely factory workers) would be required to sign on to a 15-year lease-to-purchase 
scheme, and over the course of this time period, would need to pay over $28,000 for their 
home – an astronomical sum for most Haitians (Nabatec, 2010, p. 31). Moreover, Nabatec’s 
vision for housing stands in stark contrast to the way Canaan is currently being used by 
squatter communities.  
After the earthquake, then-President Preval faced significant pressure from the U.S. 
government and humanitarian actors to make land available for the temporary relocation of 
IDPs from Port-au-Prince camps (especially for populations residing on private land). In 
particular, these international actors wanted to relocate people from the Petionville Golf 
Course Club camp – a camp sitting on a piece of land with significant commercial interests. 
This foreign pressure on President Preval was a significant factor in his decision in March 
2010 to expropriate 5,000 hectares of land in the Canaan area (including Nabetec’s land), 
through his Declaration of Public Utility (Déclaration d'utilité publique). The government’s 
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declaration of public utility, importantly, was not meant to strip Nabatec of its property rights. 
In fact, Nabatec’s CEO, who sat on the reconstruction commission, helped identify his own 
land for a temporary relocation project pushed by the U.S. government (Katz, 2013). Nabatec 
expected a handsome pay-out of US $ 19 million in compensation for state expropriation of 
its land. 272 Furthermore, the expectation was that Nabatec would eventually recover its land 
because the relocation of IDPs from the Petionville Golf Club camp was only meant to be a 
temporary measure (Katz, 2013). (In fact, the relocated people from the camp were closely 
monitored and restricted from building any permanent infrastructure on the relocation site.273 
In short, the expropriation of Nabatec’s land was hardly an infringement of the company’s 
property rights. Rather, it was an example of state-corporate collusion, facilitated by 
international interests and policy-making, that would Nabatec to first profit from the 
temporary use of its land, and then profit again from the implementation of its urban 
development plan.  
Nabatec’s plan, however, went awry when foreign donors refused to use 
reconstruction funds to pay Nabatec for the state expropriation of its land. The Haitian state’s 
lack of funds to pay Nabatec meant that it could not satisfy procedural requirements set forth 
in the country’s expropriation law, thus setting up a legal challenge to its expropriation from 
Nabatec.274 The legal complexities, however, did not stop humanitarian actors and American 
military from quickly relocating families from the Petionville Golf Club camp to a very small 
relocation site within the vast expropriated area (called Corail-Cesselesse). The move essentially 
resulting in dumping this small group of people in the urban periphery without any tenure 
security or information on future housing.  
While the botched expropriation and relocation was another example of humanitarian 
                                                
272 This figure of expected compensation was reported by Time magazine interview with Aby Brun on November 
12, 2010. Available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2031102,00.html.  
273 Interview with humanitarian official 27, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 6 August 2014. 
274 In terms of the procedural aspects of the law, an Order of Declaration of Public Utility must be issued by the 
government to commence the expropriation process. This Order is meant to clearly demarcate the land to be 
expropriated. What follows is an official letter or public notice sent out to owners and residents in the area, 
inviting them to submit their land titles to the Direction General des Impôts (DGI), or government entity 
responsible for titling all public land and for collecting taxes on real estate transactions (IFRC, 2014). When the 
sixty-day window for submitting title documents has expired, all title documents are inspected by an expert 
committee from the DGI and then forwarded to another government committee, which determines the rate of 
compensation (IFRC, 2014, p. 34). The landowner(s) at this point have the opportunity to contest the rate of 
compensation and the expropriation itself at a judicial hearing. 
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actors putting populations at risk of future victimisation, it also had the effect of making 
people aware of available land for squatting. A small group of people from the adjacent 
commune of Croix-des-Bouquet were some of the first squatters to slowly test the state response 
by setting up small squats next to the Corail-Cesselesse relocation site. In line with the dynamics 
discussed in Chapter Six, others expelled from humanitarian camps joined these squatters 
between 2011 and 2015. By 2015, over 200,000 squatters had constructed shelters within the 
area. With each wave of expulsion and migration, different neighbourhoods and blocks were 
formed and shifted the density and level of construction. I will now discuss how social and 
political processes of self-construction and property-making in Canaan emboldened squatters 
to make demands on the state, and prompting counterattacks on their land gains. This 
discussion will be framed through concepts of agency and James Holston’s (2008) formulation 
of ‘insurgent citizenship.’ 
II. Squatter Agency and Insurgent Citizenship  
 As seen in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the political power of post-earthquake 
squatters rested on their land control and their ability to disrupt the circuits of reconstruction 
capital and power relations sustaining them (Harvey, 2012; Davies, 2007). However, by gaining 
land control and disrupting the unequal distribution of property rights, squatters became 
natural targets for retribution and face immense challenges to maintain their access. Chapters 
Four and Five illustrated the violent and repressive forces operating to wrest land control back 
from squatters. These chapters also noted the legal and discursive tactics used by dominant 
groups to contest squatters’ rights to belong in a particular space (Keenan, 2014; Blomley, 
2004). As we see in Haiti and elsewhere, the more successful and visible squatting becomes, 
the more likely it is to invite a heavy-handed response by the privileged classes. This is because 
people’s ability to reclaim the commons, especially when it entails large numbers of people 
like in Canaan, sets a dangerous precedent for destroying the very foundation of elites’ political 
and economic power (Finchett-Maddock, 2016). 
In some of the interdisciplinary literature on land and housing struggles, extra-legal 
occupations are presented as both political and politicizing processes (Finchett-Maddock, 2016; 
Pruijt, 2013, p. 14; Blomley, 2004; Vasudevan, 2017; Vergara-Camus, 2014). Scholars have 
noted shifts in class consciousness and revolutionary behaviour arising from the lived 
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experiences of land occupation and illegal residence. Some have drawn on Gramsci’s insights 
to explain that the autonomy provided in open, unbuilt spaces without governmental 
intervention offers breathing room for social praxis and mobilisation (see Vergara-Camus, 
2014). Others claim that squatting in urban areas can provide marginalised citizens with unique 
opportunities to put their urban visions and demands into practice (see Holston, 2008; 
Finchett-Maddock, 2016; Vasudevan, 2017). Such ideas emerge, for example, in James 
Holston’s work Insurgent Citizenship. Based fieldwork in Brazil, Holston (2008) not only argues 
that land occupants in Brazil have disrupted power relations because they have succeeded in 
taking land out of market circulation, but he also observes more intricate processes whereby 
squatter communities start to make demands on the state for legally-recognised rights and 
equal treatment as “propertied” citizens. These demands stem from people’s land control and 
contributions to the urban environment. Holston (2008) crafts the term “insurgent 
citizenship” to capture how new claims for rights and recognition arise through experiences 
of illegal occupation. 
Holston’s formulation of insurgent citizenship is useful for Canaan because it 
specifically refers to the events taking place on urban peripheries amongst people who have 
been denied entry and recognition by the legal system. His describes a distinct form of social 
agency that is connected to the experience of auto-construction. This form of agency, Holston 
argues, is what inspires a new kind of counter-politics for citizens living on urban peripheries. 
He observes that such citizens seize the opportunity to transform occupied peripheries ‘into a 
space of alternative futures, produced in the experiences of becoming propertied, organising 
social movements, participating in consumer markets, and making aesthetic judgements about 
house transformations’ (Holston, 2008, p. 8). These processes, importantly, foreground new 
struggles for legal and political inclusion because they offer disenfranchised citizens new 
platforms for arguing their ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1968). Holston outlines the 
relationship between auto-constructed agency and new social demands for rights in the 
following passage: 
 
In the insurgent formulation [of citizenship], the residents of the 
periphery imagine that their interests derive from their own 
experience, not from state plans, that they are informed and 
competent to make decisions about them, and that their own 
organizations articulate them. They consider this organized 
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experience the basis for an exercise of citizenship through which 
they participate in and hold accountable the institutions of society, 
government and law that produce the conditions of urban life. 
(2008, p. 248) 
In Canaan, the processes and politics of becoming insurgent citizens, as described by 
Holston, characterised the power struggles between land occupants and the Haitian state. I 
found that Canaan’s squatter communities imagined themselves as having the power to design 
the urban periphery according to their needs. During interviews, land occupants frequently 
asserted their elevated and expert position to develop Port-au-Prince due to their grassroots 
knowledge and personal experiences of suffering. We can also see a similar insurgent-
citizenship concept taking root in the ways that land occupants gradually advanced their 
demands for inclusion and legalisation of their occupied properties. These social behaviours 
and discourses, illustrated a proactive and emboldened citizenry in Canaan. They also, 
however, provoked violent reactions by the state and elite forces – as I will describe later in 
this chapter. 
In Canaan, I found occupants had decreased feelings of powerlessness in tandem with 
increased feelings of personal control over their housing situation. On several occasions, 
interview questions probing squatters’ feelings about the settlement prompted responses that 
described their arrival to Canaan. To express how the informal settlement nurtured personal 
freedom, squatters invited me to walk around the settlement with them to convey what it 
meant to have the power to select a parcel of land that fits one’s needs and desires, just as any 
homeowner weighs the pros and cons of different properties before choosing one. This way 
of communicating freedom and choice came across in my interview with Jimmy, a squatter 
who had arrived to Canaan two years after the earthquake and had purchased land on the top 
of a hill. This location, Jimmy stressed, gave him a crisp breeze and sea view. Having previously 
lived in an overcrowded, inner-city slum in Port-au-Prince, Jimmy described his good fortune 
in the following terms: ‘Rich people never allow poor people to view the sea – unless they are 
trapped in it.’ As evidence of the relationship between this land parcel and his genuine feeling 
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of freedom, Jimmy named the shop he 
constructed next to his home “You can 
Breathe!” Stories like this evidence the sense 
of personal power and satisfaction derived 
from the simple act of being able to choose 
where one wanted to live in the settlement 
itself.  
 
My fieldwork also shed light on gender differences in the way that housing was 
acquired and produced feelings of liberation as a result of the opportunity to choose land and 
design one’s home and lifestyle around the security it provided. Esterline, a young woman 
from an overcrowded slum in downtown Port-au-Prince, leveraged her new land possession 
to leave circumstances of domestic abuse. She subsequently became an independent 
entrepreneur in Canaan by building a small coffee roasting stall on her property. Her illegal 
residence gave her a way out of an abusive situation and gave her economic security. She no 
longer had the long daily commute from her home to the central market in Port-au-Prince, 
where she worked as a vendor. This commute, particularly at night, had put her at risk of theft, 
robbery, and even sexual abuse. Jimmy and Esterline’s stories frame some of the subjugating 
characteristics of the city, underscored in the previous 
chapter. Similar to empirical descriptions of other 
global south land occupations (see Vargara-Camus, 
2014), these stories reveal the connection between 
illegal occupation and freedom, where a degree of 
autonomy is achieved from the social and material 
oppression experienced in the city.  
If independent living establishes new 
conditions of freedom, it also invites discussion about 
urban conditions and how to transform them. Away 
from the state, the market, and humanitarian actors, 
squatters conveyed a critical consciousness about abject 
Figure 2 Constructing Small Businesses in Canaan 
Figure 3 Establishing Livelihoods Near Homes 
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city life and how they would improve it. This is reflected in the words of Emmanuel, a squatter 
who previously lived in central Port-au-Prince:  
Out here, we do not want to be like the rest of Port-au-Prince, 
which is constructed badly. The city lacks spacious rooms, houses 
have no room to expand, and there is no sanitation. We know this 
because during the earthquake the houses fell on top of us and too 
many people died. But our community [in Canaan] is going to build 
differently. We have already decided that all roads in the 
neighbourhood be at least 10 to 14 meters wide.275 
In practice, I observed a number of families along one road who had sacrificed a small 
percentage of their land parcels to make way for wider, safer roads. They insisted on wider 
roads as a way to counter slumification. Communities enforced rules about land occupation, 
house construction, and the aesthetic design of neighbourhoods. These rules articulated their 
shared norms and values in relation to the organisation of public space and social life. People 
explained that a certain distance between houses must be maintained as a matter of disaster 
preparedness. This corresponded with squatters’ experiences during the earthquake of having 
loved ones crushed to death in the narrow walkways between houses in densely populated 
slums, or being trapped themselves for days without knowing if they would be rescued.  
Residents in the community strongly discouraged neighbours from subdividing land 
parcels. Subdividing is a common strategy in Haitian slums for households to increase their 
income, but lends itself to overcrowding and overpopulation. During the fieldwork, I 
witnessed one family being schooled by community leaders after trying to subdivide their land 
parcel and sell part of it. In the end, the family 
did not make the sale. Through these methods 
of informal regulation, even land sellers 
appeared to follow a code around the equitable 
distribution of land plots. ‘There are limits and 
regulations here on how much land you can 
take,’ one squatter explained, ‘and we are asking 
everyone living here not to divide their land 
parcels into two so we can prevent this place from becoming another bideonville [slum 
                                                
275 Interview, Squatter 15, Village des Pêcheurs, 20 June 2014. 
Figure 4 Occupants Give Themselves Street Addresses 
	 212 
neighbourhood].’ Countering “slummification” was as basic as giving people street addresses, 
which instilled a sense of permanency, dignity, and belonging. The excitement of finally having 
an address underscored the extent to which landless surplus populations in Port-au-Prince 
longed for recognition as human beings with a fixed place of belonging.  
 Although squatters had come from different areas and backgrounds in the city, they 
were united with a shared vision for the settlement. No matter the neighbourhood that I 
visited, this vision was always conveyed to me as the anti-Cite Soleil method of construction 
and development. Cite Soleil276 has a rich and troubled history as the most dangerous and 
stigmatised slum in Port-au-Prince. It is not surprising that squatters used this particular slum 
as a cautionary tale and reference point when making decisions affecting their 
neighbourhood’s design and structures of governance. Their enforced rules around land and 
housing, described above, connected with an acute sensitivity to the drivers of urban decay 
and insecurity. Moreover, squatters imagined Canaan as a blank slate where communities – not 
institutions – held the keys to rewriting Haiti’s urban history. 
Not surprisingly, my interview data showed strong contrasts between people repressed 
in humanitarian-managed settlements and the people living in Canaan. Whereas the former 
group felt hopeless and dehumanised, Canaan’s land occupants conveyed hope and excitement 
about their new role in urban development. These sentiments, likewise, connected with a new 
social identity as a contributor citizen, as described by Holston (2009, pp. 260–63). The ways 
that Canaan’s occupants reclaimed land and advanced legitimate claims for belonging are 
empirical examples of communities asserting their ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 
2008). 
These themes were evident in the way that people evaluated their contributions in 
relation to their entitlements, as seen in the words of one squatter: 
Right before the earthquake this place was a bad area. It harboured 
bandits who would rob people on the road as they passed to go up 
north. But each person who comes to Canaan is making it a better 
                                                
276 Cite Soleil, a Port-au-Prince slum, was formed via the flow of disposable labour from the countryside to urban 
factories during the 1980s and 1990s. When factories disappeared, as a result of U.S. sanctions, joblessness turned 
the new settlement into a hollowed-out slum. Today, Cite Soleil is one of Haiti’s densest slums and home to 
many organised political and criminal groups. It has also been subjected to violent crackdowns by UN 
peacekeepers in coordination with state authorities.  
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place. We are bringing trees. We are upgrading this land. People 
who started by living in plastic tents are now bringing blocks from 
the city to build sounder houses. One day we will be the ones who 
made Canaan a beautiful place.277 
 In speaking about why their land possession should be recognised by the state, 
squatters compared their contributions to the 
built environment with the abject failure of 
state-humanitarian actors to build homes after 
the earthquake or improve urban living 
conditions. By no means were their impressions 
exaggerated. Rather, they originated from an 
acute awareness of wasted aid money and 
limited housing built for poor people during the 
reconstruction (see Chapters Four and Five). 
These perspectives emerge in the way that one 
group protested their stigmatisation by Haiti’s dominant classes:  
 
We are the ones decentralizing Port-au-Prince. So many people 
here have come from the city. The government should be thanking 
us for accomplishing this. 
As opposed to the government or the grandon (landowning class), Canaan’s squatters had 
mixed their labour with the soil to create a liveable environment:  
We put our hands, energy and effort into clearing this land so that 
we could all live here. We were even injured doing it! The 
government has not given us one cup of water, not one penny to 
live. Everything we have done has been by our own hands, our 
own courage.278 
The dynamics of occupation and auto-construction resulted in solidarity amongst 
occupants. The settlement was alive with a host of newly created grassroots organisations, 
such as sectoral committees, women’s associations, musical groups, and churches. In Village 
des Pêcheurs and Vilaj Mozayik, community committees performed administrative functions for 
their respective neighbourhoods. These included maintaining family registries, distributing ID 
                                                
277 Interview, Squatter 48, Canaan 3, 1 August 2014. 
278 Interview, Squatter 26, Vilaj Mozayik, 28 June 2014. 
Figure 5 Gradual Build-up of the Canaan Settlement 
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cards, and resolving disputes between neighbours. On several occasions, I accompanied 
community leaders in walks around the settlement, where I observed their positive reception 
by households. Community committee members told me that regular visits were made to 
individual households to boost morale and remind the community that they were creating a 
different life than slum life in Port-au-Prince. This point was reinforced as one said: ‘When 
you have a beautiful vision like we do, you have to make sure that it does not get lost.’279 
While I observed a new energy for change in squatter communities, I do not want to 
romanticize the conditions or the way that informality signified exclusion from the city. 
People’s new beginnings went hand-in-hand with a lack water, electricity, and other basic 
services, not to mention minimal opportunities for steady employment. These conditions also 
hindered the amount of time people could afford to give to building and consolidating 
communities. Many of the community leaders in these neighbourhoods had their own political 
interests. As mentioned in Chapter Six, they were usually benefitting financially from selling 
land or from providing basic services to the occupants. These dynamics, nevertheless, did not 
stop community leaders from mobilising squatters at crucial moments, either to demand rights 
or to protect villages from threats of eviction. In Village des Pêcheurs and Vilaj Mozayik, squatters 
were particularly pleased with the energy of their community leaders to make demands for 
political recognition of their land rights.  
 
III. Building Land Tenure Security  
Three years after the earthquake, land occupants began exploring how they could turn 
their land access into legally recognised property rights to build secure land tenure. This 
occurred in tandem with the consolidation of the built environment, as new roads, services, 
and community structures appeared across the settlement. In this section, I discuss how these 
processes of attempting to legalise land access unfolded and triggered a backlash by state 
authorities, landowners, and businesses with commercial interests in the land. The challenges 
that squatters faced must be understood in the context of the criminal opportunity structures 
that arose in response to people’s illegal residence and their quest for tenure security.  
 
                                                
279 Interview, Squatter 27, Vilaj Mozayik, 28 June 2014. 
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III. I Chasing after property rights. 
The risks of violence and/or legal dispossession associated with seeking formal 
property rights begs the question of why squatters would try to legalise their occupied 
properties. In the post-earthquake period, squatters had completely overtaken the northern 
periphery of Port-au-Prince through mass occupation. Many humanitarian actors believed that 
the Haitian government had lost control over Canaan, and would not be able to remove 
squatters without serious political consequences.280 As I will show, these assumptions were not 
only misguided, but they sharply contradicted squatters’ own perceptions of their tenure 
security. This is illustrated by one squatters’ opinion about the permanency of her land access: 
 
Today, I am 50% confident that I own this land because I took it 
and built a house. But I will only be 100% percent confident about 
my rights to the land when I get papers from the government 
stating that I own it. That will determine if I can keep living here. 
281 
 These concerns connected with the wider motivation of squatters to smuggle 
themselves into the formal property system. This is a frequent goal of land-related social 
movements as documented in the literature on land occupations in the global south (see 
Holston, 2008, p. 204; Vargara-Camus, 2014). This motivation, of course, constitutes the 
natural response of people excluded from legal property systems (Holston, 2008). If property 
ownership serves as the basis for exercising citizenship rights, as it does in many societies, then 
making the giant leap from the informal to the formal property system can be a form of catharsis 
for landless people (Holston, 2008). On the one hand, it provides relief from the daily anxiety 
of insecure tenure, and on the other, it produces satisfaction that dangerous struggles for land 
were worth it in the end (Holston, 2008).  
These affective and political dimensions of achieving legal property rights explain why 
Canaan’s squatters were willing to embark on a risky, rights-seeking process, despite facing 
numerous obstacles in doing so. As previously discussed, Haiti’s legal process is inflexible and 
prohibitively expensive. Aside from a lack of resources, squatters lived in unprotected areas 
                                                
280 Interview, foreign government official, Port-au-Prince, 28 April 2014. 
281 Interview 4, Village des Pêcheurs, 17 May 2014. 
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with incrementally built homes, minimal basic services, and no law enforcement. Under these 
circumstances, they were easy targets for criminal gangs from the city.  
Fundamentally, squatters lacked knowledge of the legal and institutional framework 
governing their land claims. This confusion was evident in legal arguments or strategies they 
put forth to embark on the process. Most people were also unaware about what governing 
institutions had the power and authority to grant rights to land in the institutional complexity 
of Haiti’s legal system. Some interviewees used President Preval’s decree of expropriation 
(discussed in Section I) on which to base their claims. In my discussions, they pulled out 
photocopies they kept of the presidential decree, pointing to the document’s statements about 
‘providing land to earthquake victims’ as evidence the land was theirs. However, no matter the 
wording of Preval’s expropriation, or its interpretation by squatters, the decree’s application 
did not provide a legal avenue to establish rights to land. As discussed in Chapter Four, Haitian 
law forbids the state from transferring land that it owns to private citizens. 
Even when squatters did comprehend the legal complexities obstructing their claims, 
they blamed the state for failing to find an extrajudicial solution to address the issue that they 
were physically living in Canaan without an alternative. This desperation for a political solution 
to address tenure insecurity in Canaan is captured by the following words of a squatter:  
 
The Haitian state really needs to put on its glasses and open up an 
administrative process so that everyone can quickly have their land 
recognized.282 
Others voiced practical understandings of how they might achieve property rights. 
This arose from social understandings of how land access is brokered and maintained outside 
the legal system. Precarious land claims, in the view of some, could be advanced by someone 
in power who could sell you your rights.283 However, this individualistic and transactional 
strategy for building tenure security was at risk of fracturing new solidarities amongst land 
occupants. Some categorically rejected the idea of paying for rights because they believed it 
would eventually undermine the egalitarian spirit of the settlement. This is illustrated by an 
interviewee’s comment:  
                                                
282 Interview 20, Village des Pêcheurs, 24 June 2014. 
283 Interview, community representative 1, Village des Pêcheurs, Haiti, 24 June 2014. 
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All of a sudden, not everyone here has the same opportunity. Some 
say that if we want to get papers for our land, we have to pay for 
it. But some people have the means to do so and others do not. 
This will mean that we are not all equal here [in Canaan].284 
The problem highlighted here was that, as much as the processes of land occupation 
and auto-construction had brought people together, individual steps toward building tenure 
security, through pursuit of legalisation of occupied properties, was now threatening to pull 
new communities apart. At the same time, it is important to understand how this 
individualisation, and the turn to riskier routes of paying for rights, was driven by the complex, 
uncertain, and unjust situation that squatters confronted. 
At no point did state authorities enter the settlement to provide squatters with 
information about their land claims despite clear knowledge that squatters were seeking state 
recognition. On two occasions, I observed the community committees of Village des Pêcheurs, 
Vilaj Mozayik, and other nearby villages approach the nearest local municipality (Croix-des-
Bouquet) to obtain information from the government about the steps residents could take to 
formalise ownership of their land plots. The motivation behind these visits to local 
government offices was to seek clarification about land status with the authorities. As 
explained by a community representative: 
 
Especially after the earthquake, it is difficult for us to know what 
administrative department has the authority to give papers 
showing that you have the land. If we do not have this knowledge, 
every person here will have to figure out his own way [to legalise 
properties]. 285   
These bold demands for clarity by community leaders, as a first step toward inclusion 
in the property system, failed to produce definitive answers about squatters’ legal standing in 
Canaan. Squatters responded to being stonewalled by the state by independently seeking out 
institutions they believed had the authority to award land rights, or at least help them build 
their tenure security. One group of squatters said they had approached Électricité d'Haïti (EDH) 
to connect them to electricity, in part to receive a utility bill that could shore up their claims 
                                                
284 Interview 19, Village des Pêcheurs, 22 June 2014. 
285 Interview, community representative 1, Village des Pêcheurs, Haiti, 24 June 2014. 
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to land in Canaan.286 Others mentioned that once they had enough resources they would 
approach Haiti’s Direction Général des Impôts (DGI), the government entity responsible for titling 
land and collecting taxes on registered properties.287 This demonstrates the kind of forum 
shopping taking place in Canaan in the face of the official silence of state authorities. The 
Haitian state expressed no political will to address the mass occupation in Canaan, even though 
its existence was linked to criminal evictions and state omissions to identify land for housing 
during the reconstruction period. 
 
IV. Canaan’s Patterns of Re-Victimisation and Vulnerability to Harm  
As Canaan’s squatters struggled to define and claim their rights, they increasingly 
became the targets of land-related violence and criminal exploitation. Unprotected land 
occupants were vulnerable to fraud, physical harassment and intimidation, sabotage, and 
extortion by criminal gangs who entered the settlement and were rumoured to have links to 
national and municipal authorities. These criminal actions resulted in thefts from resource-
poor squatters. This section details some key examples of the re-victimisation of land 
vulnerable people living in Canaan. 
 
IV.I Fraud, extortion, and intimidation by criminal entrepreneurs. 
In the settlements that I visited frequently – Village des Pêcheurs, Mozayik, Onaville, and 
Canaan 3 – the exploitation of squatters by criminal gangs followed the same pattern. Gangs 
would enter neighbourhoods claiming to represent state institutions or presenting themselves 
as intermediaries of land legalisation processes. Criminal gangs tended to call themselves 
“annexes” of the municipality of Croix-des-Bouquet. Operating as annexes of the municipal 
government allowed criminal gangs to assert their authority to levy “mandatory” taxes on 
squatter households. They also manipulated squatters into paying these taxes by providing 
them with fraudulent information about the government-related services they could provide. 
Annexes claimed they could legally survey squatters’ land and provide them with land titles. 
When Canaan’s land occupants attempted to resist these activities, these criminal gangs 
                                                
286 Interview 10, Village des Pêcheurs, 19 June 2014. 
287 In terms of property registration, the DGI has a responsibility is to register deeds that are submitted by 
individual public notaries.  
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resorted to intimidation and harassment to squeeze illegal fees from poor and vulnerable 
households. 
In Canaan 3, I interviewed squatters reported that “the annex” routinely visited 
households demanding they pay 3,000 Haitian gourdes (then US $46) in property tax. This 
was an enormous sum of money for families living on less than $2 a day. For criminal gangs, 
this form of extortion promised quick and easy money. If all of Canaan 3’s 4,483 households288 
were subject to the same rate of extortion, it could may netted up to $200,000 in illegal profits 
for criminal gangs applying methods of coercion and physical harassment.  
Canaan 3’s residents resisted 
extortion by engaging in clever forms of 
subterfuge and self-protection. They 
would, for example, quickly leave their 
homes whenever they received word 
that members of the annex were visiting 
households. Some squatters deliberately 
slowed the construction of their homes. 
This allowed them to resist so-called official tax collectors by invoking a clause in Haitian 
property law exempting unfinished properties from taxation. However, it did mean that 
squatters could not finish their house construction, which in turn could jeopardise the strength 
of their land claims. While such tactics succeeded in the short term, they sometimes led to 
violent responses by criminal profiteers. On one occasion, I observed criminal groups in 
Canaan 3 soliciting money at gunpoint from squatters. 
The squatter neighbourhood of Village des Pêcheurs was similarly vulnerable to this type 
of exploitation. Six months after my first visit to the settlement, a yellow-building labelled 
“annexe” (annex) was established in the centre. Perhaps due to the element of surprise of 
seeing a foreign researcher, the individuals claiming to represent Croix-des-Bouquet municipality 
gave me permission to enter the annex building and interview them. This access provided a 
clearer view of the annex’s criminal activities, their conflicts with squatter communities, and 
                                                
288 This estimated number of households was provided by the American Red Cross based on their mapping of 
the area. 
Figure 6 Criminal Groups Threaten Land Occupants at Gunpoint 
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their collusion with state authorities in defrauding squatters about measures to legalise their 
land rights. 
The inside of the annex office provided some clues about its activities. It contained 
only one small table, a few writing utensils, and most importantly, a register with the names of 
all the people living in the neighbourhood. All five male representatives interviewed in the 
annex verified their authority by providing me with a yellow card, imprinted with the Haitian 
government logo, that said: Bureau of Croix-des-Bouquet. They stated that the local government 
had sent them to deal with land conflicts in the village. Their role, they claimed, was to address 
crime and insecurity stemming from disputes between households. They disclosed that they 
planned to remove the existing committee of village leaders, who were at the same time trying 
to negotiate with the local authorities to start the process of legalising land claims. The annex 
also claimed they were the entity responsible for starting the state-led legalisation process. This 
claim justified their collection of property tax in the village. By their account, they were 
intermediaries of the state responsible for providing land surveying services to squatters. In 
other words, squatters would need to first pay for their land to be measured before the 
government could calculate the tax that they owed and award squatters land titles on that basis.  
This was clearly a fraudulent scheme. The local municipality, for example, has no 
authority to award legal title to land and Haitian law does not permit squatters to have 
possession of state land. These gangs nevertheless created confusion that led to the abuse of 
many defenceless squatters living in Village des Pêcheurs. One household paid 1,500 Haitian 
Gourdes (then US $23) to the annex with the expectation that they would receive official 
papers declaring ownership of their land plot. The household not only failed to receive 
documentation, but they exposed themselves to more extortion. After paying this sum, the 
household was re-approached by the annex for more money to process their paperwork. (No 
one, of course, received a receipt for any money given to the annex). This slow bleeding of 
households illustrates how people chasing their rights were easily deceived and exploited based 
on their lack of state protection (Holston, 2008, p. 256). Another squatter recounted her 
experience when the criminal gang arrived at her door and handed her a bill for 6,000 Haitian 
gourdes (then US $93). After protesting this bill, which was one-third of what she actually paid 
for her land, she was instructed to halt construction on her building. The gang told her she 
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had violated building regulations under the urban code and could not resume construction on 
her home until her taxes had been paid. In relaying this story, the woman vented her confusion 
and frustration: 
 
In Haiti, you only see the government when you are working or 
trying to building something. They won’t provide you with 
anything, but they will obstruct you when you take matters into 
your own hands. We don’t know who the Annex is, but they are 
handing out official papers to everyone saying they must go down 
to the Annex building to pay tax. Most of the houses around here 
have stopped building just to avoid payment. They don’t have the 
money.289 
Other squatters faced similar experiences. They showed documents containing the Croix-des-
Bouquet municipal logo that listed eight documents they must procure to legally build on their 
occupied properties. It was unclear if this paper had in fact been issued by local authorities, or 
if it was a forged document meant to coerce squatters into making extortion payments to the 
annex.  
Regarding the links between the annex and state actors, my fieldwork strongly suggests 
that local officials had colluded with criminal groups to carry out these acts of fraud and 
extortion. Village des Pêcheurs committee members had video footage, secretly taken on a smart 
phone, of a meeting between municipal authorities and committee members. In this video, 
local officials instructed committee members to allow the annex to collect property taxes. They 
were told that the payment would lead to legalisation of squatters’ properties. During this 
meeting, Village des Pêcheurs committee members also managed get local officials to agree to 
lower the rate of property tax. Initially, the local authorities – through the annex – demanded 
payments of 150 Haitian gourdes per square meter of land. The committee members 
negotiated a lower rate of 50 Haitian gourdes per square meter. This negotiation may have 
relieved the burden on squatter households, but it did not change the fact that local 
municipality lacked the authority to provide land title to extra-legal land occupants. This 
ultimately meant that squatters would make payments without any real improvement to their 
tenure security. While it is unclear where this money was going, a local news article dated July 
2014 reported that the municipality of Croix-des-Bouquet had surprisingly risen to the top ten 
                                                
289 Interview 49, Village des Pêcheurs, 1 August 2014. 
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regions in Haiti in terms of tax revenue.290 This suggests, at a minimum, that local state 
authorities benefitted materially from land occupants while withdrawing protection and 
refusing to help them advance their claims to land and housing. 
Though squatters were trapped in a web of dependency and exploitation in terms of 
their pursuit of legal property,291 they found creative ways to counter these power imbalances. 
Throughout the summer of 2014, squatters wrote angry messages about annex gangs on 
buildings and fences around Village des Pêcheurs. One such message painted in large letters at 
the entrance of the squatter neighbourhood read: Go Away, Thief! Squatters also burned tires 
outside of the annex building. These measures failed to drive out the annex completely from 
the village, but they did send strong messages to the local authorities backing their activities. 
The community committee members believed that these actions helped lower the amount of 
money demanded from squatters in the village.  
 
IV.II Forced evictions.  
In addition to facilitating fraud and extortion, the Haitian state advanced the interests 
of large landowners and businesses with interests in Canaan’s land. People living on the edge 
of Canaan near the seaside and Route National 1, were the most at risk due to commercial 
projects planned in the area after the earthquake. On 7 December 2013, squatters in Vilaj 
Mozyik woke to an unannounced visit by seventeen Haitian police, armed gangs, and the justice 
of the peace from the Croix-des-Bouquet municipality.292 The armed men and police proceeded 
to terrorise the population and tear down their houses without warning or time to gather their 
household belongings.293 Amnesty International reports294 and video295 taken during the 
eviction show several individuals brutally beaten and injured in the attack, including a woman 
                                                
290 Haiti Libre, 30 July 2014. “Croix-des-Bouquets in the Top 10 of higher tax revenues.” Haiti Libre. Accessed 
on 8 April 2018. Available at http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-11698-haiti-economycroix-des-bouquets-in-
the-top-10-of-higher-tax-revenues.html 
291 Holston (2009, p. 256) describes similar processes in Brazilian informal settlements. 
292 See Amnesty International’s Urgent Action with details of the eviction. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/amr360052014en.pdf   
293 Interview with Mozayik community leaders on 11 April 2014. 
294 See Amnesty International’s Urgent Action with details of the eviction. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/amr360052014en.pdf    
295 See Jonathan Bougher’s video documentation of the Mozayik eviction. Available at 
https://www.123vid.net/video/attack-on-camp-mozayik-in-canaan-haiti-ef99c24f108bd7f016171b.html 
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who was four months pregnant.296 This exercise led to 200 families being violently evicted 
from their homes, which were bulldozed shortly after the incident. This was not the first time 
that Vilaj Mozyik squatters had experienced police harassment. Three months prior to their 
eviction, police officers had entered their neighbourhood twice and destroyed some of the 
makeshift housing.297 In late January and February 2014, Vilaj Mozayik suffered two more 
attacks by armed groups and police, attempting to evict the remaining families from the 
squatter site. This time, police used tear gas as well as physical violence on the 100 families 
still living in the settlement. This violence resulted in the hospitalization of two squatters and 
the injury of several children and elderly people298  
Vilaj Mozyik squatters and community leaders contested the legality of both of these 
evictions. They were unaware that four landowners had started court proceedings against 
residents months prior to their eviction.299 Also, no one had been served with an eviction 
notice before the December 7th eviction. The way the eviction occurred stripped the residents 
of their legal rights to challenge the order and present their case regarding the arbitrary and 
violent eviction in court. The Vilaj Mozayik community raised other illegal acts in the way the 
eviction was planned and carried out. In the evening prior to the eviction, squatters reported 
that thugs had entered the squatter site and taken the names of ten people living there. These 
ten names subsequently appeared on the eviction notice signed by the justice of the peace and 
presented to squatters the following morning.300 While ten people were named on the official 
eviction notice, the demolition operation forcibly removed 300 families from the site. 
Notwithstanding the illegal aspects of the eviction, the state violated its obligations by failing 
to provide the Vilaj Mozayik community with meaningful consultation prior to their eviction 
or provide a housing alternative to the evictees.  
                                                
296 See Amnesty International’s Urgent Action with details of the eviction. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/amr360052014en.pdf 
297 This incident was documented by the Human Rights Section of the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and 
discussed in email communication dated 30 October 2013, which was obtained during the fieldwork. 
298 See Amnesty International’s Urgent Action with details of the fourth eviction at Vilaj Mozayik. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/amr360052014en.pdf 
299 This information was obtained from humanitarian organizations in April 2014, based on an email from the 
UN Human Rights Section dated 30 October 2013. 
300 Interview with 2 Mozayik community leaders, 11 April 2014. 
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This state criminality appeared to be motivated by a US$123 million project to build a 
gas terminal in the neighbouring area of Titayan.301 Vilaj Mozayik squatters accused Haytrac 
Power and Gas S.A, a local company, of organising the eviction using state police and armed 
groups. 302 The link between the gas terminal project and the forced eviction was also raised 
by human rights reports.303 Haytract Power, a long-established firm in Haiti, was rumoured to 
have profited immensely from Haiti’s earthquake reconstruction by leasing tractors and other 
necessary equipment for road reconstruction.304 Haytrac also benefitted from their political 
connections with the Martelly government. On 23 August 2013 – one week before Vilaj 
Mozayik residents first reported police harassment – Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe, 
along with the Minister of Tourism and the acting Minister of Energy Security, officially 
launched Haytrac’s project in Titanyen. At the event, the prime minister hailed the project as 
a sign of Haitian development and thriving public-private partnerships.305 Around the same 
time as the evictions were taking place, the government’s Center for Facilitation of 
Investments named Haytrac’s gas terminal project, investment of month.306 
The human toll of this forced eviction cannot be understated. Vilaj Mozayik squatters 
lost everything they had built over two years, including new homes, planted trees, and basic 
services they had collectively brought to the settlement. The Vilaj Mozayik leaders lamented 
that the eviction broke their small, thriving community apart by scattering the community’s 
families across Canaan in pursuit of new homes. Most of all, the Vilaj Mozayik eviction 
highlights the perpetual victimisation of landless people during the reconstruction period. This 
constituted the second major eviction for this group of targeted families (Amnesty, 2015a).  
                                                
301 A video of the project developed by the company. Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJ6Ve1BA8QE 
302 Interview with 2 Mozayik community leaders, 11 April 2014. See also AmCham Haiti. Available at 
http://amchamhaiti.com/home/natural-gas-project-takes-hold-in-haiti-by-haytrac/ 
303 This was mentioned in both Amnesty International’s report. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/amr360052014en.pdf  and private communication 
with UN officials. 
304 Confirmed by Hytrac Power’s website: http://www.haytrac.com/about-us/ 




IV.III Sabotaging and fragmenting new communities 
In addition to the fraud, extortion, and violence against squatters in Canaan, my 
research uncovered active attempts by private landowners to lay claim to Canaan by sabotaging 
new communities and undercutting their pursuit for formal land rights. These efforts 
destabilised the formation of new community structures and disrupted locally led 
reconstruction initiatives. 
Community leaders from the different squatter sites in Canaan began to establish 
relationships and build a more cohesive group to advance their land claims. One community 
platform established by squatter representatives received support from a grassroots Brazilian 
NGO, Viva Rio, which had prior experience supporting Haitians to organise for social justice 
goals.307 With the support of Viva Rio, squatter representatives established a group of seventy 
leaders from the various squatter neighbourhoods. Rather than each squatter site demanding 
answers from the government about their legal status, the larger group aimed to collectively 
engage with the national government and put forward a series of demands for their protection 
and recognition. One demand was to remove the informal settlement in Canaan from the 
Croix-des-Bouquet municipality, and declare it a separate commune with its own local 
government structure. This demand was motivated by squatters’ desire to curb the power of 
Croix-des-Bouquet authorities, who had exploited, harassed, and defrauded squatters. Viva Rio 
organisers portrayed the alliance between different squatter neighbourhoods in the following 
way:  
 
Without any outside help, they have developed this strong 
cohesion amongst themselves. It has been developing rapidly, 
considering none of these people knew each other beforehand and 
live across different areas across Canaan. Their social platform 
includes claims for tenure security and to break away from Croix-
des-Bouquet and govern themselves as a different commune in 
Port-au-Prince.308 
Not unexpectedly, this social movement became a threat to large landowners laying 
claim to Canaan, including Nabatec, Canaan’s most powerful claimant. From conversations 
with various squatters and organisations, it appears that Nabatec’s CEO had either directly 
                                                
307 See Viva Rio’s website. Available at http://www.vivario.org.br/dois-minutos-pela-paz/ 
308 Interview with community development organisation, Port-au-Prince, 5 August 2014. 
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hired or simply partnered with an American business Haiti Recovery and Development 
Company (HRDC) to destabilise this movement.309 Some informants allege that HRDC 
formed its own community structure and was attempting to replace the grassroots platform 
formed by different squatter communities. To accomplish this, HRDC was said to be 
recruiting poor squatters by offering payment in exchange for political support and 
participation in this rival community structure. In stark contrast to the grassroots platform 
shaped by squatter representatives, the HRDC-led platform advocated for modern economic 
development and the establishment of a legal city that recognised Nabetec’s land claim. The 
rival structure’s objectives, in other words, mirrored the objectives of Nabatec to reclaim its 
land from squatter communities. Viva Rio’s description of HRDC meetings offers evidence 
of the underlying goal to sabotage squatters’ claims:  
 
The first time that HRDC invited us to their community meeting, 
we arrive to see the mayor of Croix-des-Bouquet and some people 
from Canaan. They revealed their plans to build a modern city in 
Canaan. They talked upholding Nabatec’s private property rights. 
But their main objective was to build a community platform that 
would include Croix-des-Bouquet officials, landowners such as 
Nabatec, and representatives from different neighbourhoods 
Canaan. We expressed reservations with this proposal but HRD 
defended it very strongly.310 
The HRDC, Nabetec, and local government partnership was but another attempt to 
undermine organic community structures in the settlement by replacing grassroots 
mobilisation with mechanisms that supported powerful interests.  
 
V. State stigmatisation and de-legitimisation of squatters’ land claims 
State actors relied on political and legal tactics to undermine squatters’ land claims and 
movements for people-led reconstruction. One tactic of the government was to pass a decree 
law that significantly reduced the total area of land expropriated, as a method for legitimising 
future evictions. This decree law (2012) released the north-west part of the expropriated area 
from state ownership, thus enabling its private sale and ownership. This measure had a direct 
                                                
309 See Haiti Recovery and Development Company. Available at: 
http://haitirecoverydevelopment.com/resettlement-camp-transition/ 
310 Interview with community development organisation, Port-au-Prince, 5 August 2014. 
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impact on outer-edge neighbourhoods of Canaan, such as Vilaj Mozayik, by excluding them 
from the state-expropriated area. The decree law was passed quietly with little public awareness 
or consultation. It laid the groundwork for forced evictions around the outer edge of the 
settlement and began the process of putting state-expropriated land back into private 
circulation.  
This legal manoeuvre was supplemented with negative state discourses about 
squatters’ true motivations for land occupation. These discourses operated to de-link squatter 
communities from their histories as earthquake victims and marginalised urban citizens. 
Politicians and state officials insisted that Canaan housed a mix of populations – not only 
genuine earthquake victims.311 State officials claimed that many of Canaan’s occupants were in 
fact rural-urban migrants taking advantage of post-earthquake instability. These assertions 
lacked proof and could be easily disproven by field research.312 Such rhetoric also blurred the 
link between rural poverty and over-urbanisation, allowing the government to blame rural 
people for informal settlements and slums (see Davis, 2006, pp. 16–17). 
State discourses laid bare the toxic politics practiced by state-elites to undermine land 
claims and public sympathy for Canaan’s residents. Once the link was broken between 
Canaan’s squatters and the earthquake as a reason for their occupation, it was easier to define 
their behaviours as immoral, illegal, and criminal. Government officials frequently portrayed 
Canaan’s occupants as welfare abusers who had stolen state land. This image is reinforced in 
the following statement by a government official interviewed from the Ministry of Public 
Works: 
 
Most of the families out there [in Canaan] are not victims. They 
are not from destroyed houses. They just decided they did not want 
to rent houses anymore.313 
Sometimes the welfare-abuser portrayal of Canaan’s land occupants made it to the 
media. Croix-Des-Bouquet’s mayor declared on public radio that everyone in Canaan had only 
                                                
311 Interview with Haitian Government official from UCLBP on 10 May 2014. 
312 I did not encounter one family who had arrived from rural areas. However, I recognise that rural poverty and 
state neglect could drive rural family members to join their urban relatives in Canaan. 
313 Interview with Haitian government official 10, Port-au-Prince, 7 July 2014. 
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migrated to the area in search of free housing.314 She contrasted Canaan’s illegal and immoral 
residents with the city’s “respectable” residents who paid for housing and respected private 
property rights. Government officials also raised concerns that squatters had criminal 
motivations for occupying land. Suggesting an intrinsic link between squatting and crime, one 
government official claimed: 
 
There is a lot of crime influenced by all this squatting. I think these 
squatters are people who are avoiding paying rent and want to get 
easy access to a permanent area where they can commit crime.315  
 Maintaining the criminal character of squatters also operated by conflating land sellers 
with land purchasers. By suggesting that both land sellers and the vulnerable landless had the 
same character and motivation for criminal activity, state officials managed to negatively 
stereotype everyone associated with the informal settlement. This is apparent in an interview 
with a senior representative from Haiti’s housing authority: 
 
These people, they are all squatters. They just went to Canaan, took 
the land, and said its mine. They are just out there to sell land. But 
they are not real owners, people who can legitimately sell land.316  
Government officials also reconstructed the spatial identity of Canaan in ways that 
masked squatters’ actual goals and achievements. They denigrated Canaan as yet another 
example of “wild urbanisation”, portraying the settlement as dirty, dangerous, and 
ungovernable.317 Even though the informal settlement was not even close to resembling the 
city’s overcrowded slums, state officials were eager to label it a bideonville and compare the 
settlement to an earlier version of Cite Soleil. This bideonville reference to Canaan appeared in 
the Haitian press. Yet, government representations of Canaan were at extreme odds with the 
urban vision of squatters inside the settlement and their agency to implement that vision. A 
Haitian housing activist described government characterisations of Canaan that emerged 
during his own conversations with state officials:  
 
The government gives a bad impression about Canaan. They think 
it sprawling and ugly, and too close to places of national 
                                                
314 Radio FM 106.1 on 24 July 2014. 
315 Interview with Haitian government official 10, Port-au-Prince, 6 June 2014. 
316 Interview with Haitian government official 2, Port-au-Prince, 10 May 2014. 
317 Interview with Haitian government official 2, Port-au-Prince, 10 May 2014. 
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importance like the seaside, tourist areas, and the new Olympic 
Centre. They often say, ‘oh, those people are stealing land and they 
should not be there.’ But they also think that Canaan’s inhabitants 
do not have anything – that these are poor, miserable, and 
unemployed. They say Canaan’s occupants have really crossed the 
line and created a truly violent place – another Cite Soleil.318 
 Such accusations underpinned the state’s strategy for denying the relationship between 
Canaan and state-led evictions, mismanaged humanitarian aid, and their omissions to provide 
housing to landless Haitians. Assigning blame to squatters thus allowed state officials to 
whitewash their past failures and criminality, while re-positioning the Haitian state as the victim 
of unplanned development. This is captured in the following government statement:  
 
The public declaration of Preval happened in March 2010. The 
government wanted to organize everything in the area, starting 
with its establishment of the temporary Corail camp for some of 
the earthquake displaced. But from there, all these people just 
rushed in to live around this area. They create informal settlements 
that were uncontrollable.319 
Yet, such rhetoric was inconsistent with how government officials were materially and 
politically benefitting from Canaan’s existence. As the urban reconstruction process unfolded, 
it came to light that state officials were actually using Canaan as a catchment area for all city 
populations standing in the way of the state’s reconstruction plans.  
In May 2014, Haitian police demolished 400 houses in downtown Port-au-Prince and 
forcibly evicted over 62,000 people from their homes.320 These actions were justified by the 
state as necessary to rebuild the city’s administrative centre and make space for private sector 
development.321 In another wave of forced evictions associated with the influx of 
reconstruction capital, downtown Port-au-Prince residents, who had lived their whole lives in 
the area (and were not displaced by the earthquake), were expelled and coerced to accept 
US$500 as compensation for their lost homes and land (many claim they never received this 
money).322 Significantly, some evictees reported they were instructed by Haitian police to  ‘go 
                                                
318 Interview with Haitian housing activist 2, Port-au-Prince, 24 April 2014. 
319 Interview with Haitian government official 4, Port-au-Prince, on 17 March 2014. 
320 See https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/21/haiti-where-will-the-poor-go/ 
321 See https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/21/haiti-where-will-the-poor-go/ 
322 See https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/21/haiti-where-will-the-poor-go/ 
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out and buy land in Canaan’. 323 This suggests that the state perceived Canaan as a dumping 
ground for unwanted populations within the broader reconstruction environment. Moreover, 
these events highlight how state discourses criminalising Canaan’s squatters worked hand-in-
hand with state efforts to reproduce Canaan as a slum for disposing of the city’s surplus 
populations. These discursive attacks on Canaan’s land occupations constituted another way 
the state re-victimised earthquake-affected populations. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has illuminated the dialectic nature of land struggles in post-disaster Haiti 
as they occurred throughout reconstruction time and space. In the post-earthquake period, we 
saw Canaan functioning simultaneously as a space of exclusion and resistance. On the one 
hand, Canaan offered new opportunities to marginalised urban populations to build their own 
city,324and through that experience, to make new land and citizenship claims.  
On the other hand, this chapter revealed the forces of extortion, coercion, and violence 
that worked against people’s goals for land tenure security and a safer, more inclusive urban 
environment. It showed how people’s individualised pursuit of tenure security often 
threatened to destabilise new communities. Having lived a life of urban precarity, vulnerable 
squatter families were motivated to find and forge their own solutions to their lack of security 
and protection within the Canaan settlement. Such dynamics, however, brought inevitable 
risks to community solidarity and cohesion – pointing to the fragile social conditions within 
new squatter sites. 
Canaan’s experience also shed light on the extreme vulnerability of informal land 
occupants to state-sponsored counter-attacks on their land control, motivated in part by the 
capitalist dynamics of reconstruction. We saw how different powerful and criminal groups – 
from state authorities to powerful landowners to land mafias – flooded Canaan and sought to 
abuse or exploit the people living inside the settlement to achieve their own material and 
political interests. In short, Canaan’s squatters faced significant barriers to achieving their goals 
                                                
323 Interview 46, Village des Pêcheurs, 1 August 2014. 
324 This phrase was used to describe Canaan in the URD report: “Reconstruction et environnement dans la re ́gion 
me ́tropolitaine de Port-au-Prince: Cas de Canaan ou la naissance d’un quartier ex-nihilo.” Available at 
http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/ReconstructionetEnvironnement_Rapport_Canaan_Nov2012.pdf 
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for the built environment. Most importantly, these experiences in Canaan exposed the 
relationship between state-humanitarian crime and the creation of perpetual vulnerability. This 
chapter provides evidence for the argument that state-humanitarian expulsions from Port-au-
Prince settlements resulted in increasing the vulnerability of earthquake victims to further 
harm and violence. This outcome therefore constitutes as one aspect of determining the 

























Humanitarian Denial: Concealing Expulsions and Vulnerable 
Settlements 
To expand on the concept of state-humanitarian crime requires an exploration of 
humanitarian strategies of denial for obscuring, reinterpreting, or minimising the harmful 
impacts of humanitarian actions and policies. Combining interview data, media articles, and 
humanitarian reports, this chapter unveils a complex political discourse that masked the 
harmful nature of state-humanitarian expulsions and their causal relationship with the creation 
of new informal settlements. As we shall see in this chapter, there is a constant need for 
humanitarian organisations to re-interpret people, places, and events to fit their narrative about 
humanitarian protection, and their expert and efficient roles in delivering it. For this reason, 
humanitarian discourses targeting post-earthquake informal settlements, including Canaan, 
continually shift to obscure organisational involvement in producing socio-spatial patterns of 
injustice and re-victimisation. 
 Humanitarian strategies of denial demonstrate how responsibility for housing-related 
harms and land criminality are repackaged and deflected. These strategies become necessary 
for maintaining humanitarians’ hegemonic position and legitimacy throughout Haiti’s 
reconstruction process. They are also borne of the need to protect organisational reputations 
and advance future funding goals. With these dynamics in mind, this chapter contributes to 
an understanding of the interplay between repression and resistance as struggles for land and 
housing are shaped by humanitarian involvement. In Canaan, the discursive and governing 
power of humanitarian agencies emerged once again, and operated to contain, suppress, and 
re-appropriate new squatter movements that repudiated state-humanitarian practices and 
threatened elite land control. I will show how humanitarian power combined with the different 
forms of state-sponsored violence in Canaan to become a powerful force working against the 
goals of squatter communities, who were striving to achieve permanent housing and a safer, 
more inclusive urban order. 
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I. Understanding Denial and Techniques of Neutralisation 
Critical criminologists often apply concepts of denial to interpret the criminal 
behaviour of powerful actors (see Green & Ward, 2000, 2004; Whyte, 2012, 2016; MacManus, 
2018). Similar to the theoretical significance of resistance practices in labelling state crime, 
denial strategies manufactured by states and their agents are theoretically relevant for 
identifying and exposing harmful and criminal events, and their legitimation to social audiences 
(Green & Ward, 2000, p. 103; Green & Ward, 2004, pp. 134–35). Investigating organisational 
forms of denial is also important for challenging repressive power configurations. Revealing 
state strategies of denial may lead to ‘insight, acceptance, and acknowledgement; the hidden 
truth emerges; and, the healing process then beings’ (Cohen, 2000, p. 36). 
Criminological analyses of state forms of denial are informed by Stanley Cohen’s 
(1993, 2000) ground-breaking work on the subject. Cohen sought to explain public acceptance 
of human suffering, such as torture, human rights violations, and state crimes, by interrogating 
how denial operates in official state accounts. In doing so, Cohen acknowledged a relationship 
between individual and organisational denial, writing that ‘the denials used by individual 
perpetrators of some well-known atrocities and the official reactions by governments 
today…will look very similar. It cannot be otherwise’ (2001, p. 76). Though Cohen’s insights 
largely draw from his study of state behaviour, critical criminologists have since applied them 
to illegitimate acts of other powerful actors, namely corporations (see Whyte, 2016; 
MacManus, 2018). This extension of Cohen’s framework suggests that it may also be applied 
to humanitarian organisations, whose operative goals, means, and conduct are similar to both 
states and corporations (see Chapter Two).  
In his study of political accounts of mass atrocities, Cohen identified three forms of 
denial at work in the way that powerful actors justify their crimes externally and construct a 
defensive shield against legal and public sanctions. They are literal denial; interpretative denial; and 
implicatory denial. Cohen, and other scholars using his work, encourage us to view state strategies 
of denial as highly contextual, where different forms arise at different stages and for particular 
reasons (see Green & Ward, 2004, p. 134). Literal denial – pure denial – entails a flat-out refusal 
to accept knowledge or facts (Cohen, 2000, p. 7). State counter-claims may work for a certain 
period of time, but when the rejection of facts defies their explanations, state strategies often 
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shift to interpretative denial (2001, p. 105). Cohen characterises this second, less perceptible form 
of denial as the re-appropriation of meaning to facts, people, and events. Its motivating force 
is to give the impression that ‘what is happening is really something else’ (2001, p. 105). The 
games of truth manifesting through interpretive forms of denial allow powerful actors to evade 
culpability for their actions by reframing them as well as their consequences. For example, 
Thomas MacManus’s (2018) work on toxic dumping by U.K. company Trafigura revealed a 
two-pronged strategy of denial wherein the company denied facts on the ground, and then 
redirected blame to its business partners. Cohen’s third category, implicatory denial, relates to 
the justificatory grounds put forth by powerful groups to exculpate themselves from 
wrongdoing. Perpetrators and their accomplices brush off state crimes and human rights 
violations they have committed by claiming they were necessary, contextual, or deserved 
(2000, p. 110). This involves contesting the veracity of facts, demonizing victims, and 
rationalising situations of harm by comparing them to worse-off situations, or by framing them 
as unintentional consequences of difficult circumstances (2000, pp. 133–34). 
 In exploring the political strategies of denial, critical criminologists have found that, 
similar to perpetrators of less serious offenses, state-corporate perpetrators rarely acknowledge 
their norm-breaking behaviour (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Cohen, 2000, p. 77). They do not 
challenge the social codes and values that sanction their wrongdoing, but instead resort to 
techniques of neutralisation to justify or normalise their behaviours. Some of these techniques 
are: 
• denial of responsibility  
• denial of injury  
• denial of the victim  
• condemnation of the condemners325 
In recognise the ways that powerful actors neutralise their unethical and criminal 
conduct, the law emerges as a powerful means for justifying harmful actions. This observation 
connects with theoretical insights on the hegemonic position and normalising power of law, 
and the instrumental use of the language of legality to reframe the meaning or value of people, 
places, and events, according to dominant interests (Whyte, 2016; see also Nadar & Mattei, 
                                                
325 For a full description of each technique, see Sykes and Matza (1957), Chapter 4 in Cohen (2000) States of 
Denial, and Whyte (2016). 
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2008, p. 7; Golder & Fitzpatrick, 2009). Elite knowledge production is another important 
means for powerful groups to attack the credibility and claims of their victims (Cohen, 2000). 
Elites routinely leverage their power to subject victims to inferior social positions, thus 
neutralising their victims’ knowledge of events (see Whyte, 2012).  
Cohen guides scholars in locating deliberate forms of organizational denial and 
separating it from what sociologists and psychologists call cognitive bias. To do this, Cohen 
(2000, pp. 6, 33) identifies the ‘grey areas between consciousness and unconsciousness,’ which 
he calls the state of ‘knowing and not knowing.’ Though he marks out a difference between 
active and passive denial (2000, p. 32), Cohen suggests that statements of not knowing are 
often part of the defensive denial strategy, which signals organisational awareness of their 
deviant behaviours. Behind claims of not knowing are often deliberate evasions of the truth. 
Organisations may even choose, or collude with others, to not investigate an issue because of 
its threatening nature. For this reason, Cohen writes that ‘denying unwelcome and potentially 
dangerous news…needs explanation’ (2000, p. 31).  
 In the following sections, I will apply Cohen’s insights to the official and personal 
accounts given by humanitarian organisations to excuse, defend, and rationalise their harms 
and deviancy. The deviancy under investigation relates to specific organisational breaches of 
international humanitarian principles and human rights norms in the governance of post-
earthquake settlements, and the design of housing programmes that resulted in re-victimising 
landless populations. As discussed, one of the clearest examples of humanitarian 
organisational deviance in Haiti is the coercive closure of settlements. In Chapter Four, I 
showed how humanitarian-led settlement closures failure to follow normative procedures or 
provide evictees with adequate alternative housing, in accordance with their right to housing.  
I have also traced the harms associated with landlessness and the lack of a home. The 
ways that people were forced out of city by state-humanitarian programmes, I have argued, 
led to new exposure to harms because, despite obtaining land access and enacting their own 
reconstruction process, people ultimately lacked basic services, urban planning support, and 
protection from criminal gangs and re-evictions. Thus, having reviewed the harms and 
deviancy that humanitarian organisations are likely to conceal, I will now engage in a detailed 
discussion of humanitarian denial strategies and techniques of neutralisation. 
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II. Denying Organisational Responsibility for Post-Earthquake Informal Settlements  
Without question, the interventions and conduct of humanitarian organisations led to 
the development of Canaan as a catchment area for excluded people in a capital-intense 
reconstruction period. This assertion is based on two factors. First, as discussed in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six, the rapid and coercive expulsion of populations from post-earthquake 
settlements, led by humanitarian organisations, left hundreds of thousands of people in 
precarious housing conditions. These conditions prompted mass exodus to Canaan in pursuit 
of housing. Second, humanitarian organisations contributed to Canaan emerging as a pull 
factor for informal settlement by nature of its role in the state’s rushed expropriation of land 
in Canaan to enable the relocation of the Petionville Golf Course camp (see Chapter Seven). 
As mentioned, this expropriation did not follow proper legal procedure, nor was there an 
administrative plan for how the land was to be used. Despite this, humanitarian organisations 
carelessly relocated the Petionville Golf Club settlement population to Canaan without due 
consideration of their uncertain legal status on the land or their future basic needs, including 
housing and employment. This relocation, which was seen to incentivise mass movement 
specifically to Canaan, intersects with a second aspect of humanitarian involvement in 
Canaan’s development. Moreover, the involvement of humanitarian organisations in the 
decisions and processes that created Canaan as one of Haiti’s largest informal settlements can 
be summarised as: 
 
1. Their role in compelling mass migration and occupation of Canaan as an outcome 
of the expulsions of earthquake victims from post-earthquake settlements without 
the provision of adequate housing. 
2. Their role in the coercive and careless relocation of populations to the state-
expropriated urban periphery, which catalysed the direction of the squatter 
movement to Canaan.  
Humanitarian organisations were sensitive to facts on the ground that pointed to their 
role in Preval’s expropriation of Canaan, and the consequent pull factor for land occupation 
on the urban periphery (not to mention their eventual abandonment of the relocated 
Petionville Golf Club camp population). Within months, humanitarian organisations said they 
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noticed small squats forming around perimeter of the Corail relocation area.326 Interviewed 
officials remarked that these early squats (observed after the relocation) ‘put the entire 
humanitarian sector in an immediately uncomfortable position.’327 They feared they had 
inadvertently catalysed the land occupation process by putting an empty plot of land on the 
radar, and they could be blamed by Haitian and international audiences for incentivising extra-
legal occupations. Being linked to this outcome could be reputational suicide for neutral and 
law-abiding humanitarian agencies.328 One humanitarian official explained his organisation’s 
impetus to distance themselves from squatter movement from the beginning: 
 
During that time, we were constantly consulting with our lawyers 
because we were afraid that we would be blamed by landowners or 
the government for these movements, in which both were losing 
land. Everyone was nervous with these movements. We decided 
to lie low and ensure that none of our materials and services left 
the Corail [relocation] camp to reach the surrounding squatter 
area.329  
From the outset, humanitarian organisations were keenly aware of the poor conditions 
in squatter settlements.330 Yet, embodying a strategy of literal denial, their immediate reaction 
was to lie low and ignore extra-legal occupations that threatened organisational reputations. 
Most humanitarian organisations therefore exercised a strategy of avoidance despite their role 
in catalysing these events. Some expressed hope that Canaan’s squatters would give up and 
move elsewhere, especially once they realised they would not receive humanitarian aid or basic 
services inside this “zone of exclusion”331 (Agier, 2012).  
When Canaan’s squatters did not move away, it prolonged the discomfort of 
humanitarian organisations who understood the causal relationship between their actions and 
the settlement’s development.332 This initial strategy of avoidance was not easily maintained. 
                                                
326 Interviews with humanitarian officials 1 and 2 (15 November 2015, Port-au-Prince), 3 (9 June 2014, Port-au-
Prince), and 23 (29 March 2015, London). 
327 Interviews with humanitarian officials 1 and 2, Port-au-Prince, 3 April 2014. 
328 Interviews with humanitarian officials 1 and 2, Port-au-Prince, 3 April 2014. 
329 Interviews with humanitarian officials 1 and 2 (15 November 2015, Port-au-Prince), 3 (9 June 2014, Port-au-
Prince). 
330 Interviews with humanitarian officials 1 and 2 (15 November 2015, Port-au-Prince), 3 (9 June 2014, Port-au-
Prince), and 23 (29 March 2015, London). 
331 Interview with humanitarian official 32, Port-au-Prince, 9 August 2014. 
332 This was explicitly mentioned in the following interviews: Interview with humanitarian official 3, London; 
interview with humanitarian officials 9 and 32, Port-au-Prince, 14 April 2014; Interview with humanitarian 
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Stated commitments to humanitarian principles made it difficult for organisations to distance 
themselves from an area demonstrating humanitarian need. Humanitarian principles require 
organisations to provide equitable assistance to populations of concern and to fill gaps 
whenever they arise for people who are identified in need (Slim, 2015). Yet, the Haitian 
government provided strict instructions to humanitarian organisations to deny aid to Canaan’s 
new settlements. State authorities, it seemed, were pursuing a hostile environment policy with 
the hope that poor conditions would force squatters to leave the area.333 Most humanitarian 
organisations complied with the government’s request not to provide ‘permanent structures, 
materials or services’ such as housing materials or water points in the expanding settlement.334 
Nevertheless, they needed to justify why they had conceded to state demands and singled out 
Canaan for aid exclusion. Some justifications for their non-compliance with humanitarian 
principles invoked squatters’ violations of Haitian law and state authority. This is illustrated in 
the following statement: 
 
Our organization waited to see if the government would kick 
everyone out because they were not legal. It was pointless to 
provide assistance if they were going to do that. Yes, we did have 
a lot of funds to provide shelter materials, for more than 500 
families, but we weren’t going to distribute our materials out there 
[Canaan]. There was the government issue and the legal issue.335 
 Not all humanitarian officials were comfortable with the wilful blindness pursued by 
their organisations. One interviewee complained of the thousands of people being rendered 
invisible to housing assistance based on state policy. 336 She protested: 
 
In my view, the entire humanitarian sector waited a long time 
ignoring and not doing anything to help these people. Canaan was 
a “taboo topic” for the international community for at least two 
years. Everyone was hesitant because of reputational risks that 
Canaan posed for humanitarian agencies.337 
                                                
official 4, 26 June 2016; interview with humanitarian official 7, Port-au-Prince, 21 April 2014; Interview with 
humanitarian official 8, Port-au-Prince, 20 April 2014. 
333 Interview with humanitarian official 33, Port-au-Prince, 14 July 2014. 
334 Interview with humanitarian official 9, Port-au-Prince, 21 January 2014. See also T. Padgett and J. 
Desvarieux, Haiti: Where Building a Hospital Can be Illegal, Time, 12 November 2010. Available at 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2031102,00.html 
335 Interview with humanitarian official 33, Port-au-Prince, 15 July 2014. 
336 Interview with humanitarian official 35, London, 10 June 2014. 
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In short, humanitarians’ strategic avoidance of topics related to Canaan, either in public 
interviews or government forums, constituted a form of denial aimed at protecting powerful 
interests. 
 There were some exceptions to this in the organisational landscape. In November 
2010, several months after small settlements became noticeable to the international 
community, Techo (a Chilean NGO) called attention to the harmful effects of the state-
sponsored ban on providing material assistance to new squatter communities.338 This small 
NGO warned that the government’s ban, and all those who followed it, were actively risking 
the physical safety of the people living in Canaan.339 They accurately noted that squatters were 
being forced to build in the area without any formal urban planning support. The refusal to 
recognise new squatter communities led to a lack of strategic inputs essential at the early stage 
of settlement development. This included the planning and coordination of the provision of 
housing materials, road construction, electricity distribution, and sanitation and drainage 
systems. The Techo representative’s comments reinforce the point that humanitarians were 
complicit in increasing the vulnerability of squatter communities through their practices of aid 
exclusion, which was driven by their conformity to state policy. 
 
III. From Literal to Interpretive Denial: Re-labelling Squatter Sites as IDP Camps 
Cohen (2000, pp. 135–36) notes that strategies of denial shift to accommodate new 
realities and facts on the ground that are difficult to suppress. In Haiti, early strategies of literal 
denial and avoidance about informal settlements morphed into new strategies as the context 
shifted and defied dominant explanations of events. Chapter Six showed that Canaan’s steady 
growth was linked to both the state’s failure to identify land for housing and the humanitarian-
led settlement closures. The need to obscure the relationship between Canaan’s population 
growth and the harmful effects of state-humanitarian expulsions is evident in humanitarian 
transcripts of events. This need produced a new form of denial about what was really 
happening in Canaan.  
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To that end, humanitarian organisations revised their narrative and labelled the 
burgeoning squatter site as a displacement camp – making the camp residents IDPs. What is 
interesting about this decision is that it did not correspond with the belief that the people 
living in Canaan fit the international description of IDPs – as opposed to populations 
identified immediately after the earthquake to whom humanitarians confidently applied the 
label. Most humanitarian interviewees were aware that what was happening in Canaan was a 
mass land occupation and that its residents sought permanent occupancy.340 Put differently, 
humanitarians recognised that squatters’ identities and their land use patterns were 
conceptually different from those described by the normative framework on internal 
displacement.  
The humanitarian organisations’ deliberate mislabelling of Canaan residents cannot be 
seen as pure cognitive dissonance and lack of understanding of events. The transformation of 
land occupants into IDPs, I argue, responded to the need to find a label acceptable to 
dominant power relations. We have previously discussed that the IDP label usefully signals 
the temporariness of land occupations and authorises the state and humanitarian organisations 
to reclaim control over autonomous settlements. Therefore, this labelling decision can be 
interpreted as a strategy of neutralisation, in which dangerous and threatening events (land 
occupations driven by state-humanitarian wrongdoing) were converted into a strategically 
useful and acceptable narrative of events (earthquake-related displacement camps). Once 
Canaan’s squatter movement was re-classified, humanitarian organisations assumed new 
authority over the settlement and carried their power relations to this new site of land 
occupation.341 Such labelling also allowed them to distribute non-permanent/non-threatening 
levels of aid to squatters (i.e., daily consumables), which assuaged the tension between the 
Haitian government demands and humanitarian norms. 342  
One key effect of this reframing was its ability to mask humanitarian deviance. IDP 
language allowed humanitarian organisations to describe mass movement to the urban 
periphery as another ‘episode of the earthquake displacement crisis’ rather than a direct 
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outcome of their RSCG programme (see Chapter Five). Drawing from Cohen’s insights (2000, 
p. 64), IDP vocabulary delivered a ‘culturally recognisable language to evade conventional 
judgement.’ It also allowed humanitarian organisations to flip their role from the perpetrators of 
camp closures to the saviours of this supposedly new group of earthquake victims. In stark 
contrast to the modes of people-led reconstruction described in Chapter Seven, Canaan’s 
population was depicted as weak and dependent on humanitarian relief.343  
 Certainly, Canaan’s land occupants received material benefit from medical and other 
needs-based assistance as a result of their reconstructed identities. These benefits, I 
nevertheless maintain, far outweigh the impact of a dominant narrative that re-positioned 
humanitarian authority over land occupants and obscured their social goal, which was aimed 
at winning land rights and building a more inclusive urban environment. One way of 
reinforcing my point is to show how modes of humanitarian engagement, interlaced with 
performance goals, destabilised new communities. In carrying out their aid activities, 
organisations tended to appoint new leaders (camp leaders) in nascent communities and 
empower them with resources and leadership responsibilities, without any interrogation of 
their social backgrounds or community relationships. Consequently, organisations 
undermined new community structures and created local hierarchies that had not previously 
existed in Canaan. In one instance, land occupants complained that humanitarian-empowered 
leaders were charging every family USD$100 to put their name on aid distribution lists and 
threatened to remove their names if their extortion was reported.344 People who could afford 
the USD$100 said that they paid it, hoping the fee would eventually provide them access to 
desperately needed construction materials. In the end, they saw camp leaders pocket at least 
$10,000 from “selling” aid in their community.345 Land occupants also claimed that the 
provision of material aid enticed criminal entrepreneurs to their new communities and had the 
effect of strengthening the power of criminal groups, in line with the dynamics described in 
Chapter Seven.346 In these ways humanitarian actions worked against people’s goals by 
reshaping and redistributing power on the ground. 
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IV. Neutralising Uncomfortable Truths about State-Humanitarian Settlement 
Closure Programmes  
Over time, the rapid increase in the number of new houses, markets, and small 
businesses in Canaan put humanitarian explanations for the settlement into question. 
Essentially, the settlement, which now housed 200,000 people, hardly fit the description of an 
IDP camp that could be closed by humanitarian organisations. Canaan’s growth, furthermore, 
prompted greater awareness by humanitarian organisations of the causal link between the 
informal settlement and settlement closure programmes.347 These events precipitated a 
deliberate cover-up of facts by humanitarian organisations as a means for denying 
responsibility for harms created by their interventions. 
In mid-2013, UN-Habitat, which had privately criticised humanitarian camp closure 
programmes, began investigating the situation of Canaan’s residents.348 It did so through 
several field visits in addition to conducting a survey of 6,000 families in the settlement.349 UN-
Habitat’s unpublished survey found that almost half (45%) of the families in their sample had 
previously lived in IDP camps in the city and received rental grants. While this study did not 
investigate why so many people expelled from humanitarian-managed camps were now living 
in a new informal settlement on the urban periphery, there were clear indications that it was 
because people could no longer afford housing after their grants had expired, or that they had 
refused to return to expensive rental markets (see Chapter Six).  
Interviews with humanitarian organisations confirmed their knowledge of the UN-
Habitat study.350 Some RSCG implementing agencies did not dispute the study or the reality 
that many camp residents now lived in Canaan.351 They too had discovered through their own 
monitoring of grant beneficiaries, that some rental subsidy recipients had violated the 
conditions of their grants.352 These organisations explained that Port-au-Prince landlords, as 
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350 Interviews with humanitarian officials 40 (1August 2014), 25 (10 April 2014), and 32 (9 August 2014), Port-
au-Prince 
351 Interviews with humanitarian officials 40 (1August 2014), 25 (10 April 2014), 32 (9 August 2014), and 42 (5 
May 2014), Port-au-Prince. 
352 Interviews with humanitarian officials 12 (29 April 2014) and 42 (5 May 2014), Port-au-Prince. 
	 243 
well as their own local staff, had told them that many families had taken their money to 
Canaan’s illegal land market because of the limited and insufficient nature of their rental 
grants.353 
Anecdotal and unpublished information, such as the UN-Habitat study, came to light 
during the course of my fieldwork. In July 2014, a foreign researcher placed with the Haitian 
Ministry of Public Works (MPCE) conducted qualitative fieldwork with 100 families living in 
Canaan.354 Similar to UN-Habitat’s findings, her research showed that many landless Haitians 
had used humanitarian-provided grants to move to Canaan. Her research evidenced that the 
average selling price of land in Canaan was identical to the amount of the humanitarian rental 
grant (20,000 Haitian goudes). This proves that the informal land market was driven by the 
closure of settlements inside Port-au-Prince. When this study was presented to Haitian 
government officials and humanitarian organisations in a closed-door meeting that I attended, 
humanitarian organisations who were instrumental in the design and implementation of the 
RSCG programme, reacted defensively. The organisational representatives tried to discredit 
the researcher’s study based on its ‘lack of quantitative data to prove the scale of the 
phenomenon.’355 This was despite the fact that many humanitarian organisations had already 
reached similar conclusion from their own monitoring of the RSCG programme. This 
defensive reaction illustrates a common tactic of denial by humanitarian organisations, which 
was to attack the credibility of information produced by non-humanitarian organisations, who 
could not claim the same level of authority and expertise as organisations operating in the 
humanitarian sector.  
The form of denial taken to dispute this evidence exhibits what Cohen calls the 
‘subterranean level at which everyone knows what is happening, but the surface is a permanent 
“as if” discourse’ (Cohen, 2000, p. 63). According to humanitarian organisations, the camp-
to-Canaan pattern of mobility was simply ‘too difficult to know’ and ‘lacked conclusive 
evidence.’356 Such attempts to rebuff any link between settlement closure processes and the 
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rise of informal settlements constituted both a denial of responsibility as well as a denial of the 
harm caused by humanitarian programmes. Privately, some humanitarian officials articulated 
that studies showing the structural link between camps and Canaan were dangerous to 
organisational reputations.357 They feared that media attention or research on this link could 
trigger a duty of care to RSCG recipients who had ended up in an under-serviced informal 
settlement as a result of humanitarian programmes.358 Organisations would not be able to meet 
this duty of care, however, because donor funding had dried up for Haiti.359  
These fears prompted coordinated cover-ups by humanitarian organisations with a 
vested interest in keeping the connection between post-earthquake settlements and new 
informal settlements in Canaan out of the public domain. Off the record, lower-level 
humanitarian officials explained that organisational heads required them to remove any 
reference of the link between settlement closure processes and Canaan, in their public 
reporting.360 Even if humanitarian staff identified that humanitarian cash grants were being 
used to purchase land in Canaan, they were forbidden from reporting this to the public or to 
their donors.  
This deliberate omission in humanitarian reporting extended to other forms of 
organisational control over information flow. Photographic evidence that provided a counter-
narrative to the humanitarian story was systematically treated as classified. For example, 
photos of For Sale signs on land in Canaan’s “IDP camps” were hidden from the public – 
although they were covertly passed between humanitarian organisations. There appeared an 
unwritten agreement to not distribute such damaging photos to researchers or the media. Even 
when researchers (like myself) were cautiously shown a photo or two on computer screens, 
requests for copies were denied.361 Since this behaviour was exhibited by implementers of 
camp closure/rental subsidy programmes but not by organisations providing other types of 
aid, it suggests that organisations involved in settlement closure programmes were well aware 
of their wrongful conduct and were making a deliberate effort to conceal damning 
information.  
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Withholding information from the public contravenes key humanitarian principles of 
transparency and public access to information (Slim, 2015), and therefore required 
justification. Some interviewed organisations claimed that they could not release information 
that posed ‘concerns for the security of humanitarian personnel.’362 This justification was 
framed in a neo-colonial discourse about Haitians who, if made aware of humanitarian 
shortcomings or wrongdoing, might retaliate with violence against their international 
caregivers. Some interviewees asserted that their moral imperative justified their high degree 
of secrecy. No negative information about humanitarian work, or the reconstruction process 
in general, should be leaked to the public because it might ‘erode public trust’ and put future 
‘critical life-saving work in jeopardy.’363 Essentially, any unethical conduct or inadvertent harms 
perpetrated by humanitarian actions should not be publically disclosed or discussed because 
humanitarian organisations acted in good faith and always had the greater good in mind. This 
assertion is easily countered by pointing out the humanitarian adherence to state interests 
throughout the reconstruction process. 
There were highly organised efforts to suppress discreditable information about the 
way that humanitarian organisations conducted and oversaw donor evaluations of their work. 
Donor evaluations are a mechanism of humanitarian accountability, otherwise called upward 
accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). As a performance monitoring tool, donor evaluations usually 
assess the progress that organisations have made toward stated objectives for donor funding, 
as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of resources spent (Ebrahim, 2003; Jordan & Tuijl, 
2006). They are also meant to ensure that humanitarian organisations adhere to particular 
standards in the delivery of their services; they may further try to measure social changes and 
outcomes (Ebrahim, 2003). For all these reasons, donor evaluations have a significant impact 
on organisational reputations and opportunities for future funding. Arguably, donor 
evaluations are important sources for interpreting humanitarian denial because they give a 
picture of how certain activities have been narrated and rationalised. 
 In Chapter Five, I discussed two evaluations of the RSCG programme. Both 
evaluations were heavily influenced by organisations who had control over the evaluation’s 
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terms of reference, methodology, and final review.364 The second evaluation process, however, 
is one that I personally observed and believe was most important for de-linking settlement 
closures from the emergence of new informal settlements. As previously discussed, several 
studies prior to this second evaluation had suggested the harmful effects of settlement closure 
programme. Some humanitarian organisations stated that the ‘the second evaluation needed 
to show that we did not put people into a terrible situation in Canaan, that donor’s money did 
not do that, and that we did not create this illegal situation for people.’365 Thus, even before 
this evaluation was conducted, humanitarian organisations had identified dangerous facts on 
the ground that needed to be ‘repackaged in an acceptable format’ (Cohen, 2000, p. 64). 
This led to a dedicated cover-up of dangerous facts. In a planning meeting on the 
development and execution of the second evaluation, I observed a high degree of anxiety 
amongst organisations that this evaluation would put the RSCG programme in a negative light. 
It was subsequently agreed by participating organisations that a negative evaluation of the 
programme could be circumvented through careful construction of the evaluation’s terms of 
reference. Thus, humanitarian organisations agreed that the terms of reference could be 
structured toward producing evidence that ‘donors got their money’s worth for what they paid 
for – camp closures.’366  
The desire to hide the truth about the harmful impact of rental subsidies and 
settlement closure processes influenced the evaluation’s methodology and the questions asked 
of the programme’s participants. For example, people were asked if they felt physically safe 
for the one-year period that they lived in rental homes paid for by humanitarian grants (the 
limited period of grants). Meanwhile, questions related to the prevention of future 
homelessness, such as the affordability of rental housing, were omitted. One researcher with 
direct knowledge of the evaluation process said that RSCG evaluators (hired by organisations) 
were told not to visit Canaan during their research.367 Expert evaluators, who believed it was 
important to conduct field trips to Canaan to assess the impact of rental grants, were unable 
to push back on this organisational decision which did not make sense if the objective was to 
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understand how rental grants had been used.368 ‘Canaan just didn’t fit with their narrative,’ 
explained this observer of the process.369 A U.S. government official was more open about the 
coordinated effort to suppress information about the programme’s harmful impacts: 
 
There is simply no question that Canaan is closely linked with 
humanitarian rental subsidies. It is a definite feature of the 
humanitarian response. But neither foreign donors or 
humanitarian organizations want to admit it. And they certainly do 
not want to include it in their evaluation because it would defeat 
the whole purpose of their programme and its success – which 
they said was to take people out of camps and put them in rental 
housing. But really, they should accept responsibility for what they 
did and throw money at Canaan, something they are actually 
responsible for.370 
This senior official’s analysis of the situation illustrates the uncomfortable truth being actively 
denied by humanitarian organisations with responsibility for the harmful effects of the RSCG 
programme. Not surprisingly, when the second evaluation was published, its 133 pages 
contained only one reference to Canaan (see Trevino et al., 2014). The reference, buried in the 
middle of the report, hardly exposed the gravity of the situation. It stated: ‘There are also 
questions about how many beneficiaries moved and built homes in so-called informal 
settlements such as Canaan’ (Trevino et. al., 2014). This passing reference to Canaan embodies 
the collective denial that Cohen refers to when he explains how the space between knowing 
and not knowing is maintained to mask organisational deviance. 
 
V. Denying and Criminalising Victims 
Recalling this chapter’s introduction, the denial of victims and their injuries are 
neutralisation techniques used by perpetrators to deflect blame for wrongdoing and distort the 
truth. In this section, I will explore how humanitarian discourses and the international media 
normalised precarious living conditions in informal settlements while stigmatising squatter 
communities and their illegal land behaviours. This demonstrates the social function of 
humanitarian discourses in avoiding responsibility for harms and legitimising their ongoing 
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dominance over global society’s “dangerous classes.” I argue that blaming the urban poor for 
slum-making in Canaan provided a cover for humanitarian organisations.  
 
V.I Blaming victims. 
In July 2013, the Haitian government asked humanitarian organisations to remove 
Canaan from its official list of registered IDP camps (IOM, 2013). Until then, Canaan had 
been listed as a displacement site and its population had been included in the total count of 
IDPs. There were strong suspicions that government officials wanted Canaan off the official 
IDP list because its growing numbers defeated state-humanitarian objectives to reduce 
population numbers.371  
The withdrawal of Canaan’s status as an IDP camp posed lingering questions for an 
interested international public and media. If Canaan was not an IDP camp, what was it? Why 
had it emerged in the post-earthquake period? And what should be done about it? The pressing 
need to explain Canaan as something else non-threatening to state and humanitarian organisation 
laid the foundation for victim-blaming once Canaan’s IDP camp status was taken away. 
Critical criminologists have frequently observed that powerful groups evade blame by 
labelling the behaviour of others as illegal or criminal. 372 In Haiti, humanitarian organisations 
and the Haitian government deflected their wrongdoing by assigning blame to squatter 
communities. As Canaan’s IDP camp status unravelled, there was a general consensus 
amongst humanitarian organisations implementing camp closure programmes that ‘anyone 
who had moved to Canaan had done something wrong.’373  Corresponding to this, Haitians 
who had used their rental grants to purchase land were framed as dishonest, thieving 
beneficiaries.374 They were compared to other deviant beneficiaries who had misused 
humanitarian aid, such as people who had sold shelter materials on the black market.375 Some 
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humanitarian officials likened this group of deviant beneficiaries to criminal gangs in the city 
who had stolen and sold humanitarian aid for profit.  
The stereotype of thieving beneficiaries was attached to a generalized picture of social 
deviancy. Humanitarian views neatly corresponded to the government’s own negative rhetoric 
about squatter communities, as illustrated in the statement of one humanitarian official:  
 
The earthquake whet the appetite of Haitians. In all this chaos, it 
made these people think: now is my time to grab land. These 
squatters are the people who are avoiding paying rent and taxes.376 
 One explanation humanitarian organisations repeatedly provided for the land 
occupation was that squatters were people who wanted free land and to avoid paying taxes. 
This perpetuated the idea that people who defied the law had an innate motivation for law-
breaking, which would give rise to other forms of criminality. The association between 
squatting and crime mirrors the state’s own narrative of Canaan, evidenced by one 
humanitarian official’s assertion as follows: 
 
Squatting facilitates crime. The people living in Canaan can easily 
commit crimes and then hide from everyone, even the police. 
These squatter areas have no police presence.377 
The post-IDP account of Canaan by humanitarian actors relied heavily on negative 
representations of Canaan’s built environment. In humanitarian circles, Canaan was frequently 
described as Port-au-Prince’s new Cite Soleil – Haiti’s most ill-reputed slum – even though 
the settlement looked nothing like this neighbourhood or other overcrowded areas of Port-
au-Prince. The international media, drawing much of their information from humanitarian 
organisations, reported these stereotypes. The Miami Herald, for example, repeatedly called 
Canaan the biggest post-earthquake slum;378 and the BBC cited humanitarian officials warning 
that Canaan was a slum in the making.379 Some media parroted both humanitarian and 
government officials who referred to Canaan as a large and growing cancer.380  
                                                
376 Interview with humanitarian official 24, Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014.  
377 Interview with humanitarian official 38, 24 July 2014. 
378 Miami Herald, Rebuilding Haiti: Still a work in progress. 11 January 2015 
379 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22992359 




V.II Humanitarian discourses of risk, incivility, and inferiority.  
To create a politically palatable story about Canaan required framing people’s 
circumstances as the consequence of their own actions and decisions. Humanitarian discourses 
capitalised on the so-called risky behaviours exhibited by Haiti’s lower classes. As one 
humanitarian assessment claimed, Haitians had ‘simply paid no attention to the risks related 
to the environment, to the lack of water, and to the flood-prone nature of Canaan’381 in their 
settlement decisions. This whitewashing of the conditions leading people to Canaan centred 
on the idea that Haitians had foolishly elected to occupy land exposed to environmental and 
disaster hazards.  
Under this narrative, Canaan’s squatters were not reasonably entitled to humanitarian 
protection because they had put themselves at risk of evictions through their illegal land 
purchases. Humanitarian interviewees cited the government’s urban plan to justify 
government evictions of illegal squatter communities. From the humanitarian perspective, 
sympathy was owed to the government because squatters had put the entire city at risk. They 
had occupied hilly lands needed to protect Port-au-Prince from landslides. Again, these 
discourses were parroted by the media. As an example, an Economist article insinuated that 
squatters were to blame for chaotic post-earthquake urbanisation, stating that: ‘Government 
planners and foreign aid donors once feared just the sort of anarchic construction that Canaan 
and Jerusalem represent – unzoned, unregulated, untitled and dangerous.’382 
Other forms of humanitarian knowledge production and surveillance disseminated 
risk discourses. Frequently, the IOM deployed drones above squatter settlements for the 
purpose of creating maps of the settlement’s environmental risks. Drone imagery was then 
showcased in fancy hotels in Port-au-Prince at conferences discussing new disaster risks and 
the need for international disaster risk management programs in Canaan.383 What was truly 
remarkable about risk discourses and these methods of surveillance was the extent to which 
humanitarian organisations disseminated them. These technical discourses distracted attention 
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from the political and legal questions surrounding the informal settlement. Certainly, 
environmental and disaster risks were present in the settlement.384 However, the real meaning 
of people’s exposure to disaster risks were not factored into these conversations. Discussions 
about Canaan’s environmental and disaster risks neutralised the consequences of state-
humanitarian wrongdoing and re-distributed the blame onto squatter communities for their 
new vulnerable situation. 
 Squatter incivility was another weaponised discourse used against people-led 
reconstruction. In Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon (2001, p. 32) describes colonial north-
south encounters in the following terms: 
Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. 
It is not enough for the colonist to affirm that those values have 
disappeared from, or still better never existed in, the colonial 
world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not 
only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is, 
let us dare to admit, the enemy of values, and in this sense he is the 
absolute evil. He is the corrosive element, destroying all that comes 
near him; he is the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to 
do with beauty or morality; he is the depository of maleficent 
powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind 
forces. 
Similar to Fanon’s (2001, pp. 27–57) observations of colonial-native encounters, 
humanitarian organisations played a role in ascribing violent characteristics to Canaan’s 
squatter communities. Squatters were referred as people ‘who would kill for land,’385suggesting 
an innate proclivity to violence. Canaan itself was portrayed as a Hobbesian dystopia; its 
residents lacked social values or respect for other’s property.386 Some predicted that land 
conflicts between self-interested neighbours were inevitable because squatters had no capacity 
to govern themselves.387 Others pointed to the lack of local government or police presence in 
the area, which automatically signalled Canaan’s state of mass lawlessness. It was only a matter 
of time before savage squatters’ uncontrollable urges to accumulate land would pit neighbour 
against neighbour, according to these outside representations.  
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A humanitarian official provided me with a project proposal his organisation had 
developed for a donor that justified their intervention in Canaan: 
 
In addition to the health and environmental risks, there is the risk 
of a deterioration of the social fabric in the Canaan area – 
particularly through a rise in violence and criminal characteristics 
of 'slums' or developing areas.388  
The official who had written the proposal admitted she had hardly spent time in the area or 
interviewed residents in squatter communities.389  
In the midst of this, a large humanitarian organisation commissioned Haitian lawyers 
to study Canaan’s land conflicts to determine how the organisation might intervene to control 
them.390 In their study, however, the Haitian lawyers found no systematic problem of land 
disputes in squatter communities. Their unpublished report chronicles a surprisingly low rate 
of land disputes in Canaan. In fact, the tiny number of cases they did discover had already 
been successfully mediated by community committees (such as those discussed in Chapters 
Six and Seven). The lawyers concluded that small number of land conflicts amongst squatters 
was the result of the mature and effective mediation skills of squatter associations.391 They also 
commended ‘the quality of land-management services provided by community organisations’ 
leaders.’ This glowing assessment of community cohesion in Canaan appeared in the report 
as:  
Organizations in Canaan…have a positive influence; they operate 
as a mediator in cases of land disputes and provide satisfactory 
solutions. They derive their legitimacy from the trust placed in 
them. They have no concern for [the intervention of] law 
enforcement, they base their reconciliation on the principles of 
fairness; their goal is to maintain social stability by avoiding 
conflicts.392 
                                                
388 Interview with humanitarian official 4, Port-au-Prince, 26 June 2014. 
389 Interview with humanitarian official 4, Port-au-Prince, 26 June 2014. 
390 Interviews with Haitian lawyers 1, 2, 3 and 4 on 15 March 2014 
391 Interviews with Haitian lawyers 1, 2, 3 and 4 on 15 March 2014 
392 Excerpt (p. 17 of unpublished report on Canaan provided during interviews with Haitian lawyers 1, 2, 3 and 
4 on 15 March 2014  
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Favourable assessments of squatter communities, however, had little impact on humanitarian 
discourse. The report, for reasons unknown but perhaps related to its challenge to the 
dominant narrative, was never published. 
Humanitarian forms of denial were instrumental in legitimising the resurgence of state 
and humanitarian power and authority in Canaan. Such discourses suppressed squatters’ voices 
while elevating the knowledge and capacity of humanitarian organisations. The social hierarchy 
between humanitarian organisations and squatters was maintained by comparing law-breaking 
squatters with law-preserving humanitarian organisations. Humanitarians complained that 
squatters displayed a total disregard for rule of law and had spoilt the progress made by 
international organisations to clarify and build property rights in the post-disaster period.393 
Canaan’s occupants were vilified as disruptors of modern development, in other words, the 
smooth function of a capitalist order.394 Far from the beautiful vision of Canaan put forth by 
its occupants, humanitarian organisations pronounced makeshift homes and sprawling 
informal neighbourhoods as a blight on the urban space.395 They even questioned the 
legitimacy of squatters’ belonging in Port-au-Prince. As did the government, some 
humanitarian organisations blamed squatters for attracting impoverished rural residents and 
fuelling urban growth. Canaan’s squatters were blameworthy because they were seen to be 
‘encouraging rural family members to join them in purchasing illegal land in Canaan.’396 Thus, 
in addition to the many allegations made about them, Canaan’s squatters were accused of 
creating a pull factor to the city.397  
The stigmatisation of squatters was in sharp contrast to the self-inflated discourses of 
humanitarian organisations promising to solve Canaan’s problems. The organisations engaged 
in an if only defence to obscure their prior failure to provide housing. If only expert humanitarian 
organisations had been given more time and less complexity to deal with, they would have 
built safe and legal homes and neighbourhoods.398 The disorderly squatter population had 
simply refused to wait in rental homes and reap the benefits of urban reconstruction. 
                                                
393 Interviews with humanitarian officials 1 and 2, Port-au-Prince, 15 November 2013. 
394 Interview with humanitarian official 24, Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014. 
395 Interviews with humanitarian officials 3 (9 June, 2014, London, 9) and 38 (Port-au-Prince, 24 July 2014). 
396 Interview with humanitarian official 21, Port-au-Prince, 22 October 2013. 
397 Interview with humanitarian official 21, Port-au-Prince, 22 October 2013. 
398 Interview with humanitarian official 24, Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014. 
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Humanitarian organisations could be not held culpable for urban chaos because the urban 
underclass had ‘built faster than them, and in a chaotic and unplanned fashion.’399 The if only 
discourse successfully neutralised the fact that humanitarian camp closures had played a 
significant role in excluding people from the urban recovery process, and leading them into 
precarious new settlements in Canaan.400   
 
V.III Redistributing blame to the state for housing-related harms in new settlements. 
Humanitarian techniques of neutralisation emanated from their privileged position of 
appearing both neutral and detached from state policy making. This position also allowed 
them to redirect blame to the Haitian state for activities they (humanitarians) had initiated or 
participated in as accomplices of the state. The Haitian state, for example, was depicted as the 
primary architect of settlement closure policies. Humanitarian organisations thus explained 
Canaan’s illegal land invasion as the outcome of state neglect and incompetence. They claimed 
that the Haitian state’s poor decision-making and weak land-management practices had 
allowed the state to be taken advantage of by its population of pathological land grabbers.401 
This theme emerged in an interview with a humanitarian official who explained the 
circumstances of the land occupation: 
 
Canaan is not only about the state’s lack of capacity to manage 
land. It is also about its poor capacity to understand what happens 
when you declare such a huge swath of land for public utility. You 
have to ask yourself, what was the state thinking? Its land was 
bound to be invaded. That is just what people do here.402 
State-blaming was also evident in international media reporting. This also helped erase 
the elements of the story that linked the Canaan settlement to humanitarian closure 
programmes. Yet, even though tactical narratives about the Haitian state’s failures helped the 
humanitarian agenda, these narratives did little damage to the Haitian government. President 
Preval, who had issued the expropriation decree law, had been replaced by new president from 
                                                
399 Interview with humanitarian official 24, Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014. 
400 T. Padgett and J. Desvarieux, Haiti: Where Building a Hospital Can be Illegal, Time, 12 November 2010. 
Available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2031102,00.html 
401 Interviews with humanitarian officials 3 (9 June, 2014, London, 9), 24 (Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014), and 38 
(Port-au-Prince, 24 July 2014). 
402 Interview with humanitarian official 5, Port-au-Prince 10 April 2014. 
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a different political party. Furthermore, the Haitian government was accustomed to using the 
earthquake’s impact on government buildings and resources to justify its weak land 
governance in the post-disaster period.403 This meant that any blame directed at the Haitian 
state was easily deflected back onto squatter communities. In this context, neither the state 
nor humanitarian organisations could be held accountable for precarious living conditions and 
insecure tenure within new settlements. 
 
V.IV Normalising violence against squatter communities. 
Emphasising personal choice to occupy Canaan constituted a technique for normalising 
people’s harsh living conditions and the violence directed at them by the state and landowning 
elite. Human suffering in Canaan was deemed unworthy of public concern because people’s 
movements were not directly caused by the natural disaster. Suffering in Canaan was therefore 
not legitimate suffering, or in other words, suffering that humanitarian organisations needed to 
pay attention to because of their limited mandates (see Fassin, 2012, pp. 37–43). This was 
reinforced by the removal of Canaan from the official IDP list. Once this happened, 
humanitarian organisations stressed they had no responsibility to Canaan’s occupants because 
these people ‘were officially no longer part of the humanitarian caseload.’404  
The result of this self-serving logic was that there was little humanitarian sympathy or 
response to evictions in Canaan, including the Mozayik eviction (see Chapter Seven). 
Interviewed organisations tended to interpret the violence against Canaan’s occupants as the 
inevitable outcome for people who had put themselves at risk. Aware of the strong political 
will to evict the Mozayik neighbourhood, coupled with their desire to detach themselves from 
Canaan, humanitarian organisations did not respond to the Mozayik evictees with material 
assistance or the provision of legal aid to challenge the illegal eviction. Instead, the eviction 
was normalised as something bound to occur to Mozayik’s illegal residents. One humanitarian 
official justified her organisation’s lack of reaction to Mozayik’s eviction:  
 
It is difficult for us to help the Mozayik population because the 
people are in violation of the state’ expropriation. This group fall 
outside the boundaries of the [government’s] second public 
                                                
403 Interview with Haitian government official 7, Port-au-Prince, 5 November 2013. 
404 Interview with humanitarian official 9, Port-au-Prince, 21 January 2014 
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decree, which we understand is the one that the government 
follows. And they are no longer part of the humanitarian 
caseload.405 
Once again, private property concepts were invoked to justify violence against landless 
squatters. Some dismissed the Mozayik residents’ loss of land access as the consequence of 
real-world conditions whereby not everyone can own property.406 Humanitarian ideological 
biases grounded in dominant property understandings is seen in the following interviewee’s 
statement: 
 
These people [in Canaan] now think they own land that belongs to 
someone else. But on what basis do they think they have this right? 
Sure, everyone in the world wants land. But not everyone can have 
it.407  
 Corresponding to this belief, some organisations even suggested that Nabatec’s 
industrial park plan was a better use of Canaan’s land. 408 This was because Nabatec’s plan was 
more productive and promised to build low-wage garment factories generating jobs for 
unemployed Haitians.409 A Haitian researcher familiar with these arguments found them so 
appalling that she commented: ‘humanitarian organisations who espouse this view might as 
well be advocating for the reinstatement of the plantation system.’410 Indeed, these statements 
were revealing of a humanitarian sector with a strong commitment to criminogenic capitalist 
values. 
 
VI. Denial as a Platform for Social Control  
I have explored different forms of denial used by humanitarian organisations to 
obscure and cover-up the harms created by their camp management and housing programmes. 
Humanitarian organisations rationalised their actions by relating them to the organisational 
goal to close post-earthquake settlements and end earthquake displacement (or at least the 
appearance of it). Cohen’s examination of denial, however, has other important purposes 
beyond understanding how harmful acts are carried out and justified. Organisational denial 
                                                
405 Interview with humanitarian official 9, Port-au-Prince, 21 January 2014 
406 Interview with humanitarian official 3, London, 9 June 2014. 
407 Interview with humanitarian official 6, Port-au-Prince, 21 April 2014. 
408 Interview with humanitarian official 24, Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014. 
409 Interview with humanitarian official 24, Port-au-Prince, 29 July 2014. 
410 Interview with expert researcher 1, Port-au-Prince, 2 July 2014. 
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also shores up legitimacy for new forms of social domination. Cohen explains this relationship 
between organisational denial and social control in the following way: 
 
…social control is…possible by transforming and obliterating the 
past, especially by weakening and redefining the relationship 
between what has gone before and what currently exists: not by 
opening the past to scrutiny, but closing it and deliberately setting 
up barriers to memory. This mode of policing the past calls not for 
the recovery of memory, but its eradication. (2000, p. 43) 
Building on this idea, my last section explores the implications of humanitarian denial 
and techniques of neutralisation. My key argument is that humanitarian forms of denial had a 
significant impact on power relations between communities and state-humanitarian 
institutions, with particular consequences for the trajectory of Canaan’s urban development.  
 
VI.I What to do about Canaan? 
Post-colonial theorists have often asserted that, in post-colonial encounters, Western 
categorisation of global south activity is driven by its own normative judgements and forms 
of knowledge, which are interlaced with Western political and material interests. Speaking 
about these power dynamics, Edward Said (1978, p. 95) observed: ‘since one 
cannot…obliterate the Orient, one does have the means to capture it, treat it, describe it, 
improve it, radically alter it’. Said and other post-colonial theorists have argued that 
dismembering the political power of global south populations, especially their power to create 
something new, relies on portraying such populations as pathologically impoverished and 
deviant, therefore requiring colonial forms of assistance and correction (Rajagopal, 2003; 
Kapur, 2007; Escobar, 2011). In that respect, this thesis has shown repeatedly how discursive 
binary representations of deviant others and Western saviours give purpose to humanitarian 
organisations and legitimise their governing roles in ensuring that subordinated people ‘find 
and/or accept…their proper place in the world’ (Cain, 2000, p. 71).  
Applying these insight to Canaan, we see how this settlement particularly defied state-
humanitarian goals, and global power relations more broadly given Nabatec’s plan to turn it 
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into a free trade zone.411 Yet, four years after the earthquake, the informal settlement’s size, 
level of construction, and personal investment had rendered it impossible to eliminate, as had 
been the fate of undesirable, post-earthquake settlements inside Port-au-Prince. Some 
estimated that Canaan’s population had invested about US$100 million in the construction of 
their homes, public buildings, and small businesses.412 The settlement’s development certainly 
challenged its humanitarian-given label as a temporary displacement camp. In fact, its more 
autonomous character served as a constant reminder of failed state-humanitarian promises to 
“Build Back Better”. Canaan’s growth constantly attracted international journalists trying to 
make sense of the settlement’s origins and meanings within the broader context of the 
humanitarian response and reconstruction process.  
Canaan’s emergence also sparked international condemnation of state-humanitarian 
activity. In a clear reference to Canaan’s development, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons claimed that state-humanitarian settlement 
closure programmes were ‘shifting the problem [of housing and displacement] elsewhere.’413 
Stated more clearly, the Special Rapporteur had made the link between the settlement’s 
formation with illegitimate state-humanitarian practices. The UN Human Rights Committee 
also issued a stern warning to the state to protect Canaan’s occupants against evictions. In one 
report the Committee states: ‘The State…should ensure that no persons are evicted…unless 
another solution has been found for them and their families and that all persons displaced by 
the earthquake are able to benefit from lasting solutions.’414 The doubts expressed by the UN 
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suggest that not everyone believed that humanitarian organisations had met their goal of 
ending displacement. The implication is that Canaan had the potential to cause reputational 
damage to humanitarian organisations. 
There were of course deeper motivations for the Haitian state to re-assume power and 
control over a valuable tract of urban land. Canaan’s land occupation antagonised class 
relations; it symbolised the power of the alienated masses to mount an effective challenge to 
urban land inequalities and demand recognition. In addition, Canaan’s strategic location gave 
squatters bargaining power. They could blockade an important transportation artery 
connecting Port-au-Prince with the country’s northern regions, to mobilise for a state response 
to their demands.415 When interviewed, one landed elite spoke of Canaan as a potential site of 
urban revolution similar to the mass revolts of the 1990s416 (see also Fatton, 2002). 
Undoubtedly, other political and business elites perceived Canaan as a haven of social unrest 
and class conflict.417 However, a strategy of forced evictions against a settlement of Canaan’s 
size was political dynamite. Additionally, within state-patronage networks, many individuals 
had a stake in its survival.418 Even some poorly paid police officers had purchased land in 
Canaan or set up businesses like water kiosks.419 
There was a shared interest that emerged between the state elite and humanitarian 
actors to retake control of Canaan and turn it into something less threatening, rather than 
eliminate the settlement with forced evictions. Both state and humanitarian actors recognised 
that the Haitian state would benefit from intervention in the settlement. Politicians could 
garner political capital from responding to a key urban problem and the state could generate 
new streams of revenue from regular taxation of Canaan’s residents.420 This strategy promised 
more material and political benefits over isolating Canaan from the city and allowing the 
settlement to develop outside state control. The state’s slow acceptance of Canaan’s existence 
is explained by one U.S. embassy official: 
 
                                                
415 Interview with Haitian landowner 1, Port-au-Prince, 15 July 2014. 
416 Interview with Haitian landowner 1, Port-au-Prince, 15 July 2014. 
417 Interview with Haitian landowner 1, Port-au-Prince, 15 July 2014. 
418 Interview with Haitian lawyer 2, Port-au-Prince, 3 April 2014. 
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It took some convincing [by foreign actors], but now the 
government wants this intervention. It wants to look like it ‘saved 
the people.’ Who knows, if we can make it a success, maybe they 
will even rename Canaan the ‘Martelly commune.’ 421 
The symbolic violence entailed in re-naming Canaan after President Martelly is 
apparent. Martelly had played a key role in prioritising foreign investment over social housing 
and establishing a permissive environment for forced evictions. Nevertheless, his 
government’s reluctant agreement to intervene in Canaan attracted significant praise from the 
U.S. government and humanitarian organisations. The American Red Cross, in particular, 
facilitated the Haitian government’s resumption of control of Canaan by committing US$ 20 
million of the funds it had raised for state-led urban development.422 Haiti’s housing 
department (UCLBP) would oversee the implementation of new projects in Canaan, and 
officials from the UCLBP, who had been implicated in forced evictions, were given authority 
to design new projects and strategies for the settlement. 423 The impetus was to remove power 
from the autonomous communities and return it to the state. Squatters, left to their own 
devices, would create a slum. The Haitian government, on the other hand could correct the 
illegal invasion of land and transform it on a massive scale.424 
The key rationale for re-positioning state authority over Canaan and co-opting it into 
the existing urban order, was to ‘turn Canaan into a success story for everyone.’425 All of Haiti’s 
dominant actors could receive material and reputational benefits from their institutional 
investments. Humanitarian organisations started to call the settlement a “durable solution” for 
displaced people. Through this discourse, states and humanitarian organisations could finally 
take credit for finding a long-term solution for the same people they had expelled from 
settlements in Port-au-Prince.426  
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426 Interview with humanitarian official 40, Port-au-Prince, 1 August 2014. 
	 261 
 VI.II Transforming Canaan into a neoliberal success story.  
Given the scale of vulnerabilities in Canaan, people living in the settlement were in 
desperate need of state welfare, including safer housing, basic infrastructure, and employment. 
The settlement’s incorporation into the state’s urban and housing plan did not address these 
needs or improve state responsibility and accountability to its people. Instead, Canaan 
witnessed a repeat of isolated humanitarian projects built on the logic of “resilience.” David 
Chandler notes that, at the heart of this logic, is a nudging, steering, and priming of individuals 
to make the right choices as rational market actors (2016, p. 31). In Canaan, the logic of 
resilience is seen in state-humanitarian praise of squatters for their market achievements. 
International donors, the Haitian state, and humanitarian organisations repeatedly quoted the 
US$100 million figure of local investment in Canaan as a way of signalling why this particular 
settlement (as opposed to other informal settlements) had been marked out for humanitarian-
funded projects. Squatters’ personal investments, demonstrating their ability to survive 
without the state, essentially made them a neoliberal success story. This dovetailed with the 
state-humanitarian plan to provide minimal welfare to the settlement population.427 Squatters 
needed help to construct the settlement within the guidelines set forward by the state. They 
needed training to understand how to fulfil their own needs, including training to build safer 
homes.428 
 This neoliberal success story, coupled with the state’s role to correct illegal land 
behaviours, grounded humanitarian support for repressive state acts. Since the government 
was in charge of implementing a new urban plan for Canaan, it was now empowered to 
relocate people living in the settlement’s “risky” zones (i.e. areas at risk of natural hazards). 
Some humanitarian officials, voicing support for the state’s role to ensure safe urbanisation, 
paid little attention to the fact that the government had failed to develop criteria or guidelines 
for how they would select houses for relocation.429 Meanwhile, government officials 
announced in the Haitian press their intention to evict people who had chosen to live in ravines 
in Canaan. However, there was no mention of providing alternative housing. State officials 
publically voiced their intention to invite private investors to Canaan to transform the 
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settlement into ‘an urban pole coherent with a global vision for the northern periphery.’430 In 
doing so, they articulated their intention to develop Canaan according to the same market logic 
that had led to the creation of the vulnerable settlement. 
At no point did squatters’ desires for land use and legal recognition of their land rights 
factor into state-humanitarian plans for Canaan’s urban development. Humanitarian 
organisations expressed that squatters’ legal status was the government’s decision and a 
problem that would eventually sort itself out.431 They were not willing to advocate for 
squatters’ demands for legal and political recognition of their occupied properties. These 
actions illustrate the harmful effects of humanitarian power relations and modes of 
governance. The notion that squatters’ land claims could be simply tabled for a later date, and 
that they were less important than technical upgrades to the settlement, characterised 
humanitarian thinking and approaches to Canaan, which played a role in exposing vulnerable 
squatters to new patterns of criminality and violence. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
By applying Cohen’s (1993, 2000) theory of denial, this chapter has exposed the denial 
strategies of humanitarian organisations involved in forced evictions and the creation of 
precarious informal settlements. I argue that state-humanitarian settlement closures and forced 
evictions facilitated the mass movement of people from Port-au-Prince to Canaan, where they 
faced new vulnerabilities in a volatile reconstruction environment. These dynamics, while 
working toward humanitarian goals to reduce camp population numbers, posed a reputational 
threat for humanitarian actors. Increasingly, humanitarian actors faced scrutiny for 
abandoning their duty of care to populations they excluded from housing assistance and 
effectively rendered homeless.  
 This chapter has focused on Canaan to demonstrate the consistent re-appropriation 
of meaning of the informal settlement to protect humanitarian interests. The flux in Canaan’s 
social and spatial identities explains how different challenges to the humanitarian narrative 
were met with new interpretations of the events leading to the settlement’s formation and 
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growth. What remained consistent throughout, however, was how the narration of events 
worked within the framework of state-humanitarian interests. When the state refused to 
acknowledge Canaan, and forbad the delivery of humanitarian services to the new settlement, 
humanitarian actors maintained silence about mass population movements to the area. Then, 
by labelling the site an IDP camp, they found ways to reconcile their humanitarian 
commitments with state interests. This involved stressing the temporariness of Canaan 
settlement in ways that flouted their actual understanding of the land and settlement goals of 
squatter communities. Humanitarian actors participated, too, in discourses criminalising 
squatters’ land behaviours. Finally, when deemed useful and politically appropriate, 
humanitarians recast the squatter situation as a positive new beginning for state-led urban 
development. Underneath each of these discursive shifts is therefore an attempt to whitewash 
the past and reframe Canaan as something other than the harmful outcome of state-
humanitarian activities and decision-making.  
The result of these power dynamics was that Canaan’s autonomous communities – 
attempting to achieve a different form of living in the settlement – became re-embedded in 
the material, ideological, and bureaucratic framework of capitalist reconstruction and 
development that they had tried to escape. Humanitarian attempts to distract the public and 
distance themselves from the harmful outcomes of their programmes reveal how their power 
was maintained and reproduced throughout the reconstruction period. Humanitarian denial 
strategies relied on othering practices to blame squatters for circumstances that are in fact the 
result of their (humanitarian’s) deviancy. When this failed, humanitarian actors leveraged their 
moral position to detach themselves from the harmful consequences of their actions, leading 
them to blame the Haitian state as the sole culprit of any wrongdoing. Organisations in Haiti 
colluded, when needed, to construct a narrative that absolved them from responsibility for 
perpetuating mass homelessness after the closure of Port-au-Prince settlements. Through 
various techniques of neutralisation, including victim-blaming, cover-ups, and appeals to their 
moral superiority, humanitarian organisations were able to preserve their power and authority 
over landless people. The ways they sought out and reasserted control over populations 





I.   The Criminogenic Roles of Humanitarian Actors in the Context of Disasters 
 
This thesis has sought to explore the criminogenic roles of international humanitarian 
organisations in their responses to ‘natural’ disasters. This required clarifying what we mean 
by ‘crime’ and laying out an approach for identifying harmful organisational behaviours, and 
for determining certain behaviours as criminal. Reviewing critical criminological debates about 
crime, this thesis adopted Green and Ward’s (2000) tripartite definition to determine 
humanitarian and state-humanitarian crime. In doing so, this thesis also recognised the 
importance of other criminological perspectives on social harm and institutional violence that 
enrich our understanding of how material processes shape social and political structures and 
heighten potentials for harmful outcomes (Hillyard et. al., 2004; Cooper and Whyte, 2019). 
These perspectives urge us to critically examine the power of the state, corporations, and other 
influential institutions in society and their ability to cause harm and crime – often via their 
everyday, mundane operations and decision-making. 
From this position, this thesis has empirically demonstrated that humanitarian 
organisations are part of a complex global architecture that can sustain capitalist inequalities 
and social injustices. In Haiti, it pointed to the dependency and interrelationships between 
states and humanitarian organisations in the dealing with population problems generated by 
intrusive forms of international capital. Through an intricate analysis of Haiti’s post-
earthquake land struggles, we uncovered a range of legal and illegitimate methods used by 
humanitarian organisations to suppress earthquake victims who were contesting harmful 
capitalist values and conditions. Haiti’s 2010 humanitarian intervention, therefore, offers 
compelling evidence against the claims that international humanitarian organisations operate 
as agents of protection for crisis-affected people.  
My interrogation of Haiti’s humanitarian intervention thus illuminated how a concept 
of state-humanitarian crime might be useful for critical criminologists seeking to expose the 
transnational dimensions of criminal activity. This thesis has considered a definition of state-
humanitarian crime that is similar to previous definitions of state-corporate crime, in which it 
scrutinised the ‘illegal and socially injurious actions’ that occur when humanitarian 
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organisations ‘pursue goals in direct cooperation’ with ‘one or more institutions of political 
governance’ (Michalowski and Kramer, 2006, p.15). Therefore, in parallel to state-corporate 
crime research, a concept of state-humanitarian crime seeks to analyse forms of organisational 
deviance that emerge from the ways that state and humanitarian organisations intersect 
(Michalowski and Kramer, 2006, p.20). Of course, the concept of state-humanitarian crime 
developed and tested in this thesis has obvious limitations. The thesis relied on qualitative case 
study methodology centred on a single case (Haiti) to base its analysis and conclusions. It 
furthermore focused on only one type of humanitarian intervention (disaster response). Haiti, 
by nature of its geographic location and type of crisis, likely drew together a specific group of 
humanitarian organisations. Therefore, we may see different power dynamics between 
humanitarian organisations, and between humanitarian organisations and states, in different 
social contexts. For this reason, future research that can build on the study of state-
humanitarian actions, inactions, and motivations for criminal activity is necessary for testing 
this concept’s utility and for expanding what we mean by state-humanitarian crime. 
Nevertheless, from a literature review and empirical study of Haiti, it was argued here 
that international humanitarian organisations are important subjects of criminological inquiry 
because of their considerable influence within crisis zones and their symbiotic relationships 
with states (both foreign and local). While there are many different forms of ‘humanitarianism’ 
in circulation, this thesis demonstrated that a clearly dominant structure of international 
humanitarianism has emerged and it is highly dependent on states – for funding, legitimacy, 
and access to populations. In theory, humanitarian organisations are bound to strict principles 
of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Yet, as we saw Chapter Two, 
humanitarian organisations increasingly go beyond ‘life-saving’ activities and become involved 
in problematic forms of global governance. This has resulted in humanitarian actors assuming 
state functions in ways that challenge their normative commitments – especially when they are 
called upon to govern human movements and restrict people’s claims for state protection 
(Koch, 2014).  
Humanitarian organisations, it would appear then, are essential structures for 
mediating state power and allowing states to govern and exercise repression at a distance. This 
thesis presented arguments about how the aid agendas of economically dominant states, often 
termed the ‘securitisation of aid,’ has driven even closer, potentially collusive, relationships 
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between humanitarian organisations, states, multilateral institutions (e.g. World Bank), foreign 
militaries, and other elites in the performance of humanitarian work (Duffield, 2001). The 
political and economic conditions moulding humanitarian roles, mandates and activities thus 
point to a global humanitarian system that is increasingly tied to the objectives and interests 
of dominant states. These power relations, in turn, raise significant concerns for people who 
are targeted and governed by humanitarian organisations.  
Organisational competition within the humanitarian marketplace has also become 
increasingly intense. Contemporary examples of humanitarian activity have shown the 
significant pressure on humanitarian organisations to deliver on their stated goals and claimed 
responsibilities – which are often out of their reach due to their lack of resources or decision-
making power. This pressure can tempt organisations to breach human rights norms and 
standards, because an organisation’s ability to obtain donor funding is linked to its survival. In 
addition to this, international NGOs and intergovernmental institutions entrusted to provide 
or administer aid to communities enjoy considerable privileges and immunities under 
international law (Ferstman, 2017). These conditions may generate deviant organisational 
outcomes because organisations are able to commit harm and crime with relative impunity. 
Still, to a large extent, the moral authority of humanitarian organisations and their day-to-day 
activities are seldom questioned, which is partially a consequence of their value to the exercise 
of state power. Humanitarian ideology also operates to sustain the reproduction of 
humanitarian power by allowing organisations to assert certain limits to their actions and to 
their duty of care to affected populations. 
We also reviewed why disasters are important events for criminological study of 
humanitarian organisations. This entailed unpacking the wider criminogenic political economy 
surrounding disasters to reveal some of the potentials for humanitarian deviancy and harm 
production. Drawing from state crime theory and empirical examples, this thesis demonstrated 
how disaster-related harms (i.e., displacement or homelessness) are not simply the outcome of 
unanticipated disaster events. Disasters are events that shine a light on the ‘unavoidable 
excesses and inequalities of capitalism’ (Loewenstein, 2015, p. 9). In other words, the harmful 
outcomes triggered by disasters are rooted in the social conditions that are shaped by the laws 
and logic of capital. To make this clear, we revisited Marx’s political economy approach and 
his core propositions related to the circulation of capital and its destructive effects through 
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continual expansion. We also considered the key role of the state in creating the conditions 
necessary for rapid and ongoing capital accumulation. States, it was argued, are motivated to 
initiate or overlook crimes linked to their goals of accumulation and the consolidation of 
political (and territorial) power. Applying Marx’s approach, critical criminologists have drawn 
attention to capital’s inherent contradictions between value production and social protection, 
and the structural motivations that exist for states to deviate from human rights standards in 
securing optimal market conditions, thus producing vulnerability to harms triggered by 
disasters (Green, 2005; Whyte, 2009, p.175).  
Our theoretical enquiry also touched upon the importance of disaster reconstruction 
environments as particularly enticing spaces for international capital via the efforts of 
economically dominant states to assert their political power over states that are less dominant. 
Klein’s (2007) term “disaster capitalism” depicts the various roles undertaken by states to 
achieve their interests in the aftermath of disasters. On the one hand, Klein empirically shows 
how states are involved in redirecting public aid funds to corporate projects and profit-making. 
On the other, she explains the efforts of economically dominant states to exploit the disorder 
and weak accountability created in post-disaster contexts for the purposes of restructuring 
local economies to benefit long-term economic objectives. What Klein makes clear in her 
analysis is that dominant states are able to reframe reconstruction priorities and conditions 
contrary to the interests and social needs of affected people – often by mobilising humanitarian 
discourses and institutional arrangements. This thesis, through empirical detail, has defined 
various reconstruction policies designed by states as deviant based on their clear violation of 
international human rights standards and their labelling as such by Haitian civil society. 
II. Haiti, Humanitarianism, and the Political Economy of Disaster Reconstruction  
 
Building upon these theoretical insights, this thesis then turned to its attention to Haiti. 
Beginning with slavery, Haiti has been repeatedly victimised by foreign state violence and 
deviant policymaking designed to make the small Caribbean island subservient to international 
(primarily American) capital. The constant and coerced integration of Haiti’s economy with 
that of the U.S. – coupled with U.S. bankrolling of politically repressive Haitian governments 
– has consolidated state corruption, poverty, inequality, and harmful imbalances in land 
distribution and control. Over time, the collusive and criminal relationships between U.S. and 
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Haitian authorities have pushed millions of dispossessed peasants into deprived urban areas 
where they lack safe, decent, and affordable housing. Over-urbanisation, in turn, was one of 
the key contributors to mass displacement, homelessness, and death when the 2010 earthquake 
struck Port-au-Prince. 
Klein’s “disaster capitalism” concept took root in Haiti through the prioritisation of 
state-corporate interests over the housing needs of disaster victims. Rather than address 
violations of people’s right to housing stemming from prior patterns of state deviance, the 
U.S. and other foreign states engineered Haiti’s adoption of new neoliberal policies that would 
sustain the conditions responsible for creating mass homelessness. Significant amounts of 
foreign aid committed to Haiti’s reconstruction by international donors, ostensibly to build 
homes for Haitians, was instead redirected to multinational corporations and state entities such 
as the military. Today, there is little to show from foreign pledges to “Build Back Better.” 
Instead of significant improvements to housing, we saw instead that foreign reconstruction 
funds were allocated for new industrial parks for foreign corporations to take advantage of 
cheap Haitian labour. This use of aid was complemented by foreign efforts to develop a lax 
regulatory framework for Haiti’s mining sector. Both outcomes of foreign intervention in 
Haiti’s economy after the earthquake have exposed Haitians to new state and corporate harms 
(Sontag, 2012). In fact, foreign involvement in Haiti’s mining sector is likely to generate even 
more forced rural-urban migration as rural populations now face threats to their land and 
livelihoods in mining areas.432 
This thesis identified the institutional arrangements, ideologies, and actions of 
international humanitarian organisations that facilitated “disaster capitalism” dynamics and 
power relations. Humanitarian organisations were instrumental in disseminating discourses 
that marginalised Haitian communities and elevated international expertise to fix Haiti’s urban 
problems. At a discursive level, they aided foreign states in deflecting attention away from 
deviant state policies that contributed to over-urbanisation and mass homelessness. 
Organisations continued to proffer hegemonic discourses even when they became aware of 
the sheer lack of foreign donor interest to provide housing for disaster victims. The discursive 
                                                




cover provided by the “Build Back Better” rhetoric allowed foreign states to take control of 
the reconstruction process, and to insert their deviant interests into Haiti’s roadmap for 
reconstruction. 
We also observed how the humanitarian marketplace shaped ongoing power relations 
between international actors and local communities. Within Haiti’s humanitarian marketplace, 
both “humanitarian” and “development” organisations vied for donor resources and authority 
to determine approaches for re-housing earthquake victims. Humanitarian organisations, 
however, had the strategic advantage of offering quick-fix solutions to donor states and the 
Haitian government. Development organisations, in contrast, advocated for long-term 
approaches focused on house construction and affordability. Once humanitarian organisations 
secured their authority and share of the marketplace on the ground, their short-term mandates 
ultimately allowed them to argue limits to their duty of care to earthquake victims. The result 
was an overwhelming lack of progress. In reflecting on this outcome, Haiti’s experience indeed 
validates the value of international humanitarian organisations to foreign states that are seeking 
to limited responses to harms created by their drives for accumulation – and in ways that still 
inflate the image of Western states as problem-solvers for “developing” states (Kiely, 2010, p. 
218). 
This thesis also confirmed observations within critical humanitarian literature on 
humanitarian governmentality and its links to state interest. My fieldwork brought out the key 
role that humanitarian organisations played in neutralising Port-au-Prince’s post-disaster land 
struggles – in particular by classifying squatter populations according to internationally-
accepted definitions. Humanitarian labelling of squatter populations as IDPs not only 
provided sanitised ways of interpreting urban struggles, but they also connected with 
prescribed and efficient techniques for managing populations who had disrupted the urban 
order. The managerial approaches of humanitarian organisations provided immense benefits 
to Haitian elites by shifting land control and the balance of power from squatter communities 
to state actors and landowning elites. Their divisive and individualised approaches to aid also 
helped undermine community cohesion in new squatter sites. As discussed repeatedly through 
this thesis, humanitarian aims and methods worked against those pursued by local 
communities, who sought to ensure that their long-term needs for housing were met. 
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Humanitarian techniques of surveillance and data collection in Haiti also produced 
standardised ways of “knowing” the displaced populations that went against local people’s 
needs and interests. The “truth” produced by statistical data, gathered by IOM’s Displacement 
Tracking Matrix (DTM), reinforced pre-developed humanitarian solutions for dealing with 
“uprooted” populations. Forms of population surveillance like the DTM were quickly co-
opted by state interest and weaponised against squatter communities. Haitian state frequently 
used DTM data as a means of pressuring humanitarian organisations to close remaining 
settlements and return urban land back to the state and Haitian elite. 
This thesis further observed the functional importance of private property concepts 
to humanitarian governance. In line with capitalist values and logics, humanitarians interpreted 
property as individually held, giving property owners the right to excluded others from landed 
resources. In humanitarian-governed camps, property became as the key reference point for 
determining earthquake victims’ housing entitlements; it also provided a method for emptying 
camps without confronting hard political questions over access to land. Thus, by privileging 
property rights over other rights (i.e. housing), humanitarian organisations helped normalise 
the city’s unequal distribution of landed property and the harms caused by this situation.  
In addition to property, humanitarian logics of return were used to control the 
movements and housing behaviours of squatter populations. Humanitarian organisations 
suggested that they had a duty to re-insert displaced people into their natural place of belonging 
within the city – regardless if those places put people at risk of future harm and violence. 
Needless to say, return discourses directly reinforced state interests by allowing the state to 
evade its responsibilities to address mass homelessness and the poor conditions in slum 
neighbourhoods. Over time, humanitarian return discourses typified organisational 
indifference to the violent circumstances of disaster victims’ pre-earthquake living conditions. 
III. Humanitarian Deviance and State-Humanitarian Crime 
 
Chapter Five applied Green and Ward’s (2004) definition of state crime to expose 
humanitarian deviance in Haiti’s housing sector. It identified specific examples where 
humanitarian organisations deviated from human rights norms and standards due to their 
privileged relationships with states and Haiti’s landowning elite. Preoccupation with 
performance goals and reputational demands were also factors that persuaded organisational 
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wrongdoing. Broadly speaking, the thesis found that decisions about humanitarian housing 
projects were primarily tied to state and organisational interests and were not the product of 
democratic consensus involving victims. Instead of protecting earthquake victims’ right to 
housing, humanitarian decisions to build housing or improve land access were influenced by 
their own notions of reputational risk, scalability, market innovation, and state acceptability. 
The research exposed several human rights violations associated with humanitarian 
policies. These rights violations materialised in response to perceived barriers to the quick 
resolution of the displacement crisis. One year after the earthquake, humanitarian 
organisations were faced with a situation in which 78% of the 600,000 people still living in 
post-earthquake settlements lacked access to land or affordable housing. Meanwhile, the 
Haitian state had made no effort to identify land for post-earthquake re-housing. It had also 
neglected its role to develop an urban housing plan. This situation, coupled with limited donor 
funding for housing, created a significant obstacle for humanitarian actors in terms of fulfilling 
their stated and normative commitments to earthquake victims. Humanitarian organisations 
also faced significant media pressure to demonstrate their expertise and ability to solve housing 
problems. 
Rather than call attention to state failures, or advocate on behalf of land-vulnerable 
populations, several humanitarian organisations decided to pursue “workable” solutions that 
only created the appearance of meeting state-humanitarian responsibilities to earthquake 
victims. The rental subsidy cash grant (RSCG) programme was a prime example of deviant 
state-humanitarian policymaking. The programme effectively expelled populations from post-
earthquake settlements, without adequate alternatives for housing, and helped abdicate the 
Haitian state from its obligations to fulfil the right to housing. The policy’s coercive, and 
sometimes violent, implementation was masked by triumphant claims from humanitarian 
organisations that they had ended Haiti’s displacement crisis. Yet, robust data collected by the 
humanitarian sector showed the harmful consequences of their policy, especially in terms of 
reinforcing long-term homelessness and landlessness.  
Similar forms of organisational deviance that emerged when humanitarian 
organisations arbitrated land conflicts between the state, elite landowners, and landless 
populations. This thesis found that organisational preference for the speedy resolution of land 
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conflicts (as part of the strategy to empty settlements) led humanitarian organisations to 
abandon important due-process norms that were meant to protect people from forced 
evictions. Land occupants desiring to stay in informal settlements, or assert their rights to 
housing via their land control, were rendered powerless by humanitarian negotiations and 
logistical operations predicated on removing them from conditions of “illegal” residence. 
Humanitarian approaches to evictions were justified in terms of the need to remove illegal 
populations living on other people’s land from situations that may lead to harm. Yet, for these 
people, their expulsion from settlements did not reduce their exposure to violence. My thesis 
revealed strong biases by humanitarian officials against landless people, which partially 
explains their appreciation of elite forms of truth and their collusion with the state-elite in 
recognising their property claims over the claims of landless populations. 
IV. Anti-Capitalist Resistance and Censuring State-Humanitarian Harm and Crime 
 
This thesis also argued that mobility and land occupation were forms of resistance 
used by landless, earthquake-affected populations to apply sanctions to state-humanitarian 
harm and crime. This conclusion was based on my fieldwork in Canaan, a new settlement on 
the periphery of Port-au-Prince, whose formation was intertwined with the deviant acts of 
powerful actors involved in housing decisions. The post-earthquake exodus from inner Port-
au-Prince to Canaan was due to forced evictions, rental market unaffordability, and the 
implementation of violent and exclusionary housing policies by the state and humanitarian 
organisations. My interviews with Canaan’s land occupants revealed widespread discontent 
and rejection of state-humanitarian housing policies that justified their subversion of the rental 
subsidy cash grant (RSCG) programme and led to extra-legal land occupations on the urban 
periphery. Canaan’s land occupants dismissed the RSCG programme as illegitimate because 
the policy cemented predatory class dynamics, based on the distribution of landed property, 
while failing to protect people from long-term homelessness.    
Chapter Six also brought to light the alternative, often anti-capitalist values embedded 
in people’s vision for Canaan as a new neighbourhood within the reconstructed city. Land was 
depicted as the basis for human freedom – every family was entitled to have equal access to 
land to fulfil their needs and aspirations. In Canaan, people elevated the social and collective 
uses of land over its commodification and appropriation by foreign investors for a new free 
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trade zone. They called for more public control and social input into reconstruction decisions. 
Both land control and social autonomy were portrayed as ways for people to recreate a more 
inclusive urban environment. Of significance was how land-occupants’ discourses on the ideal 
relationship between people and land organised their social critique of state-humanitarian 
behaviours. Land occupants rejected what they saw as institutional collusion between the state, 
private landowners, and humanitarian organisations, especially in creating a situation whereby 
a small minority were able to re-exert their exclusionary rights over urban land needed by the 
majority to enjoy their fundamental freedoms and rights. These counter-hegemonic ideas aired 
in Canaan, and the ways they were put into practice, constituted the force necessary to shift 
land use from the construction of a new free trade zone (IEZ) to the consolidation of a new 
informal settlement for the urban poor. The remarkable and spontaneous formation of 
Canaan is therefore symbolic in illustrating the sanctioning power of Haiti’s earthquake-
affected communities. 
V. Humanitarian Re-Victimisation, Denial, and Impunity  
 
Although a space of resistance, the Canaan settlement simultaneously offered a 
framework for understanding how humanitarian interventions ultimately deepened conditions 
of urban illegality and precariousness, and created new ways for international institutions to 
reproduce their power and influence over urban environments. Little by little, Canaan began 
to resemble a catchment area for excluded people. The conditions of insecurity and illegality 
that people encountered in this post-earthquake settlement also created new vulnerabilities to 
state violence and organised crime.  
Despite these conditions in Canaan, and the link between population expulsions and 
Canaan’s development, humanitarian organisations told the world that Haiti’s housing 
problem was no longer as acute as it had been in the aftermath of the earthquake. In this way, 
humanitarian organisations helped normalise the insecurity of landless people. Once people 
were cast out of camps – so-called spaces of humanitarian protection – they were easily 
stigmatised by state and humanitarian actors as unauthorised and deviant. In line with 
observations made by critical criminology, the state’s privileged position to criminalise and 
sanction certain social behaviours frequently aligns with their failures to provide for their 
citizens (Pearce, 1976, p. 81). As we saw with the discourses around squatting, states and their 
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accomplices often use position to frame unauthorised human activity as the moral failure of 
individuals, and not the state. 
Different forms of state-humanitarian stigmatisation occurred despite the fact that 
new settlements had exposed people to new patterns of post-disaster criminality and violence. 
Canaan’s population of poor, unprotected people easily drew predatory groups and state 
authorities seeking to profit from the legal and physical insecurity of the settlement’s residents. 
This dynamic, in turn, threatened to destabilise the incremental gains that people had made in 
terms of constructing new neighbourhoods and slowly building their security of tenure. Such 
realities prove that state-humanitarian failures and housing policies put people at risk of 
constant re-victimisation in the post-earthquake period.  
Although state-humanitarian housing policies and forced evictions played a significant 
role in increasing the vulnerability of landless people to abuse, exploitation, and future natural 
disasters, there is little public recognition of these social impacts. To explain this, I interrogated 
humanitarian strategies of denial and their productive nature. Humanitarian organisations 
continually formed new explanations to deal with the contradictions and excesses of their 
policies. There is no better example of this than the shifting narrative about Canaan: from an 
IDP camp, to an illegal squatter settlement, to a promising new extension of Port-au-Prince. 
Each new narrative of Canaan was grounded in the need to explain the informal settlement as 
something other than the negative outcome of state-humanitarian programmes. By 
successfully achieving this, humanitarian organisations were eventually able to repurpose 
Canaan in the framework of the state’s urban development plan and assist the state to reclaim 
its authority over the squatter settlement.  
This outcome for Canaan throws into stark relief the importance of denial strategies 
in the maintenance of humanitarian power and credibility. Even though humanitarian 
interventions in the housing sector were largely unsuccessful, they did not preclude 
humanitarians from re-asserting their dominance as the solution to problematic, informal 
urbanisation emerging in the post-disaster period. Because humanitarians were not held 
accountable for the harmful consequences and contradictions arising from their policies and 
actions, this impunity fostered new opportunities for humanitarian organisations to intervene 
in population problems of their own making.  
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To conclude, this thesis points to the circularity that defines humanitarian action. 
Humanitarian organisations not only have the potential to commit harm and crime in 
collaboration with states and the roles they fulfil, but they also help contribute to long-term 
population issues. These issues, in turn, continually mobilise the need for humanitarian actors 
to address problematic human movements and settlements. To paraphrase Andersson, 
‘illegality is not just produced; it is also productive’ (2014, p. 274). 
ANNEX 1: Housing and Reconstruction Interviews   
 
Type	of	Interview	 Organisation	 Role/Expertise	 Date	
Humanitarian	official	1	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 15-Nov-13	
Humanitarian	official	2	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camps/Disaster	Mitigation	 16-Nov-13	
Humanitarian	official	3	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 9-Jun-14	
Humanitarian	official	4	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 26-Jun-14	
Humanitarian	official	5	 International	NGO	 Camps/Housing	 10-Apr-14	
Humanitarian	official	6	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 21-Apr-14	
Humanitarian	official	7	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Protection	 21-Apr-14	
Humanitarian	official	8	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Protection	 21-Jan-14	
Humanitarian	official	9	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camps/Protection	 21-Jan-14	
Humanitarian	official	10	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 26-Jan-14	
Humanitarian	official	11	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Head	of	Organisation	 2-Aug-14	
Humanitarian	official	12	 International	NGO	 Camps/Housing	 17-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	13	 International	NGO	 Camp	Management	 16-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	14	 International	NGO	 Camp	Management	 16-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	15	 Donor	Government	 Camps/Housing	 7-Apr-14	
Humanitarian	official	16	 International	NGO	 Camp	Management	 30-Jun-14	
Humanitarian	official	17	 International	NGO	 Camp	Management	 22-Oct-13	
Humanitarian	official	18	 International	NGO	 Camp	Management	 22-Oct-13	
Humanitarian	official	19	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing/reconstruction	 27-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	20	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 29-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	21	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 22-Oct-13	
Humanitarian	official	22	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 20-Mar-14	
Humanitarian	official	23	 International	NGO	 Camp	Management	 29-Mar-15	
Humanitarian	official	24	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Head	of	Organisation	 29-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	25	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 10-Apr-14	
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Humanitarian	official	26	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 27-Mar-14	
Humanitarian	official	27	 International	NGO	 Camp	Management	 30-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	28	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Head	of	Organisation	 4-Nov-13	
Humanitarian	official	29	 International	NGO	 Camps/Housing	 28-Mar-14	
Humanitarian	official	30	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing	 4-Nov-13	
Humanitarian	official	31	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Head	of	Organisation	 4-Nov-13	
Humanitarian	official	32	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Head	of	Organisation	 3-Mar-14	
Humanitarian	official	33	 International	NGO	 Camps/Housing	 15-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	34	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing/reconstruction	 3-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	35	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing/reconstruction	 10-Jun-14	
Humanitarian	official	36	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing/reconstruction	 3-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	37	 International	NGO	 Housing/Urban	Planning	 16-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	38	 International	NGO	 Housing	 24-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	39	 International	NGO	 Camps/Protection	 24-Nov-15	
Humanitarian	official	40	 International	NGO	 Housing/Urban	Planning	 1-Aug-14	
Humanitarian	official	41	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camp	Management	 7-May-14	
Humanitarian	official	42	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing/Property	 24-Oct-14	
Humanitarian	official	43	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing/Property	 22-Oct-14	
Humanitarian	official	44	 International	NGO	 Housing	 15-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	45	 International	NGO	 Camps/Housing	 17-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	46	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing	 18-Jul-14	
Humanitarian	official	47	 International	NGO	 Housing/Property	 17-Jun-14	
Humanitarian	official	48	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Data	Management	 15-Mar-14	
Humanitarian	official	49	 International	NGO	 Camps/Housing	 7-Aug-14	
Humanitarian	official	50	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Camps	 7-Aug-14	
Government	official	1	 Haitian	government	 Housing	 14-Jul-14	
Government	official	2	 Haitian	government	 Housing	 13-May-14	
Government	official	3	 Haitian	government	 Housing/Urban	Planning	 6-Aug-14	
Government	official	4	 Haitian	government	 Housing	 17-Mar-14	
Government	official	5	 Haitian	government	 Housing/Urban	Planning	 6-Aug-14	
Government	official	6	 Haitian	government	 Housing	 13-May-14	
Government	official	7	 Haitian	government	 Housing	 5-Nov-13	
Government	official	8	 Haitian	government	 Public	Works	 24-Jan-14	
Government	official	9	 Haitian	government	 Public	Works	 25-Jan-14	
Government	official	10	 Haitian	government	 Public	Works	 7-Jul-14	
Government	official	11	 Haitian	government	 Housing	 6-Aug-14	
Haitian	Lawyer	1	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Legal	advisor		 12-Mar-14	
Haitian	Lawyer	2	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Legal	advisor		 3-Apr-14	
Haitian	Lawyer	3	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Legal	advisor		 12-Mar-14	
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Haitian	Lawyer	4	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Legal	advisor		 12-Mar-14	
Haitian	Lawyer	5	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Legal	advisor		 2-Aug-14	
Haitian	Lawyer	6	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Legal	advisor		 25-Jul-14	
International	housing	
advisor	1	 International	NGO	 Housing	 26-Feb-14	
International	housing	
advisor	2	 International	NGO	 Housing	 27-Feb-14	
International	housing	
advisor	3	 International	NGO	 Housing	 17-Mar-14	
International	housing	
advisor	4	 UN/Intergovernmental	 Housing	 15-Nov-13	
International	housing	
advisor	5	 Foreign	Government	 Housing	 15-Jul-14	
Reconstruction	advisor	
1	 Multilateral	Organisation	 Housing/reconstruction	 15-Nov-13	
Civil	Society	1	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 25-Oct-13	
Civil	Society	2	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	3	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	4	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	5	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	6	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	7	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	8	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	9	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 24-Apr-14	
Civil	Society	10	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 6-Aug-14	
Civil	Society	11	 Haitian	civil	society		 Housing	activist	 6-Aug-14	
International	housing	
activist	1	 International	NGO	 Housing	activist	 6-Apr-14	
International	housing	
activist	2	 International	NGO	 Housing	activist	 4-Nov-15	
International	housing	
activist	3	 International	NGO	 Housing	activist	 25-Oct-13	
International	housing	
activist	4	 International	NGO	 Housing	activist	 28-Oct-15	
International	researcher	
1	 International	Institute	 Camps	 2-Jul-14	
International	researcher	
2	 International	Institute	 Camps/Housing	 27-Apr-18	
International	researcher	
3	 University	 Camps/Housing	 25-Jul-14	
International	researcher	
4	 University	 Camps/Housing	 15-May-14	
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International	researcher	
5	 University	 Camps/Housing	 15-May-14	
Haitian	Academic	1	 University	 Migration	 10-Jul-14	
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